People v. Sherman

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 8, 2026
• Docket: 1-24-0009
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 240009-U No. 1-24-0009 First Division June 8, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 22 CR 10488 ) GREGORY SHERMAN, ) Honorable ) Mary Margaret Brosnahan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Howse concurred in the judgment. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith specially concurred.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s judgment is affirmed where: (1) there was sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty of being an armed habitual criminal, (2) there was no error in the admission of certain testimony at trial, (3) defendant’s arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was constitutional, and (4) the armed habitual criminal statute is not facially unconstitutional. No. 1-24-0009

¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant-appellant was found guilty of being an armed habitual

criminal (AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. 1

On direct appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt; (2) he was denied his right to a fair trial where the State elicited improper hearsay testimony;

(3) the State violated his constitutional rights by arresting him pursuant to an investigative alert;

and (4) the AHC statute is facially unconstitutional. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On August 24, 2022, defendant was arrested, and on September 20 2022, he was indicted

for the offenses of AHC, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, and two counts of aggravated

unlawful use of a weapon. The charges stemmed from an incident that occurred on July 9, 2022,

at the Shell gas station located at 1768 West Armitage Avenue.

¶5 Defendant was initially represented by private counsel, Patrick Campanelli and Ari

Williams. Defendant’s first jury trial began on June 27, 2023. The jury could not reach a

unanimous verdict, and, therefore, the trial ended in a mistrial.

¶6 On June 29, 2023, defendant informed the court that he wished to demand trial. His private

counsel stated that they were both unavailable under the circumstances of a trial demand. They

withdrew their representation, and defendant filed a motion to represent himself. The court

admonished defendant regarding his right to an attorney, the difficulties with representing himself,

the advantages of counsel representation, and the charges against him and their accompanying

penalties. Defendant confirmed with the court that he wanted to demand trial and to represent

1 Effective January 1, 2025, this offense has been renamed “[u]nlawful possession of a firearm by a repeat felony offender.” See Pub. Act 103-822, § 20 (eff. Jan. 1, 2025) (amending 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7).

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himself, and he confirmed that he understood the sentencing range for the offense charged. The

court then allowed defendant to proceed pro se.

¶7 Prior to trial, defendant filed several motions, including a motion to suppress his arrest.

The State responded that there was probable cause to support his arrest, and the court denied the

motion.

¶8 The case again proceeded to a jury trial on July 24, 2023, at which defendant continued to

represent himself.

¶9 Chicago police officer Resendiz 2 testified that, on July 9, 2022, he and his partner, Chicago

police officer Ben Clifford, were patrolling the bar district area on Milwaukee Avenue from

Division Street to North Avenue. At 11:46 p.m., there was a dispatch of a person who arrived at

St. Elizabeth’s Hospital with a gunshot wound. Upon arrival at the hospital, Officer Resendiz

spoke with defendant, who informed him that he was shot exiting District, a bar located at 1540

North Milwaukee Avenue. He further informed Officer Resendiz that he was leaving the bar when

an altercation occurred between two unknown individuals and he was shot, although he was not

the target. After this conversation, Officer Resendiz radioed the information to other police units

in the area so they could further investigate. Defendant also informed Officer Resendiz that he

drove himself to the hospital and his silver Lexus was parked in front of the hospital. Officer

Resendiz confirmed that the car was registered in defendant’s name and then looked through the

windows into the car and observed blood on the driver’s seat. His body-cam footage was then

admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

2 Officer Resendiz’s first name does not appear in the record.

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¶ 10 On cross-examination, Officer Resendiz confirmed that he did not receive a dispatch

regarding a person shot at 1514 Milwaukee Avenue, he did not enter defendant’s car, and there

was no gun recovered in or near his car. On redirect, Officer Resendiz testified that St. Elizabeth’s

is about a mile and a half from the Shell gas station at 1768 West Armitage Avenue.

¶ 11 Chicago police officer Jeffery Gipson testified that, on July 9, 2022, he was patrolling the

same bar district area as Officer Resendiz, both in his vehicle and on foot. Officer Gipson recalled

that, around 11:46 p.m., there was a dispatch of a person shot, and, after other officers responded

to that dispatch to determine where the shooting occurred, the address of 1514 North Milwaukee

Avenue was provided in relation to the shooting. Officer Gipson and his partner went to that

location, which was Nick’s Beer Garden, and “spoke with community members as well as the bar

staff, in particular doormen and bouncers.” They also went to District at 1540 North Milwaukee

Avenue and Debonair at 1569 North Milwaukee Avenue and spoke with individuals at those

locations as well. When asked if he learned of any altercations in the area, Officer Gipson

answered: “Everyone corroborating said that it was pretty peaceful, nothing seemed out of the

norm.” He further testified that no one informed him of any shootings, he did not hear any gunshots

that evening, and he did not see anything to suggest that there had been a shooting, such as groups

of people disbursing and running from the area.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Officer Gipson testified that District permanently closed in

December 2022 because of gun violence. He also clarified that there were two dispatch calls that

night, “one from the hospital and another one was at a gas station.”

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¶ 13 Chicago police officer Cauinian 3 testified that, on July 9, 2022, he was on routine patrol

duty with his partner, Chicago police officer Miguel Cordero. Around 11:46 p.m., they were

dispatched to respond to a call of a person shot at the Shell gas station at 1768 West Armitage

Avenue. Officer Cauinian spoke with Juan Hernandez, a gas station employee, who showed them

a “fired bullet” on the floor inside the gas station. Officer Cauinian testified that there was no blood

on the bullet when it was recovered.

¶ 14 On cross-examination, Officer Cauinian testified that they did not activate their lights or

sirens on the way to the gas station and they did not secure the crime scene because it was only an

investigation. Officer Cauinian’s body-worn camera footage was entered into evidence and played

for the jury. Officer Cauinian confirmed that he did not see any blood inside or outside of the gas

station, but Hernandez had informed him that he cleaned the floor before the officers arrived.

Officer Cauinian also confirmed that he did not know where the bullet came from or if anyone had

touched it before it was recovered. On redirect examination, Officer Cauinian confirmed that,

when he arrived at the gas station, there was no one present who had been shot.

