People v. McClendon

2015 IL App (3d) 130401

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 25, 2015
• Docket: 3-13-0401, 3-13-0402 cons.
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2015 IL App (3d) 130401 Consolidated with 130402

Opinion filed August 25, 2015 ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

A.D., 2015 ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit, ) Knox County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Appeal Nos. 3-13-0401 and 3-13-0402 ) Circuit Nos. 12-CF-355 and 13-CM-42 WILLIAM D. MCCLENDON, ) ) Honorable James R. Standard, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. ______________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The State and defendant William D. McClendon entered into a fully-negotiated plea

agreement. However, within a few days, defendant had a change of heart, hired new counsel,

and filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Although the State did not have an

objection to defendant’s timely motions, the trial court refused to allow defendant’s request to set

aside the plea agreement. Defendant appeals. We reverse and remand. ¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 On August 1, 2012, the State filed an information in case No. 12-CF-355 charging

defendant with four felony charges, including mob action, arising out of events occurring on

July 21, 2012. The court issued a $100,000 arrest warrant for defendant on August 2, 2012.

¶4 On January 15, 2013, defendant was arrested on the $100,000 arrest warrant and charged

with new unrelated offenses, including domestic battery, in case No. 13-CM-42. The State also

filed separate petitions to revoke probation in case Nos. 10-CF-326 and 10-CF-548, based on the

new allegations of domestic battery. Defendant was unable to post bail and remained

incarcerated in the Knox County jail until February 5, 2013. On that date, the parties informed

the trial court that they had reached a proposed negotiated plea agreement.

¶5 The terms of this proposed negotiated plea agreement required defendant to plead guilty

to one felony mob action count in case No. 12-CF-355 and one misdemeanor count of domestic

battery in case No. 13-CM-42. In exchange for defendant’s guilty pleas, the State agreed to

dismiss all other pending charges against defendant, including the separate petitions to revoke

probation.

¶6 After proper admonishments by the court, defendant told the court he understood his right

to a trial in each case, wished to give up the right to a trial, and wanted to plead guilty. The court

asked defendant whether he spoke with his public defender about the specific terms of this plea

agreement and whether defendant was satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Defendant

stated, “Yes, sir.” Further, defendant denied he was subjected to any threats, promises, coercion,

or force by anyone and wished to plead guilty to these two counts.

¶7 Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to two years’

probation for the mob action conviction, and also sentenced defendant to pay fines resulting from

2 his domestic battery conviction. The court dismissed the remaining counts in both cases and the

pending petitions to revoke defendant’s probation pursuant to the agreement. The court

admonished defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6,

2013)), regarding defendant’s right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

¶8 On March 7, 2013, defendant’s newly-retained counsel filed identical amended motions

to withdraw defendant’s guilty pleas (motions to withdraw) supported by affidavits from

defendant and occurrence witnesses in case Nos. 12-CF-355 and 13-CM-42. In essence, the

motions to withdraw and supporting affidavits alleged defendant had an actual defense to both

charges, but defendant entered a guilty plea because his appointed counsel pressured him to do

so by advising defendant he should “just plead guilty so [he] could just go home and see [his]

kids,” and “it would be a lot worse for [defendant] if he did not just plead guilty.” The motions

and affidavits alleged appointed counsel also advised defendant that he “would have to sit there

in jail for a long time while nothing happened on [his] case,” if he persisted in his assertion that

he was not guilty of the charged offenses.

¶9 On June 5, 2013, the parties appeared for the hearing on defendant’s motions to withdraw

before the same judge who accepted defendant’s guilty pleas. Initially, the defense presented the

testimony of the victim of the domestic battery charge. The victim testified before the court that

defendant did not batter her on January 14, 2013. Following the victim’s sworn testimony,

defense counsel advised the court that “the State is not objecting to this motion [to withdraw] and

is actually agreeing that the motion should be granted.”

¶ 10 Defendant also testified before the court and explained that the first time his attorney

spoke with defendant about the terms of the plea agreement was on February 5, 2013. Defendant

testified he repeatedly told the public defender that he was innocent and did not wish to plead

3 guilty. However, the public defender instructed defendant to “[j]ust plead guilty so you

[defendant] can go home today ‘cause it’s a good deal.’ ” 1 According to defendant, his public

defender also told him, “[I]f you don’t plead guilty, then you’re just going to be sitting in jail

while nothing happens in your case.” Defendant testified his entire conversation with his

attorney about the plea agreement lasted for “about three minutes” and took place immediately

before the court called his case on February 5, 2013.

