NOTICE 2024 IL App (5th) 230047-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/12/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0047 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Christian County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-100 ) JACOB R. MARIACHER, ) Honorable ) Bradley T. Paisley, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Welch and Moore concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in its application of aggravating and mitigating factors when sentencing the defendant for aggravated battery with a firearm. The circuit court’s sentencing decision was within the statutory sentencing range and not an abuse of discretion.
¶2 The defendant, Jacob R. Mariacher, pled guilty to aggravated battery with a firearm (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2022)) and was subsequently sentenced to 20 years in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) with 3 years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On
appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred when considering the use of a firearm in
aggravation where the use of a firearm was inherent in the offense; the circuit court erred in failing
to consider strong provocation as a mitigating factor based on an unspecified statement from a
police report made by the defendant’s girlfriend; and the circuit court’s sentencing decision was
1 excessive where it failed to account for multiple mitigating factors. For the following reasons, we
affirm the circuit court of Christian County.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On March 14, 2021, the defendant fired a gun at the face of his 17-year-old roommate,
A.T. The bullet travelled through A.T.’s cheek. He lost several teeth and underwent several
surgeries but survived the incident.
¶5 The defendant was charged by information with aggravated battery with a firearm (720
ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2020)), aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2 (West
2020)), unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020)), and
possession of a stolen firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-3.8(a) (West 2020)).
¶6 On April 8, 2022, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the count of aggravated battery
with a firearm. The defendant received admonishments and was informed that the punishment for
that offense was a determinate sentence of incarceration of not less than 6 years and not more than
30 years in the IDOC, and/or a fine not to exceed $25,000, and a 3-year term of MSR. The circuit
court found that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement,
understood his legal rights, and understood the penalties in the case. The remaining charges were
dismissed.
¶7 During the hearing on the plea agreement, the State provided a factual basis for the
aggravated battery with a firearm conviction. The State asserted that an investigating officer would
testify to the conversation with the minor victim, A.T., after he was taken to the hospital. A.T. had
indicated that the defendant lived with A.T.’s family. On March 14, 2021, A.T. rode his bicycle to
find the defendant. The defendant was a passenger in the car driven by C.A., the defendant’s
girlfriend. As A.T. approached the car, the defendant pulled out a gun and shot A.T. in the face.
2 A.T. was taken to the hospital for the injuries sustained to his face and A.T. lost teeth. The officers
additionally interviewed C.A., who provided a statement that was consistent with A.T.’s version
of events.
¶8 The defendant was carrying a Glock pistol when he was taken into custody. The passenger
side of C.A.’s vehicle was tested for gun powder residue. Gun powder residue was found inside
the vehicle by the passenger window. The defendant had also called his mother from the Christian
County Sheriff’s office and told her that he shot A.T. The defense stipulated that if the case were
to proceed to trial, the State would be able to produce evidence as described. The circuit court
found that there was a factual basis to support the defendant’s guilty plea.
¶9 The circuit court held a sentencing hearing on May 26, 2022. A presentence investigation
and report (PSI) was submitted. The PSI included multiple police reports, and those reports
included narratives from A.T., Ashley Nation, 1 C.A., and the defendant. Although C.A. did not
testify at the hearing, the circuit court reviewed the PSI and considered her narrative. According
to the police interview of C.A., three to five days before the incident, the defendant caught A.T.
taking photographs of the defendant’s debit card or credit card which caused the defendant to move
from A.T.’s house. C.A. informed the police officer that on March 14, 2021, she was driving her
car, and the defendant was a passenger. C.A. had approached a stop sign and A.T. appeared on a
bicycle. A.T. dropped the bicycle in front of her car, impeding its movement. A.T. then walked
over to the defendant’s side of the car and the defendant pulled out a gun and pointed the gun
towards A.T. No words were exchanged. Then, she heard a gunshot and saw that A.T. had grabbed
his face and had fallen to the ground. The defendant told C.A. to drive, and she drove over A.T.’s
bicycle.