¶ 15 Asad Munawar testified that he worked for Gas Depot, a company owning multiple gas

stations, and was the district manager of the Shell gas station. Munawar testified that the gas station

was equipped with functioning surveillance cameras inside and outside of the store. On July 10,

2022, after learning of an incident occurring at the gas station the day prior, Munawar obtained the

relevant video recordings from the surveillance cameras and provided them to law enforcement.

Three videos, two showing the inside of the gas station and one showing the outside, were played

for the jury.

3 Officer Cauinian’s first name does not appear in the record.

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¶ 16 Our review of the videos showed the following. The first video clip, with a view of the

interior of the gas station with a timestamp of 11:19 p.m., showed defendant entering the gas

station and standing in line at the counter behind a man in a blue shirt. Defendant appears to have

a cell phone in his right hand, and his left hand is in or near his back left pants pocket. A few

seconds after entering the gas station, as defendant appears to be, for lack of a better word, fiddling

with something in his back pocket, there is a small flash near his legs, and he slightly hops or steps

to the right as he looks down at his right foot. At the same time as the flash, the customer in the

blue shirt appears startled and immediately looks behind him at defendant. The customer backs

away from defendant as defendant immediately exits the gas station. The customer looks at the

floor where defendant was just standing and then walks towards the exit door, appearing to see

where defendant went. Hernandez, dressed in a red shirt, then enters the frame. The customer

appears to speak to Hernandez and points to the floor where defendant had been standing. The

second video clip shows the same sequence of events but from a different angle inside the gas

station.

¶ 17 The third video clip shows the exterior of the gas station, facing the gas pumps. This video

is timestamped at 11:18 p.m. and shows defendant standing near a silver sports utility vehicle,

which is parked at one of the gas pumps. Defendant appears to remove the gas cap from his car

and attempts to pay but then sets the gas cap down near the gas pump and walks into the gas station.

Defendant has a normal gait upon entering the gas station. Defendant reenters the frame about 20

seconds later. His gait is different from before, and he is walking quickly, almost running.

Defendant speaks to the man at the gas pump next to him and, again, appears to look down at his

foot. He then limps about three steps over to his car and enters the driver’s seat. The other man

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quickly walks over to replace defendant’s gas cap before defendant reverses out of the parking lot

quickly.

¶ 18 On cross-examination, Munawar testified that he did not recall seeing any footage of

Hernandez sweeping or mopping the gas station, but he did not watch all of the footage from that

day.

¶ 19 Chicago police officer JD Howard testified that, on August 24, 2022, he and his partner,

Chicago police officer Engram, 4 were assigned to the fugitive apprehension unit, which is tasked

with locating and arresting “individuals who either have active warrants or probable cause to arrest

exists based upon detectives[’] investigations.” They received a case involving the reckless

discharge of a firearm and conducted an investigation to identify the target of that offense. They

proceeded to an apartment building at 4600 North Albany Avenue and observed defendant exit the

building and enter an Uber. Defendant matched the description they had received of the offender.

Officer Howard observed that defendant was using crutches. After following the Uber for a short

period of time, they conducted a stop on the car and Officers Howard and Engram arrested

defendant. Officer Howard’s body-worn camera footage, which was played for the jury, showed

defendant with crutches. On cross-examination, Officer Howard testified that he authored the

arrest report, and he confirmed that the report states that the original incident occurred at 1514

North Milwaukee Avenue. Officer Howard admitted that the address in the report was an error

because the incident actually occurred at the Shell gas station near Armitage Avenue and Wood

Street.

4 Officer Engram’s first name does not appear in the record.

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¶ 20 The parties stipulated that the 2002 Lexus with license plate CA93987 was registered to

defendant and that defendant had two qualifying convictions for purposes of the AHC offense.

¶ 21 Chicago police detective George Junkovic testified that he was assigned to recover video

evidence from the Shell gas station related to an incident occurring on July 9, 2022. He went to

the Shell gas station with another detective and a police officer and spoke with Munawar, who

provided him with a flash drive containing the requested surveillance footage. On cross-

examination, Detective Junkovic testified that he did not recall the name of the detective who sent

him the video retrieval request.

¶ 22 Juan Hernandez testified that he was working as a cashier at the Shell gas station on the

night in question. During his shift, between 11 and 11:30 p.m., “[s]ome guy shot himself in the

foot.” Specifically, he testified that he was standing behind the counter, which has a glass divider,

and he was ringing up a customer. There was another customer in line who Hernandez described

as “African-American, 6 feet tall” and wearing “all black” and a hat and sunglasses. Hernandez

then heard a loud bang, “[l]ike a gunshot[.]” Hernandez testified that he was familiar with the

sound of gunshots, as he heard “them everyday pretty much” because he “grew up in a rough

neighborhood.” According to Hernandez, the customer directly in front of him “stuttered” or

“ducked” and he noticed the other customer in all black was gone. Hernandez initially thought that

the gunshot came from outside, but the customer still in the store pointed out a “trail of blood” that

lead to the exit. Hernandez mopped the floor, and he observed a shell “fragment,” which he swept

towards a dustpan and left on the floor. He then called his boss, who instructed him to call 911 and

make a police report. Hernandez testified that he did not observe blood or a fragment on the floor

when he started his shift at 10 p.m. Hernandez testified that the man in all black did not pay for

gas or purchase anything. The surveillance videos from the gas station were played for the jury,

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and Hernandez identified both the customer at the counter and defendant as the person in line. He

also pointed out where he observed the blood on the floor and identified a sports utility vehicle

exiting the parking lot. He testified that the fragment was found near the front of the counter area.

¶ 23 On cross-examination, Hernandez testified that, at the start of his shift, he would walk

around the interior of the gas station, check the bathroom, and make sure there was no garbage on

the floor. He further testified that, throughout his shift, he would inspect floor of the gas station

whenever possible. Defendant played an extended version of the surveillance video of the interior

of the gas station for the jury. Hernandez testified that there was not a lot of blood and he did not

taste or smell the substance, but “to [his] knowledge that was blood.” Hernandez did not see

himself sweeping or mopping in the video. Finally, Hernandez testified that he knew that the bullet

fragment “[c]ame from that person that shot himself.”

