People v. Mansoori

2025 IL App (1st) 250481-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 1-25-0481
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 250481-U No. 1-25-0481B Order filed June 18, 2025 Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ ) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Nos. 19 CR 12258 v. ) 19 CR 12259 ) 19 CR 13576 CHRISTOPHER MANSOORI, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Neera Walsh, ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justice D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment. Justice Reyes specially concurred.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The judgment of the trial court which ordered defendant’s continued detention and subsequently denied his Rule 604(h) motion for relief is affirmed.

¶2 Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act,

amended article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West

2022)) and effected sweeping changes to the laws governing pretrial release and detention. See No. 1-25-0481B

Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 & n.1 (noting neither “(SAFE-T) Act” nor “Pretrial Fairness

Act” are “official” names but common shorthand for sequence of public acts). One of those

changes is a provision which requires the trial court, at every court date, to find that continued

detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or to prevent

the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). Defendant

Christopher Mansoori sought his release from detention and now appeals the trial court’s finding

that his continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to any person.

¶3 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On September 5, 2019, the State charged defendant in two separate cases, 19 CR 12258

and 19 CR 12259, each of which alleged two counts of domestic battery against the same person

that took place on April 22, 2019, and June 7, 2019. On October 7, 2019, the State subsequently

charged defendant in a third indictment under case number 19 CR 13576, alleging two counts of

armed violence, two counts of possession of a controlled substance, and two counts of aggravated

unlawful use of a weapon, all of which occurred on August 2, 2019.

¶6 Defendant was arrested on August 2, 2019, and released on bail in early August 2019, with

a bail amount of $150,000-D. His bail was revoked in October 2019, after a hearing where the

State claimed that defendant used a third party to attempt contact with the complaining witness in

his domestic battery cases.

¶7 Even though he was in custody, on October 10, 2023, the State filed petitions to detain

defendant, which were granted. Defendant appealed, and we reversed. People v. Mansoori, 2024

IL App (1st) 232351, ¶ 36. Specifically, we held that because defendant was already detained, the

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proper analysis for the trial court was to determine the necessity of defendant’s continued detention

pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). Id. ¶ 33. Given that the trial court is required to

make that finding at every court date, we remanded with instructions to the trial court to make the

required finding. Id. That decision adequately summarizes the relevant facts and proffers for that

proceeding, so we need not restate them here.

¶8 Following the issuance of our mandate on May 20, 2024, defendant, who was pro se, filed

a “Motion for Reconsideration of Pretrial Release Conditions,” on June 10, 2024. Defendant

argued that he does not pose a threat because the complaining witness in his domestic battery cases

lives in Iowa and has lived there for 20 years, and that he was accused of constructively possessing

a firearm rather than using the firearm to threaten or injure a person. Defendant also claimed that

he was not a flight risk because he appeared in court in 2019 when his bail was revoked, knowing

that he might be detained, and that his previous failures to appear were in misdemeanor cases

following confusion about court dates and issues with transportation. Defendant further denied

attempting to contact the complaining witness in his domestic battery cases. He also claimed that

he wrote a letter to the complaining witness’s brother on September 13, 2019, expressing concern

for the safety of defendant’s son and included instructions not to share the letter with the

complaining witness. He further alleged that he wrote a Facebook message to the complaining

witness’s sister, once again expressing concern about the safety of defendant’s son.

¶9 The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion on July 11, 2024. During the hearing,

defendant argued that one of the alleged instances of domestic battery was actually an occasion

where he was defending himself and his son from the complaining witness. He claimed the police

reports in his case maintain that he accused the complaining witness of battery before he was

charged with domestic battery. Defendant also reiterated that the complaining witness lives in Iowa

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and that defendant previously appeared in court knowing the State was seeking to revoke his bail,

thus demonstrating that he is not a flight risk.

¶ 10 In response, the State argued that defendant knows where the complaining witness lives in

Iowa and is therefore a danger to her. It also claimed that defendant is a threat to the community

at large based on “the totality of the allegations and how they stem from an incident at a public

office as to one of the incidents, the People felt that police intervention was required.” The State

provided no further details about this incident.