1 Ashley Nation is A.T.’s adoptive mother. 3 ¶ 10 The State presented evidence in aggravation, including the testimony of A.T. and his
adoptive mother. A.T. testified that he was 17 years old in March of 2021. At that time, he lived
with his adoptive mother, brother, and the defendant. A.T. had known the defendant for his entire
life, as they lived near each other in the suburbs of Chicago. A.T. and the defendant stole cars
together in Sullivan, Illinois. The defendant became homeless and A.T. invited him to live with
his adoptive family who had moved to Pana, Illinois. The defendant moved in with A.T. and they
shared a bedroom. A.T. testified that after the defendant found a girlfriend, he began to act “weird,
like he didn’t want to really talk much and it seemed like he just had something against me.”
¶ 11 A.T. testified that in the morning of March 14, 2021, he noticed that belongings were
missing from his room, and the defendant’s bed had been stripped of sheets. A.T. searched for the
defendant and rode his bike to the defendant’s girlfriend’s house. A.T. found the defendant riding
in his girlfriend’s vehicle. A.T. dropped his bike in front of the defendant’s girlfriend’s car and
walked around the vehicle towards the passenger door to speak to the defendant. The defendant
then raised his gun. A.T. testified that the defendant was his best friend, and he “didn’t think that
he would shoot me.” A.T. was approximately three feet from the car and testified that instead of
walking away he used his right hand and “reached for the gun to smack it out of the way.” The
defendant, however, fired the gun before A.T. could reach it or say anything to the defendant.
¶ 12 After the gun discharged, A.T. grabbed his face and immediately noticed that he was
bleeding. A.T. then dropped to the ground to avoid being shot again. The defendant left, and A.T.
attempted to crawl for help. He realized that he was able to walk and headed to a nearby house for
assistance. The police were called and A.T. was taken to a hospital in Springfield, Illinois. A.T.
had surgery on his fractured jaw and his jaw was wired shut. The bullet had entered the front of
his face under his nose and exited the left side of his mouth. Three or four teeth were missing due
4 to the gunshot. A.T. continued to have issues with fully opening his mouth and with eating. The
injury remained painful.
¶ 13 A.T. additionally testified that he was aware that the defendant had a gun prior to the
incident. The defendant found the gun when he was “car hopping.” A.T. described “car hopping”
as rummaging empty or unlocked cars for items. A.T. did not give an opinion on a sentence length
for the defendant and stated that he wanted the judge to decide.
¶ 14 Ashley Nation, A.T.’s adoptive mother, testified that she adopted A.T. in July of 2018.
When Nation was in the process of adopting A.T., she knew that A.T. was friends with the
defendant. Nation was aware that the defendant was homeless, and A.T. had asked if the defendant
could move in with their family. Nation initially refused but decided to pay for a bus ticket for the
defendant to move from the Chicago area into her house.
¶ 15 Approximately two months prior to the incident, Nation had noticed that the defendant’s
behavior had changed, and she had sought advice on how to remove the defendant from her home.
Nation described him as “weird” and “overly nice, almost a fake nice.” The defendant had never
fought with A.T. before the incident.
¶ 16 Nation was sleeping when she received a call that A.T. was on the way to a hospital because
he had been shot. A.T. required five surgeries, his jaw was wired shut for six weeks, and his head
was immobilized. Nation testified to how she felt and stated that “to use the word shocked is not—
I don’t have words for how this blew me away.”
¶ 17 Nation testified that she confronted the defendant about rules for the house before he
moved in but had never threatened the defendant. Additionally, they did not have firearms in the
house. Nation did not want to see the defendant in prison for the rest of his life but wanted him
5 there for “a good part of it.” The defendant had shown no remorse and had tried to take her child’s
life.
¶ 18 The defense submitted character reference letters from the defendant’s mother, maternal
grandmother, stepfather, aunt, and two friends as evidence in mitigation. No testimony was
presented by the defense.
