2020 IL App (1st) 1-17-1151-U
FIRST DIVISION May 4, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) Cook County, Criminal Division. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 14 CR 21541 ) KEITH MARTIN, ) ) Honorable ) Joseph M. Claps, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE GRIFFIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hyman and Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective. The trial court did not arbitrarily or automatically consider defendant’s claim of innocence as an aggravating factor during sentencing.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant Keith Martin was convicted of shooting his girlfriend and
fatally shooting her son. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms of 15 years for
aggravated discharge of a firearm and 55 years for first-degree murder. Defendant appeals, and
claims his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Defendant separately contends that the trial No. 17-1151
court arbitrarily increased his sentence after he asserted his innocence during allocution. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On July 18, 2014, defendant was arrested in Wisconsin for the shooting of Anita Pierce-
Thompson (Anita) and shooting death of her son, Addarrius Thompson. Defendant waived his
Miranda rights, agreed to speak with Chicago Police Officers and denied any involvement in the
shootings, which took place on July 12, 2014. Defendant told the officers that he was with Mona
Ford on the night in question and therefore, could not have committed the crimes. Following his
extradition to Illinois, defendant was charged with several criminal offenses, including aggravated
battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2014)) and first-degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2014); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2014)). Defendant’s case was tried
before a judge on February 15, 2017.
¶5 A. Opening Statements
¶6 The State told the trial court that defendant was in a dating relationship with Anita. They
shared an apartment and Anita’s two adult sons, Addarrius and Angelo, stayed with them. After
Angelo allegedly beat up his girlfriend at the apartment, defendant called the police. This event
caused a rift in the family. Defendant got into a dispute with Angelo, and another argument erupted
between defendant and Addarrius. Defendant wanted them out of the apartment and grew
increasingly agitated with the situation. On July 12, 2014, he walked into Anita’s apartment and
shot and killed Addarrius. On his way out, defendant shot Anita in the chest.
¶7 Defense counsel opened by stating that the witnesses would not place defendant at the
scene of crime. He alluded that there was “an issue with this young lady, the victim that lived, who
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purports to be this gentlemen’s girlfriend and how she is the witness to this” and concluded by re-
emphasizing that the evidence would fail to place defendant at the scene.
¶8 B. Anita Pierce-Thompson
¶9 Anita testified that in July of 2014, she and defendant were living together in a three-
bedroom apartment in Chicago. The building was a two-flat and she lived on the second floor.
Defendant’s name was on the lease, but Anita paid the rent. Her elderly mother and two adult sons,
Addarrius and Angelo, lived in the apartment with her. Anita’s mother passed away before trial.
¶ 10 On the night of July 10, 2014, a fight broke out at the apartment between Angelo and his
girlfriend. She sustained an eye injury during the fight and defendant was “upset” with Angelo,
“just plain angry.” Defendant called the police. Paramedics took Angelo’s girlfriend to the hospital
and Angelo left the apartment. Defendant stayed the night.
¶ 11 The next day, July 11, 2014, defendant got into an argument with Angelo at the apartment.
Defendant called the police a second time. Angelo and his girlfriend left the apartment around
10:00 p.m. or 11:30 p.m. Anita told defendant it was “bogus” for him to have called the police.
Another argument erupted on the front porch, this time between defendant and Addarius.
Defendant demanded that Addarrius give him the keys to the apartment and leave. Anita heard
defendant say there were “three people that got to go.”
¶ 12 Anita tried to escape the situation by watching television in her bedroom, but defendant
broke the television antenna in half. He then left the apartment in his gray Ford pickup truck.
Defendant’s truck was “very loud” because the “muffler had fell out or something.” Addarrius
walked to the corner store and defendant returned to the apartment while he was out.
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¶ 13 Anita testified that defendant was “hostile.” Defendant demanded that she tell him where
Addarrius was hiding. Anita walked downstairs to the front porch and tried to call her mother, who
was still in the apartment. Defendant grabbed Anita’s cell phone, broke it in half, and threw it into
the neighbor’s yard. She retrieved the phone and took a seat next to defendant on the porch.