¶ 11 The trial court found “that by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or

combination of conditions of release would reasonably prevent the defendant from being charged

with a subsequent felony or a Class A misdemeanor.” The trial court reasoned that defendant

“reached out to the complaining witness from Cook County Jail through a third party” and that

defendant “has the wherewithal to find and contact the complaining witness who does not reside

in the state.”

¶ 12 On February 26, 2025, defendant filed a motion for relief as required by Supreme Court

Rule 604(h). Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). That motion claimed that the trial court

erroneously found that defendant reached out to the complaining witness from custody, applied an

improper standard, and failed to consider why less restrictive means would not mitigate any threat

defendant posed.

¶ 13 The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion on March 10, 2025. The State provided

a factual proffer which stated that defendant was arrested on August 2, 2019. Officers were

conducting a follow-up related to a domestic battery and telephone harassment that occurred at a

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) office at 1026 S. Damen in Chicago, Illinois.

The officers were alerted that defendant was at the DCFS office and when they arrived, they

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identified him and placed him under arrest. Officers obtained defendant’s keys and performed an

inventory search of defendant’s car which yielded a loaded nine-millimeter handgun in the

glovebox, an AR-15 rifle in the trunk with a loaded magazine, five empty magazines, and 100

rounds of ammunition. They also discovered a plastic bag containing crack cocaine.

¶ 14 The State also related the allegations regarding defendant’s two domestic battery incidents.

On April 22, 2019, defendant was at home with the complaining witness and their eight-month-

old child when defendant and the complaining witness got into an argument. During the argument,

defendant punched the complaining witness in the arms and side, pushed her into a running shower

and pulled some of her hair out, and attempted to push her down a flight of stairs.

¶ 15 On the second occasion on June 7, 2019, defendant and the complaining witness were

arguing about what to do with a life insurance payout for the complaining witness’s mother.

Defendant then stomped on her legs and claimed that he wanted to break her legs. The complaining

witness subsequently moved to Iowa, but returned to Chicago on July 6, 2019, to file for an order

of protection. The order of protection was granted, but was not served at the time. Between May

and June, the complaining witness received multiple threatening text messages and phone calls

from defendant, though the State did not provide any details.

¶ 16 Furthermore, the State proffered that it sought the revocation of defendant’s bail on

October 7, 2019, on the basis that he sent text messages to the complaining witness’s sister and a

letter to the complaining witness’s brother which made disparaging comments about the

complaining witness and threatened her with physical harm.

¶ 17 Finally, the State proffered that defendant has four failures to appear, as well as six

misdemeanor convictions for phone harassment and domestic battery, both with a different victim,

assault, resisting arrest, criminal damage to property, and possession of cannabis.

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¶ 18 The trial court stated that defendant had written letters to the complaining witness’s family

threatening her harm, and that defendant’s arrest, with firearms in his car, took place in broad

daylight and therefore posed a threat to the community and the complaining witness. The trial

court also discounted the efficacy of GPS monitoring, reasoning that “GPS would not give any

immediate notification to the court as to that the defendant has violated,” and that “GPS would not

be viable if the complaining witness is also not in the State of Illinois.” It further stated, “There’s

not a protected area in the State of Illinois, and again, being on electronic monitoring gives this

defendant unfettered movement for two days that he could be anywhere, and the court would have

no notification of that.”

¶ 19 Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 10, 2025, and this appeal followed.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 On appeal, defendant puts forth multiple arguments. First, he argues that the continued

detention finding required by the Code places the burden of proof on the State and that our standard

of review should be de novo. He also argues that the trial court erred in determining that

defendant’s detention was necessary to avoid a threat to the complaining witness and necessary to

prevent defendant from being charged with additional felonies or Class A misdemeanors.

¶ 22 A. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof

¶ 23 Defendant argues that, when it comes to the finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the

Code, the burden of proof falls on the State. In support of this proposition, he argues that, because

there is no burden of proof specified in section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code, the burden should fall on

“the party that initiates an action and disturbs the status quo.” He also argues that there is “always

a presumption that defendant is entitled to release on conditions,” citing to 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a).