¶ 24 Detective Mark Tamlo testified that, on July 11, 2022, he was assigned to investigate a

shooting that occurred on July 9, 2022, at the Shell gas station located at 1768 West Armitage

Avenue. He learned that there was an individual who was shot that drove himself to the hospital,

and he reviewed the surveillance video footage from the gas station and also went to the gas station

to speak with Hernandez. Detective Tamlo attempted to contact Tyrone Muhammad, who

defendant had reported was with him on the night of July 9, 2022. He was unable to reach

Muhammad despite leaving multiple voicemail messages. Detective Tamlo issued an investigative

alert that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for aggravated discharge of a firearm.

¶ 25 On cross-examination, Detective Tamlo acknowledged that a July 23, 2022, supplementary

report, which he authored, indicated the location of the occurrence as 1514 North Milwaukee

Avenue. On redirect examination, he confirmed that he listed that address because it was the

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location reported to him by defendant. On recross examination, Detective Tamlo confirmed that

no firearm was ever recovered related to this case.

¶ 26 Dr. Sean Tubridy testified that he treated defendant at St. Mary’s Hospital on July 10, 2022.

Defendant had been transferred from St. Elizabeth’s Hospital to St. Mary’s Hospital. Dr. Tubridy

observed two gunshot wounds on defendant’s left posterior thigh and gunshot wounds to the top

and bottom of his right foot. Defendant also had fractures in his right foot. Dr. Tubridy testified

that the wounds were cleaned and bandaged and defendant’s foot was placed in a splint for

stabilization. According to Dr. Tubridy, defendant informed him that he “was closing up his shop

on Milwaukee[,]” he saw “two guys getting in an argument[,]” and he “felt he had been shot and

was able to drive himself to the closest hospital.” On cross-examination, Dr. Tubridy testified that

he did not document any gun powder burns on defendant and he could not testify as to entry or

exit wounds or trajectory.

¶ 27 The State rested, and the court denied defendant’s motion for a direct finding.

¶ 28 Defendant called Officer Clifford as a witness. Officer Clifford testified that on July 9,

2022, he was patrolling the entertainment area of Milwaukee Avenue. He heard through the

dispatch radio “a call for a person shot” and he and his partner, Officer Resendiz, “volunteered to

go to the hospital to speak with the individual who was shot.” The dispatch also stated that “the

caller related that it happen[ed] somewhere on [the] 1500 block of Milwaukee” and that either a

silver Lexus or silver Mercedes may have been involved. Officer Clifford testified that, at the

hospital, he spoke to the doctor at some point and Officer Resendiz was “mainly talking to”

defendant. Officer Clifford testified that he did not have his body-worn camera activated to protect

the privacy of other patients in the emergency room.

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¶ 29 Defendant testified in his own defense to the following. On July 9, 2022, from 7 p.m. to 11

p.m., he was at a “dispensary café” called Chitiva, located at 1948 West North Avenue. He was

with Darnell Wilson, Samuel Wilson, and Tyrone Muhammad. Defendant was there as “door

detail,” i.e., making sure “the neighborhood and customers feel secure[,]” and “hype man[,] just

welcoming customers[.]” Defendant then introduced into evidence a video showing him in the

dispensary. He testified that the video was taken “shortly after 10:00 p.m.” on his cellphone

“during a Facebook Live on the night of July 9th.” Darnell can also be seen in the video. Defendant

testified that around 11 p.m., when the dispensary closed, he and Muhammad decided to canvass

the area. Defendant acknowledged that he is on the surveillance footage from the interior of the

gas station, and he testified that the “flash” that can be seen on the video was from his vape pen.

Defendant further testified that, in the Facebook Live video, he exits the gas station and tells

Muhammad what just occurred and Muhammad “laughed it off.” Defendant and Muhammad then

traveled back to the Milwaukee Avenue entertainment district “to continue [their] violence

prevention work.” When they arrived near 1514 Milwaukee Avenue, they “noticed an altercation”

and then he heard two to four gunshots and “instantly knew” he got hit in the foot. Defendant

“jumped in [his] car” and “drove [himself] to the hospital.” Defendant testified that he spoke with

three different police officers while he was in the hospital.

¶ 30 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he did not call the police to the area when

he saw the altercation and heard the gunshots and he did not call an ambulance because it would

have taken too long. He also testified that he did not see the shooter and could not provide a

description of the shooter. Defendant testified that he was shot near 1514 Milwaukee Avenue, and

he denied that he informed Officer Resendiz that he was shot leaving District. Defendant also

testified that Dr. Tubridy “paraphrased” when he stated that defendant told him he was “closing

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up his shop” when he was shot. Rather, defendant testified that he informed Dr. Tubridy that “we

were at the dispensary which we were, and then after closing is when I got hurt.”

¶ 31 In viewing the video of himself entering and exiting the gas station, defendant testified that

he was not limping or hobbling when he was walking into the gas station and he was “skipping”

when he exited the gas station. He denied that he was “limping” back to his car. When asked if he

did not replace his gas cap, he responded: “Looks like I forgot.” He confirmed that he did not pay

for gas and he did not buy anything in the store. When shown the video of himself inside the gas

station, defendant testified that the “flash” was his vape pen, which had “popped.” Defendant

stated that the vape pen did not explode; he explained that you hit the button on the vape pen, “it

generates heat in order for the vape to work[,]” and he assumed that “it overheated[,] popped.” He

stated that he did not receive a burn when this occurred and he was not bleeding. Defendant further

testified that this was the first time anyone had asked him what happened at the gas station, so he

had not told anyone about it previously.

¶ 32 Darnell Wilson testified that he is a Chicago Transit Authority bus driver, and on the night

of July 9, 2022, he was at Chitiva on North Avenue. He arrived there around 8 or 8:30 p.m. and

left before the dispensary closed at 11 p.m. Defendant was also at the dispensary. Defendant played

the Facebook Live video and Wilson identified himself in the video. On cross-examination, Wilson

testified that he has known defendant for 20 years, and he agreed that he is “close with him[.]”

¶ 33 Samuel Wilson testified that he was retired from the County Club Hills Fire Department

and now owned Chitiva. He testified that, on July 9, 2022, he was at Chitiva and defendant was

also present. He identified himself and defendant in the Facebook Live video. He testified that

defendant left the dispensary “somewhere after 11:00.”

