People v. McClain

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 1, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-0086
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 250086-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is June 1, 2026 not precedent except in the NO. 4-25-0086 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County LARRY D. MCCLAIN JR., ) No. 22CF151 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Ryan M. Cadagin, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding:

(1) Trial counsel affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of codefendant’s jailhouse calls and defendant did not establish counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jailhouse calls or to move to sever the trials.

(2) Trial counsel affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of the certifications of authenticity for the cell phone records.

(3) Trial counsel’s failure to object to the qualifications and testimony of two police detectives did not deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel.

(4) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prior consistent statement of a State’s witness, and there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different had the jury been given a limiting instruction for the statement.

(5) Defendant forfeited his argument as to the admission of other-crimes evidence, and he did not establish trial counsel provided deficient representation for failing to request a limiting instruction for that evidence. (6) The prosecutor’s comments in closing argument did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, defeating defendant’s claims of plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel.

(7) The record is insufficient to address defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim as to his sentence and his ineffective assistance claim is premature.

¶2 Following a September 2024 trial, a jury found defendant, Larry D. McClain Jr.,

guilty of (1) the first degree murders of Bryant Williams, Savante English, and Keyera Gant (720

ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2), (3) (West 2020)), (2) armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(1)), and (3) armed

violence (id. § 33A-2). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to a mandatory life

sentence for the first degree murder convictions, to run concurrently with a 30-year sentence for

the armed violence conviction. The armed robbery conviction merged into the first degree

murder convictions for sentencing.

¶3 On appeal, defendant argues (1) he was denied a fair trial because of the improper

admission of jailhouse call recordings, certifications of authenticity, cell phone records, expert

testimony, and other-crimes evidence; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel for

failing to object to or request a limiting instruction for the evidence at issue; (3) the trial court

abused its discretion in allowing a prior consistent statement and other-crimes evidence; (4) he

was denied a fair trial when the State made improper comments during closing argument, and

counsel was ineffective for failing to object; and (5) his sentence violates the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). For the following

reasons, we affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In March 2022, a grand jury indicted defendant on nine counts of first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2), (3) (West 2020)), one count of armed robbery (id. § 18-

2(a)(1)), one count of armed violence (id. § 33A-2), one count of unlawful possession of a

-2- weapon by a felon (id. § 24-1.1)), possession of a firearm by a street gang member (id. § 24-

1.8(a)(1)), and two counts of obstructing justice (id. § 31-4(a)(1)). The indictment alleged, on

August 9, 2021, defendant, along with codefendants Kelton Galmore and Joseph Hembrough,

while armed, went to the home of English, located at 2517 South 10th Street in Springfield,

Illinois, with the intent of committing a theft against Williams. While inside the home, they shot

and killed Williams, English, and Gant and stole money and drugs from Williams.

¶6 In June 2024, defendant filed a motion to sever his trial from Hembrough’s based

on Hembrough’s confession directly implicating defendant. Defendant did not move to sever his

trial from Galmore’s. In August 2024, the State filed a motion in limine to admit the testimony of

Michael Pullings. The motion alleged Pullings would testify, on October 27, 2021, he was

incarcerated with Hembrough. Hembrough told Pullings that he and two other individuals

participated in a drug-related robbery in Springfield and the other two individuals shot and killed

the three victims. Hembrough also told Pullings he left behind a magazine from his gun at the

scene.

¶7 At a September 2024 pretrial hearing, the motion to sever was withdrawn after

Hembrough pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against defendant. The trial court reserved ruling

on the State’s motion in limine regarding Pullings’s testimony, including whether the testimony

could come in as a prior consistent statement of Hembrough’s.

¶8 A. Jury Trial

¶9 In September 2024, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The following evidence

was adduced at trial.

¶ 10 On August 8, 2021, a party was held at 2517 South 10th Street. The party was

attended by several individuals, including Shyra Daniel, Nashaya Wilson, Michael Smith,

-3- Jamika Harris, Jabborah Harris, Davosia Whiteside, Williams, Gant, and defendant. During

police interviews with these individuals, it was revealed defendant was a light-skinned Black

male who went by the nicknames “Junior” and “White Boy.”

¶ 11 1. Smith

¶ 12 Smith testified he attended a party at 2517 South 10th Street on August 8, 2021.

Smith testified he knew Williams was a drug dealer and was in possession of large sums of

money, and there were drugs at English’s home. Smith indicated defendant was at the party, but

Smith never saw him because Smith was asleep for most of it. The State asked Smith if he told

the police he saw defendant in possession of a firearm. Smith answered, “Yes. Not, not at the

party—not that house. I never said [defendant] had possession of a firearm at the house. I never

seen him at the house.” The State asked Smith to clarify when he saw defendant in possession of

a firearm. Defense counsel objected, and the State withdrew the question. Smith recalled telling

the police he saw defendant in possession of a Glock 9-millimeter pistol.

¶ 13 After the party, the group went to an IHOP restaurant. Smith and Whiteside then

went to the home of Aaliyah Flakes, where they remained for the rest of the night. Flake’s police

interview and surveillance video from the area corroborated Smith and Whiteside were at

Flakes’s home during the time the homicides occurred. Smith learned of the murders when

LaQuintae Brewer called and told him the next day. On cross-examination, Smith reiterated he

was asleep the entire time defendant was at the party.

¶ 14 On redirect examination, the State asked Smith if he recalled telling the police

“that you saw [defendant] showing the firearm, that’s how you knew what it was?” Defense

counsel objected, and the trial court overruled it. Smith testified he remembered telling the police

he saw defendant showing a firearm.

-4- ¶ 15 On recross-examination, the following exchange occurred between defense

counsel and Smith:

“Q. And you didn’t tell the cops that [defendant] had a gun at the party,

right?

A. No.

Q. You told the cops that you’d seen [defendant] with a gun on some other

occasion, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. The questions he just asked you about this gun that you saw, was this

the gun that you saw on some other occasion?

A. Yeah. Always see. He always had a gun on him.

Q. But not—you didn’t see—

A. I didn’t see it that night, no.”

¶ 16 Defense counsel had no further questions, and Smith stepped down from the

stand. Outside the presence of the jury, counsel expressed his concern the State’s redirect

examination elicited other-crimes evidence that depicted defendant as someone who always had

a gun. Counsel noted defendant’s objection on this point was sustained during direct

examination. The trial court determined the earlier objection was resolved when the State

withdrew its question, and Smith’s later testimony was not a product of the State’s direct

examination.

¶ 17 2. Latravian Medley

¶ 18 Latravian Medley testified he went to 2517 South 10th Street after Williams did

not answer his phone. He went in the house and discovered the bodies of Williams and English.

-5- He was on the phone with Brewer and told him what he saw. Brewer came over to the house, and

neither person called the police. Surveillance video obtained by the police showed Medley’s and

Brewer’s vehicles in the area of the crime scene the morning after the homicides.

¶ 19 3. Shunderika Price

¶ 20 Shunderika Price testified she was Williams’s fiancée. After she was unable to get

in contact with Williams, Price went to 2517 South 10th Street. She knocked on the front door,

but there was no response. Price walked around to the back door and saw Williams’s red Dodge

Charger in the backyard with a broken window. (We note the vehicle is referred to as both a

Dodge Challenger and a Dodge Charger in the record.) She entered the home after finding the

back door was open. She found English lying on the kitchen floor and Williams on the dining

room floor, both with gunshot wounds. Price stated the home was “messed up” and “filthy,”

which was not normal for the home. After calling 911 to report what she saw, Price walked into

one of the bedrooms, where she found Gant up against a wall with gunshot wounds.

¶ 21 4. Crime Scene Evidence

¶ 22 Brian Crolly testified he was a patrol officer with the Springfield Park District

Police Department in August 2021. Crolly was the first officer to arrive on the scene. He did not

observe any signs of forced entry, and the front door was locked. He saw multiple cartridge cases

on the ground next to the bodies. The house was in disarray, with the cabinets in the kitchen left

open and items thrown around the house.

¶ 23 Lori White testified she was a crime scene detective with the Springfield Police

Department (SPD) in August 2021. White took photographs and scans of the scene depicting the

following. In the back of the house, there were muddy tire tracks and a footwear impression.

Another picture showed Williams’s red Dodge Charger with a broken driver’s side window. In

-6- the kitchen, there were open cabinets and drawers. To the left side of English’s body, there was a

mop and bucket, a bottle of bleach, and three spent cartridge cases. In the dining room, there was

a fully loaded magazine next to Williams’s head and spent cartridge cases next to his body.