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Finally, defendant claims that the trial court is required to consider the necessity of detention at

each and every court date. Thus, in total, defendant argues that these principles equate to the burden

of proof resting on the State.

¶ 24 We do not agree with the logic defendant ascribes to these various components. First, we

disagree that the presumption of eligibility for pretrial release is ever-present during the pendency

of the case. Section 110-2(a) of the Code only states that “All persons charged with an offense

shall be eligible for pretrial release before conviction. It is presumed that a defendant is entitled to

release on personal recognizance on the condition that the defendant attend all required court

proceedings and the defendant does not commit any criminal offense, and complies with all terms

of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022). Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code also

enumerates this presumption. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). But that presumption is clearly

overcome once the State proves by clear and convincing evidence the requisite elements, which

authorizes the trial court to order the defendant’s pretrial detention. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(4)

(West 2022); see People v. Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 27 (“At subsequent hearings,

however, the court is not obligated to make the same findings.”).

¶ 25 When the trial court is required to determine if a defendant’s detention remains necessary

at subsequent appearances, the State’s burden of clear and convincing evidence no longer applies.

People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 13. Indeed, it follows logically from the finding

required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code that a presumption no longer exists because “rather

than ask whether pretrial detention can mitigate the threat posed by a defendant, it starts from the

premise that detention was necessary to guard against that threat and asks whether anything has

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changed such that a defendant’s detention is no longer warranted.” People v. Thomas, 2024 IL

App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14.

¶ 26 Likewise, we reject defendant’s argument that we should presume the existence of a burden

of proof where the statute is silent. See Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023 IL

127712, ¶ 70 (where a statute is silent, the burden falls on the party initiating the proceedings).

Even ignoring the fact that defendant is relying on a case that dealt with the burden of proof in

administrative proceedings, his argument that the burden of proof should fall on the party that

“disturbs the status quo” makes little sense. The Code requires the trial court to consider a

defendant’s detention at every court date, regardless of whether a party makes such a request. 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). There is no party initiating the proceedings when the trial court

makes the finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code.

¶ 27 Furthermore, the legislature, in multiple locations throughout the Code, specified the

burden of proof. In section 110-6.1(e), it specified that the burden of proof is on the State at an

initial detention hearing, where the standard is clear and convincing evidence. 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e) (West 2022). The legislature also mandated that the State bears the burden to prove the

necessity of any particular condition of release by clear and convincing evidence. 725 ILCS 5/110-

2(b) (West 2022). Thus, we can only conclude that if the legislature wished for the State to bear

the burden of proof with respect to the finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code, it

knows how to include that language and would have done so. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s

argument that the State bears the burden of proof in this matter.

¶ 28 Defendant also argues that because the parties proceeded by way of proffers and

documentary evidence, that we should review the trial court’s determination de novo. This court

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previously held that the trial court’s finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code was

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 16; see also Casey,

2024 IL App (3d) 230568, ¶ 14. We reasoned that “the legislature prescribed no standard of proof,

i.e., no degree of confidence required, and has not placed the burden of proof on any particular

party,” and thus concluded that the legislature intended the section 110-6.1(i-5) finding to be

discretionary. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 16.

¶ 29 However, those cases were decided before our supreme court decided People v. Morgan,

which held that the trial court’s initial detention finding should be reviewed de novo when that

finding is based solely on proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.

People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 51. Thus, we must decide if cases such as Thomas and Casey

survive the supreme court’s holding in Morgan.

¶ 30 Morgan dealt with a trial court’s finding at an initial detention hearing, and not the finding

required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code. Id. ¶ 1. Although Morgan stated its holding in the

context of a pretrial detention hearing, it did not expressly disclaim its application to other areas

of the Code. Id. ¶ 51. However, the discussion of various standards of review in Morgan and its

analysis of the appellate court’s holding are instructive.