¶ 19 The State argued factors in aggravation. The defendant’s conduct had caused or threatened
serious harm where the victim was shot in the face and required multiple surgeries and continued
to have issues with his mouth. The defendant had a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity
as the PSI contained a felony conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle, and this incident
occurred while the defendant was serving probation for that offense. The PSI additionally included
a note from the Illinois State Police report with a transcription of a conversation between the
defendant and his mother where the defendant indicated that he had shot A.T. in the face. The
defendant additionally had said that he hoped that A.T. was not okay because “he was trying to
steal [the defendant’s] social and all of that s***.” The State further argued that a sentence was
necessary to deter others from committing the same crime and recommended a 28-year sentence
in the IDOC served at 85% with a 3-year MSR.
¶ 20 The defense argued that a shooting was a serious matter and understood that imprisonment
was necessary to deter others. The defendant, however, had a difficult upbringing, had received
special education, and was diagnosed with ADHD. This one incident was out of character for the
defendant and the defendant was shocked by what he had done. The defendant also had a history
of using controlled substances and had taken Xanax on the day of the incident. The defense argued
that the defendant had a minimal criminal history and the defendant’s character references stated
that the defendant had positive qualities.
6 ¶ 21 The defense further argued that the defendant had acted under strong provocation where
A.T. had thrown his bike in front of the car to prevent the defendant from leaving, then approached
the passenger side window, and A.T. grabbed for the gun, which may have caused the defendant
to pull the trigger. Defense counsel further argued,
“all we know is that [A.T.] was shot and that [the defendant] pulled the trigger, but there was a lot of aggression on the other side here. Had there not been the aggression and the provocation, there may not have been a bullet that came out of the gun that day.”
The defense requested a nine-year sentence in the IDOC served at 85%.
¶ 22 The defendant made a statement in allocution and apologized to A.T. and his family for
the trauma that he had caused. He wished that he would have spoken to A.T. instead of “letting
[his] impulsive actions take over that day.”
¶ 23 The circuit court considered the PSI, evidence that was presented during the sentencing
hearing, and arguments by counsel. Additionally, the circuit court acknowledged the defendant’s
statement in allocution where the defendant had wished that he could go back in time and not pull
the trigger. The circuit court found that the defendant was not eligible for impact incarceration.
While considering rehabilitation for the defendant, the circuit court additionally considered that it
needed to protect the public and deter others from committing crimes with guns.
¶ 24 The circuit court addressed the factors in aggravation raised by the State prior to addressing
the factors in mitigation. The defendant’s conduct caused serious harm and threatened serious
harm. A.T. suffered significant injuries and was left with permanent disfigurement and continued
to suffer pain. The defendant had a prior conviction for a serious felony, but did not have a long
criminal history. A sentence was necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. The
circuit court specifically noted that a sentence was necessary to deter gun violence in their
community and made the following statements:
7 “The other factor that the Court finds relevant is A7 which is the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. Every time I’ve sentenced anybody whether it’s for, you know, a driving offense to a shooting offense or a murder case, this factor always applies, right, because no—in determining an appropriate sentence, I have to consider [the defendant] and I have to consider the facts of this particular case and [the defendant] as a person and all of his history and character and everything else, but it’s not limited to that.
I also have to consider the community and the public and anytime I impose a sentence I hope that it deters other people from committing similar types of crimes that—I guess I would say the level of aggravation of that factor probably increases with the seriousness of the offense.
Obviously I want to impose a sentence in this case that not only punishes the Defendant, but also I want obviously a message sent to the community—we’re not a community that has a lot of gun violence. We’ve had more in the last five years than we probably had, you know—it’s getting a little worse, but we’re not Chicago.