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¶ 34 Tyrone Muhammad testified that he is the executive director of Ex Cons for Community

and Social Change (ECCSC), he is an “ex-con,” and defendant was one of his employees. He

testified that, sometime after 10 p.m. on July 9, 2022, he was at the dispensary at 1948 West North

Avenue with defendant. They left before the dispensary closed at 11 p.m. and drove to the gas

station in separate cars. Muhummad stayed outside and paid for gas at the pump while defendant

went inside and came back out. They then drove back to the area where the dispensary was located.

While in that area, he heard gunshots. Muhummad testified that there was an “incident” that

“stemmed from a club or something in that area.” He agreed that defendant was “deescalating the

situation” and, after he heard gunshots, he heard defendant state that he had been shot in the leg.

Defendant then left the area in his silver Lexus. Muhammad further testified that the detectives

“left a card on [his] door.” He called and left a message for the detective but never heard back

from him.

¶ 35 On cross-examination, Muhammad admitted that he was previously convicted of first

degree murder. He testified that he did not call the police, flag down any nearby police officers,

call an ambulance, or file a police report after defendant was shot. He confirmed that defendant

drove himself to the hospital. He further admitted that he never told anyone about the shooting

before testifying at trial. Finally, Muhammad testified that he did not recall defendant being hurt

when he exited the gas station and he admitted that he put the gas cap back on defendant’s car.

¶ 36 Defendant rested his case. In rebuttal, the State introduced certified copies of defendant’s

two prior convictions for aggravated robbery. The jury found defendant guilty of AHC.

¶ 37 On August 28, 2023, defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the

alternative, a new trial. Therein, defendant argued, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence

to find him guilty of AHC and the court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress

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evidence. On October 10, 2023, the State filed a response. On November 3, 2023, the court denied

defendant’s motion.

¶ 38 On December 5, 2023, following a hearing, the court sentenced defendant to 10 years’

imprisonment.

¶ 39 This appeal followed.

¶ 40 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 41 On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt; (2) he was denied his right to a fair trial where the State elicited improper hearsay

testimony; (3) the State violated his constitutional rights by arresting him pursuant to an

investigative alert; and (4) the AHC statute is facially unconstitutional.

¶ 42 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 43 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

guilty of AHC. In particular, he contends that the evidence was insufficient because no one testified

that they saw him with a firearm, no firearm was recovered, no physical evidence connected him

to a firearm, and he presented credible evidence that someone else shot him near 1514 North

Milwaukee Avenue.

¶ 44 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him, this court must

determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (quoting Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “It is the reviewing court’s function to carefully examine

the evidence, giving due consideration to the fact that the court and the jury saw and heard the

witnesses.” People v. Armstead, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1, 10 (2001). Further, a reviewing court is not

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required “to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence or be satisfied as to

each link in the chain of circumstances.” People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 117-18 (2007). That

said, “the fact that defendant is ‘probably’ guilty does not equate with guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” People v. Ehlert, 211 Ill. 2d 192, 213 (2004). A defendant’s conviction will be reversed

only when the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a

reasonable doubt of his guilt. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 24.

¶ 45 “The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an

offense.” People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 35. A person commits the offense of AHC when he

“receives, sells, possesses, or transfers any firearm after having been convicted a total of 2 or more

times” of certain qualifying offenses. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020). Defendant does not

contest that his criminal history meets the requirements for AHC. Rather, he solely argues that the

State failed to prove that he possessed a firearm.

¶ 46 “Possession of a firearm can be either actual or constructive.” People v. Jones, 2019 IL

App (1st) 170478, ¶ 27. To prove actual possession, there must be evidence that the defendant

exercised some dominion over the firearm, “such as that he had it on his person, tried to conceal

it, or was seen to discard it.” Id. However, the State “is not required to show personal touching of

the firearm.” People v. Daniels, 2025 IL App (1st) 230823, ¶ 19. Further, possession may be

inferred by circumstantial evidence. People v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784, 788 (2010).

¶ 47 Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of facts or circumstances giving rise to

reasonable inferences of other facts which tend to establish the defendant’s guilt or innocence.

People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d 409, 417 (2007). “Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain

a conviction if it satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged.”

People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 379 (1992). The trier of fact may consider inferences that

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flow naturally from the evidence; however, the trier of fact is not required to “search out all

possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.” Id.

at 380. “All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the prosecution.”

People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37.

¶ 48 After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that

sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury’s verdict.

¶ 49 Here, the State presented at trial Hernandez, who was working at the gas station at the time

of the alleged crime. He testified that there was a loud bang that sounded like a gunshot, one of

the customers, who was identified as defendant, left the store immediately afterwards, and

moments later Hernandez observed a red substance that he believed to be blood on the floor of the

gas station with a trail leading to the exit of the gas station. Hernandez also found a fragment of a

bullet while cleaning up the red substance. Hernandez testified that he checked the store at the

beginning of his shift at 10 p.m., ensuring there was no garbage on the floor and the floors were

clean. He did not see either blood or a bullet fragment prior to defendant’s presence in the gas

station that night. No evidence was presented suggesting Hernandez was not credible or that he

had any known bias against defendant. See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 27 (testimony of

single witness is sufficient to convict if positive and credible).

¶ 50 The video clips from the gas station also largely corroborate Hernandez’s testimony. In the

interior videos, defendant is seen entering the gas station, fiddling with something in the left back

pocket of his pants, a flash is seen near defendant’s legs, the other customer is startled and looks

at defendant, and defendant looks down at his foot and quickly exits the gas station. After

defendant left, the customer and Hernandez both looked at the floor where defendant was standing

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multiple times. In the video of the exterior, defendant, after exiting the building, can be seen

looking at his foot again and there are at least two steps he takes where he is clearly limping.

