People v. Markowitz

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Markowitz

133 A.D.2d 379, 519 N.Y.S.2d 376, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 49879

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 14, 1987

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 133 A.D.2d 379 (People v. Markowitz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Markowitz, 133 A.D.2d 379, 519 N.Y.S.2d 376, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 49879 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).

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Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Qupeens County (Chetta, J.), [380]*380rendered November 1, 1985, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We find that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s criminal responsibility for the fatal stabbing of his acquaintance (see, Penal Law former § 30.05, now § 40.15 [L 1984, ch 688, § 3]; see also, Penal Law § 25.00). Although the evidence indicated that the defendant suffers from a "schizo-affective” disorder, the People’s expert was of the opinion that the defendant was not experiencing any delusions at the time he committed the stabbing (cf., People v Gonzalez, 100 AD2d 913). This expert’s testimony contains no serious flaw (see, People v Hicks, 125 AD2d 332, 333, lv denied 69 NY2d 881; People v Jandelli, 118 AD2d 656, lv denied 68 NY2d 668), and we note that one of the defendant’s experts acknowledged on cross-examination that the defendant knew he was inflicting fatal injuries and agreed that the defendant knew his actions would "run afoul of the law”. By its rendition of a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree (see, People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, 302, affd 432 US 197; cf., People v Sears, 58 AD2d 693), the jury concluded that the defendant had the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his conduct and knew that his conduct was wrong (see, People v Wood, 12 NY2d 69). We discern no basis for disturbing that finding.

We do not agree with the defendant’s contention that prosecutorial misconduct during summation deprived him of a fair trial. While the prosecutor improperly denigrated the defendant’s experts and his defense (see, People v Wood, supra, at 77-78; People v Langert, 105 AD2d 845, 846), the defendant’s present claims with respect thereto are not preserved for appellate review and, in any event, the remarks do not warrant reversal (see, People v Langert, supra, at 846). Moreover, the prosecutor’s summation was not otherwise unreasonable when evaluated in light of that of the defense (see, People v Colon, 122 AD2d 151).

Finally, the defendant’s sentence is not excessive. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Lawrence and Harwood, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Qupeens County (Chetta, J.), [380]*380rendered November 1, 1985, convicting him of manslaughter in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We find that the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s criminal responsibility for the fatal stabbing of his acquaintance (see, Penal Law former § 30.05, now § 40.15 [L 1984, ch 688, § 3]; see also, Penal Law § 25.00). Although the evidence indicated that the defendant suffers from a "schizo-affective” disorder, the People’s expert was of the opinion that the defendant was not experiencing any delusions at the time he committed the stabbing (cf., People v Gonzalez, 100 AD2d 913). This expert’s testimony contains no serious flaw (see, People v Hicks, 125 AD2d 332, 333, lv denied 69 NY2d 881; People v Jandelli, 118 AD2d 656, lv denied 68 NY2d 668), and we note that one of the defendant’s experts acknowledged on cross-examination that the defendant knew he was inflicting fatal injuries and agreed that the defendant knew his actions would "run afoul of the law”. By its rendition of a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree (see, People v Patterson, 39 NY2d 288, 302, affd 432 US 197; cf., People v Sears, 58 AD2d 693), the jury concluded that the defendant had the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his conduct and knew that his conduct was wrong (see, People v Wood, 12 NY2d 69). We discern no basis for disturbing that finding.

We do not agree with the defendant’s contention that prosecutorial misconduct during summation deprived him of a fair trial. While the prosecutor improperly denigrated the defendant’s experts and his defense (see, People v Wood, supra, at 77-78; People v Langert, 105 AD2d 845, 846), the defendant’s present claims with respect thereto are not preserved for appellate review and, in any event, the remarks do not warrant reversal (see, People v Langert, supra, at 846). Moreover, the prosecutor’s summation was not otherwise unreasonable when evaluated in light of that of the defense (see, People v Colon, 122 AD2d 151).

Finally, the defendant’s sentence is not excessive. Thompson, J. P., Bracken, Lawrence and Harwood, JJ., concur.

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133 A.D.2d 379, 519 N.Y.S.2d 376, 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 49879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-markowitz-nyappdiv-1987.

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