We don’t have routine gun violence in this community, and obviously we don’t want there to be gun violence in the community. So, part of the sentence today is a bigger picture than just [the defendant]. It’s trying to do something others hopefully will pay attention to this sentence and think twice about the use of firearms in the community to solve problems. So, I would find that that factor is significantly aggravating in this particular case.”
¶ 25 The circuit court next considered that the defense only presented one factor in mitigation,
strong provocation. However, the circuit court did not find the defendant’s version of the events
credible after considering witness testimony and after reviewing the PSI and attachments. The
circuit court rejected the defendant’s argument in mitigation that there was a strong provocation
for his actions.
¶ 26 The circuit court considered additional factors that it found to be mitigating. The defendant
had a “chaotic childhood” and issues from an early age which may explain the defendant’s
behavior. The defendant was also a young person when the crime was committed, and he did not
have a significant criminal history. The circuit court additionally considered the cost of
incarceration, but did not give that factor much weight. The circuit court then sentenced the
8 defendant to 20 years in the IDOC, served at 85%, followed by 3 years of MSR. The circuit court
noted that the defendant would be out of prison before he was 40 years old.
¶ 27 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence and argued that his sentence was
excessive. The defendant claimed that the circuit court failed to properly weigh all of the evidence
when making its findings. The circuit court failed to consider certain mitigating factors, and the
circuit court gave excessive weight to certain factors in aggravation. After the defendant received
the transcript from the sentencing hearing, he amended his pleading to include information from
the transcript as a supplement to the original motion. The defendant maintained his argument that
his sentence was excessive. At the end of the motion to reconsider hearing, the circuit court took
the matter under advisement.
¶ 28 The circuit court subsequently reviewed the transcript from the sentencing hearing, the PSI
and attachments, and the court file. The circuit court determined that the defendant made the same
arguments raised at the time of sentencing and denied the defendant’s amended motion to
reconsider. This appeal followed.
¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 30 On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred by considering the possession
and use of a firearm as aggravation even though it is inherent in the offense of aggravated battery
with a firearm; the circuit court erred in failing to consider strong provocation as a mitigating factor
based on a statement included in a police report; and the circuit court failed to account for multiple
mitigating factors when sentencing the defendant.
¶ 31 The defendant pled guilty to aggravated battery with a firearm under section 12-3.05(e)(1)
of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2022)). A person commits the
offense of aggravated battery with a firearm when he or she knowingly “[d]ischarges a firearm,
9 other than a machine gun or a firearm equipped with a silencer, and causes any injury to another
person.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2022). The defendant argues that the court considered
the use of a gun as an independent factor in aggravation, acknowledges that he failed to properly
preserve this issue, and seeks plain error review. The defendant argues, in the alternative, that we
should review this issue as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
¶ 32 A claim of sentencing error is forfeited if a defendant does not contemporaneously object
and file a written postsentencing motion raising the issue before the circuit court. People v. Hillier,
237 Ill. 2d 539, 544 (2010). However, forfeited claims may be reviewed under the plain-error
doctrine which provides a narrow and limited exception. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. Under the
plain-error rule, a defendant must first show that a clear or obvious error occurred. Hillier, 237 Ill.
2d 539 at 545. “In the sentencing context, a defendant must then show either that (1) the evidence
at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the
defendant a fair sentencing hearing.” Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545.
¶ 33 Generally, the circuit court may not consider a factor inherent in the offense in aggravation
when sentencing. People v. Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 25. “This rule is not meant to
apply rigidly because public policy dictates that a sentence be varied in accordance with the
circumstances of the offense.” People v. Sanders, 2016 IL App (3d) 130511, ¶ 13. It is appropriate
for a circuit court to consider the degree and gravity of the defendant’s conduct including the threat
of harm to the general public. Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶¶ 25-27. “ ‘However, the trial
court may not consider the end result—i.e., the victim’s death—as a factor in aggravation where
death is implicit in the offense.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Jeffers, 2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 25
(quoting People v. Turner, 2018 IL App (1st) 170204, ¶ 88). “Whether an aggravating factor is
10 inherent in the offense is a question of statutory construction that we review de novo.” Jeffers,
2022 IL App (2d) 210236, ¶ 23.
¶ 34 One of the aggravating factors that the circuit court may consider when sentencing the
defendant is whether “the sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime.”