¶ 51 Moreover, defendant admitted that he was at the gas station and that he left the store, did

not buy anything, including gas, and drove away minutes after arriving at the gas station, forgetting

to replace his gas cap. Muhammad testified that he replaced the gas cap before defendant drove

off. Defendant admitted that he drove himself to the hospital where he was treated for two gunshot

wounds to the left thigh and two gunshot wounds to the right foot. It is the State’s burden to present

“some evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt; the State may not

leave to conjecture or assumption essential elements of the crime.” Daniels, 2025 IL App (1st)

230823, ¶ 16. The State’s evidence in this case furnished the requisite reasonable inference to

prove possession, and we would not characterize the evidence as merely conjecture or

assumptions. As such, we cannot say that no rational jury could have found defendant guilty of

AHC beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 52 Nonetheless, defendant asserts numerous issues with the State’s case, including that no

firearm was recovered, no firearm was seen on the surveillance footage, Hernandez testified that

he believed the gunshot came from outside, the alleged trail of blood could not be seen on the

surveillance footage, the red substance was not confirmed to be blood, no testing was conducted

on the fragment, and Dr. Tubridy could not determine entry and exit wounds and did not see

powder burns consistent with close-range firing. According to the State, defendant’s arguments

merely point out alleged weaknesses in the State’s case, which were presented to and rejected by

the jury.

¶ 53 We agree with the State. “ ‘Determinations of the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be

given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are the

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responsibility of the trier of fact.’ ” People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 475 (2000) (quoting People

v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 95 (1991)). Further, where the evidence produces “conflicting inferences”

it is the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve that conflict. People v. Pryor, 372 Ill. App. 3d 422,

430 (2007). Here, the trier of fact, i.e., the jury, heard the State’s evidence and heard defendant’s

conflicting evidence. Its finding of guilt implies that it did not find defendant’s account of how he

sustained those gunshot wounds at all credible. We also note that defendant’s account of a shooting

in the entertainment district near 1514 North Milwaukee Avenue was contradicted by Officer

Gipson’s testimony that, while on patrol of that area of Milwaukee Avenue, there was no dispatch

of a shooting in the area, he did not hear any gunshots that evening, and he did not see anything to

suggest that there had been a shooting, such as groups of people disbursing and running from the

area. As noted previously, we must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, not in the light most favorable to defendant. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d at 117. In this case,

that leads to a reasonable inference that defendant shot himself at the Shell gas station, not that he

was shot later by an unidentified individual on Milwaukee Avenue.

¶ 54 Additionally, we find People v. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, and In re Nasie M., 2015

IL App (1st) 151678, cited by defendant for support of his argument that the evidence was

insufficient where there was no physical evidence proving his possession of a firearm, to be

factually distinguishable.

¶ 55 In Sams, the defendant was found guilty of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Sams,

2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 1. The State presented evidence that the police received two dispatch

calls related to the same residence, one caller merely requested police assistance and the other

stated that a man had pointed a gun at her son and mentioned the defendant’s name as the one in

possession of the gun. Id. ¶ 4. The second caller did not describe the gun or the offender. Id. When

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officers responded, defendant was arrested when he exited the residence, and inside the residence,

an officer observed the living room in disarray, an apparent blood stain on the couch, and later a

shotgun under the couch. Id. ¶ 5. On appeal, this court held that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the firearm’s presence and exercised control and

dominion of the area where it was found. Id. ¶ 11. The court reasoned that the two 911 calls from

unidentified individuals were insufficient to support the conviction where the calls did not include

a description of the offender or the gun, the officers never saw the defendant with the gun, the gun

was “not easily visible or accessible,” the defendant did not live at the residence where the gun

was found, and there was otherwise no physical evidence connecting the defendant to the gun. Id.

¶¶ 12-16.

¶ 56 In Nasie, the defendant sustained gunshot wounds to his foot, and the State filed a petition

for adjudication of wardship based on allegations that he shot himself in the foot with a firearm.

Nasie, 2015 IL App (1st) 151678, ¶ 5. The defendant was found guilty of reckless discharge of a

firearm, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Id. ¶ 15. The

court’s finding was based on a detective’s testimony that he spoke to the defendant at the hospital.

Id. ¶ 16. According to the detective, the defendant first stated that he was shot at while running

away from two individuals, but he later changed his story and admitted to shooting himself in the

foot. Id. ¶ 7. Additional evidence consisted of a revolver found in the defendant’s girlfriend’s home

and a shell casing found in the lot where the incident had allegedly occurred. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. In court,

the defendant denied that he made such an admission and stated that he was under the influence of

pain medication and did not recall speaking to the police while in the hospital. Id. ¶ 14. The court

found the detective credible and the defendant not credible. Id. ¶ 16. On appeal, this court noted

that, even where a conviction turns on the trier of fact’s credibility determinations, the conviction

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may nonetheless be reversed “ ‘where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or

unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. Id. ¶ 34 (quoting People v.

Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999)). The court found that was the case in Nasie where there was no

medical testimony to support the State’s theory that the defendant’s gunshot wound was self-

inflicted, there was no evidence that the defendant was in possession of the gun when he injured

his foot, the State agreed at oral argument that the shell casing could have been from a prior

shooting, the casing did not match the gun found in the girlfriend’s apartment, and there were

inconsistencies in the testimony of the State’s witnesses. Id. ¶¶ 32-37.

¶ 57 We acknowledge some of the similarities between the facts of this case and the facts in

Sams and Nasie. For instance, like in those cases, there was no evidence presented that defendant

was seen physically holding a firearm nor any evidence connecting defendant to any weapon as

one was never recovered. Additionally, like in Nasie, there was no testimony as to the nature of

defendant’s gunshot wounds or the potential trajectory of a bullet compared to the entry and exit

wounds.

¶ 58 However, we find that there are significant differences between those cases and this one.

Here, defendant sustained gunshot wounds to the thigh and foot that he claimed he received while

“deescalating” an altercation in the entertainment district of Milwaukee Avenue. However,

Hernandez, a credible witness and an identified 911 caller, testified at trial that, while he was

working at the Shell gas station, a customer, identified via surveillance footage as defendant, shot

himself in the foot. As he was ringing up a customer, Hernandez heard a gunshot, which he initially

believed came from outside, the customer in front of him “stuttered” or “ducked,” and the customer

then pointed out a trail of a red substance leading to the door whereby defendant had just exited

without purchasing anything. While cleaning up the red substance, Hernandez found a bullet

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fragment on the floor near the area where defendant had been standing. There was also testimony

of a “flash” that could be seen on the surveillance footage just before defendant exited the gas

station, although he claimed it was his vape pen “popping.” The video evidence in this case

additionally distinguishes these facts from those in Nasie and Sams, where it corroborated

Hernandez’s testimony and showed defendant limping after leaving the gas station. Hernandez’s

testimony, coupled with the corroborating surveillance footage, provided the credible, unbiased

evidence to support the reasonable inference that defendant possessed a gun in the gas station,

evidence which was lacking in Nasie and Sams. Additionally, in contrast to those cases, here, the

only inconsistency with law enforcement witnesses’ testimony was the location of the report of

the incident, which they admitted was inaccurately identified in their police reports.