¶ 31 In Morgan, the appellate court held that that the trial court’s judgment regarding a pretrial

detention hearing should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 27. In criticizing that holding,

the supreme court reasoned that “there is nothing discretionary about making a finding as to

whether the State has met its standard of proof of a particular fact.” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting People v.

Whitaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 89 (Ellis, J., specially concurring)). It also reasoned that

“whether the State has supplied the requisite proof is a binary question; either the State has met its

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burden of proof or it has not.” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting People v. Wells, 2024 IL App (1st) 232453, ¶ 38

(Lampkin, J., specially concurring)). The court also observed that the discretion of the trial court

is not a standard of proof, as standards of proof are concerned with the quantum and quality of

proof that must be presented in order to prevail on an issue. Id. ¶ 29.

¶ 32 But as we have already noted, the finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code

contains no standard of proof or burden of proof. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). Contrasted

with an initial detention hearing with a burden on the State and a standard of proof, it is logical

that the legislature intended the finding required by section 110-6.1(i-5), with no burden or

standard of proof, to be discretionary in nature. Indeed, if the purpose of a standard of proof is to

“instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in

the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication,” Morgan, 2025 IL

130626, ¶ 29, then the absence of such a standard suggests the legislature intended to leave the

decision to the trial court’s discretion. Finally, applying de novo review to a finding that the trial

court must make at each and every court appearance, which may continually be appealed, and

which may not necessarily involve the presentation of any facts or arguments from the parties

makes little practical sense.

¶ 33 Accordingly, we believe the standard of review here, reviewing the trial court’s finding

made pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5), should be whether the trial court abused its discretion. An

abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or

where no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the trial court. Whitaker,

2024 IL App (1st) 232009, ¶ 50. However, even if we applied a de novo standard of review, our

disposition would remain the same.

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¶ 34 B. Necessity of Continued Detention

¶ 35 When an individual is initially charged with an offense, the Code prescribes one procedure

by which the State may seek the pretrial detention of a defendant. Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code

presumes that all defendants are eligible for pretrial release and places the burden of justifying

pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence on the State. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West

2022). To justify the pretrial detention of a defendant, the State must show by clear and convincing

evidence that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a

detainable offense; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition

or combination of conditions found in section 110-10 of the Code can mitigate that real and present

threat. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3).

¶ 36 However, once a defendant is already detained, the Code supplies a different procedure. At

each and every court appearance, the trial court must make a finding that “continued detention is

necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,

based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from

prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(i-5). As noted above, the Code sets out no standard of proof or burden

of proof for this finding. This finding “starts from the premise that detention was necessary to

guard against that threat and asks whether anything has changed such that a defendant’s detention

is no longer warranted.” Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14.

¶ 37 Before proceeding to the core of the issues raised on appeal, we first clarify the scope of

this appeal in the context of this court’s prior decisions. This court has previously discussed the

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proper scope of a hearing on a Rule 604(h)(2) motion for relief, and that the hearing should not

function as another full-scale detention hearing. People v. Williams, 2024 IL App (1st) 241013,

¶ 28. Instead, the purpose of a motion for relief is to “frame issues on appeal more efficiently, give

trial courts the opportunity to correct errors, and streamline the appeals process.” Id. At the hearing

on defendant’s motion for relief, the State provided a proffer which contained details that were not

recited at the July 11, 2024, hearing when defendant sought his release or during the October 16,

2023, proceedings discussed in defendant’s prior appeal. Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351,

¶¶ 5-8. However, defendant did not object to the State’s proffer at the hearing on defendant’s

motion for relief on March 10, 2025, nor has he argued on appeal that the procedure followed at

that hearing was improper. Thus, we have considered the arguments and proffers of the parties at

that hearing in full.

¶ 38 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering his continued detention based on a

misunderstanding of how electronic monitoring functions. At the hearing on defendant’s motion

for relief, the trial court reasoned that less restrictive conditions would not suffice because GPS

monitoring would not provide immediate notification as to defendant’s noncompliance and

because GPS monitoring would give defendant two days of unfettered movement. It also reasoned

that “there’s not a protected area in the state of Illinois.”

