People v. Martin

2023 IL App (1st) 220252-U

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 220252-U

FIRST DIVISION September 25, 2023

No. 1-22-0252

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. v. ) ) No. 18 CR 60203 JONATHAN MARTIN, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Timothy J. Joyce, ) Judge Presiding. )

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The circuit court properly concluded that it could not consider good-time credit in determining the maximum treatment period for a civilly committed defendant, who was previously adjudged unfit to stand trial and “not not guilty” of the crime charged.

¶2 Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court committed the 53-year-old defendant,

Jonathan Martin, to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services (DHS) pursuant to No. 1-22-0252

section 104-25(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-

25(g) (West 2018)) for a period of seven years, not to exceed August 28, 2025. On appeal, the

defendant challenges the length of his commitment. He asserts that under the 2009 amendments to

section 104-25(g) of the Criminal Code, section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections

(Corrections Code) (hereinafter the Truth in Sentencing Act) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018))

applies to determining the length of a civil commitment for a defendant previously found unfit to

stand trial and “not not guilty” of the crime charged. He therefore asserts that he was entitled to

serve only 85% of his seven-year commitment term. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On June 14, 2018, the defendant, who has a history of mental illness, was arrested, and

subsequently charged with five counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1), (a)(4),

(c), (d)(1), (f)(1) (West 2018)), for throwing a brick at the 71-year-old victim, Virginia Brennan,

and striking her in the back.

¶5 On August 28, 2018, the circuit court held a fitness hearing to determine the defendant’s

fitness to stand trial. At that hearing, the State offered the stipulated testimony of licensed clinical

psychologist, Dr. Erick Neu. If called to testify, Dr. Neu would have stated that based on his

evaluation, the defendant was disorganized, delusional, paranoid, and unable to understand the

nature and purpose of the proceedings against him. It was Dr. Neu’s opinion, however, that the

defendant could be restored to fitness within one year. Based on this stipulation, the circuit court

found the defendant unfit to stand trial and remanded him to the custody of DHS for treatment for

the statutory period of one year pursuant to section 104-16 of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/104-

16 (West 2018)).

¶6 On September 5, 2019, the circuit court held a discharge hearing (725 ILCS 5/104-25(a)

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(West 2018)). At that hearing, the parties stipulated that if called to testify, the defendant’s treating

psychiatrist, Dr. Timothy Olenek, would state that the defendant suffers from schizoaffective

disorder, bipolar type, and that despite his compliance with psychotropic medications and

treatment, he remains unfit to stand trial and is unlikely to attain fitness.

¶7 The victim, Virginia, next testified that on June 14, 2018, she was driving her car with her

husband in the passenger seat in the alley between North Lowell and Kostner Avenues. Virginia

stopped her car at the crosswalk located at the mouth of the alley because she noticed the defendant

standing on the sidewalk. When Virginia motioned the defendant to cross, he just stood there

angrily talking to himself. When Virginia and her husband continued to motion to the defendant,

urging him to cross the sidewalk, he “gave [them] the finger,” and then threw a brick at the

windshield of their car, shattering the glass. As Virginia’s husband called the police, Virginia

exited the car and followed the defendant, asking him why he had thrown the brick at them. As

Virginia followed the defendant, another woman driving along the street, yelled at the defendant:

“[H]ey buddy, drop the brick.” The defendant continued down the street, but when the woman’s

vehicle stopped at the next light, he threw the brick at the trunk of her car. The brick bounced back,

and when Virginia, who was still following the defendant, saw the defendant pick it up again and

turn towards her, she started running because she “knew” she was in danger. As she ran, the

defendant threw the brick at her, hitting her back. Virginia nearly fell in the middle of the street,

but crawled to the parkway, where several parkgoers approached to help. She was subsequently

transported by ambulance to Swedish Covenant Hospital where she was treated for a fracture of

the L4 vertebrae.

¶8 Based on this evidence, the circuit court found the defendant “not not guilty” of aggravated

battery pursuant to section 104-25(d) of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/104-25(d) (West 2018)).

3 No. 1-22-0252

The court further found that the defendant continued to remain unfit to stand trial and that there

was no substantial probability that he would regain fitness within the statutory period of one year.

The court therefore ordered that the defendant undergo an extended term treatment (of 15 months)

until December 5, 2020. See 725 ILCS 5/104-25(d)(1) (West 2018).