¶ 59 Therefore, we conclude that the jury’s finding that defendant was guilty of AHC was

proper.

¶ 60 B. Improper Hearsay Testimony

¶ 61 Next, defendant argues that he was denied his right to a fair trial where the State elicited

improper hearsay testimony that a “shooting occurred at the gas station and that everyone

interviewed about a possible shooting at 1514 North Milwaukee Avenue reported that it had been

a peaceful night.”

¶ 62 Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. Ill. R. Evid. 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). “

‘Relevant evidence’ is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 21 (citing Ill. R. Evid. 401

(eff. Jan. 1, 2011)). However, “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by [Illinois Rules of

Evidence], by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or by statute as provided in Rule 101.”

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Ill. R. Evid. 802 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered to establish

the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 173 (1991). “The basis for

excluding evidence under the hearsay rule lies in the fact that an opportunity to ascertain the

veracity of the testimony is absent.” Armstead, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 11; People v. Jura, 352 Ill. App.

3d 1080, 1805 (2004) (“The fundamental reason for excluding hearsay is the lack of an opportunity

to cross-examine the declarant.”).

¶ 63 The admissibility of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion, and its ruling will not

be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. People v. Ochoa, 2017 IL App (1st)

140204, ¶ 39. “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary,

fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial

court.” People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000).

¶ 64 However, defendant concedes that these assertions of error were not properly preserved,

and, therefore, he requests that we review for plain error. The plain error doctrine is a narrow and

limited exception to the rule of forfeiture. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). To obtain

relief under this doctrine, a defendant must show either that (1) the evidence at trial was closely

balanced, or (2) the error was so serious as to deny the defendant a fair trial and challenge the

integrity of the judicial process. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005). Whether forfeiture

may be avoided under either of these theories requires us first to determine whether a clear error

occurred. People v. French, 2017 IL App (1st) 141815, ¶ 27. For the following reasons, we find

no plain error.

¶ 65 We first address defendant’s contention that it was improper for the State to repeatedly

elicit testimony from Officer Cauinian and Detective Tamlo about a “shooting” at the Shell gas

station. In particular, he points to the following testimony. Officer Cauinian testified that, on July

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9, 2022, he and his partner, through the radio dispatcher, “got dispatched to a job on a person shot”

at the address of 1768 West Armitage Avenue, the Shell gas station. Officer Cauinian was also

asked: “When you spoke with Juan Hernandez, were there any other witnesses on the scene that

were present for the shooting?”, and he responded in the negative. Additionally, during the direct

examination of Detective Tamlo, the following exchange took place:

“Q. Detective, I am directing your attention to July 11, 2022 were you assigned to

investigate the shooting *** occurring on July 9, 2022?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Did your investigation begin on July 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you investigating a shooting that occurred [at] 1768 West Armitage in Chicago?

A. Yes ma’am.

Q. What is at that location?

A. It’s a Shell gas station.

Q. Once you were assigned to the case, did you learn there was an individual shot that had

self-transported to the hospital?

***

Q. Now did you learn that there was surveillance video at this gas station where the

shooting occurred?

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Q. Were you ultimately looking to arrest Gregory Sherman?

Q. That was in relation to the shooting that occurred at the gas station[,] correct[?]

A. Yes, that’s correct.”

¶ 66 As to Officer Cauinian, defendant contends that “the content of the dispatch was

inadmissible hearsay because it went to the central issue in the case: whether there was a shooting

at the gas station.” As to Detective Tamlo, defendant asserts that his testimony “was more

egregious” because he testified that there was a shooting at the gas station and that defendant was

the person shot. In response, the State argues that Officer Cauinian’s testimony “explained why he

went to the gas station” and Detective Tamlo’s testimony explained “what he was assigned to

investigate and who the subject of the investigation was.”

¶ 67 Our supreme court has held that “a police officer may recount the steps taken in the

investigation of a crime, and may describe the events leading up to the defendant’s arrest, where

such testimony is necessary and important to fully explain the State’s case to the trier of fact.”

Simms, 143 Ill. 2d at 174; People v. Malave, 230 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561 (1992) (such statements are

admissible “for the limited purpose of explaining why the police conducted their investigation as

they did, or why they arrested defendant, or why they confronted [the] defendant with their

suspicions”). The reasoning behind the rule is that “a portrayal of the events in question lessens

the need of the fact finder to speculate on the reasons for the officers’ subsequent actions.” Id.

Nonetheless, “[t]he testimony of the officer regarding the words of the communication must not

be used for their truth by the prosecution, but only used to show that the words were spoken when

the fact they were spoken satisfies a relevant nonhearsay purpose.” Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1086.

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¶ 68 In this case, Officer Cauinian’s and Detective Tamlo’s testimony as to the nature of the

dispatch call and the reason for their investigation certainly can be characterized as “course of

investigation” testimony. However, the difficulty here is that that testimony also tended to prove

the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., whether there was a shooting or a person shot at the Shell gas

station that night. When a statement goes directly to the essence of the dispute at trial, regardless

of whether it related to police procedure, “the scale tips against admissibility.” People v. Warlick,

302 Ill. App. 3d 595, 600 (1998). In this case, it was not “necessary and important” for the State

to provide those details of the dispatch call when questioning Officer Cauinian and Detective

Tamlo. Rather, the State could have referred to it as “an incident” at that location, and, later,

Hernandez could testify himself as to the substance of his 911 call following the incident. See

People v. O’Toole, 226 Ill. App. 3d 974, 988 (1992) (Out-of-court statements explaining a course

of conduct “should be admitted only to the extent necessary to provide that explanation and should

not be admitted if they reveal unnecessary and prejudicial information.”).

