People v. Martin

2024 IL App (1st) 221920-U

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 221920-U No. 1-22-1920 Order filed April 10, 2024 Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 20 CR 8749 ) GENOVE MARTIN, ) Honorable ) Angela M. Petrone, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice R. Van Tine concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s 18-year sentence for second-degree murder is affirmed over his contention that his sentence was excessive given the mitigating evidence.

¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Genove Martin was found guilty of second-degree murder

(720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) (West 2020)) and sentenced to 18 years in prison. On appeal, defendant No. 1-22-1920

argues that his sentence was excessive where the trial court did not give sufficient weight to the

mitigating evidence. We affirm.1

¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple counts arising from the death of Caleb

Reed. The State proceeded on two counts of first-degree murder while armed with a firearm.

¶4 At trial, Derrianna Ford, Reed’s girlfriend, testified that defendant and Reed were friends.

On July 31, 2020, she learned that Reed had been shot that day. Ford exchanged messages with

defendant, who told her that he had been standing next to Reed and “would tell” her more.

Defendant and Ford made plans to meet, but defendant did not appear and never told her what

happened. She saw defendant at a vigil for Reed and at his funeral.

¶5 Chicago police detective Ruben Weber testified that he canvassed the scene of the shooting

on West Granville Avenue. Footage from a security camera was recovered. Regular and slowed

versions of the video were published and entered into evidence. This court has viewed the video,

which is included in the record on appeal.

¶6 In the video, a group of four males walk down a sidewalk and a gray vehicle drives in the

same direction. The gray vehicle exits the frame and then reappears driving toward the group. The

gray vehicle pulls to the opposite side of the street from the males. The male in front of the group,

identified as defendant, gestures to the driver and looks over his left shoulder as he continues

walking in the opposite direction. The gray vehicle starts to drive away. Defendant then stops,

pulls a firearm from his pocket, and turns toward the gray vehicle. He plants his feet in a wide

stance, holds the firearm with both hands, and fires toward the gray vehicle as it drives away. All

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

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four males in the group run. Defendant continues shooting as he moves backwards. As the male in

the back of the group runs, he suddenly falls onto the sidewalk.

¶7 Jarrod Wieser testified for the defense as an eyewitness to the shooting. From his vehicle

at a stop sign at Granville and Damen Avenue, Wieser observed a vehicle about halfway to three-

quarters of the way down the block parked at an angle. Four young men were walking on the

sidewalk away from Wieser and past the parked vehicle. About five seconds later, Wieser saw

shots fired from the parked vehicle and the young men. The gunshots were close together and he

could not tell who shot first. The vehicle sped away and the young men ran. One man turned and

was shooting as he ran. On cross-examination, Wieser testified that he saw one or two people

shooting towards the vehicle, and shots were fired from the vehicle towards the group.

¶8 Defendant testified that he and his friends were walking when they encountered a Hispanic

man, whom they did not know, shouting and flashing gang signs at defendant’s group while the

man walked to a vehicle. Defendant and his friends kept walking. They noticed the same vehicle

return from the opposite direction and the man put a black and silver firearm in the air, but he did

not point it at them. The vehicle returned, approached “kind of fast,” and stopped in the middle of

the street. The man, who was in the vehicle, shouted “what are you?” and “[d]rop it,” referring to

gang affiliation. Defendant complied and hoped the man would leave them alone. The man started

shooting at them through the vehicle’s window. Defendant drew his firearm and shot back, fearing

that he and his friends would be shot or killed. After the shooting, defendant fled to a park, where

he threw his firearm in the garbage.

¶9 Defendant learned from a friend that Reed had been shot. When defendant returned to the

scene, he saw police and other emergency personnel. Defendant had left Reed because he was

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afraid that the man in the vehicle was still in the area. Defendant did not tell anyone what happened

because he was afraid to go to prison for having a firearm or defending himself. Defendant

exchanged messages with Ford shortly after the shooting, and he wanted to know the severity of

Reed’s injuries. At that point, defendant believed that the man in the vehicle had shot Reed.

Defendant was arrested on August 30, 2020. At the police station, after he had viewed the video

from the incident, defendant realized he may have accidentally shot Reed.

¶ 10 On cross-examination, defendant confirmed that after watching the video, he saw Reed

running towards him as he discharged his firearm. Defendant acknowledged seeing Reed fall in

the video, but denied that occurred when defendant discharged his firearm. When asked if he

agreed that it was a bullet he fired which killed Reed, defendant responded “Possibly. Yes.” He

also confirmed that on the day of the shooting, he did not go back to check on Reed or speak with

police about what had happened. Although he never visited Reed’s family to relate what happened,

he spoke briefly with Reed’s brother at the funeral about being shot at by a vehicle. Defendant

never told police he possessed a firearm on the day of the incident, and he stopped talking to police

when confronted with the video of the shooting.

¶ 11 The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree murder, which the trial

court merged. The court denied defendant’s motion for new trial.

¶ 12 Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) reflects that he was 18 years old at the

time of the incident. Defendant was raised by his mother and rarely spoke with his father. He had

a “great” relationship with his mother, siblings, wife, and 18-month-old son.

¶ 13 Defendant graduated from high school, where he was on the honor roll and involved with

extracurricular sports. He enrolled in Chicago State University, but was unable to attend due to

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this case. He hoped to attend college in the future. Defendant worked as a security officer for two

months until his arrest for the instant offense. Before that, he worked in customer service at a

laundromat for eight or nine months.

¶ 14 Defendant was diagnosed with PTSD while awaiting trial and was receiving treatment for

stress and anxiety due to this case. Defendant had no gang associations. Defendant tried alcohol

once or twice and disliked it, but he had smoked marijuana since he was 16 or 17 years old. He

denied a history of substance abuse.

¶ 15 At the sentencing hearing, the State presented victim impact testimony from Reed’s

mother, older sister, and family friend, as well as a letter from Reed’s father. All spoke of how

Reed was missed by his family and friends, and the joy he had brought them during his life.

¶ 16 Defense counsel introduced 12 letters from defendant’s mother, wife, friends, and other

members of the community. Letters were also submitted from the Chicago Bond Fund, which had

worked with defendant as he awaited trial, and Communities United, which defendant had worked

with prior to his incarceration. The letters attested to his good character, his dedication to his son,

and his close relationship with his family and friends. The letters also expressed that defendant felt

great remorse and experienced depression and PTSD from the incident. Defense counsel also

presented the testimony of defendant’s mother, wife, great aunt, and a family friend, who all

attested to defendant’s good nature and remorse. Defendant’s mother and wife also spoke about

how defendant had been his son’s primary caretaker in the months prior to trial, and that his son

had suffered from losing that contact with his father.

¶ 17 In allocution, defendant expressed remorse and apologized to Reed’s family.

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¶ 18 In aggravation, the State argued that the jury’s verdict reflected that defendant had a belief

in self-defense, but that belief was unreasonable. The State noted that defendant fired at a vehicle

that was driving away and no one in his group was injured by the man in the vehicle. Further,

defendant’s conduct in pointing a loaded firearm in the direction of the vehicle and his three

friends, who were mere feet from him, was “egregious.” It also highlighted that, though defendant

did not intend to harm Reed, he had several opportunities to avoid the shooting. The State argued

that the most significant factor in aggravation was the facts of the case and requested a “significant”

prison sentence.

¶ 19 In mitigation, defense counsel highlighted defendant’s good behavior and compliance with

electronic monitoring. Though defendant could not work on bond, he became the primary caretaker

of his son. Counsel then addressed several statutory factors, including that defendant had no

criminal history, his criminal conduct was unlikely to recur, he was unlikely to commit another

crime in light of his character and attitude, and he was likely to comply with probation. Counsel

requested that defendant receive probation, because the “case was so extraordinary.” Counsel also

highlighted that defendant was 18 years old at the time of the offense, had a favorable education

record and potential for rehabilitation, and expressed remorse. Counsel requested “the least

possible sentence.”