¶ 14 At that moment, defendant pulled a gun from his waistband, placed it to the middle of
Anita’s chest and “pulled the trigger three times.” Anita heard a “click, click, click,” but no bullets
discharged from the gun. Defendant told Anita, “[d]on’t worry about it. It’s just a play gun. It ain’t
real.” Anita got up and walked down the street.
¶ 15 At some point, Anita turned around and started walking back to the apartment building.
When she was several houses away, Anita heard a gunshot. She reached her apartment and saw
defendant coming down the stairs. He was “angry” and “appeared to be in a rush.” They met at the
bottom of the stairs and defendant grabbed Anita’s left wrist. He shook it and told her not to ever
walk away from him again. Defendant then placed his gun to Anita’s left breast and pulled the
trigger. This time the gun discharged. Anita was shot.
¶ 16 Defendant left in his truck and Anita climbed the stairs to her apartment. She found her
son, Addarrius, lying dead on living room floor. Her grandmother was standing over him. Anita
called the police at 1:15 a.m. and asked, “[c]an I get a police? I’ve just been shot by Keith Martin.
My son’s been shot.” Anita called out to her neighbor, Lateena Thigpen, who was sitting outside
on her porch. The police arrived and Anita was taken to the hospital.
¶ 17 On cross-examination, Anita testified that she had never seen defendant with a gun. She
knew defendant was married to another woman. Anita and defendant “never had any altercations”
prior to the shooting, and his actions were uncharacteristic of his ordinary behavior. Anita admitted
4 No. 17-1151
that she failed to call the police after defendant placed a gun to her chest the first time. She also
admitted that defendant was angry with Angelo, not Addarrius.
¶ 18 B. Jaqueline Banks-Lindsay
¶ 19 Jaqueline Banks-Lindsay was defendant’s ex-girlfriend. Banks-Lindsay testified that she
financed defendant’s gray Ford pickup truck. After the shooting, she received three phone calls
from defendant. They discussed the truck and defendant told Banks-Lindsay where it was located.
Banks-Lindsay relayed the information to the police. When she told defendant that the truck had
been recovered by police, defendant responded “s-h-i-t” and hung up.
¶ 20 C. Lateena Thigpen
¶ 21 Thigpen lived across the street from Anita’s apartment. Sometime after 11:00 p.m. on July
11, 2014, she saw defendant arguing with Addarrius outside. She overheard Addarrius say, “[i]t’s
my momma’s house, I’m not going anywhere.” Defendant responded, “[i]’m going to show you.”
Defendant left the apartment sometime after midnight and returned in his truck.
¶ 22 Thigpen saw defendant enter the apartment building, and then heard a shot and saw a
“bright flash” in the window. She saw Anita enter the apartment building and heard another shot.
But this time, the shot was closer. Anita asked, “what did you do” and defendant responded, “I
told you, I told you.” Defendant drove off in his truck at “about 1:00 in the morning” on July 12,
2014. Anita screamed, “my son,” and then called out to Thigpen through the apartment window.
¶ 23 On cross-examination, Thigpen testified that she never called the police on the night of
July 12, 2014. Thigpen never heard defendant threaten to shoot Addarrius, and lost sight of
defendant after he entered the apartment building.
¶ 24 D. Angelo Thompson
5 No. 17-1151
¶ 25 Angelo Thompson testified that he got into an argument with defendant on July 11, 2014,
about his presence at the apartment. Defendant called the police and Angelo left with his girlfriend
and her children. Around 1:20 a.m. on July 12, 2014, Angelo received a phone call from his mother
and returned to the apartment. Angelo found his brother, Addarrius, lying dead on the floor. On
cross-examination, Angelo testified that defendant never threatened him, and he never saw
defendant with a gun.
¶ 26 E. Defendant’s Post-Arrest Interview
¶ 27 The State introduced into evidence a video recording of defendant’s post-arrest interview.
The parties eventually stipulated to certain statements defendant made during the interview. The
parties stipulated that: defendant said he was playing dominoes at “81st and Elizabeth” with Steven
Lewis, Don Hollinquest, Andre, Tony and others on the night in question; he then went to Mona
Ford’s house and drank some beer with her brother, Emanuel Ford; he stayed with Mona the entire
night; and he lost his cell phone. The post-arrest interview was admitted by the trial court into
evidence.