There were no suitable fingerprints for testing on the magazine or the ammunition in the

magazine. On the dining room table, there was a digital scale with some white residue, a glass jar

with green plant material, and two boxes of sandwich baggies. Later testing determined one

fingerprint on the glass jar matched Whiteside and four prints matched defendant. No other

fingerprints at the scene matched defendant. A Snapchat video recovered from English’s cell

phone, recorded at 6:57 p.m. on September 8, 2021, showed defendant sitting at the dining room

table. Other pictures and videos from the party showed defendant handling the glass jar.

¶ 24 White recovered 5 spent cartridge cases in the kitchen, 11 spent cartridge cases in

the living room and dining room area, 5 spent cartridge cases in the bedroom, and 4 fired bullets.

All the cartridge cases were determined to be 9-millimeter Luger cases. Later testing revealed the

cartridge cases were fired from two different firearms. Four of the five cartridge cases from the

bedroom and eight cartridge cases from the dining room came from one gun, while the remaining

cartridge cases were fired from another gun.

¶ 25 White also collected DNA swabs from numerous surfaces throughout the house.

None of the swabs tested contained DNA consistent with defendant’s.

¶ 26 Michael Fannin, a sergeant with SPD, processed the Red Dodge Challenger

located in the rear of the house. A search warrant for the vehicle showed Williams was the

registered owner. Latent fingerprints were obtained from the hood of the vehicle and the exterior

driver’s door handle. Two fingerprints from the door handle were later determined to be from

Smith. Fannin testified it appeared someone had rummaged through the vehicle while attempting

-7- to steal it. The driver’s side window was also broken. A brick was found nearby and was

consistent with a red substance seen on the broken window. Fannin collected several DNA swabs

from the vehicle and the brick. The DNA swabs from the brick and the prints from the vehicle’s

door handle were consistent with coming from Smith.

¶ 27 Michael Mack, a police detective with SPD, testified he obtained a search warrant

for the house’s security system. The police were unable to recover any video, but they received

entry logs for the front door. The logs showed the front door was opened at 1:49 p.m. on August

9, 2021, which was approximately when officers responded to the scene. Prior to that, the front

door had not been opened since 1:06 a.m. the same day.

¶ 28 5. Jason Sloman

¶ 29 Jason Sloman, a detective with SPD, testified, in the days following the

homicides, the police collected video evidence from numerous locations around the crime scene.

Surveillance video from IHOP showed English and Williams leaving at roughly the same time as

Smith and Whiteside, at approximately 11 p.m. English and Williams got into a black SUV

belonging to English, while Smith and Whiteside got into a silver Jeep.

¶ 30 The following surveillance video was collected from the homes surrounding 2517

South 10th Street. For reference, South 10th Street runs north-south, with 2517 South 10th Street

located on the west side of the street. An alley also runs north-south directly behind 2517 South

10th Street. The block of South 10th Street where the house is located intersects with East

Oberlin Avenue to the north and Bryn Mawr Boulevard to the south. Around 12:58 a.m., a dark

red four-door vehicle with a silver front quarter panel and silver hood is seen driving south on

10th Street and turning west onto Bryn Mawr Boulevard. Around 1:05 a.m., surveillance video

from a house across the street shows three individuals standing on the front porch of 2517 South

-8- 10th Street. Around 1:14 a.m., the red vehicle is seen coming out of the alley behind 2517 South

10th Street and turning west on East Oberlin Avenue. Around 1:51 a.m., the red vehicle is seen

returning to the alley behind 2517 South 10th Street. The police did not recover any surveillance

video showing the red vehicle leaving the area a second time.

¶ 31 Thereafter, Sloman put out a law enforcement bulletin to locate the red vehicle.

Around two months later, Sloman determined the red vehicle was a 2007 Mercury Milan owned

by Taylor Rosenberger. Rosenberger had totaled the vehicle in a crash a few days after the

homicides, and the vehicle was in the possession of a towing company. The towing company

gave the police possession of Rosenberger’s vehicle.

¶ 32 6. Rosenberger

¶ 33 Rosenberger testified, in August 2021, she was living with her boyfriend,

Hembrough, and Steven McFadden and Marya Park in a house in Jacksonville, Illinois. She and

Hembrough both sold methamphetamine at this time. She admitted she had previously abused

methamphetamine and Xanax but was now seven months clean. Rosenberger knew Hembrough

was friends with Galmore, who also went by the nickname “Fats.” She confirmed she owned a

red 2007 Mercury Milan with a gray hood in August 2021. She stated Hembrough would often

drive the vehicle without her permission.

¶ 34 On August 8, 2021, Rosenberger overheard Hembrough talking on the phone to

someone about “[h]itting a lick,” which she explained was slang for robbing someone. She went

to sleep around 7 or 8 p.m. that night. When she woke up on August 9, 2021, at around 7 or 8

a.m., her vehicle was missing and Hembrough was not home. Hembrough returned later in the

morning in a black Ford pickup truck with a light-skinned individual she did not recognize.

McFadden gave the individual a different set of clothes. Hembrough and Rosenberger left in the

-9- truck, where Hembrough showed her a large quantity of methamphetamine. The unknown

individual left Rosenberger’s home around 1 or 2 p.m. After this incident, Rosenberger

discovered a large quantity of little individual bags of fentanyl in the home. Rosenberger testified

no one in the home used fentanyl, and she did not know Hembrough to sell fentanyl.

¶ 35 Rosenberger confirmed she was in a vehicular collision on August 13, 2021,

which resulted in totaling her vehicle and the silver hood catching fire. Shortly thereafter, she

and Hembrough were in another car wreck in Schuyler County. They both went to jail after

methamphetamine was found in a bulletproof vest in the vehicle. Rosenberger believed it was the

same methamphetamine Hembrough had shown her in the black pickup truck a few days earlier.

They both bonded out of jail, but Hembrough was later arrested in October 2021 in Morgan

County.

¶ 36 On cross-examination by Galmore’s counsel, Rosenberger stated Hembrough told

her he left behind a “clip” to his gun at the scene.

¶ 37 7. Hembrough

¶ 38 Hembrough testified he was currently incarcerated in the Sangamon County jail.

On August 8, 2021, Galmore texted Hembrough he was looking for a new connection for drugs.

Galmore went to Hembrough’s home and showed him a Snapchat video of an individual with a

red vehicle and large amounts of money. Hembrough did not recognize the individual but later

learned it was Williams. He testified he initially thought they would purchase drugs from

Williams, but Galmore indicated they might get the drugs for free. Hembrough testified he

understood this to mean they would commit a robbery.

¶ 39 Later that night, Galmore messaged Hembrough it was time to meet up.

Hembrough, while armed with a Ruger 9-millimeter pistol and wearing a bulletproof vest, drove

- 10 - Rosenberger’s vehicle to Galmore’s house in Jacksonville. A picture of a Ruger pistol and three

magazines taken from Hembrough’s cell phone was entered into evidence. After picking up

Galmore, they drove to an apartment complex in Springfield and picked up an individual named

“Junior.” Hembrough did not know this person and later learned he was defendant. Defendant

directed Hembrough to drive to an address on South 10th Street, and they did not discuss

anything on the way. Around 1 a.m., they drove past the back of the house, circled the block, and

then pulled the vehicle into the back alley of the house.

¶ 40 The group exited the vehicle and walked around to the front porch. Defendant

knocked on the door, and English opened the door and let them in. Hembrough entered the

dining room, while English went to the kitchen to retrieve a scale and a bag. Williams entered

the room and started yelling at defendant for bringing people over to the house unannounced.

Defendant put his head down and apologized to Williams. Galmore responded by pointing a

Glock 34 pistol equipped with a switch “to make it automatic” at Williams. Williams laughed

and moved to smack the gun out of Galmore’s hand when the gun went off. Williams was shot

multiple times in his left side and collapsed in the dining room. Hembrough then saw defendant

turn and shoot English two to three times in the kitchen. Hembrough testified he had not seen

either individual with a gun prior to that moment. Defendant took keys and money from

Williams’s pockets, and then defendant and Galmore went towards the bedroom at the front of

the house. Hembrough testified he was in complete shock and started pacing before he heard

another round of automatic gunfire. He ran to the front bedroom and saw defendant fire a single

shot at a person who was cowering in the corner of the room.

¶ 41 At that point, all three individuals ran out the back door to Rosenberger’s vehicle.

Hembrough noticed a magazine on the ground next to Williams. He later realized the magazine

- 11 - came from his firearm. Later testing determined the live rounds in the magazine did not match

any of the spent cartridge cases recovered at the scene. Hembrough asserted he never pulled out

his firearm, but it was possible he accidentally bumped the release during the incident.