¶ 69 Several cases cited by defendant support our conclusion that the State elicited improper

hearsay testimony in their questioning of both Officer Cauinian and Detective Tamlo. For example,

in Warlick, this court held that the trial court erred in admitting an officer’s testimony that he had

received a radio call regarding a “burglary in progress” at a warehouse where the matter in

controversy at trial was whether defendant had been seeking shelter or to burglarize. Warlick, 302

Ill. App. 3d at 600-01. Notably, the error in Warlick was ultimately held to be harmless. Id. at 601.

Next, in Jura, a gun possession case, this court found that trial court erred in admitting testimony

from three police officers as to the substance of a radio call which provided the location and

description of a person with a gun and that the defendant’s location and description matched it.

Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1086-88. The Jura court found that the hearsay statements directly

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addressed the essence of the dispute, i.e., whether the defendant was the person who committed

the crime. Id. at 1088. Additionally, in People v. Cordero, 244 Ill. App. 3d 390, 391-92 (1993),

the reviewing court found that two officers’ testimony as to the contents of a police dispatch stating

that a vehicle was reported stolen was inadmissible hearsay because it “went to the very essence

of the stolen vehicle offense” and the jury may have considered it for the truth of the matter

asserted. Nonetheless, the Cordero court found that the error was harmless. Id. at 393. Finally, in

People v. Thomas, 199 Ill. App. 3d 79, 98 (1990), a police officer testified that he received a radio

dispatch informing him of an “intoxicated driver” and provided the type of car and license plate

number, and the trial court allowed the testimony under the course of investigation exception. The

Second District of this court found that the testimony went beyond the officer’s investigatory

procedure and was inadmissible hearsay testimony where the defendant was charged with driving

under the influence. Id. at 99. In accordance with those decisions, we find that, in this case, the

State elicited improper hearsay testimony at trial.

¶ 70 Defendant also asserts that the State elicited inadmissible hearsay through Officer Gipson,

who testified that he spoke to community members and bar staff on Milwaukee Avenue and

“[e]veryone corroborating said it was pretty peaceful, nothing seemed out of the norm.” We agree

with defendant, and the State does not dispute, that this constituted inadmissible hearsay, as it was

clearly based on out-of-court statements and was offered to establish the truth of the matter

asserted, i.e., that there were no shootings on Milwaukee Avenue that night and contrary to his

own account, defendant could not have been shot in that area.

¶ 71 Defendant argues that we should reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial under

either prong of plain error review. Although we find error in the court’s admission of the improper

hearsay testimony, we find no plain error.

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¶ 72 We begin first with the second prong of the plain error analysis, which requires that the

error be “so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity

of the judicial process.” (Hall, 195 Ill. 2d at 20). Plain error review is not applicable to the type of

error identified here. Our supreme court has “equated the second prong of plain-error review with

structural error[.]” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613-14 (2010). Structural errors are a

limited category, having only been found in cases involving, “a complete denial of counsel, trial

before a biased judge, racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury, denial of self-

representation at trial, denial of a public trial, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction.” Id. at

609. Additionally, structural error has been found where the trial court failed to apply the one-act,

one-crime rule (In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 378-79 (2009)) and where the trial court failed

to exercise discretion in denying a continuance (People v. Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 131 (2009)).

The admission of improper hearsay testimony does not fall into any of the foregoing categories.

See People v. Temple, 2014 IL App (1st) 11653, ¶ 51 (finding that, inter alia, police officer hearsay

testimony beyond the scope of explaining procedure did not constitute structural error). Thus, we

find no plain error under the second prong.

¶ 73 As to the first prong, we conclude that the evidence in this case was not “so closely

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless

of the seriousness of the error[.]” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48. Stated another way,

we do not find that the verdict in this case “may have resulted from the error and not the evidence

properly adduced at trial.” (Internal quotations and citation omitted.) People v. White, 2011 IL

109689, ¶ 133. Under this prong, we “must evaluate the totality of the evidence and conduct a

qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the case.” People v. Sebby, 2017

IL 119445, ¶ 53. As we explained above, the jury had sufficient evidence to find beyond a

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reasonable doubt that defendant was in possession of a firearm. We will not use the word

overwhelming to describe the evidence in this instance, but there was unimpeached, credible

testimony from Hernandez that supported a reasonable inference that defendant shot himself in the

foot at the gas station that night, and the surveillance footage corroborated Hernandez’s testimony.

Given the nature of this evidence, defendant cannot show that the improper hearsay testimony

severely threatened to tip the scales of justice against him.

¶ 74 Additionally, we do not believe that the brief improper mentions in Officer Cauinian and

Detective Tamlo’s testimony of a “shooting” or “a person shot” or Officer Gipson’s testimony

alluding to his conversation with bystanders and bar employees in the area greatly contributed to

the jury’s finding of guilt. Rather, this testimony was cumulative of other proper testimony. First,

the dispatch call was based on Hernandez’s phone call to the police, which he explicitly testified

about at trial. Second, defendant himself asked Officer Cauinian specifically about the dispatch

call “of a person shot.” Finally, Officer Gipson’s improper hearsay testimony was cumulative of

his other testimony. In particular, he testified that he was on patrol in his car and on foot in that

area and no one informed him of any shootings, he did not hear any gunshots that evening, and he

did not see anything to suggest that there had been a shooting, such as groups of people disbursing

and running from the area.

¶ 75 As the evidence was not closely balanced and there has been no structural error, plain error

has not been established.

¶ 76 C. Investigative Alert

¶ 77 Next, defendant argues that the State violated his rights under the United States and Illinois

Constitutions against unreasonable seizures by arresting him 46 days after the alleged incident

pursuant to an investigative alert, rather than pursuant to a probable cause finding by a neutral

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magistrate. Relying on People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, and People v. Smith, 2022 IL

App (1st) 190691, defendant maintains that, because of this unreasonable seizure, his arrest and

the fruits thereof should have been suppressed, and we should remand for a new trial.

¶ 78 As the State correctly asserts, the supreme court’s opinion in People v. Clark, 2024 IL

127838, which was issued after defendant filed his brief, is dispositive of this issue. In his reply

brief, defendant agrees and concedes that Clark is binding authority upon this court regarding this

issue.