¶ 28 F. Emanuel Ford
¶ 29 Emanuel Ford testified that in July of 2014, he lived with his sister, Mona, in a three-flat
building in Chicago. On July 11, 2014, defendant arrived at the building around 8:30 or 9:00 a.m.
Defendant left with Mona in his truck and dropped her off at 3:00 or 3:30 p.m. Defendant said he
would return at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. According to Emanuel, defendant returned to the apartment at
8:00 p.m. When asked whether it was true that defendant had returned to the apartment around
3:00 or 4:00 a.m. the next day, Emanuel answered, “[h]e was there way before then.” The State
confronted Emanuel with his grand jury testimony.
6 No. 17-1151
¶ 30 Emanuel testified before the grand jury in this case on November 12, 2014. He told the
grand jury that defendant returned to Mona’s house around 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. and that he “saw
[defendant] again about maybe 3:00 or 4:00 in the morning.” Emanuel also indicated to the grand
jury that, in the early morning hours of 1:00 a.m. on July 11, 2014, no one was inside the house
besides him and Mona.
¶ 31 Emanuel admitted that he made these statements to the grand jury. However, he proceeded
to tell trial court that: (1) the time he gave the grand jury regarding defendant’s arrival at Mona’s
house was “wrong”; (2) defendant was in fact at Mona’s house in the early morning hours of July
11, 2014; and (3) he did not “set eyes” on defendant until “8:45 in the morning on the 12th.” When
asked, he denied having lied to the grand jury.
¶ 32 On cross-examination, Emanuel testified that defendant “stayed the night” at Mona’s house
on July 11, 2014; he was “in the other room with [Mona], the back room off [Emanuel’s] kitchen.”
Emanuel confirmed that, “between the hours of midnight to about 6:00 in the morning,” defendant
was at the apartment with his sister and him. Emanuel admitted that he did not check to see if
defendant was in the room with his sister. But Emanuel claimed he would have known if defendant
left because he does not sleep.
¶ 33 G. Mona Ford
¶ 34 Mona Ford testified that she was in a relationship with defendant. Emanuel Ford was her
brother and in July of 2014, she lived with him in Chicago. Defendant picked Mona up in his gray
truck in the morning on July 11, 2014, and dropped her off around 3:00 p.m. Defendant returned
shortly after 11:30 p.m. Mona testified that she heard defendant talking to her brother, and “the
next thing [she] knew, [defendant] came into [her] room.” Mona confirmed that defendant “was
there” and stayed with her through the night.
7 No. 17-1151
¶ 35 On November 6, 2014, Mona gave testimony before the grand jury. She testified that
defendant dropped her off at her house at 1:00 p.m. on July 11, 2014, and she did not see him again
for the rest of the day. When confronted with this testimony, Mona gave the following answer:
“[a]nd when I said I didn’t see [defendant] that night because if you have two U.S. Marshals, one
sheriff *** and one police officer holding you up in the room telling you your’re going to jail for
aiding, and abetting, that you don’t know nothing about, why would you say that someone was
around you?” Mona proceeded to deny, or cite as incorrect, several portions of her grand jury
testimony.
¶ 36 On cross-examination, Mona testified that, “at the Grand Jury when they asked me did I
see [defendant] any more that night and I told them no, I really should have went on and told them
yeah.” She continued, “[b]ut if you are in a room with two U.S. Marshals, a police officer, and a
sheriff, and they telling you you’re going to jail for aiding and abetting, you’re going to say I didn’t
see anybody.” Defense counsel asked Mona if law enforcement officials told her what to say, she
answered, “no.”
¶ 37 Defense Counsel then asked Mona if she lied to the grand jury. Mona frantically asked if
she needed to get a lawyer. However, she eventually declined to speak with an attorney, stating:
“[n]o, I don’t want to talk to no lawyer. Then I’ll stick to he didn’t come back.” Defense counsel
reminded Mona she was under oath. She testified, “I’m mixed up,” and said, “I don’t know what
time it was, it could have been after midnight, it could be before midnight, I don’t know.”