¶ 39 Our electronic monitoring statute mandates that participants must be provided with

movement spread out over no fewer than two days per week to participate in basic activities such

as working, seeking employment, obtaining medical care, or purchasing groceries. 730 ILCS 5/5-

8-4(A), (A-1) (West 2022). Nothing in that statute, as defendant argues, prohibits the trial court

from imposing some restrictions on that allowed movement. And defendant’s point is well taken

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that it is not clear what the trial court meant when it said that there is no protected area in Illinois.

Perhaps the trial court intended to say “Iowa,” but the record is unclear. However, even though the

trial court’s stated reasoning is somewhat flawed, the record provides a clear basis of why the trial

court was skeptical of electronic monitoring’s efficacy in this case.

¶ 40 Indeed, defendant’s defense of electronic monitoring as sufficient to guard against the

threat he poses presumes his compliance. Based on the record before us, that is unlikely. The record

reflects defendant’s numerous instances of noncompliance with laws and rules. Of particular note,

defendant has four failures to appear in the past, and he has a history of other domestic offenses

against other victims including telephone harassment and domestic battery. Most importantly, his

bail was revoked in this case specifically because he was noncompliant with the conditions of his

release.

¶ 41 A review of defendant’s bail revocation hearing on October 7, 2019, reveals that defendant

was ordered not to have contact with the complaining witness or her family, and defendant

nevertheless made contact with the complaining witness’s sister via text message, at which point

he bragged about posting bond, made disparaging comments about the complaining witness, and

told the sister “not to indicate anything because no one knew that he had bonded out.” Defendant

also contacted the complaining witness’s brother by letter in which he made more disparaging

comments about the complaining witness and described how he would harm her in the future,

saying, “I told her let me find out that you did that on purpose and I will beat the dog shit out of

you.”

¶ 42 Additionally, defendant’s bail revocation hearing reveals that he was arrested at a DCFS

office because the complaining witness was there with her daughter and defendant arrived there

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and “caused a scene.” He argues that the allegations against him are not sufficient to justify his

detention based on a threat to the complaining witness or the community at large. We have

previously said that the basic allegations against a defendant that constitute an offense are, without

more, insufficient to demonstrate that less restrictive means cannot mitigate the threat a defendant

poses. People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18. This is because “if the base allegations

that make up the sine qua non of a violent offense were sufficient on their own to establish this

element, then the legislature would have simply deemed those accused of violent offenses

ineligible for release.” Id.

¶ 43 But in this case, we have much more than the mere allegations that make up the basic

elements of the offenses. After attacking the complaining witness twice, defendant showed up to

a DCFS office where the complaining witness was present with her young daughter and engaged

in behavior that necessitated summoning the police. Meanwhile, his car was parked outside the

office and it contained a loaded nine-millimeter pistol and an AR-15 rifle, which was loaded and

accompanied by 100 rounds of spare ammunition. In the context of the prior allegations of extreme

violence against the complaining witness, which involved not only striking her and pulling her hair

out, but stating a desire to break her legs and attempting to throw her down a set of stairs, the trial

court’s ruling that continued detention was necessary was patently reasonable. These instances of

erratic and violent behavior while having access to loaded, and unlicensed, firearms are clearly a

threat to others.

¶ 44 Given the lengths to which defendant has allegedly gone to attack and harass the

complaining witness, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering defendant’s continued

detention. Because we find this to be a valid basis for defendant’s continued detention, we need

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not reach defendant’s second argument that the trial court erred in finding his detention necessary

to prevent him from being charged with another felony or Class A misdemeanor.

¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46 The trial court did not err in ordering defendant’s continued detention. For the foregoing

reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 47 Affirmed.

¶ 48 REYES, J., specially concurring:

¶ 49 I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly ordered defendant’s

continued detention and denied his Rule 604(h) motion for relief. I must write separately, however,

concerning several aspects of the majority’s decision.

¶ 50 First, as the majority observes, this case is before us after it was previously remanded for

a continued detention hearing “pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022).” Supra ¶ 7. I

dissented from that decision, in part, due to the majority’s determination that any continued

detention hearing was required to be held in accordance with section 110-6.1(i-5). See People v.

Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351, ¶ 43 (Reyes, P.J., dissenting). I noted that defendant was in

custody due to the revocation of his pretrial release, which was governed by section 110-6 of the

Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2022)), and that section 110-6.1(i-5) was therefore inapplicable to

his case. Id. I continue to maintain that position—as the majority in the earlier appeal reversed the

detention petition filed by the State, there has effectively never been a petition to detain defendant

pursuant to section 110-6.1. The only basis for defendant’s detention is the revocation of his

pretrial release under section 110-6. Any continued detention hearing should therefore be held

according to that statute.

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¶ 51 I observe that the continued detention hearing held on remand, while ostensibly held

pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code, was, in substance, a hearing pursuant to section 110-

6. Indeed, the trial court’s order after the continued detention hearing was on the form specified

for hearings under section 110-6, and its findings—both oral and written—were based on its

determination that no conditions of release would prevent defendant from being charged with a

subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor, which is the standard for continued detention under

section 110-6(j). See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(j) (West 2022); supra ¶ 11. In considering defendant’s

motion for relief, however, the trial court appears to have applied the standards applicable to

section 110-6.1(i-5). Under both statutes, the trial court is required to reevaluate whether continued

detention is appropriate at each appearance by defendant before the trial court. See 725 ILCS

5/110-6(j), 110-6.1(i-5) (West 2022). In this case, based on the trial court’s findings, continued

detention would have been appropriate under either statute, and I therefore find no error in the trial

court’s conclusion. In the future, however, I urge the State—and the trial court—to exercise

caution to ensure that they are proceeding under the correct standard.

¶ 52 I must also write separately concerning the majority’s determination as to the standard of

review to be applied. The foundation of its analysis is its position that there is no burden of proof

at continued detention hearings. See, e.g., supra ¶ 27 (“reject[ing] defendant’s argument that the

State bears the burden of proof in this matter”); ¶ 32 (indicating that the finding in a continued

detention hearing has “no burden or standard of proof”). This is not an entirely novel position, as

it has been adopted by other courts. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14.

The cases adopting such a position, however, have not addressed section 110-2(b), which provides

that “[a]t all pretrial hearings, the prosecution shall have the burden to prove by clear and

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convincing evidence that any condition of release is necessary.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS

5/110-2(b) (West 2022). In my view, a continued detention hearing could fall within the plain

language of this subsection. See People v. Milner, 2024 IL App (1st) 241284, ¶ 37 (in construing

a different section of the Pretrial Fairness Act, observing that the words “ ‘if any’ ” when

referencing conditions of release make clear that one possible result is that no such conditions of

release exist); People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2025 IL 130618, ¶ 40 (citing Milner with approval).

At a minimum, a number of courts have found that the State continues to bear some burden of

proof in continued detention hearings, even if it is a lesser one. See, e.g., People v. Stokes, 2024

IL App (1st) 232022-U, ¶ 29 (“it remains the State’s burden throughout the progression of the

defendant’s case to demonstrate that detention continues to be necessary”); People v. Cross, 2024

IL App (1st) 240616-U, ¶ 37 (same); People v. Harris, 2024 IL App (2d) 240070, ¶ 39 (same);

People v. Jones, 2024 IL App (1st) 240515-U, ¶ 5 (same). Thus, it is not entirely clear to me that

there is “no burden or standard of proof” (supra ¶ 32) in continued detention hearings, as asserted

by the majority.

¶ 53 Since the majority’s adoption of an abuse of discretion standard of review is based on the

above reasoning concerning the standard of proof, I similarly find it unclear whether an abuse of

discretion standard of review is appropriate, especially in light of our supreme court’s decision in

People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626. I agree, however, with the majority in its finding that

continued detention was appropriate in this case, regardless of the standard of review applied.

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