Hembrough testified they were in the house for around 5 to 10 minutes at most. As they were

leaving, they tried to open the Red Dodge Challenger with the key defendant took from Williams

to steal money but were unable to unlock it. The group got back into Rosenberger’s vehicle, and

Galmore and defendant realized no one had grabbed the drugs. Defendant ran back into the

house through the back door and returned with a large gray bag.

¶ 42 The group pulled out of the alley and started to drive away when Galmore

realized he did not have his phone. Galmore used Hembrough’s cell phone to call his phone to

see if he could hear it in the vehicle. They were near New Berlin, Illinois, when they turned

around and went back to the house. Galmore found his phone in the back alley. The group drove

back to Hembrough’s house and split the drugs from the gray bag. Hembrough estimated there

were five pounds of meth and nine ounces of fentanyl. After splitting up the drugs, defendant and

Hembrough burned their clothes in a burn pile at the house. McFadden gave defendant a pair of

pants and a shirt. Hembrough gave Galmore a ride back to his house, and defendant remained at

Hembrough’s home. When he left, McFadden and defendant were playing video games in the

front room. After dropping off Galmore, Hembrough made several stops before returning to his

house. He picked up Rosenberger and later showed her the methamphetamine. In the afternoon,

Hembrough gave defendant a ride back home. Hembrough testified he later sold his Ruger pistol

to defendant. The firearm was never recovered by the police.

¶ 43 A few days later, Hembrough and Rosenberger were in a vehicular collision in

Schuyler County that resulted in the vehicle being totaled. Hembrough and Rosenberger were

- 12 - arrested after the police discovered methamphetamine in the vehicle. Hembrough stated this was

the same methamphetamine he obtained during the robbery.

¶ 44 On October 18, 2021, Hembrough was arrested for possession of a firearm by a

felon and possession of stolen property in Morgan County after officers executed a search

warrant at his house in a different case and found a Polymer 80 ghost gun and an SKS rifle. Later

testing determined none of the cartridge cases recovered from the crime scene matched

Hembrough’s Polymer 80 ghost gun.

¶ 45 On October 22, 2021, Hembrough came forward to the police at the Morgan

County jail to provide information regarding the triple homicide at 2517 South 10th Street. In

March 2022, Hembrough was charged with three counts of first degree murder in Sangamon

¶ 46 On cross-examination by Galmore’s counsel, Hembrough stated he pleaded guilty

to lesser charges in the Schuyler County case and the Morgan County case was dismissed. He

was interviewed by the police twice in October 2021 and again in February 2022. Hembrough

asserted he was completely truthful in his February 2022 interview. He admitted he lied to the

police about being present for the murders during his first two interviews in October 2021,

instead telling the police defendant and Galmore showed up at his house with two kilos of

methamphetamine. He also admitted he lied about not knowing what vehicle was used, telling

the police it was a maroon passenger car, and about letting Galmore use his cell phone. When

asked, Hembrough agreed he told the police at his first interview, “I’m trying to do everything I

can to save my own bacon.” In the February 2022 interview, Hembrough finally admitted to the

police he had been present at the murders.

¶ 47 On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Hembrough’s motivation in

- 13 - pleading guilty two weeks before the trial and agreeing to testify against defendant in exchange

for a 20-year sentence. Defense counsel attacked the inconsistencies between Hembrough’s

statement to police in February 2022 and his trial testimony. Counsel then accused Hembrough

of “repeatedly [lying],” including lying during his police interviews and to the jury at trial.

Hembrough acknowledged lying in his October 2021 interview but denied lying during his trial

testimony. Counsel then asked, “[Hembrough], you’re a liar, right?” Hembrough responded,

“No.”

¶ 48 On redirect examination, the State asked, “In order to get 20 years for first-degree

murder, was there something you were required to do?” Hembrough responded, “To give an

honest and truthful statement.” The State followed up, “And if you are not honest and truthful,

what happens to this 20 years?” Hembrough replied, “They revoke the plea, and I face the full

sentence of the charges.”

¶ 49 8. Pullings

¶ 50 Following Hembrough’s testimony, the State sought to admit Pullings’s testimony

as a prior consistent statement by Hembrough to rebut an accusation of recent fabrication or a

motive to testify falsely. Specifically, the State sought to admit Pullings’s testimony to show the

plea deal did not influence Hembrough’s testimony. Defense counsel objected, and the trial court

allowed the testimony. Counsel did not request a limiting instruction for the jury.

¶ 51 Pullings testified, in October 2021, he was in custody at the Morgan County jail

due to pending burglary and drug charges. His cellmate was Hembrough, who he had known

since he was a child. Hembrough told Pullings he was involved in a triple homicide over on

“10th Street.” Hembrough said “Fats and the white dude” from Springfield were also involved.

Hembrough told Pullings he drove the group to the house on 10th Street. After the group went

- 14 - inside, a “dude with the gold teeth” came out of a bedroom and asked why they were there.

“Fats” shot the individual with the gold teeth with an automatic weapon. The group took

methamphetamine and fentanyl from the house. They tried to unlock a new Dodge Charger to

steal more money but were unsuccessful. The group left and returned to Hembrough’s house.

Hembrough told Pullings he flushed the fentanyl because he could not sell it for the price he

wanted. He also told Pullings he accidentally left a magazine from his gun at the house.

¶ 52 On cross-examination, Pullings admitted he told the police he thought

Hembrough might be lying and Hembrough threatened to kill him if he told anyone. Pullings

reiterated Hembrough never told him the name of the third perpetrator. When Hembrough told

him the third person was a “white guy,” Pullings understood this to mean the third perpetrator

was a White person.

¶ 53 9. Tyann Miller

¶ 54 Tyann Miller testified she was dating defendant in August 2021.In December

2021, defendant made statements to her about a robbery he was involved in. Miller recalled

defendant was distraught and crying, and she heard him say, “[W]hy would you let me do this,”

and, “I shouldn’t have did what I did.” Defendant did not give Miller any details about the

robbery and did not tell her what he did.

¶ 55 10. Garrett Harney

¶ 56 The State moved to admit records consisting of cell tower data and certifications

of authenticity from AT&T and T-Mobile. Galmore’s attorney stated, “No objection subject to

cross and no objection to publish.” Defense counsel stated, “Identical. Thank you, Your Honor.”

¶ 57 Garrett Harney testified he had been employed by the Sangamon County Sheriff’s

Office for the past 12 years and was currently a detective. He specialized in “digital forensics,”

- 15 - which he described as “a special branch of forensics that has to do with the analysis,

examination, extraction of digital devices such as cell phones, computers, [and] cell data

records.” He stated he received training at the National Computer Forensics Institute and

completed multiple specialized trainings with CellHawk. He had performed over 420 cell phone

extractions and completed cell data mapping in over 115 cases. Harney’s curriculum vitae (CV)

noted he obtained a CellHawk user certification in August 2020. This was Harney’s first time

testifying as an expert in digital forensics.

¶ 58 Harney testified, in October 2021, he was contacted by SPD to assist in mapping

the cell data records in this case. The State moved to admit State’s exhibit Nos. 98 and 98A,

consisting of defendant’s cell phone location data and a T-Mobile certification of authenticity.

Galmore’s attorney stated, “No objection at this point, subject to cross-examination.” Defense

counsel stated, “Same. Thank you, Your Honor.” The State also admitted without objection

Hembrough’s and Galmore’s cell phone location data.

¶ 59 Harney stated the cell site location data was obtained through individual device

extractions and search warrants sent to AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile. He also used cell tower

data obtained from the phone carrier companies. Harney used the phone numbers associated with

defendant’s, Galmore’s, and Hembrough’s cell phones to narrow down the location data from the

cell tower dumps for each device. Harney uploaded the cell site location data from the three

devices and the cell tower dump data into CellHawk to generate a screen recording depicting the

movement of the devices on a map. The State admitted without objection the CellHawk screen

recording and several screenshots taken from the recording. Before playing the recording for the

jury, Harney explained how he generated the screen recording using the CellHawk program:

“I’ll kind of explain the software just so everybody’s kind of on the same

- 16 - page. CellHawk is utilized in a browser like Chrome or Edge or Firefox. It’s

software that can map over Google maps. To kind of explain cell records real

quick, I guess imagine yourself in an airplane. If you’re looking down on your—

you’ll have towers mapped out on the earth. They’re in different sections, so 360

degrees. Each sector is about 120 degrees. Whenever you’re driving, so let’s say

you’re driving down the interstate, your phone is communicating almost

constantly but quite frequently with those towers. And as you drive on the

highway, say you’re going to Indiana, you’re going to hit those—your phone is

going to communicate with those towers as you drive along the interstate. What

we’re seeing here is when you see a color light up, you’re seeing a sector of that

tower light up, indicating what size of tower the phone is communicating with.”