¶ 38 The parties stipulated that Mona agreed to testify before the grand jury. They also stipulated
that the grand jury prosecutor did not threaten or promise her anything in exchange for her
testimony. Certain excerpts of Mona’s testimony from the grand jury minutes were included in the
stipulation. The parties separately agreed that, if called to testify, the medical examiner would
8 No. 17-1151
testify that Addarrius died of a close-range gunshot wound to the chest involving the heart and
lungs.
¶ 39 H. Steven Lewis, Andre Hardwick, Donald Hollinquest
¶ 40 The trial court allowed defendant to call defense witnesses Steven Lewis, Andre Hardwick,
Donald Hollinquest out of order. They each testified that defendant was with them at Steven’s
house on July 11, 2014, from around 4:00 p.m. to about 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. Donald testified that
defendant left in the evening, but he could not remember the exact time of his departure. All three
witnesses denied seeing defendant with a gun.
¶ 41 I. Defense Motion for a Directed Finding
¶ 42 The State rested, and defendant moved for a directed finding. Defense counsel argued that
Mona and Emanuel “corroborated” the statements made by defendant in his post-arrest interview.
Counsel maintained that it was clear from Mona’s testimony that defendant was at her apartment
when the shooting occurred. He concluded that it was “impossible,” given the inconsistencies in
the witness testimony, that defendant shot Anita and killed her son. The trial court denied the
motion for a directed finding.
¶ 43 J. Keith Martin
¶ 44 Defendant testified that he and Anita were “best friends” and that his name was on the lease
to Anita’s apartment. Defendant went to Mona’s house at 10:40 or 10:45 p.m. on the night of July
11, 2014. He stayed overnight with Mona in her bed. Defendant denied ever calling Jaquelyn,
denied calling the police on July 10, 2014, and denied shooting Addarrius or Anita. Defendant
testified that he never possessed a firearm and the first time he learned that Addarrius had been
killed was when the police confronted him in Wisconsin. Defendant had traveled to Wisconsin in
September to “help a friend take some furniture up there.”
9 No. 17-1151
¶ 45 K. Closing Arguments
¶ 46 The State asked the trial court to find defendant guilty. The alibi defense was characterized
as “ridiculous,” Mona was dubbed a “liar” and the State argued that Emanuel was “impeached.”
Anita watched as defendant placed a gun to her chest and shot her. She was “unimpeached” and
Thigpen “corroborated” her testimony. The State claimed that defendant’s phone calls placed to
Banks-Linsday, along with his fleeing the jurisdiction to Wisconsin, constituted clear evidence of
a guilty conscience.
¶ 47 Defense counsel noted the difficulty of “get[ting] out from under” Anita’s testimony, but
indicated “there’s something more to this.” He argued that there were no eyewitnesses to the
shooting of Addarius and emphasized defendant’s testimony that he did not have a problem with
Addarrius. It was Angelo that defendant had issues with, and after their argument, “[defendant]
didn’t pull a gun out and shoot somebody.” Instead, he called the police and made a report.
¶ 48 Regarding Anita’s testimony, defense counsel asked, “why would she make this up?” He
posed additional questions about the lease of Anita’s apartment, defendant being “fed up” with the
people staying there and defendant’s rent payments. Counsel also mentioned that there was “some
drug operation going on” in the house. He concluded by recounting the alibi testimony of the
witnesses and told the trial court that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof.
¶ 49 L. Finding of Guilt
¶ 50 Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2014); 730
ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2014)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-
3.05(e)(1) (West 2014)). The trial court called defendant’s alibi “absurd” and said that describing
his defense as a “fairytale” would “give it more credit than it deserves.” The trial court “strongly
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suggest[ed]” that the State investigate Mona and Emanuel for perjury. Defendant filed a motion
for a new trial. The trial court denied it.
¶ 51 M. Sentencing
¶ 52 Defendant gave a statement in allocution and told the judge he was innocent. Defendant
denied having done any harm to the victims and proclaimed he was “not guilty of this crime.” The
trial court sentenced him to 55 years for killing Addarrius, and 15 years for shooting Anita in the
chest. Defendant’s claim of innocence was deemed “insulting” and the trial court told defendant,
“if you really want to find the man who committed this offense, Mr. Martin, when you pass the
next mirror take a look inside.” Defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied.