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(7) (West 2022). When considering this aggravating factor, the circuit court
explained that “[e]very time I’ve sentenced anybody whether it’s for *** a driving offense to a
shooting offense or a murder case, this factor always applies.” The circuit court further explained
the importance of sending the message to the community about gun violence and stated,
“part of the sentence today is a bigger picture than just [the defendant]. It’s trying to do something others hopefully will pay attention to this sentence and think twice about the use of firearms in the community to solve problems.”
The circuit court did not focus on the end result of the defendant’s conduct of discharging a firearm
as an aggravating factor. Rather, it properly considered the importance of imposing a sentence that
would deter the general public from committing the same crime.
¶ 35 As noted above, under both prongs of the plain-error doctrine, the defendant must first
show a clear and obvious error occurred. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. Here, no error is shown, and
therefore, the procedural default will be honored. See People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008).
¶ 36 When determining whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient where it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Ineffective assistance of counsel during a
sentencing hearing occurs when “counsel’s performance was below minimal professional
standards and *** a reasonable probability exists that the sentence was affected.” People v.
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 168 (1995). Both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied by the
11 defendant for a finding of ineffectiveness. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30. Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are generally reviewed de novo. People v. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st)
170542, ¶ 91. Because there was no error in sentencing on this issue, the defendant has not
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance.
¶ 37 We next turn to whether the circuit court failed to account for the multiple mitigating
factors presented by the defense when sentencing the defendant. The defendant claims that the
circuit court failed to consider strong provocation, as well as mitigating factors related to the
defendant’s age, history of drug use, acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse,
character evidence, family support, and the defendant’s serious rehabilitative potential.
¶ 38 We first address the defendant’s claim of whether that the circuit court erred in rejecting
the defendant’s argument that strong provocation (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a)(3) (West 2022)) applied
as a mitigating factor where the circuit court considered a statement by C.A. in a police report. The
defendant argues that de novo review applies where the circuit court considered an improper factor
at sentencing. See People v. Winchester, 2016 IL App (4th) 140781, ¶ 72. However, “[a]s long as
the court does not consider incompetent evidence, improper aggravating factors, or ignore
pertinent mitigating factors, it has wide latitude in sentencing a defendant to any term within the
statutory range prescribed for the offense.” People v. Dominguez, 255 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1004
(1994). Substantial deference is given to the circuit court’s sentencing decision because the
sentencing judge “is in a much better position to consider factors such as the defendant’s
credibility, demeanor, moral character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder,
2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36.
¶ 39 There is a presumption that the circuit court considers relevant mitigating evidence before
the court. Dominguez, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. The balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors
12 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Dominguez, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. A circuit court
imposing a sentence within the statutory limits will only be deemed excessive and an abuse of
discretion where the sentence is “greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or
manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210
(2000). “The spirit and purpose of the law are promoted when the trial court’s sentence reflects
both the seriousness of the offense and gives sufficient consideration to the defendant’s
rehabilitative potential.” People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 28. Furthermore, the
circuit court “has no obligation to recite and assign value to each factor presented at a sentencing
hearing.” People v. Hill, 408 Ill. App. 3d 23, 30 (2011).
¶ 40 The defendant argues that he had acted under strong provocation where the victim had
thrown his bike in front of the defendant’s girlfriend’s car, angrily approached the defendant, and
had tried to reach for the defendant’s gun. On one hand, the defendant argues that circuit court
erred by relying on a police report which included a statement made by C.A. which was not
relevant or reliable evidence. On the other hand, the defendant argues that C.A.’s statement
corroborated the defendant’s claim of strong provocation, as well as A.T.’s testimony.