¶ 60 The CellHawk mapping of the three devices depicted the following. On August 9,

2021, around 12:42: a.m., all three devices were pinging off the same tower in Springfield near

the crime scene. Around 1:24 a.m., Hembrough’s device was pinging a tower west of

Springfield, while Galmore’s device remained in the same area near the crime scene. Around 2

a.m., all three devices were moving away from the crime scene, and by 2:20 a.m., all three

devices were pinging off towers in Jacksonville.

¶ 61 Defense counsel declined to cross-examine Harney.

¶ 62 11. Ryan Maddox

¶ 63 Prior to Ryan Maddox’s testimony, the State offered a limiting instruction

regarding defendant’s and Galmore’s jailhouse calls. Galmore’s counsel stated, “Your Honor, I

understand what they are doing and I have no objection.” Defense counsel added, “I welcome the

instruction, Your Honor.”

- 17 - ¶ 64 Maddox, a detective with SPD, testified he was the lead detective in this case.

During an August 2021 police interview, Smith told Maddox he saw defendant in possession of a

Glock 19 pistol at the party on August 8, 2021. A recording of the interview was entered into

evidence without objection.

¶ 65 The State admitted without objection the phone records from defendant’s,

Hembrough’s, and Galmore’s cell phones. The call logs showed a call was placed from

Hembrough’s phone to Galmore’s phone at 1:23 a.m. and 1:27 a.m. on August 9, 2021. The logs

also showed a call was made from defendant’s phone to Hembrough’s phone at 3:30 a.m. on

August 9, 2021. The logs for Galmore’s phone showed his device received a call from

defendant’s device at 9:23 p.m. and 11:11 p.m. on August 8, 2021. The logs also showed

Galmore’s phone made an outgoing call to defendant’s phone at 12:46 a.m. on August 9, 2021.

¶ 66 Maddox testified regarding the CellHawk screen recording that was created using

the cell site location data from the devices of defendant, Hembrough, and Galmore. He was not

tendered as an expert witness, and his testimony was generally consistent with Harney’s

testimony on the CellHawk screen recording.

¶ 67 The State admitted without objection five recordings from Galmore’s jailhouse

calls. Immediately thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury, “With regards to People’s

Exhibits Number 101 ***, if you determine a defendant made a statement you should consider

that statement as evidence only against the defendant who made the statement.” The five

recordings were played for the jury.

¶ 68 In the first jailhouse call recording, Galmore can be heard referring to “white boy”

or “island boy” and insisting this person needed to take his weight. Maddox testified that taking

one’s weight meant “the person that’s being spoken of needs to take accountability for something

- 18 - that occurred.” Galmore also makes a reference to “three bodies.” Galmore made this call prior

to defendant’s arrest. In another jailhouse call made before defendant’s arrest, Galmore can be

heard saying, “Junior [needs to] come take his motherfuckin’ charge.” Maddox testified this

phrase also meant the person being referred to needed to take responsibility for something that

occurred. In a jailhouse call placed on March 2, 2022, the day of defendant’s arrest, Galmore can

be heard saying, “You know they caught island boy?” Maddox testified Galmore was not told

there were any other suspects in the case.

¶ 69 B. Closing Argument and Jury Verdict

¶ 70 In closing, the State argued that at the August 8, 2021, party, defendant “was in

possession of something that he showed to Michael Smith. He was in possession of a Glock 19, a

9 millimeter firearm.” The State reminded the jury they could use Galmore’s jailhouse calls only

against Galmore and not defendant. As to the content of Galmore’s jailhouse calls, the State

argued the following:

“But as soon as defendant Galmore is arrested he starts to complain because he

and *** Hembrough had been arrested but Island Boy has not. And then clarifies

Junior needs to take his weight, which means responsibility, take accountability.

And if there was any doubt that Galmore was talking about [defendant] on March

2nd, the day [defendant] is arrested Galmore says you know they caught Island

Boy. Galmore knew who did it. And the reason he knew that is because he was

there and he did it with [defendant] or Island Boy or Junior. That’s how he knew

to get on the phone and complain about the fact that he was being held in the jail

and his friend wasn’t. And you can use that against defendant Galmore.”

¶ 71 Galmore’s counsel argued, “You know as well as I do Hembrough’s concocting

- 19 - this story so he can get what he wants. He’s then peddling that going on three years now. And

finally they accepted it. He’s succeeded. He saved his bacon.” He further argued Hembrough lied

in each of his police interviews and declared, “He’s a liar then. He’s a liar now.” In defendant’s

closing argument, defense counsel reiterated that Hembrough told numerous lies during his

police interviews.

¶ 72 In rebuttal, the State argued:

“[Hembrough] took 20 years of his life away.

He accepted that and so if 20 years of your life is gone is a deal, but there

was a catch. Not only would he lose 20 years of his life, he had to tell the truth.

And if he didn’t, that 20 years, it’s gone and he’s looking at a potential life

sentence. And not his version of the truth. Not even what the prosecutors want to

hear. The truth. The judge decides that. And so [Hembrough] is not thinking to

himself, what can I get away with? He is motivated to be truthful now.”

¶ 73 The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Williams, English,

and Gant, armed robbery, and armed violence.

¶ 74 C. Posttrial Motions and Sentencing

¶ 75 In October 2024, defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The motion argued,

inter alia, (1) the State improperly bolstered the credibility of Hembrough in its closing

argument regarding Hembrough’s plea agreement, (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State

to introduce other-crimes evidence against defendant through Smith, and (3) the court erred in

allowing Pullings to testify as to an alleged prior consistent statement by Hembrough.

¶ 76 In December 2024, the presentence investigation report (PSI) was filed in the trial

court. The PSI stated defendant’s parents never married and ended their relationship shortly after

- 20 - he was born. Defendant lived with his mother until 2018, when he moved in with his father. His

father treated him more as a friend than a father figure and did not make him attend school.

Defendant’s criminal record included a juvenile conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, a

Class 2 felony, in 2019, and an adult conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, a

Class 4 felony, in 2021. The employment history section of the PSI showed defendant worked

various part-time jobs. Defendant dropped out of high school after his junior year and did not

obtain a GED. He denied any psychiatric issues or being prescribed medication for a psychiatric

condition. He reported using cannabis daily from when he was 10 years old and consuming

alcohol on the weekends starting when he was 15 years old.

¶ 77 In December 2024, the trial court held a hearing and denied defendant’s motion

for a new trial. The court immediately proceeded to a sentencing hearing. Defense counsel did

not present any evidence in mitigation.

¶ 78 The State requested a mandatory life sentence pursuant to section 5-8-

1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

(West 2024)). Defense counsel argued the following as to the sentence:

“Your Honor, the Court is required here to impose a sentence that conforms with

the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution which specifically

states under Article 1, Section 11 that all penalties shall be determined both

according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the

offender to useful citizenship.

Your Honor, as the [PSI] and the facts that were adduced at trial events

[defendant] was an emerging youth at the time of the offense conduct. So I submit

to the Court a sentence that conforms with Article I, Section 11 of the Illinois

- 21 - Constitution of 1970 is the one that’s embodied in [People v. Buffer, 2019 IL

122327,] that states any sentence greater than 40 years is a de facto life sentence

for a youthful offender. So I would ask this Honorable Court to impose a sentence

in conformity therewith. Thank you, Your Honor.”

¶ 79 Defendant declined to present a statement in allocution and professed his

innocence.

¶ 80 The trial court stated it considered the trial evidence, the PSI, the addenda, the

victim impact statements, the history, character, and attitude of defendant, the evidence and

arguments presented, and the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. As to the first

degree murder convictions, the court stated, “[A]s required by statute, life in prison.” The court

further sentenced defendant to a concurrent 30-year sentence for the armed violence conviction.

The armed robbery conviction merged into the first degree murder convictions.

¶ 81 In December 2024, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. He argued

his mandatory life sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution

because the trial court had no discretion to consider any mitigating factors relating to his

individual characteristics as a young adult offender. The motion noted the PSI showed defendant

had a difficult home life, dropped out of school, and started using drugs when he was 10 years

old.

¶ 82 In January 2025, the trial court held a hearing and denied the motion, finding the

statute required it to impose a mandatory life sentence.

¶ 83 This appeal followed.