¶ 53 Defendant appeals, and seeks a new trial on the basis that defense counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. Defendant argues that his counsel completely failed to test the State’s
case and alternatively, claims that he suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s errors.
Defendant separately contends that the trial court arbitrarily increased his sentence after he asserted
his innocence during allocution.
¶ 54 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 55 Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. To prevail on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, a defendant must prove that counsel’s representation was deficient, and the
deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1986).
Prejudice is found when there is a reasonable probability, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is
“a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
11 No. 17-1151
¶ 56 In certain contexts, a defendant need not prove prejudice. Pursuant to United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984), prejudice to the defense is presumed “if counsel entirely fails
to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” As opposed to a Strickland
claim, where a defendant challenges counsel’s conduct at specific points during the proceeding,
Cronic applies when counsel completely fails to oppose the State’s case. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 697 (2002). Cronic is an infrequently applied “narrow exception” to Strickland. Florida v.
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004). Defendant argues that Cronic applies to this case.
¶ 57 Our supreme court has applied Cronic only twice in the more than 30 years since the case
was decided. See People v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 27. In People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449,
458 (1985), defense counsel opened at trial by telling the jury his client was guilty of strangling to
death a mother and her two daughters. He advanced no theory of defense, presented no evidence
and chose not to make a closing argument. Id. at 459. The only thing counsel did was attempt to
demonstrate on cross-examination that his client was compelled to kill the victims, a defense that
was invalid. Id. As a result of counsel’s total failure, the defendant was granted a new trial. Id. at
519.
¶ 58 In People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004), overruled on other grounds, People v. Pitman,
211 Ill. 2d 502 (2004), counsel made a plea for jury nullification, but proceeded to present evidence
to the jury that her client had brutally beaten an unrelated victim to death and burned his body.
Worse yet, the trial court had barred that evidence from being introduced at trial. Id. at 185. The
court noted that while in certain circumstances the only line of defense may be a nonlegal one (id.
at 183), defense counsel’s introduction of the barred evidence at trial “rendered her trial strategy a
nullity.” Id. at 186. The defendant “stood before the jury throughout the trial with no defensive
strategy whatsoever.” Id. at 188. The court granted the defendant a new trial. Id.
12 No. 17-1151
¶ 59 Cronic does not apply here. Defense counsel presented an alibi theory of defense (which
was all he was presented with) and tested the State’s proof at several stages during the proceeding.
This case is nothing like Hattery or Morris. This a Strickland claim and we will treat it as such.
¶ 60 Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective because he: (1) “misrepresented” the case in
his opening statement by indicating that the witnesses would not place defendant at the scene; (2)
“effectively conceded” defendant’s guilt during closing argument by arguing, with respect to the
aggravated discharge offense, that it was not a “whodunnit” if Anita’s testimony as believed; and
(3) abandoned the role of defense counsel by “weakening” Emanuel’s testimony and causing Mona
to recant her testimony.
¶ 61 As we indicated above, to prevail under Strickland a defendant must show deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010). Prejudice is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 411 (2000). Courts are free to
dispose of ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the basis of insufficient prejudice. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim
to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one”).
¶ 62 We hold that defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. The testimony of a single
eyewitness, if positive and credible, is sufficient for a conviction even in the presence of
contradictory alibi testimony. People v. Homes, 274 Ill. App. 3d 612, 621 (1995). A trier of fact
has no obligation to accept alibi testimony over the positive identification of an accused (People
v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 315 (1989)) and it is well-settled that a conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence. People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 150209, ¶ 19. Based on the totality
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of evidence in this record, even if defendant could show that his counsel’s performance was
deficient, he would still fall short of establishing prejudice.
¶ 63 At trial, Anita testified that defendant put a gun to her body and pulled the trigger three
times. Luckily, it failed to discharge. She walked down the block, turned around and heard a
gunshot. She reached the apartment building, met defendant at the bottom of the stairs and for the
second time, defendant placed a gun to her body and pulled the trigger. This time the gun
discharged, and a bullet was sent into her chest. Anita ran upstairs and found her son, Addarrius,
lying dead on the living room floor. Anita called the police and named defendant as the perpetrator:
“[c]an I get a police? I’ve just been shot by Keith Martin.”