¶9 On June 7, 2021, upon the State’s motion, the circuit court held a civil commitment hearing

(725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) (West 2018)) at which two expert psychiatrists testified regarding the

defendant’s mental state. Dr. Timothy Olenek, who treated the defendant from 2018 to 2020, first

opined that the defendant remained unfit to stand trial and in all probability was not likely to

become fit, and that he constituted a threat to public safety. Dr. Olenek reiterated that the defendant

was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and explained that this was a chronic

mental illness, which includes mood swings, psychotic episodes, and disorganized and delusional

thinking. Dr. Olenek stated that prior to his current admission for treatment, between 1993 and

2014, the defendant had been previously admitted to DHS nine times. Dr. Olenek acknowledged

that during his current treatment at DHS, the defendant has exhibited no aggression and has been

compliant with medication. He stated, however, that the defendant refuses to partake in any group

therapy and to acknowledge that he suffers from a mental illness. In fact, the defendant “still

remains very paranoid” and thinks that he was the victim of the crime. Based on the defendant’s

lack of community support, Dr. Olenek opined that if the defendant was released and stopped

taking his antipsychotic medication, he would relapse.

¶ 10 The defendant’s current treating psychiatrist, Dr. Syed Hussain, testified consistently with

Dr. Olenek. He opined that the defendant remained unfit to stand trial and was unlikely to attain

fitness because he does not understand either the charges against him or the seriousness of the

crime and the injuries that he caused the victim. Dr. Hussain further opined that if the defendant

4 No. 1-22-0252

were to be released and to stop taking his antipsychotic medication he would “most certainly”

relapse because he lacks any community support. According to Dr. Hussain, the defendant poses

a serious danger to the public at large and to any individuals with whom he comes into contact

because he is unaware of his mental illness and because the risk of relapse is “extremely high.”

¶ 11 After hearing this evidence, the circuit court found that the defendant continued to remain

unfit to stand trial. The court further found that the defendant remained a danger to himself and

others and a serious threat to public safety. The court therefore ordered that pursuant to section

104-25(g)(2) of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(2) (West 2018)) the defendant be

involuntarily civilly committed to the custody of DHS for the maximum permitted term of seven

years from the date of the original finding of unfitness.

¶ 12 On July 1, 2021, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider asking the circuit court to

modify the length of his involuntary commitment. In his motion, the defendant conceded that he

was subject to the maximum term of commitment of seven years based on the fact that he was

charged with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(a)(1), (a)(4), (c), (d)(1), (f)(1) (West 2018)),

which is a Class 2 felony, normally punishable by three to seven years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS

5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West 2018)). The defendant nonetheless argued that he was entitled to good time

credit served. He claimed that had he been convicted in a criminal proceeding and sentenced to

seven years, that sentence would have been served at 85% pursuant to the Truth in Sentencing Act

(730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018)) such that his maximum sentence would have been 2,172 days.

The defendant therefore requested that his commitment term be modified and that he be released

from DHS custody no later than August 8, 2024.

¶ 13 On February 22, 2022, the circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider,

finding that the Truth in Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018)) applies only to criminal

5 No. 1-22-0252

defendants and not to involuntarily civilly committed patients, like the defendant. The defendant

now appeals.

¶ 14 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it found that the Truth

in Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018)) does not apply to civilly committed

defendants like himself. The defendant asserts that when the legislature amended section 104-

25(g)(4) of the Criminal Code (see P.A. 95-1052, § 85 eff. July 1, 2009) to include a reference to

section 5-4.5 of the Corrections Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5 (West 2018)) it intended for the Truth

in Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018)) to apply to civil commitment proceedings.

He therefore asserts that the maximum term to which he should have been involuntarily

committed to DHS was 85% of the maximum seven-year sentence to which he would have been

condemned had he been convicted of the crime charged, or until April 8, 2024. For the following

reasons, we disagree.

¶ 16 It is axiomatic that the interpretation of a statute is a legal question subject to de novo

review. People v. Miles, 2017 IL App (1st) 132719, ¶ 26. The fundamental principal of statutory

construction “is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” In re Detention of

White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 45; see also People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277, 287 (2010).

The most reliable indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory

language itself. White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 45; Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d at 287. In determining

the plain meaning of statutory terms, a court must consider the statute in its entirety and keep in

mind the subject the statute addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting that

statute. White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 45; Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d at 287. If the statutory

language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resorting to further

6 No. 1-22-0252

aids of statutory construction. White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187, ¶ 45; Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d at 287.