¶ 79 Briefly, in Clark, the defendant, who was charged with multiple counts of attempted first

degree murder and aggravated battery, moved to quash his arrest, which was effectuated pursuant

to an investigative alert, as well as his inculpatory statement made after the arrest. Id. ¶ 1. The trial

court denied the motion, and the defendant was eventually convicted of two counts of aggravated

battery with a firearm. Id. ¶¶ 1-2. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in denying

the motion to quash arrest and suppress his statement. Id. ¶ 22. On appeal to the supreme court,

the defendant argued that the Chicago Police Department’s investigative alert system was

inconsistent with the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Id. ¶ 29. The supreme court, in a

thorough analysis, expressly rejected the reasoning of Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, and Smith,

2022 IL App (1st) 190691. Id. ¶¶ 55-62. The court then held that there is no violation of the Illinois

Constitution through the use of investigative alerts to make warrantless arrests for felonies based

upon probable cause. Id. ¶ 63. Therefore, in the case before us, defendant’s arrest was

constitutional under Clark, and the trial court did not err in upholding defendant’s arrest.

¶ 80 D. Constitutionality of AHC Statute

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¶ 81 Finally, defendant argues that this court should vacate his conviction for AHC where the

statute is facially unconstitutional under the United States Constitution and pursuant to New York

State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

¶ 82 The statute at issue, section 24-1.7(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)

(West 2022)), provided, in pertinent part at the time of his conviction, that it is unlawful for a

person to possess any firearm after having been convicted two or more times of any combination

of certain enumerated felonies.

¶ 83 “Statutes are presumed to be constitutional.” People v. Legoo, 2020 IL 124965, ¶ 29. “To

overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish that it violates

the constitution.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 487 (2005). A party may assert a facial

constitutional challenge to a statute at any time. People v. Villareal, 2023 IL 127318, ¶ 13. “[A]

facial challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, i.e.,

the specific facts related to the challenging party are irrelevant.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL

118151, ¶ 36. Where there is a situation in which the statute could be validly applied, the facial

challenge cannot succeed. People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 24. We review a statute’s

constitutionality de novo. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 57.

¶ 84 The second amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security

of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const.,

amend. II. The second amendment applies to the States through the fourteenth amendment of the

United States Constitution. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).

¶ 85 In Bruen, the Supreme Court set forth a new analytical framework for evaluating the

constitutionality of firearm regulations under the second amendment. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. First,

a court must determine whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s

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conduct.” Id. at 24. If it does, then the Constitution “presumptively protects that conduct” and the

government must justify the regulation by showing that it is consistent with our nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation. Id. Such a showing can be made by identifying a reasonably similar

historical analogue to the regulation at issue. Id. at 30.

¶ 86 Defendant argues that, under Bruen, his “conduct of possessing a weapon is presumptively

protected by the Second Amendment, irrespective of his prior convictions” and the State “cannot

meet its burden to show any historical analogue for this constitutionally defunct law.”

¶ 87 Our sister districts and the divisions of this district have considered this same issue on many

occasions, and, in each instance, this court has applied the Bruen test and rejected facial challenges

to the AHC statute. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (1st) 232120, ¶ 22 (collecting cases

finding the AHC statute constitutional on its face), pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 131973

(filed June 26, 2025). Although our supreme court has yet to weigh in on the constitutionality of

the AHC statute (or similar statutes, such as unlawful use of a weapon statute), several cases

involving this issue are currently pending leave to appeal in that court. See People v. Grace, 2025

IL App (1st) 232429-U, ¶ 13 (collecting cases), pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 132119 (filed

Aug. 8, 2025); Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. June 3, 2025) (nonprecedential orders entered on or after

January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes).

¶ 88 Notably, the appellate court is split as to the result at the first step of the Bruen test. See

People v. Wade, 2025 IL App (1st) 231683, ¶ 48 (noting split in approach), pet. for leave to appeal

pending, No. 132355 (filed Oct. 8, 2025). Some districts and divisions have found that the second

amendment is not applicable to individuals who are not “law-abiding citizens” (see, e.g., People

v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37, pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 130174 (filed Nov.

3, 2023)), whereas others have found that a defendant’s status as a felon is not relevant to the first

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step and should be considered at the second step (see, e.g., People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st)

200435, ¶ 89, pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 130153 (filed Oct. 30, 2023)). We agree with

those decisions finding that a felon cannot be considered a law-abiding citizen. Thus, we similarly

conclude that the first step of the Bruen test is dispositive here and the AHC statute is facially

constitutional.

¶ 89 We note that defendant specifically relies on People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435,

for support of his argument as to the first step. As mentioned above, in Brooks, this court found

that the challenged conduct is covered by the plain text of the second amendment and a defendant’s

status as a felon is more appropriately considered at the second step of the Bruen test. Id. ¶¶ 84-

89. However, the Brooks court ultimately found that “both the founding-era historical record and

Supreme Court precedent support the ability of our legislature to prohibit firearm possession by

people who have demonstrated disrespect for legal norms of society” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. ¶ 100. Thus, the Brooks court ultimately arrived at the same conclusion, namely that

the AHC statute is facially constitutional. See, e.g., People v. Woodhouse, 2026 IL App (1st)

240827, ¶¶ 39-47 (following Brooks); People v. McCorkle, 2025 IL App (5th) 230238, ¶¶ 22-25

(same); Wade, 2025 IL App (1st) 231683, ¶¶ 47-50 (same); People v. Macias, 2025 IL App (1st)

230678, ¶¶ 28-34 (same); People v. Travis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230113, ¶¶ 25-33 (same); People v.

Stephens, 2024 IL App (5th) 220828, ¶¶ 25-39 (same). For that reason, Brooks does not aid

defendant here, and we are not persuaded to depart from this court’s consistent rejection of facial

challenges to statutes barring felons from firearm possession.

¶ 90 Accordingly, we reject defendant’s argument that the AHC statute is facially

unconstitutional.

¶ 91 III. CONCLUSION

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¶ 92 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 93 Affirmed.

¶ 94 FITZGERALD SMITH, P.J., specially concurring:

¶ 95 I wholly agree with the outcome of this appeal. I write specially only with respect to the

final issue in this matter regarding the constitutionality of the AHC statute, and simply to state

that I would follow People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, to conclude that under the

second step of the Bruen test, defendant here cannot succeed on a second amendment challenge

to the AHC statute, thereby reaching the same ultimate result.

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