¶ 41 “The source and type of information that the sentencing court may consider is virtually
without bounds.” People v. Rose, 384 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941 (2008). Furthermore, the circuit court
has discretion in determining whether reliable and relevant evidence is admissible during the
sentencing hearing. Rose, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 941. To preserve the evidentiary issue on appeal, a
defendant must object at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 544.
The defendant failed to object to the admission of the police interview of C.A. and has forfeited
review of whether the C.A. police interview was admissible. The defendant again argues that plain
error applies, or in the alternative, counsel was ineffective.
13 ¶ 42 “While ‘strong provocation’ is not defined in the Unified Code of Corrections, the similar
term ‘serious provocation’ has a well-established meaning when considering whether an individual
acted under serious provocation sufficient to reduce the offense of first degree murder to second
degree murder, and is limited to the categories of substantial physical injury or assault, mutual
quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and spousal adultery.” People v. Powell, 2013 IL App (1st)
111654, ¶ 36 (citing People v. Merritte, 242 Ill. App. 3d 485, 492 (1993)). Strong provocation as
a mitigating factor at sentencing includes a wider range of conduct than serious provocation and
requires direct and immediate provocation. Powell, 2013 IL App (1st) 111654, ¶ 36.
¶ 43 The circuit court considered the testimony of the witnesses and observed their demeanor
during the sentencing hearing and the circuit court did not find the defendant’s version of events
to be credible. A.T. had testified that on March 14, 2021, he was searching for the defendant on
his bicycle. A.T. dropped his bicycle in front of C.A.’s vehicle while the vehicle was at a stop sign.
A.T. approached the passenger side of the vehicle where the defendant was sitting. The defendant
pulled out a gun and immediately shot A.T. in the face before A.T. was able to “smack” the gun
from the defendant or say anything to the defendant. A.T.’s bicycle had not prevented the
defendant from leaving when A.T. approached because C.A. drove away after the defendant shot
A.T.
¶ 44 The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in its determination that the defendant did not
act in strong provocation. There was no evidence of direct and immediate provocation where A.T.
had only approached his friend sitting in the passenger seat of a vehicle and was shot before he
was able to speak or reach for the gun.
¶ 45 The defendant also has not demonstrated that clear and obvious error occurred. See Hillier,
237 Ill. 2d at 545. The procedural default will be honored where no error was shown. See Naylor,
14 229 Ill. 2d at 593. Additionally, the defendant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of
counsel where he was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance.
¶ 46 The defendant additionally argues that his 20-year sentence should be reduced where the
circuit court failed to account for multiple mitigating factors. However, the circuit court
specifically addressed additional mitigating factors and found the defendant’s age and “chaotic
childhood” as factors in mitigation. The defendant’s history of drug use was contained in the PSI,
which the circuit court considered, and the court considered the letters submitted by the
defendant’s family members. The circuit court acknowledged the defendant’s statement of
allocution where the defendant had demonstrated remorse and wished he had not pulled the trigger,
as well as witness testimony. Nation had testified that the defendant was not remorseful. The circuit
court considered that it had to weigh the defendant’s rehabilitative potential while considering the
need to protect the public and deter others from committing similar crimes. Additionally, the
circuit court explicitly stated that it had considered the cost of incarceration when sentencing the
defendant.
¶ 47 Aggravated battery with a firearm is a Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(h) (West 2022).
The sentencing range is 6 to 30 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2022). The State argued that
the defendant should be sentenced to 28 years in the IDOC. The circuit court, after considering
factors additional factors in mitigation, sentenced the defendant to eight years less than the State’s
recommendation. The defendant was sentenced within the statutory sentencing range and received
a sentence of 20 years in the IDOC. Given this record, we find that the circuit court did not abuse
its discretion in its sentencing decision.
15 ¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 49 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentencing judgment of the circuit court of
Christian County.
¶ 50 Affirmed.