¶ 17 If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, “ ‘we may look to other sources to

ascertain the legislature’s intent.’ ” Watson v. Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, L.L.C.,

2021 IL App (1st) 210279, ¶ 42 (quoting Maschek v. City of Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520,

¶ 44); see also Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 395 (2003). “ ‘These other sources

include primarily the statute’s legislative history and debates.’ ”Id.

¶ 18 The statute at issue in this appeal reads:

“In no event may the treatment period be extended to exceed the maximum sentence to

which a defendant would have been subject had he or she been convicted in a criminal

proceeding. For the purposes of this Section, the maximum sentence shall be determined

by Section 5-8-1 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) or Article 4.5 of Chapter V of the “Unified Code of

Corrections [730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-5 et seq.], excluding any sentence of natural life.”

(Emphasis added) 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(4) (West 2018).

¶ 19 The parties agree that prior to 2009, section 104-25(g)(4) of the Criminal Code

referenced only section 5-8-1 of the Corrections Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1) for determining the

maximum commitment period allowed and that courts construing that version of the statute

consistently held that involuntarily civilly committed defendants were not entitled to good time

credit because the plain language of the statute did not provide for it. See People v. Williams, 142

Ill. App. 3d 858, 861-64 (1986); People v. Rasgaitis, 222 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861 (1991). The

parties further agree that in 2009, P.A. 95-1052 added the additional reference to “Article 4.5 of

the ‘Unified Code of Corrections’” (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-5) as relevant to determining the

maximum commitment period permitted under the Criminal Code. See P.A. 95-1052, § 85, eff.

July 1, 2009.

7 No. 1-22-0252

¶ 20 On appeal, however, the parties disagree as to the impact that this additional language

had on section 104-25(g)(4). Specifically, they dispute whether the reference to Article 4.5 of the

Corrections Code discloses a legislative intent that the Truth in Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-

3 (West 2010)) be applied to the determination of the maximum treatment period permitted for

involuntarily civilly committed defendants who were previously found unfit to stand trial and

“not not guilty” after a discharge hearing.

¶ 21 The defendant contends that the plain language of the 2009 amendment to section 104-

25(g) explicitly references Article 4.5 of the Corrections Code, which unlike the original version

of section 5-8-1 of that Code, directly provides that the Truth in Sentencing Act is to be applied

in calculating the maximum prison sentence for criminal offenders. The defendant therefore

asserts that by including this additional refence in the 2009 amendment, the legislature clearly

intended that the Truth in Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018)) be applied in

calculating the maximum treatment period permitted for involuntarily civilly committed

defendants, such as himself.

¶ 22 The State, on the other hand, asserts that this amendment did not make any substantive

changes to the Criminal Code or the method by which trial courts are to calculate the maximum

treatment period for civilly committed defendants. According to the State, the purpose of P.A.

95-1052 was to reorganize and renumber the Corrections Code with respect to the sentencing of

offenses. The State posits that after that amendment, Article 4.5 merely replaced section 5-8-1 of

the Corrections Code in designating which sentence should be applied to each level of felony

offense. The State therefore asserts that under the plain reading of the amended statute, the Truth

in Sentencing Act (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3 (West 2018)) does not apply to civilly committed persons

such as the defendant.

8 No. 1-22-0252

¶ 23 For the following reasons, we agree with the State and conclude that the legislature did

not intend for the 2009 amendment to apply good time credit to defendants found “not not

guilty” and subject to involuntary civil commitment.

¶ 24 At the outset, we note that the plain language of the amended version of section 104-

25(g)(4) is ambiguous. See People v. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 13 (A statute is ambiguous “if

it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different

ways.”).

¶ 25 The plain language of that amended section instructs trial courts to look to Article 4.5 of

the Corrections Code in determining the maximum treatment period permitted for civilly

committed defendants found “not not guilty” of the crime charged. P.A. 95-1052, § 85, eff. July

1, 2009; 725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(4) (West 2018). Section 104-25(g) explicitly states that:

“[i]n no event may the treatment period be extended to exceed the maximum sentence to

which a defendant would have been subject had he or she been convicted in a criminal

proceeding. For the purposes of this Section, the maximum sentence shall be determined

by *** Article 4.5.” Id.

¶ 26 Article 4.5, in turn provides that “a sentence of imprisonment” for the commission of a

Class 2 felony, such as the one with which the defendant was charged in the instant case, shall be

“a determinate sentence not less than 3 years and not more than 7 years.” See P.A. 95-1052, §

85, eff. July 1, 2009; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018). Section 35(j) of Article 4.5 further

instructs that for Class 2 felonies, the court should “see Section 3-6-3 of this Code” (i.e., the

Truth in Sentencing Act) for rules and regulations determining early release based on “good

conduct.” See P.A. 95-1052, § 85, eff. July 1, 2009; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(j) (West 2018).

