People v. Marcellis

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Marcellis

307 N.W.2d 402, 105 Mich. App. 662

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedApril 22, 1981

DocketDocket 49796

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 307 N.W.2d 402 (People v. Marcellis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Marcellis, 307 N.W.2d 402, 105 Mich. App. 662 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

Pincite

Opinions

M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.

We adopt the statement of facts as set forth by our brother Allen but disagree that People v Loney, 12 Mich App 288; 162 NW2d 832 (1968), and People v Ewing, 101 Mich App 51; 301 NW2d 8 (1980), correctly interpret MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). Following instead the rationale of People v Moore, 96 Mich App 754, 760-762; 293 NW2d 700 (1980), and People v Anglin, 102 Mich App 118; 301 NW2d 470 (1980), we hold that the 180-day rule was violated under the facts of this case.

We also disagree with our brother that this interpretation of the 180-day rule ought to be applied prospectively only. Moore, supra, and Anglin, supra, are simply interpretations of a statute. As such, they would be applicable to any case tried subsequent to the enactment of the statute. The instant case would certainly fall within this purview.

Accordingly, we would reverse defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. We note our agreement with our brother Allen’s discussion of the defective [665]*665jury waiver. However, having reversed the principal conviction, we need not address further the validity of the habitual offender conviction.

J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.

We adopt the statement of facts as set forth by our brother Allen but disagree that People v Loney, 12 Mich App 288; 162 NW2d 832 (1968), and People v Ewing, 101 Mich App 51; 301 NW2d 8 (1980), correctly interpret MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). Following instead the rationale of People v Moore, 96 Mich App 754, 760-762; 293 NW2d 700 (1980), and People v Anglin, 102 Mich App 118; 301 NW2d 470 (1980), we hold that the 180-day rule was violated under the facts of this case.

We also disagree with our brother that this interpretation of the 180-day rule ought to be applied prospectively only. Moore, supra, and Anglin, supra, are simply interpretations of a statute. As such, they would be applicable to any case tried subsequent to the enactment of the statute. The instant case would certainly fall within this purview.

Accordingly, we would reverse defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. We note our agreement with our brother Allen’s discussion of the defective [665]*665jury waiver. However, having reversed the principal conviction, we need not address further the validity of the habitual offender conviction.

J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

307 N.W.2d 402, 105 Mich. App. 662, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-marcellis-michctapp-1981.

Opinions

M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack