People v. Manzo

114 P.3d 78, 2005 WL 82140

Opinions

KAPELKE

Footnotes

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**, J.

Defendant, Patrick A. Manzo, appeals the order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief from the judgment and sentence imposed upon his guilty plea. We reverse the order, vacate the judgment and sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving serious bodily injury, a class five felony. According to the charges, while driving his truck, defendant sideswiped a car, causing it to leave the road and go into a field. He failed to stop or remain at the accident scene. Three of the four occupants of the car suffered serious injuries.

Defendant was originally charged with one count of leaving the scene of an accident causing serious bodily injury, one count of failing to report an accident, and four counts of careless driving.

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, defendant pled guilty to an added count of leaving the scene of an accident causing serious bodily injury, and the remaining charges were dismissed.

The petition to enter a plea of guilty, which defendant signed, included the following:

The elements of the crime of leaving the scene of an accident (F5) are:

1. That the defendant,

2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,

3. being the driver or operator of a vehicle,

4. directly involved in an accident which resulted in serious bodily injury to another person,

5. did unlawfully fail to immediately stop his vehicle at the scene or as close thereto as possible or forthwith return to or in every event,

6. remain at the scene until he had fulfilled the requirements of Section 42-4-1603, C.R.S.

A person acts “knowingly” with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts “knowingly” with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.

At the providency hearing, the prosecutor described the factual basis of the charge as follows:

[O]n June 13, 2002, the victims that I just listed were traveling southbound I believe from Boulder on Colorado Highway 93 in the direction of Golden.

And as they were traveling southbound the defendant driving an F-150 truck was exiting a parking lot and the two cars got into a serious, serious collision in which the defendant then, instead of remaining at the scene and calling the police and dealing with the situation, left.

The injuries to the victims range from no injuries up to very, very serious injuries. [One victim] as she will probably tell you at sentencing was injured very, very badly. Her hand was basically degloved, she had serious injuries to her face, her eyelid was ripped off.

The court then explained the rights defendant was giving up by pleading guilty and the possible penalties he was facing. The following exchange occurred:

[THE COURT]: All right, now you heard [the prosecutor] describe what I call the factual basis. The reason I ask for that is because I don’t want an innocent man or someone who feels he’s innocent pleading guilty to a crime. Did you hear what [the prosecutor] said?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.

[THE COURT]: You left the scene of an accident.

[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.

[THE COURT]: Do you have any questions you’d like to ask me at this time?

[DEFENDANT]: No.

[THE COURT]: Do you feel like you fully understand your rights?

[DEFENDANT]: Yes, sir.

[THE COURT]: Court finds that [defendant] has been fully and properly advised in writing and by the Court. He is represented by counsel with whom he’s satisfied. He’s acknowledged the factual basis.

The court sentenced defendant to two years in prison.

Thereafter, defendant filed his Crim. P. 35(c) motion to set aside his plea and conviction, arguing that he had not been properly advised of the culpable mental state for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving serious bodily injury and that his plea was therefore not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant had been adequately advised of the elements of the offense, that there was a factual basis for his plea, and that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.

II.

Defendant contends that the trial court failed to advise him, as required by Crim. P. 11, of all the elements of leaving the scene of an accident involving serious injuries. Specifically, he maintains that he was not properly advised of the requisite culpable mental state of the offense. We agree that defendant’s advisement was inadequate.

A guilty plea cannot be voluntarily or knowingly entered unless the defendant “understands the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense” to which he or she is pleading. Crim. P. 11. The record must demonstrate that the defendant understood any mental element of the crime. Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1, 6 (Colo.1989).

Section 42-4-1601(1), C.R.S.2004, which proscribes the offense to which defendant entered his guilty plea, provides in pertinent part:

The driver of any vehicle directly involved in an accident resulting in injury to, serious bodily injury to, or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close to the scene as possible but shall immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of section 42-4-1603(1).

The statute does not specify a culpable mental state element for the offense.

Section 18-1-503(1), C.R.S.2004, provides that when the commission of an offense re quires a particular culpable mental state, that mental state is ordinarily designated by use of a listed term describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. Nevertheless, § 18-1-503(2), C.R.S.2004, provides:

Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental state.

(Emphasis added.)

Generally, to subject a defendant to criminal liability, there must be a concurrence of an unlawful act and a culpable mental state. See People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 5, 612 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1980). Therefore, in construing a criminal statute, a court should not interpret legislative silence as an indication that no culpable mental state is required. “Rather, the requisite mental state may be implied from the statute.” Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo.2000); People v. Gross, 830 P.2d 933, 942 (Colo.1992).

Factors that may be considered in determining whether the legislature intended to impose liability without fault, or instead, meant to require fault though it failed to “spell it out clearly,” include: (1) the legislative history; (2) guidance in some other statute; and (3) the severity of the punishment of the crime. “Other things being equal, the greater the possible punishment, the more likely some fault is required.” 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.5(a), at 384 (2d ed.2003).