¶ 27 However, section 100 of Article 4.5 titled “Calculation of Term of Imprisonment” then

9 No. 1-22-0252

directs trial courts in the following ambiguous manner:

“(a) COMMENCEMENT. A sentence of imprisonment shall commence on the

date on which the offender is received by the Department or the institution at which the

sentence is to be served.

(b) CREDIT; TIME IN CUSTODY; SAME CHARGE. The offender shall be

given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term and the minimum period of

imprisonment for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence

was imposed, at the rate specified in Section 3-6-3 (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3). Except when

prohibited by subsection (d), the trial court may give credit to the defendant for time

spent in home detention, or when the defendant has been confined for psychiatric or

substance abuse treatment prior to judgment, if the court finds that the detention of

confinement was custodial.” See P.A. 95-1052, § 85, eff. July 1, 2009; 730 ILCS 5/5-

4.5-100 (West 2018).

¶ 28 For a defendant, such as the one here, charged with a Class 2 aggravated battery, the “rate

specified in Section 3-6-3” is the receipt of “no more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each

month of his *** sentence of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2018).

¶ 29 There are two possible readings of the aforementioned plain language of the amended

statute. On the one hand, section 100 of Article 4.5 can be read together with section 104-

25(g)(4), to require courts to apply good credit at the rate specified by the Truth in Sentencing

Act in calculating the maximum prison sentence for criminal offenders, and thereby

correspondingly the maximum treatment period for civilly committed defendants. See P.A. 95-

1052, § 85, eff. July 1, 2009; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2018) (“The offender shall be

given credit on the determinate sentence or maximum term *** at the rate specified in Section 3-

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6-3.”); (725 ILCS 5/104-25(g)(4) (“[i]n no event may the treatment period be extended to exceed

the maximum sentence to which a defendant would have been subject had he or she been

convicted in a criminal proceeding. For the purposes of this Section, the maximum sentence shall

be determined by *** Article 4.5.”).

¶ 30 On the other hand, because the second sentence of section 100 of Article 4.5 merely gives

trial courts discretion to give defendants credit for time spent “confined for psychiatric treatment

prior to judgment” if the court also finds that the confinement was “custodial,” the statute can be

read as trying to distinguish between two different classes of defendants—i.e., those convicted

and sentenced for the crimes charged, who are entitled to good credit under the Truth in

Sentencing Act, and those civilly committed prior to a judgment of guilt or innocence, whose

entitlement to credit will depend on the trial court’s discretion and the type of psychiatric

confinement they received. See P.A. 95-1052, § 85, eff. July 1, 2009; 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100

(West 2018).

¶ 31 This second interpretation is further supported by the different treatment the amended

statute affords defendants found guilty by reason of insanity. Unlike subsection (g)(4),

subsection (c) of section 104-25 of the Criminal Code, which deals with such defendants,

provides that to determine their sentences a court should look to section 5-2-4 of the Corrections

Code (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4). That section, in turn, states that if a defendant found not guilty by

reason of insanity needs inpatient mental health services, “[s]uch period of commitment shall not

exceed the maximum length of time that the defendant would have been required to serve, less

credit for good behavior as provided in Section 5-4-1 of the Unified Code of Corrections.”

(Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b). There is no corresponding language in subsection (g) or

Article 4.5 that states good time credit must be given to defendants found unfit to stand trial and

11 No. 1-22-0252

“not not guilty” of the crime charged.

¶ 32 Accordingly, because there is more than one interpretation of the plain language of the

amended statute, we must turn to legislative history to determine the legislature’s intent. Watson,

2021 IL App (1st) 210279, ¶ 42 (where a statute is ambiguous, we may look to other sources

such as the statute’s “legislative history and debates” to ascertain the legislature’s intent); see

also Maschek, 2015 IL App (1st) 150520, ¶ 44 (when interpreting an ambiguous statute, courts

look to legislative discussions); see also K. Miller Const. Co. Inc. v. McGinnis, 238 Ill. 2d 284,

299 (2010) (while an amendatory change in the language of a statute creates a presumption that it

was intended to change the law as it previously existed,” this presumption “is not controlling”

and “may be overcome by other considerations,” such as demonstrated legislative intent); see

also Krohe v., 204 Ill. 2d at 395; In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 68; Julie Q.

v. Department of Children & Family Services, 2013 IL 113783, ¶ 31.