¶ 84 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 85 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the admission of his codefendant’s jailhouse calls

- 22 - deprived him of a fair trial and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the calls;

(2) he was denied a fair trial where the trial court admitted cell phone records that were not

properly certified as business records; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

qualifications and testimony of two police detectives; (4) the court abused its discretion in

allowing the admission of a prior consistent statement of a State’s witness, and counsel was

ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction; (5) the court abused its discretion in

allowing other-crimes evidence of defendant, and counsel was ineffective for failing to request a

limiting instruction; (6) he was denied a fair trial when the State made improper comments

during closing argument, and counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the comments; and

(7) his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.

¶ 86 A. Nontestifying Codefendant’s Statements

¶ 87 1. Plain Error

¶ 88 Defendant contends his right of confrontation guaranteed by the sixth and

fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV), was

violated and he was denied a fair trial where the trial court admitted Galmore’s recorded

statements although Galmore did not testify and was therefore not subject to cross-examination.

In addition, he argues the limiting instruction was insufficient to cure any prejudice against him.

Defendant admits the error was not preserved but urges this court to review the argument for

plain error.

¶ 89 The State contends defendant is precluded from raising this argument on appeal

because he affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of the jailhouse recordings at trial.

“When a defendant actively invites or acquiesces to the admission of a piece of

evidence at trial, he cannot challenge the admission of that evidence as plain error

- 23 - on appeal. This is so because invited error or acquiescence does not raise a mere

forfeiture to which the plain-error exception might apply; it creates an estoppel

that precludes plain-error analysis.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 59.

¶ 90 In this case, defense counsel affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of the

recordings. First, prior to trial, the parties stipulated to the foundation for the recordings of

Galmore’s jailhouse calls. Second, when the State moved to admit the recordings at trial, defense

counsel asserted, “No objection, Your Honor.” See id. (finding the defendant acquiesced to the

admission of a video-recorded statement when defense counsel stated, “ ‘No objection, Judge’ ”).

Later, when the recordings were published to the jury, Galmore’s counsel asserted, “No

objection, Your Honor.” Defense counsel stated, “Same, Your Honor.” As such, defendant is

estopped from challenging the admission of the recordings under the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 91 2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 92 Next, defendant argues defense counsel was ineffective for (1) allowing

Galmore’s recorded statements to come into evidence without objection, (2) failing to seek the

removal of all references to defendant in the recordings, and (3) failing to renew the motion to

sever the trials based on the recordings.

¶ 93 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-part test

set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.

2d 504, 526 (1984) (adopting the Strickland standard). To prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance, a defendant must show counsel performed deficiently and the deficient performance

prejudiced the defendant. People v. Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914, ¶ 76. To establish

deficient performance, the defendant must show “counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective

- 24 - standard of reasonableness.’ ” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (2009) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687-88). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show, “absent counsel’s errors,

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914, ¶ 77. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffective assistance

claim on the ground that it lacks sufficient prejudice, then a court may proceed directly to the

second prong and need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient.” People v.

Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

¶ 94 Here, defendant cannot establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Even

if counsel erred in failing to object to the admission of Galmore’s statements or to move to sever

the trials, the result of the proceedings would not have been different. Hembrough clearly

identified defendant as his accomplice in the robbery and as one of the shooters. His trial

testimony about their locations and travels the night of the murders was largely corroborated by

numerous surveillance videos and cell site location data. The surveillance videos showed a red

vehicle with a silver front quarter panel and silver hood drive past 2517 South 10th Street around

12:50 a.m. The vehicle was later found to belong to Rosenberger. Around 1:05 a.m., three

individuals are seen standing on the front porch of 2517 South 10th Street. Around 1:14 a.m., the

red vehicle is seen driving out of the alley behind the house onto East Oberlin Avenue. Around

1:51 a.m., the red vehicle is seen returning to the alley behind 2517 South 10th Street.

¶ 95 The cell site location data extracted from defendant’s, Hembrough’s, and

Galmore’s cell phones, in addition to the cell tower data, also largely aligned with Hembrough’s

trial testimony and the surveillance videos. Around 12:42: a.m., all three devices were pinging

off the same tower in Springfield near the crime scene. Around 1:24 a.m., Hembrough’s device

was pinging off a tower west of Springfield, while Galmore’s device remained in the same area

- 25 - of the crime scene. Around 2 a.m., all three devices were moving away from the crime scene,

and by 2:20 a.m., all three devices were pinging off towers in Jacksonville. Additionally, the call

logs from defendant’s, Hembrough’s, and Galmore’s phones showed the three individuals were

in communication with each other around the time of the murders.

¶ 96 The police also used the surveillance video to rule out other potential suspects.

Surveillance video showed Smith and Whiteside did not return to 2517 South 10th Street after

going to IHOP and instead stayed the night at Flakes’s residence. Additionally, Medley’s and

Brewer’s vehicles were not seen in the area of 2517 South 10th Street until the morning after the

murders. The only vehicle seen going to and from 2517 South 10th Street around the time of the

murders was Rosenberger’s red 2007 Mercury Milan.

¶ 97 None of the weapons were ever recovered. However, ballistics testing of the spent

cartridge cases revealed two firearms were used at the scene. It was also revealed that the unfired

cartridges from the magazine found next to Williams, which Hembrough admitted belonged to

him, did not match any of the spent cartridge cases. This evidence indicated Hembrough carried

a third firearm, which was not fired during the commission of the murders.

¶ 98 There was little physical or forensic evidence linking defendant to the inside of

2517 South 10th Street. Defendant was excluded as a contributor for all the DNA swabs taken in

the house and the red Dodge Charger. The only fingerprints consistent with defendant’s were

four fingerprints found on a glass jar. However, those prints were accounted for in a Snapchat

video from the August 8, 2021, party, where defendant is seen holding the glass jar.

¶ 99 While the physical evidence was not overwhelming, there was certainly sufficient

evidence of defendant’s guilt such that there is no reasonable probability that, but for the

admission of Galmore’s jailhouse calls, the jury would have acquitted defendant. Because

- 26 - defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by Galmore’s jailhouse calls, his ineffective-assistance

claim must fail.

¶ 100 B. Evidentiary Claims

¶ 101 Defendant argues the trial court erroneously admitted the following evidence:

(1) T-Mobile cell phone and cell tower records, (2) Harney’s and Maddox’s testimony regarding

the cell phone records, (3) Pullings’s testimony as to Hembrough’s alleged prior consistent

statement, and (4) other-crimes evidence depicting defendant as someone who “always had a gun

on him.”

¶ 102 1. Cell Phone Evidence

¶ 103 a. Cell Phone Records

¶ 104 Defendant argues the T-Mobile cell phone and cell tower records were not

admissible under the business records hearsay exception because the accompanying certifications

did not comply with Illinois Rules of Evidence 902(11), (12), and (13) (eff. Sept. 8, 2018)). He

acknowledges he forfeited this issue but asks this court to review his claim under the first prong

of the plain-error doctrine and for the ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 105 As to plain error, the State responds defendant is precluded from raising this

argument on appeal because he affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of the certificates at

trial. “Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the

scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and

encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, ¶ 54.

¶ 106 In this case, defense counsel affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of the T-

Mobile certifications of authenticity. In response to the State moving to admit each certificate,

- 27 - counsel asserted defendant had no objection. As such, defendant is estopped from challenging

the admission of the cell phone evidence under the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 107 We are also unpersuaded by defendant’s ineffective-assistance argument.

Defendant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the certificates

at trial and raising the issue in a posttrial motion. Again, “[a] claim of ineffective assistance has

two elements: deficient performance and resulting prejudice.” Id. ¶ 64. “Whether to object to

matters such as foundation for evidence is, by and large, a matter of trial strategy.” People v.

Probst, 344 Ill. App. 3d 378, 387 (2003). “[W]e may dispose of an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim by proceeding directly to the prejudice prong without addressing counsel’s

performance.” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17.

¶ 108 Assuming, arguendo, the failure to object to the certificates was deficient

performance, defendant cannot show there was a reasonable probability that if counsel had

objected, the State would have been unable to cure the objection. See Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th)

200081, ¶ 64. There is nothing in the record to suggest the State would not have been able to lay

the proper foundation, either by obtaining new certificates or calling a witness who could

authenticate the records. Accordingly, we find no basis for asserting a reasonable probability the

State would be unable to cure any authentication objection.

¶ 109 b. Expert Testimony

¶ 110 Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

testimony of Harney and Maddox regarding the historical cell site location data. He asserts both

witnesses were unqualified and the State failed to lay a foundation for Harney’s testimony on the

CellHawk program.