First, we note that the legislative history is silent as to whether the General Assembly intended to impose liability without proof of a culpable mental state.

The offense of which defendant was convicted here is a class 5 felony. In our view, the fact that the offense is a felony and exposes the offender to a concomitantly severe punishment indicates that a culpable mental state must have been intended by the General Assembly. We will not lightly assume that the legislature intended to subject conduct to serious criminal penalties without requiring a culpable mental state. See People v. Sequin, 199 Colo. 381, 386, 609 P.2d 622, 625 (1980); People v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 422, 593 P.2d 962, 964 (1979) (holding that a culpable mental state was most likely constitutionally mandated if a criminal statute was to carry severe penalties); see also People v. Ellison, 14 P.3d 1034, 1037-38 (Colo.2000) (strict liability public welfare crimes are distinguishable from common law crimes in part because of the nature and severity of punishment).

Further, we note that the Colorado pattern jury instruction setting forth the elements of the crime of failure to give notice, information, and aid following a hit-and-run accident requires a showing that the defendant, as the driver of the vehicle, “knowingly and directly involved in an accident resulting in [injury to], [serious bodily injury to] [the death of] any person” failed to stop his vehicle and failed to take other actions, including giving certain information and rendering reasonable assistance where practicable. CJI-Crim. 37:13 (1983).

Most courts in other jurisdictions have construed hit-and-run statutes to require knowledge of the occurrence of the collision, injury, or damage as a prerequisite to conviction, even where the statute defining the offense does not expressly refer to a culpable mental state. Marjorie A. Caner, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Showing, in Criminal Prosecution Under “Hit-and-Run” Statute, Accused’s Knowledge of Accident, Injury, or Damage, 26 A.L.R.5th 1, ¶ 2[a] (2004); see, e.g., State v. Feintuch, 150 N.J.Super. 414, 420-21, 375 A.2d 1223, 1226 (1977)(noting that “[t]he great weight of authority in this country ... is that knowledge of the happening of an accident, and in some states, knowledge of consequential injury or damage is an integral part of the crime”).

Courts that have addressed statutory language similar to that here have indicated that to hold otherwise would make little sense: the purpose of such a statute is to ensure that an automobile driver involved in an accident will provide identification and assist in aiding or obtaining aid for those who are injured. The courts have reasoned that it is unlikely the legislature intended to impose a penalty for failing to follow a course of action where the driver was unaware of the collision. See State v. Wall, 206 Kan. 760, 764, 482 P.2d 41, 44 (1971); State v. Feintuch, supra, 150 N.J.Super. at 421, 375 A.2d at 1226.

Thus, we agree with defendant that § 42-4-1601 logically requires that, to be found guilty, a defendant must have known that he or she was involved in an accident.

We nevertheless reject defendant’s additional contention that to be convicted under § 42-4-1601, the defendant must also have acted with knowledge that serious injuries were incurred in the accident. Such a requirement is neither expressed nor implied in the statute, and interpreting the statute to impose such a requirement could defeat the public interest that is served by requiring drivers involved in collisions to stop and ascertain whether assistance is necessary. Otherwise, a callous person might make immediate flight from the accident scene to avoid learning whether injuries were sustained and how severe any such injuries were. See People v. Martinez, 120 Ill.App.3d 305, 313, 75 Ill.Dec. 936, 458 N.E.2d 104, 112 (1983); State v. Wall, supra, 206 Kan. at 764, 482 P.2d at 44.

Further, that a culpable mental state may be implied in a statute does not mandate that such a mental state be applied to all elements of the statute. Gorman v. People, supra, 19 P.3d at 666.

Here, the trial court did not advise defendant that one of the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty was knowledge that the accident had occurred. Although the court asked defendant whether he “had left the scene of an accident,” to which he answered in the affirmative, this question was not tantamount to an advisement by the court or an admission by defendant of the “knowingly” element of the offense. The court did not ascertain whether, when he left the scene, defendant knew of the accident. Further, the plea agreement signed by defendant did not set forth a culpable mental state of “knowingly” as an element of the offense, but rather only defined that term without indicating whether or how it applied to the elements of the offense.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that because defendant’s advisement was inadequate and failed to comply with Crim. P. 11, his conviction cannot stand.

The dissenting opinion, in concluding that the General Assembly intended that the offense at issue here be a strict liability offense, relies on People v. DeHerrera, 697 P.2d 734 (Colo.1985). We find that case distinguishable here, however. The offense in DeHerrera was leaving the scene of an accident resulting in damage to a vehicle. That offense, unlike the offense here, was not a felony, but rather merely a class two traffic offense. Understandably, the supreme court could conclude that no “knowingly” element had to be proven there. Moreover, we note that the jury in DeHerrera had been instructed that the offense of leaving the scene of the accident required a showing that the defendant knew the vehicle had been involved in accident. The defendant’s challenge related to the instruction defining the term “knowingly”.

The order denying postconviction relief is reversed, the judgment of conviction and sentence are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judge GRAHAM concurs. Judge RUSSEL dissents.

Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const, árt. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S.2004.