¶ 20 The trial court sentenced defendant to 18 years in prison. In announcing its sentence, the

court recited the trial evidence, noting that “defendant shot at the car before anybody in the car

shot at him or even verbally threatened him.” The court also noted defendant’s unwillingness to

come forward in the weeks following Reed’s death, and that he attended Reed’s funeral and vigil

without speaking to anyone about what occurred. The court remarked that defendant denied he had

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a firearm when the police arrested him a month later, even when confronted with the video

evidence, and he testified that Reed was possibly shot from a bullet from his firearm and did not

fall when defendant was shooting in his direction.

¶ 21 The court “considered the numerous letters advocating for the defendant,” which addressed

compassion, the opportunity for defendant to find redemption and live a meaningful life, his

remorse, and the negative effect defendant’s incarceration would have on his child. The court

referenced the PSI, which indicated “much of what’s already been said.” The court highlighted

that defendant graduated high school with good grades and, prior to this offense, he had substantial

employment. The court noted defendant was 18 years old at the time of the offense, and the jury

accepted defendant’s assertion of self-defense although his belief was unreasonable. The court

stated that it had “considered the facts of the case, all the statements that were presented from both

sides, and the defendant’s statement in allocution.”

¶ 22 The trial court also discussed the relevant statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation

in detail and stated that it “considered all of the factors in aggravation and mitigation” required by

the law. The court found that defendant had rehabilitative potential but his degree of participation

in the incident was “great.” The court further found that defendant had no criminal history and had

led a “law-abiding life” before this offense. The court did not believe defendant’s actions were

influenced by peer pressure, family, or any other negative influence. While the court found it

“inexplicable” that defendant chose to marry and “have a baby” while awaiting trial on charges

for first-degree murder, it agreed with counsel that defendant’s 1½ year-old child’s wellbeing

would be negatively affected by defendant’s absence and his incarceration would cause a hardship

to his family. The court considered it uncertain whether the circumstances are unlikely to recur,

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as it saw “some minimizing.” The court noted that “[t]he first remorse [it] heard at all from the

defendant was today” and defendant had previous opportunities “to indicate what he had done.”

¶ 23 Regarding factors in aggravation, the court believed the sentence was necessary to deter

others. The court found “most aggravating” that “defendant left his friend without helping him”

and then later “acted like he had nothing to do with it.” After reviewing the statutory factors, the

court noted that defendant would be eligible for probation after serving 50% of his 18-year

sentence, and that, in conjunction with time served on electronic monitoring, he could serve less

than 8 years in prison.

¶ 24 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence and a supplemental motion. In the motions,

defendant argued, inter alia, that the court did not consider mitigating factors, including his work

and educational background, lack of a criminal record or prior delinquency, unlikeliness that

criminal conduct would recur, letters of support, and family impact statements reflecting the

negative effects of his absence on his infant child. The trial court denied the motion.

¶ 25 On appeal, defendant contends that his 18-year sentence for second-degree murder was

excessive. He argues that the court failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating evidence,

including that defendant is unlikely to re-offend where the jury determined that the offense was

prompted by an unreasonable belief in self-defense, his lack of criminal history, his remorse, his

education and employment history, the impact on his young child, and his supportive family.

¶ 26 The Illinois Constitution provides that a trial court shall impose a sentence balancing “the

seriousness of the offense” and “the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill.

Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The trial court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence. People v.

Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). Where a defendant challenges a sentence within the

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statutory limits for the offense, this court will not disturb it absent an abuse of discretion. People

v. Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600, ¶¶ 35-36. In the sentencing context, an abuse of discretion

occurs when a sentence is “manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v.

Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 50. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that

of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the sentencing factors differently.

Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213.

¶ 27 In fashioning a sentence, the sentencing court must balance the retributive and

rehabilitative purposes of punishment, which includes carefully considering all factors in

aggravation and mitigation. People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109 (2002). These factors

include “the defendant’s age, demeanor, habits, mentality, credibility, criminal history, general

moral character, social environment, and education, as well as the nature and circumstances of the

crime and of defendant’s conduct in the commission of it.” Id. A trial court is not required to recite

and assign a value to each factor. People v. Williams, 2019 IL App (1st) 173131, ¶ 21. However,

the seriousness of the crime is the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence,

and there is no requirement for the court “to give greater weight to mitigating factors than to the

seriousness of the offense, nor does the presence of mitigating factors either require a minimum

sentence or preclude a maximum sentence.” People v. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st) 122345, ¶ 123.

The trial court is presumed to have properly considered all mitigating factors and rehabilitative

potential before it, and the defendant bears the burden to affirmatively show the contrary. People

v. Brazziel, 406 Ill. App. 3d 412, 434 (2010).

¶ 28 In this case, defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder, a Class 1 felony offense

with a sentencing range of 4 to 20 years in prison. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(d) (West 2020); 730 ILCS 5/5-

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4.5-30(a) (West 2020). Because his 18-year sentence is within the statutory range for second-

degree murder, we must presume it is proper barring affirmative evidence to the contrary. People

v. Villalobos, 2020 IL App (1st) 171512, ¶ 73.

¶ 29 Nevertheless, defendant argues that his 18-year sentence was excessive as the trial court

did not properly consider the mitigating evidence and unique circumstances. We disagree.

¶ 30 Here, defendant offers no evidence, other than the sentence imposed, to show that the trial

court did not properly consider the mitigating evidence. See People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st)

140134, ¶ 19 (the trial court is presumed to have considered the mitigating evidence presented

“absent some indication to the contrary, other than the sentence itself”). Indeed, the record shows

the trial court expressly considered the same mitigating factors defendant raises before this court.

¶ 31 The trial court stated that it considered the letters in support submitted by defendant and

the applicable statutory factors in mitigation and aggravation, and also recited the relevant

information reflected in the PSI. Specifically, the trial court found that defendant had rehabilitative

potential, lacked a criminal history, graduated high school with good grades, and had substantial

prior employment history. The court also acknowledged the negative impact his incarceration

would have on his family and child. 2 However, the trial court found “most aggravating”

defendant’s own actions following the shooting, emphasizing that “defendant left his friend

without helping him” and later “acted like he had nothing to do with it.”

¶ 32 As noted, the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence is the

seriousness of the offense, and there is no requirement for the trial court to give greater weight to

2 In his brief on appeal, defendant asserts the trial court mistakenly surmised that his child was conceived after the offense. Regardless, the trial court’s comments reflect that it thoroughly considered the effect of defendant’s incarceration on his child.

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the mitigating factors than the severity of the offense. People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063,

¶ 11. Defense counsel argued the mitigating evidence and mitigating factors in an attempt to secure

a lesser sentence, but the term imposed reflects that the court was not convinced to do so given the

circumstances of the case. Defendant does not provide affirmative evidence rebutting the

presumption that the sentencing court considered the relevant mitigating evidence. To the contrary,

our review of the record shows that the trial court adequately considered all of the relevant

mitigating evidence. Defendant is, essentially, requesting that we reweigh the same factors in

aggravation and mitigation and independently conclude that the sentence was excessive, which we

will not do. People v. McWilliams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130913, ¶ 28.

¶ 33 In conclusion, we do not find defendant’s 18-year sentence for second-degree murder,

which is within the applicable statutory sentencing range for the offense, at variance with the spirit

and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. See People

v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

sentencing defendant to 18 years in prison.

¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

¶ 35 Affirmed.

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