¶ 111 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant bears the burden to

- 28 - show both (1) “his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”

and (2) “ ‘but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result

of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” People v. Bradford, 2019 IL App (4th) 170148,

¶¶ 14-15 (quoting People v. Houston, 229 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2008)). In deciding whether counsel was

deficient, “[c]ourts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct is sound trial

strategy.” Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶ 60 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “ ‘A defendant

must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test and a failure to satisfy any one of the prongs

precludes a finding of ineffectiveness.’ ” Bradford, 2019 IL App (4th) 170148, ¶ 15 (quoting

People v. Simpson, 2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35).

¶ 112 We first address defendant’s argument as to Harney’s qualifications. Defendant

asserts Harney was unqualified to testify as an expert witness based on his allegedly inadequate

explanation as to historical cell site analysis. However, Harney testified he (1) had been a police

officer for 12 years; (2) specialized in digital forensics, which included the extraction,

examination, and analysis of cell data records; (3) participated in multiple specialized trainings,

including several trainings conducted by CellHawk; and (4) had performed over 420 extractions

of digital devices and completed cell data mapping in over 115 cases. Had defense counsel

objected to Harney’s qualifications, the objection would not only have been fruitless but would

have drawn attention to Harney’s extensive training and experience in cell phone data analysis.

See id. ¶ 14 (“It is axiomatic that a defense counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to

make a futile objection.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Defendant further offers nothing

to suggest the State could not have presented additional testimony as an expert. To the contrary,

Harney’s CV, which was provided to defense counsel, contained even more information on

Harney’s extensive work in cell phone data analysis. Because we have determined defendant has

- 29 - not satisfied the first Strickland prong, we need not address the second prong, whether defendant

was prejudiced by counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.

¶ 113 Defendant next claims, because the State did not lay a proper foundation for the

CellHawk program, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to its admission. He

contends Harney never testified regarding whether CellHawk was (1) generally accepted by

experts in his field or (2) working accurately at the time it generated results. See People v.

Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703, 707 (2001). Defendant correctly notes in his reply brief that the

State failed to address this argument in its appellee’s brief. “Arguments omitted from the

appellee’s brief and raised for the first time at oral argument are forfeited.” People v. McCoy,

2014 IL App (2d) 130632, ¶ 28. However, because forfeiture is a limitation on the parties but not

the courts, we choose to address this claim despite the State’s forfeiture. See People v. Boston,

383 Ill. App. 3d 352, 354 (2008).

¶ 114 Even if the first prong of Strickland was satisfied, the admission of the CellHawk

recording was harmless error. “[W]hen the competent evidence in the record establishes the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and it can be concluded that retrial without the

erroneous admission of the challenged evidence would produce no different result, the admission

of the improper evidence can be considered harmless error.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

People v. Diaz, 377 Ill. App. 3d 339, 349 (2007). If the CellHawk screen recording were not

admitted into evidence, the jury would have still learned of the whereabouts of defendant the

night of the murders through Hembrough’s testimony, which was corroborated through extensive

surveillance video footage taken from various locations surrounding 2517 South 10th Street.

Moreover, we cannot say there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome because even if

counsel had objected, it is likely that the State would have immediately cured the foundation

- 30 - deficiency by asking more questions concerning Harney’s knowledge and experience with the

CellHawk program. See id. at 350. Accordingly, even if we were to find the admission of the

CellHawk screen recording was error, it was harmless.

¶ 115 Likewise, we find Maddox’s testimony was harmless because he merely reiterated

what was testified to by Harney. Again, had Maddox not testified to the contents of the

CellHawk screen recording, the jury still could have relied on Hembrough’s testimony, in

conjunction with the surveillance videos, to find defendant guilty. Because defendant cannot

establish he was prejudiced by Harney’s or Maddox’s testimony, his ineffective-assistance claim

must fail.

¶ 116 2. Prior Consistent Statement

¶ 117 Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Pullings to

testify regarding Hembrough’s prior consistent statement because Hembrough’s motive to lie

predated the statement. He also argues counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting

instruction preventing the use of the statement as substantive evidence.

¶ 118 Illinois Rule of Evidence 613(c) (eff. Sept. 17, 2019) provides a witness’s prior

consistent statement is admissible to rebut an express or implied suggestion on cross-

examination the witness is motivated to testify falsely or the testimony is a recent fabrication.

People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 227 (1991). This exception applies only if “the prior

consistent statement was made before (1) the time of the fabrication; or (2) the existence of the

motive to lie.” People v. Wheeler, 186 Ill. App. 3d 422, 427 (1989). Further, a prior consistent

statement may only be admitted for the sole purpose of rehabilitating the witness and cannot be

used as substantive evidence. People v. Stull, 2014 IL App (4th) 120704, ¶ 99. A trial court’s

ruling admitting a prior consistent statement will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

- 31 - People v. Randolph, 2014 IL App (1st) 113624, ¶ 16. A court abuses its discretion where its

decision “was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable,” or where “no reasonable person would agree

with it.” Id.

¶ 119 During the defense’s cross-examination of Hembrough, counsel attempted to

damage Hembrough’s credibility. Counsel began his questioning by asking Hembrough why he

persisted in a plea of not guilty for over two and a half years, then suddenly pleaded guilty two

weeks before trial. Counsel then interrogated Hembrough over why he took the 20-year plea deal

in exchange for his testimony against defendant when he could have pleaded guilty without

entering a plea deal. Counsel questioned whether Hembrough was telling the truth at trial and

repeatedly accused him of lying in court.

¶ 120 Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing Pullings’s testimony because

Hembrough’s motive to lie arose when he voluntarily gave his statement to the police five days

before his conversation with Pullings. However, at that time, Hembrough was not a suspect, had

not been charged in the offense, and he had seen no discovery in the case. Moreover, we find it

notable the story Hembrough told the police in October 2021 was not the same story he told

Pullings. In fact, Hembrough’s statements to Pullings were far more inculpatory of his

participation in the crime than his statements to the police. In his October 2021 police interview,

Hembrough told the police he was not present at 2517 South 10th Street or involved in the crime

at all, but he later told Pullings he participated in the robbery and gave him details about the

crime that aligned with evidence later found at the scene. Furthermore, Hembrough did not admit

to the police he was present for the homicides at 2517 South 10th Street until the February 2022

interview. Thus, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Pullings to testify

to Hembrough’s prior consistent statement.

- 32 - ¶ 121 Defendant’s reliance on People v. Terry, 312 Ill. App. 3d 984 (2000), is

misplaced. In Terry, the witness gave a statement implicating the defendant in a shooting after

being taken in and questioned for two days at the police station, which meant the witness himself

might have been a suspect. Id. at 995. Here, Hembrough made his statement to Pullings, a fellow

inmate, prior to any indication he was a suspect or being charged in the case. He also talked to

Pullings five days after voluntarily giving a statement to the police where he denied any

involvement in the crimes. Hembrough did not speak to the police again until January 2022 and

was not charged with the murders until February 2022. On these facts, we cannot find

Hembrough had a motive to lie when he spoke with Pullings in October 2021.

¶ 122 Even if we were to find the trial court admitted Pullings’s testimony in error, this

would not warrant reversal in this case. “[A] court’s error in admitting prior consistent

statements will warrant reversal of the defendant’s conviction only when a reasonable probability

exists that the jury would have acquitted the defendant in the absence of the improperly admitted

prior consistent statements.” Stull, 2014 IL App (4th) 120704, ¶ 106. Pullings’s testimony, while

certainly damaging to codefendant Galmore, was much more speculative as to defendant’s

identity as the third perpetrator. Pullings testified Hembrough told him “Fats,” who he identified

in court as Galmore, was responsible for shooting the victim with the gold teeth. Pullings could

not remember how the other two victims died. While Pullings mentioned there was a third

individual who participated in the robbery and referred to this individual as “the white dude,” he

made no in-court identification of defendant. He also indicated Hembrough told him the third

perpetrator was a White person. Thus, even if Pullings’s testimony was admitted in error, it

would not have warranted a reversal because the jury could have reached the same result based

on other evidence implicating defendant in the murders.

- 33 - ¶ 123 Next, defendant argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) request a

limiting instruction for Pullings’s testimony and (2) object to the prosecutor’s comment

referencing Pullings’s testimony during closing argument. Under the Strickland standard,

defendant must show counsel’s performance was deficient and he was prejudiced by counsel’s

error. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “Even in cases where prior consistent statements are

properly admitted, such evidence must be accompanied by a limiting instruction informing the

jury that the evidence should not be considered for its truth, but only to rebut a charge of recent

fabrication.” Randolph, 2014 IL App (1st) 113624, ¶ 20. “Our supreme court has noted that

where the State argues that a prior consistent statement is the truth, and the jury is not instructed

that the evidence should be considered for a limited purpose, the statement is being used as

substantive evidence.” People v. Dupree, 2014 IL App (1st) 111872, ¶ 49. Here, counsel should

have requested an instruction informing the jury to use Pullings’s statements for rehabilitative

purposes only. Because the jury was not instructed to avoid considering Pullings’s testimony as

substantive evidence, counsel was deficient in this respect.