¶ 11 During closing arguments on the motions to withdraw, the State confirmed defense

counsel did not spend much time with defendant on the date the court accepted the plea

agreement. Specifically, the prosecutor told the court, “I would just [submit] to the Court that I

remember the day of the plea, and [defendant’s] representations as to the amount of time

[defense counsel] spent with him explaining things are accurate.” After recognizing the court

properly admonished defendant, the State advised the court, “[T]he State is not objecting to the

presentation and the granting of this motion [to withdraw].”

¶ 12 However, the court denied defendant’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court

found that the court’s admonishments were not defective and defendant’s responses indicated

defendant fully understood the nature and consequences of his plea agreement.

¶ 13 Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 14 ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, both parties agree defendant filed timely motions to withdraw the guilty pleas,

which were originally presented to the trial judge as part of a fully-negotiated plea agreement. In

addition, both parties agree that the State and defense counsel advised the trial court that the

State was not opposing defendant’s timely motions to withdraw. On appeal, defendant asserts 1 Defendant’s appellate counsel argues on page 10 of his appellate brief that defendant was in custody when he entered his guilty plea and he “secured his release after the trial court accepted his guilty plea.” 4 the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s unopposed and timely motions to withdraw his

guilty pleas should now be reversed in the interest of justice.

¶ 16 We recognize that the court’s decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea should

not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 40

(2000). Our research has not revealed any other published decision where the trial court denied a

timely defense motion to withdraw guilty pleas that the State did not oppose. Consequently, it

appears that the case at bar raises an issue of first impression.

¶ 17 We begin our analysis by reviewing the general law governing plea agreements.

Applying the principles of contract law to the plea agreement, the case law recognizes that

ordinarily the terms of a plea agreement are enforceable against both parties and, therefore,

neither party can unilaterally renege or modify the agreement. People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320,

326-27 (1996). However, this case does not involve a situation where one party seeks to rescind

the plea agreement over the other party's objection. Here, the State Attorney's Office elected not

to oppose this defendant’s timely request to rescind the plea agreement by requesting to

withdraw his recent guilty pleas.

¶ 18 By statute, the State’s Attorney has the exclusive duty and discretion to commence and

prosecute all criminal actions. 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1) (West 2012). In addition, the State’s

Attorney is a part of the executive branch of government vested with the discretionary powers of

an executive officer and “ ‘[t]he sanctity of prosecutorial discretion should not be cavalierly

discarded.’ ” People ex rel. Thompson v. Anderson, 119 Ill. App. 3d 932, 939 (1983) (quoting

People v. Thompson, 88 Ill. App. 3d 375, 379 (1980)). It was well within the State's Attorney's

discretion to decide whether or not to oppose a defendant's request to withdraw his guilty pleas.

5 ¶ 19 While the prosecutor did not recite the reasoning supporting the prosecutor’s executive

decision not to contest the defendant’s motions to withdraw, the prosecutor’s good faith is

evident of record. We note the prosecutor first waited for the victim of the domestic battery to

provide her sworn testimony to the court, on the record, before advising the court that the State

would not oppose the defense’s motions to withdraw. Moreover, in her sworn testimony, the

victim denied a domestic battery occurred, although we recognize there were other independent

occurrence witnesses.

¶ 20 Based on this unique record, we conclude the court acted unreasonably by refusing to

allow the timely and unopposed motions to withdraw the guilty pleas. Respectfully, judicial

discretion should not be exercised to override prosecutorial discretion in the absence of

compelling reasons for the trial court to do so. After careful review, we cannot discern any

compelling reasons for the trial judge’s decision in this case.

¶ 21 We conclude the court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion and reverse that

decision. We remand with directions for the trial court to allow the motions to withdraw the

guilty pleas, vacate defendant’s convictions subject to this appeal, reinstate all dismissed

charges, and return the parties to the status quo prior to the court’s decision approving the fully-

negotiated plea agreement.

¶ 22 CONCLUSION

¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motions to

withdraw his guilty pleas, vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this order.

¶ 24 Reversed and remanded.