¶ 33 The legislative discussions, which occurred prior to the passage of the statutory

amendment reveal that the legislature did not intend to substantively change the Criminal Code.

During the Illinois Senate General Assembly hearings regarding the 2009 statutory amendments,

Senator Cullerton explained that P.A. 95-1052, introduced as Senate Bill 100:

“comes from the CLEAR Commission, which is a commission that Senator Dillard and I

serve on, which is rewriting the Criminal Code. This particular aspect of the rewrite is to

codify the sentencing provisions of the Code of Corrections. Does not make any

substantive changes, but -- recodifies them and puts them in a different order. And it does

codify some Illinois Supreme Court decisions that control the implementation and the

effect of these provisions. The purpose is to make the sentencing provisions easier for

judges and attorneys and -- to understand and to reduce the number of resentencing

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hearings caused by improper dispositions.” (Emphasis added.) 95th Ill. Gen. Assem.,

Senate Proceedings, May 25, 2007, at 14-15 (statements of Senator Cullerton).

¶ 34 Similarly, during the Illinois House of Representatives General Assembly, Representative

Turner explained that the purpose of P.A. 95-1052 was to “codify the sentencing Code so that we

can go to one section in the Criminal Code and be able to determine what sentence should be

given for the particular crime committed.” 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November

20, 2008, at 31 (statements of Representative Turner). Representative Durkin further stated that:

“This is strictly just a reorganization Bill that’s going to help practitioners, not only the court,

the judges, but also the prosecutors, the public defenders and private attorneys who are defense

counsel.” (Emphasis added.) 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, November 20, 2008, at

33 (statements of Representative Durkin).

¶ 35 These comments make it abundantly clear that the legislature did not envision any

substantive changes to the Criminal Code.

¶ 36 In fact, the legislature codified its intent not to make any substantive changes in the

Criminal Code when it wrote Article 4.5. Specifically, section 990(b) of that article reads in

pertinent part:

“A provision of this Article 4.5 or any other provision of this amendatory Act of the 95th

General Assembly that is the same or substantially the same as a prior law shall be

construed as a constitution of the prior law and not as a new or different law.” 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-990(b).

¶ 37 The legislature’s intent for the statute’s application to remain unchanged is further

demonstrated by the simultaneous amendment to section 5-8-1 of the Corrections Code. Prior to

the passage of P.A. 95-1052, which created Article 4.5 of the Code of Corrections, section 5-8-1

13 No. 1-22-0252

of that Code read:

“[E]xcept as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, for a Class X felony,

the sentence shall be not less than 6 years and not more than 30 years;(4) for a Class 1

felony, other than second degree murder, the sentence shall be not less than 4 years and

not more than 15 years;(5) for a Class 2 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 3 years

and not more than 7 years;(6) for a Class 3 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 2

years and not more than 5 years;(7) for a Class 4 felony, the sentence shall be not less

than 1 year and not more than 3 years.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2008).

¶ 38 After the enactment of P.A. 95-1052, the above language was removed and recodified in

the newly created Article 4.5. Because there is no longer any reference to these sentencing

provisions in section 5-8-1, the addition of Article 4.5 in its place evinces the legislature’s intent

to provide a new path to finding the same sentencing provisions.

¶ 39 Because the new version of section 104-25(g)(4) is substantially the same as the pre-2009

statute, we must construe it as continuation of the prior law. Since the original version of the

statute did not allow involuntarily civilly committed defendants found unfit to stand trial and

“not not guilty” of the charged crime to receive good time credit under the Truth in Sentencing

Act, we find that under the amended statute, the defendant here is similarly not entitled to any.

See Williams, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 861-64 (holding that under the original statute, “the legislature

specifically intended to exclude good-time credit from those defendants who have been

involuntarily civilly committed after being found unfit to stand trial”; noting that the statute

clearly distinguishes between defendants who have already been adjudicated guilty or innocent

and are entitled to good time credit and those who were involuntarily civilly committed after

being found unfit to stand trial, and who are not entitled to good credit because they are “no

14 No. 1-22-0252

longer consider[ed] *** criminal[s]”); see Rasgaitis, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 857 (following

Williams).

¶ 40 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 41 For these reasons, we find that the trial court properly held that the Truth in Sentencing

Act does not apply to the defendant in the instant case. We therefore affirm the seven-year

commitment period imposed by the trial court.

¶ 42 Affirmed.