¶ 124 Having determined counsel’s performance was deficient, we must decide

whether, but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the

proceedings. First, we must reiterate that Pullings’s testimony, while damaging to Galmore, did

not meaningfully identify defendant as the third perpetrator. Second, absent Pullings’s statement,

Hembrough’s testimony was otherwise corroborated by numerous surveillance videos, cell site

location data, cell phone call logs, and ballistics evidence found at the scene. Therefore,

defendant cannot show there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had

counsel requested a limiting instruction.

¶ 125 Likewise, we find defense counsel’s failure to object to the State’s reference to

- 34 - Pullings’s testimony during closing argument did not prejudice defendant. “[I]t is improper for

the State to refer to the prior consistent statements as substantive evidence in closing arguments.”

Randolph, 2014 IL App (1st) 113624, ¶ 20. Even if we assume counsel was deficient for failing

to object to the prosecutor’s comment, as discussed above, there was sufficient evidence to

convict defendant. Accordingly, defendant cannot show counsel was ineffective for failing to

request a limiting instruction or failing to object during the State’s closing argument.

¶ 126 3. Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 127 Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Smith to testify

to other-crimes evidence that depicted defendant as someone who “always had a gun on him.”.

He further argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting instruction

regarding the other-crimes evidence.

¶ 128 Defendant contends he preserved this error for review. However, our review of

the record reveals otherwise. In response to a question from defense counsel during recross-

examination, Smith testified, “Yeah. Always see. [Defendant] always had a gun on him.”

Counsel asked one more question, and Smith left the stand. Thereafter, the trial court and the

parties discussed a sidebar on the record where counsel expressed his concern that Smith had

testified to impermissible other-crimes evidence. However, at no point did counsel object to or

move to strike Smith’s testimony. Given counsel’s awareness Smith’s testimony might introduce

other-crimes evidence, the grounds for this objection became apparent immediately after Smith

made the statement. “An objection to evidence is untimely if not asserted as soon as its ground

becomes apparent.” People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (4th) 220476, ¶ 34. Moreover, the “trial court

is not obligated to exclude improper evidence where a defendant makes no objection, does not

move to exclude it or does not disclaim the answers.” People v. Burage, 23 Ill. 2d 280, 283

- 35 - (1961). Therefore, we find defendant has forfeited this issue on review.

¶ 129 Forfeiture aside, defendant invited the error he now complains of. Smith’s

offending testimony was not elicited by the State but rather came out during defense counsel’s

re-cross-examination of Smith. “The State cannot be faulted for questions asked by defendant’s

counsel or responsible for its witnesses’ answers to those questions.” Brown, 2023 IL App (4th)

220476, ¶ 35. Defendant responds that defense counsel was “forced” by the State’s prior

questioning to delve into when Smith saw defendant with a gun. However, just before the

statement at issue, Smith testified he told the police he had seen defendant with a gun on another

occasion, but he did not see defendant with a gun at the party. Nevertheless, counsel again asked

Smith to clarify when he saw defendant with a gun on another occasion, to which Smith

answered with the allegedly improper statement. We cannot fault the State for defense counsel’s

decision to continue his line of questioning on when Smith saw defendant with a gun after he

already elicited the responses he sought from Smith.

¶ 130 Next, defendant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to request a limiting

instruction, such as Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (approved Oct. 17,

2014) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.14), regarding the other-crimes evidence testimony. To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, “ ‘a defendant must show both that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.’ ”

People v. Peel, 2018 IL App (4th) 160100, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496

(2010)). This court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s challenged action was the

product of sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “The decision to not request a

limiting instruction” has been found to be trial strategy “to avoid drawing undue attention to the

other-crimes evidence.” Peel, 2018 IL App (4th) 160100, ¶ 52.

- 36 - ¶ 131 Here, counsel’s performance was not deficient. The decision not to request IPI

Criminal No. 3.14 was likely trial strategy to avoid drawing more attention to Smith’s assertion

“[defendant] always had a gun on him.” Furthermore, it is unclear whether IPI Criminal No. 3.14

would have been appropriate in this case. IPI Criminal No. 3.14 is used when evidence is

admissible for one purpose, such as proving identity or intent, but not for another, such as

demonstrating propensity. See People v. Clark, 2015 IL App (1st) 131678, ¶ 28; Ill. R. Evid. 105

(eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Here, the other-crimes evidence was not admitted for another purpose, so

there was no proper purpose the trial court could have directed the jury to consider. A limiting

instruction would have drawn the jury’s attention to the statement, only for the court to then

instruct the jury to ignore the statement completely. Under these circumstances, it was not

objectively unreasonable for counsel to not request a limiting instruction. Because we have

determined counsel did not perform deficiently, we need not address the second prong of

Strickland. Accordingly, defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

¶ 132 C. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 133 Defendant argues the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing

argument when it personally vouched for Hembrough’s credibility and for suggesting the trial

judge had already determined Hembrough was truthful, depriving defendant of his right to a fair

trial. He acknowledges he has forfeited this issue but argues this court should review his claim as

(1) plain error or (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to preserve the issue for appeal.

¶ 134 Under the plain-error doctrine, this court may review unpreserved errors where

(1) “a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone

threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the

error,” or (2) “a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the

- 37 - fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of

the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). We first

determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred at trial. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445,

¶ 49.

¶ 135 Prosecutors have wide latitude in making closing argument and “may properly

comment on the evidence presented and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence,

respond to comments made by defense counsel that invite a response, and comment on the

credibility of a witness.” People v. Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 47. “However, a

prosecutor may not personally vouch for the credibility of a witness or bolster a witness’s

testimony.” Id. A prosecutor does not cross the line of personally vouching for a witness’s

credibility if the jury has to infer the prosecutor is expressing his personal views. Gilker, 2023 IL

App (4th) 220914, ¶ 130. Rather, the prosecutor “ ‘must explicitly state that he is asserting his

personal views, stating for example, “this is my personal view.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

(quoting People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 695, 707 (1996)).

¶ 136 A prosecutor’s comment during closing argument constitutes reversible error only

where the comment was (1) improper and (2) substantially prejudicial. People v. Williams, 2022

IL 126918, ¶ 41. The alleged improper remark should not be examined in isolation but rather

considered in the context of the entire closing argument. Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914,

¶ 125. This court reviews de novo whether a prosecutor’s comment during closing argument was

improper. Id. ¶ 127.

¶ 137 In this case, defendant complains of the following remarks made during the

State’s rebuttal closing argument:

“[Hembrough] accepted that and so if 20 years of your life is gone is a

- 38 - deal, but there was a catch. Not only would he lose 20 years of his life, he had to

tell the truth. And if he didn’t, that 20 years, it’s gone and he’s looking at a

potential life sentence. And not his version of the truth. Not even what the

prosecutors want to hear. The truth. The judge decides that. And so [Hembrough]

is not thinking to himself, what can I get away with? He is motivated to be

truthful now.”

¶ 138 We find these statements fall within the bounds of acceptable comments directed

at Hembrough’s credibility and the evidence in the case. During the State’s redirect examination,

Hembrough testified he agreed “[t]o give an honest and truthful statement” in exchange for a 20-

year sentence. He testified, if he was not honest and truthful, the State would “revoke the plea,

and [he would] face the full sentence of the charges.”

“A prosecutor who causes the promise of a witness to provide truthful testimony

pursuant to a plea agreement to be revealed has only revealed that the witness

agreed to tell the truth; the prosecutor has not expressed a personal opinion as to

whether the witness has actually complied with the agreement by telling the truth.

*** [B]ringing forth such an agreement does not constitute improper vouching for

the credibility of the witness.” People v. Garcia, 231 Ill. App. 3d 460, 473 (1992).

The State’s closing argument appropriately recounted the evidence as to Hembrough’s plea

agreement, including his promise to testify honestly and truthfully. Notably, the prosecutor did

not express his personal view as to whether Hembrough fulfilled this obligation under the

agreement.