¶ 64 Thigpen provided corroboration for particular events. She saw defendant and Addarrius
get into an argument on the night of July 11, 2014. She watched as defendant left the apartment
building and returned in his truck. Thigpen saw defendant enter the building and heard a shot and
saw a bright flash in the window. She saw Anita enter the building and heard another, closer shot.
She heard Anita scream, “My son.” She observed defendant leave in his loud truck around 1:00
a.m.
¶ 65 Defendant’s primary argument on appeal is that, absent defense counsel’s cross-
examination of Mona and Emanuel, the trial court would have credited their testimony, discounted
Anita and Thigpen’s testimony, and acquitted him of the offenses. Defendant’s argument is
unavailing. Absent counsel’s cross-examination of Emanuel and Mona, we are left with two
witnesses who took the stand and placed their own credibility at issue.
¶ 66 On direct-examination, Emanuel took back statements he made to the grand jury and
equivocated to a degree that would have welcomed the skepticism of any rational trier of fact.
Mona changed her story. Even defendant admits in his opening brief that “Mona and Emanuel
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Ford’s grand jury testimony operated as garden-variety impeachment by a prior inconsistent
statement.” Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of
defendant’s trial would have been any different without his cross-examination of the primary alibi
witnesses.
¶ 67 Anita’s eyewitness testimony, coupled with Thigpen’s corroboration of events, all but
foreclosed defendant’s opportunity to demonstrate prejudice. Their testimony was positive,
unimpeached and found credible by the trial court. Homes, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 621; Johnson, 2018
IL App (1st) 150209, ¶ 19. When you add defendant’s claims that his counsel committed
prejudicial error during opening statement and closing argument, the result remains unchanged.
Defendant cannot show prejudice and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.
¶ 68 Defendant next argues that the trial court inappropriately increased his sentence in response
to his claim of innocence during allocution. He points out that the State asked for a 60-year
sentence, and the trial court added ten years to the State’s request. Defendant does not claim that
his sentence was outside the applicable statutory sentencing range.
¶ 69 A defendant’s sentence should not be altered absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Ward,
113 Ill. 2d 516, 531 (1986). An abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court’s decision is
“arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.”
People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 23 (quoting People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37).
Defendant admits that he failed to object during sentencing and did not preserve the issue in a
posttrial motion. But regardless of whether defendant forfeited the issue, we find that he has failed
to demonstrate any error on the part of the trial court.
¶ 70 A trial court should not automatically and arbitrarily consider a defendant’s insistence on
his or her innocence as an aggravating factor when fashioning a sentence. People v. Perkins, 408
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Ill. App. 3d 752, 763 (2011). However, in certain factual circumstances, “a continued protestation
of innocence and a lack of remorse may convey a strong message to the trial judge that the
defendant is an unmitigated liar and at continued war with society.” Ward, 113 Ill. 2d at 528.
¶ 71 Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the sentence imposed was any more than a basic
consideration of defendant’s lack of remorse and the seriousness of his offenses. People v. Jackson,
2014 IL App (1st) 123258, ¶ 53 (the seriousness of an offense is considered the most important
factor in determining a sentence). Defendant shot his girlfriend at point black range in the chest
and killed her son. His alibi defense was rejected, and the trial court urged the State to investigate
Mona and Emanuel for perjury.
¶ 72 Defendant maintained that he “was being wrongfully accused” and said that he “really
hope[d] somewhere down the line that they really find the person that did this.” The trial court
responded, “if you really want to find the man who committed this offense, Mr. Martin, when you
pass the next mirror take a look inside.” The trial court’s statement was merely a reaffirmation of
its finding of guilt in the case. We find no evidence of an automatic or arbitrary imposition of a
greater sentence based on defendant’s claims that he was innocent and someone else committed
the crimes. The trial court committed no error. A new sentencing hearing is not warranted.
¶ 73 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 74 Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
¶ 75 Affirmed.