¶ 139 Furthermore, when viewing the closing argument in its entirety, it becomes

apparent the prosecutor’s statement was made to rebut the defense’s remarks that Hembrough’s

- 39 - testimony was not truthful. See Marzonie, 2018 IL App (4th) 160107, ¶ 47 (stating that

depending on the context, a prosecutor may “respond to comments made by defense counsel that

invite a response[ ] and comment on the credibility of a witness”). In closing, Galmore’s counsel

attacked Hembrough’s credibility, arguing, “You know as well as I do Hembrough’s concocting

this story so he can get what he wants.” Galmore’s counsel then accused Hembrough of lying

throughout the investigation and declared, “He’s a liar then. He’s a liar now.” Defense counsel

also stressed Hembrough’s lack of credibility in closing, arguing, “Hembrough’s 100 percent

truth is our 100 percent bull crap.” The prosecutor responded in rebuttal by reminding the jury

that Hembrough was now motivated to testify truthfully under the terms of the plea agreement.

We do not find the prosecutor’s statement in response to defense counsel’s assertion about

Hembrough’s truthfulness amounted to vouching for Hembrough’s credibility.

¶ 140 The cases defendant relies on are factually distinguishable. In Marzonie, the

reviewing court found the prosecutor improperly offered his personal opinion on a witness’s

credibility when he argued the witness’s plea deal “ ‘had nothing to do with this case. She

testified she wasn’t promised anything, that this case had nothing to do with her case. You take

that as the truth. There is no evidence stating otherwise, and believe me, if there was, you would

hear about it.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 58. In People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st)

122745, ¶ 16, the reviewing court found the prosecutor improperly injected his view the witness

was truthful by arguing, “ ‘We don’t just take everything he says for truth immediately, we check

it out,’ ‘we corroborate’ and ‘don’t just *** take the word of anyone.’ ” Unlike Marzonie and

Williams, the prosecutor here neither explicitly asserted he was expressing his personal view as

to Hembrough’s credibility nor made any indication the State possessed information about

Hembrough that the jury did not have.

- 40 - ¶ 141 We also find the prosecutor’s comment regarding the trial judge did not usurp the

jury’s duty to assess Hembrough’s credibility. Rather, the prosecutor was merely explaining to

the jury the role of the judge as to the plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, Hembrough

agreed to tell the truth during his testimony, and it was the judge who would determine whether

Hembrough fulfilled that obligation. The prosecutor did not cross the line of asserting the judge

had already made the determination that Hembrough told the truth. Defendant’s argument is, in

essence, that the prosecutor’s comment created an inference from which the jury could

extrapolate the judge had already determined Hembrough’s truthfulness. However, as discussed

above, we will not find reversible error based solely on an inference a jury could have drawn

from a prosecutor’s comment. See Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914, ¶ 130. Additionally, the

jury received the following instruction:

“Only you are the judges of the believability of the witnesses and of the

weight to given to the testimony of each of them. In considering the testimony of

any witness, you may take into account his ability and opportunity to observe, his

memory, his manner while testifying, any interest, bias, or prejudice he may have,

and the reasonableness of his testimony considered in the light of all the evidence

in the case.”

See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (approved Dec. 8, 2011).

¶ 142 Thus, the jury was fully aware of its role as the sole decision-maker as to the

credibility of the witnesses. Defendant has failed to establish a clear or obvious error from the

prosecutor’s argument. “Absent a clear or obvious error ***, neither the doctrine of plain error

nor a theory of ineffective assistance affords any relief from the forfeiture.” People v. Jones,

2020 IL App (4th) 190909, ¶ 179. Consequently, defendant cannot prevail on his claim of plain

- 41 - error or ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 143 D. Proportionate Penalties Clause

¶ 144 Defendant contends his mandatory life sentence violates the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) and the trial court

abused its discretion. Alternatively, defendant argues, if the record is insufficient to evaluate his

claim, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to provide a sufficient record.

¶ 145 The Illinois Constitution mandates “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both

according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to

useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A statute violates the proportionate penalties

clause if “ ‘the punishment for the offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to

the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.’ ” People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186,

¶ 20 (quoting People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002)). In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,

489 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend.

VIII) prohibits mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder. In extending the

Miller court’s reasoning, the Illinois Supreme Court “has not foreclosed ‘emerging adult’

defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising as-applied proportionate penalties clause

challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain

development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87.

¶ 146 Defendant claims his mandatory life sentence violates the proportionate penalties

clause as it applies in this case, given he was 19 years old at the time of the offense and

experienced a difficult upbringing. A constitutional challenge to a statute may be facial or as

applied. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 38. “A facial challenge requires a showing that the

statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, whereas an as-applied challenge is dependent on

- 42 - the particular facts and circumstances of the challenging party.” People v. Williams, 2024 IL

127304, ¶ 25. “An as-applied constitutional challenge is a legal question that we review

de novo.” People v. Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 25.

¶ 147 Here, the trial court sentenced defendant pursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of

the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2024)). Under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii),

“the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment if the defendant, at

the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 18, and *** is found guilty of

murdering more than one victim.” Id.

¶ 148 We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to a

mandatory life sentence because the court had no discretion to sentence him to anything less

under section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code. See id. Although defense counsel briefly

referenced the proportionate penalties clause in his argument at sentencing and asked the court to

sentence defendant accordingly, as discussed below, the court lacked the requisite information to

properly address this argument.

¶ 149 Courts have emphasized the record must be sufficiently developed to address as-

applied challenges, including proportionate penalties arguments based on Miller or the

developing brains of young adults. See, e.g., Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46; People v. Thompson,

2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37. “[A] reviewing court is not capable of making an as-applied finding of

unconstitutionality in the ‘factual vacuum’ created by the absence of an evidentiary hearing and

findings of fact by the trial court.” Harris, 2018 IL 121392, ¶ 41. “Without an evidentiary record,

any finding that a statute is unconstitutional as applied is premature.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. ¶ 39.

¶ 150 We find this court’s reasoning in People v. Moore, 2025 IL App (4th) 240592-U,

- 43 - instructive. The defendant in Moore was 18 years old when he committed first degree murder

and was sentenced to 80 years in prison. Id. ¶ 2. The “[d]efendant’s trial counsel emphasized

[the] defendant’s youth at sentencing and in a motion to reconsider.” Id. ¶ 35. The PSI

documented the defendant’s lead poisoning diagnosis, various mental health disorders, and his

qualification for special education programs. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued the PSI

rendered the record sufficient to evaluate his proportionate penalties clause claim, and in the

alternative, any insufficiency in the record was due to counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id. ¶¶ 35, 41.

We held the PSI and the attached records were not sufficient to address the defendant’s claim, as

“written documentation in a PSI showing [the] defendant’s mental impairments does not

eliminate the need for sworn testimony and factual findings specifically addressing the basis of

the as-applied challenge.” Id. ¶ 40 (citing People v. Landerman, 2018 IL App (3d) 150684, ¶ 56).

As to the ineffective assistance claim, we found the defendant’s argument was premature

because we could not evaluate whether the defendant was prejudiced “without knowing what

testimony or other evidence counsel could have provided.” Id. ¶ 44.

¶ 151 Here, the record is even more sparse than the record in Moore, containing “only

basic information about defendant, primarily from the [PSI].” Harris, 2018 IL 121392, ¶ 46. The

record contains no data on the evolving science of juvenile maturity and brain development or

how that science applies to defendant’s specific circumstances. Furthermore, we reject the

State’s assertion that the sentencing hearing was an adequate substitute for an evidentiary

hearing on this matter. At sentencing, no sworn testimony was presented, and the trial court

made no factual findings addressing defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim. Therefore,

we find defendant’s as-applied challenge premature.

¶ 152 Alternatively, defendant argues defense counsel was ineffective for failing to

- 44 - sufficiently develop the record in the trial court. Criminal defendants have a right to the effective

assistance of counsel, including at sentencing. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XVI; Ill. Const. art. I,

§ 8; see People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 36. Thus, the defendant must show his

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and counsel’s deficient

performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 34.

¶ 153 We find defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim is also premature. Resolving

defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim at this juncture would require us to assume there was

sufficient evidence that could have been introduced to show the Miller considerations applied to

defendant as a young adult and would likely lead to a lesser sentence. Without knowing what

testimony or other evidence defense counsel could have presented, we cannot evaluate whether

defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence. See Moore, 2025

IL App (4th) 240592-U, ¶ 44.

¶ 154 Accordingly, we find the record is insufficient to address defendant’s as-applied

constitutional challenge. Because the claim is premature, defendant is not precluded from raising

it in a postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1

et seq. (West 2024)), where he can provide sworn testimony and evidence specific to his claim.

¶ 155 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 156 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 157 Affirmed.

- 45 -