JUSTICE GARMAN
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Thomas and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Karmeier specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Burke.
OPINION
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County, defendant, Arthur R. Manning, was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2004)) and one count of possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2004)). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 11 years and 3 years, respectively. The appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. No. 2 — 07—0846 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
BACKGROUND
Defendant was arrested after allegedly selling cocaine to an undercover police officer posing as a taxi driver and to a man posing as a passenger. The passenger went into a duplex located at 37 Sunset Court in Bensenville. He returned to the taxi with defendant, who then sold the passenger cocaine. When the officer asked to purchase cocaine, defendant went back inside the duplex and returned with cocaine that he then sold to the officer. Following defendant’s arrest, a search warrant was executed at the duplex. Cocaine was found inside a mattress in the basement, along with men’s clothing, more cocaine, a digital scale, and a razor blade. Cocaine was also found in other rooms of the duplex and heroin was found in a freezer.
During voir dire, defense counsel told the members of the venire that at the trial, they would hear evidence that defendant is a registered sex offender and that his registered residence address was not at 37 Sunset Court. Counsel thus questioned potential jurors about what impact, if any, defendant’s sex offender status would have on their ability to be fair and impartial.
During questioning by the trial court, juror 165 (hereafter referred to as A.C.) stated that he came to the United States from Romania six years before and was in the printing business. He stated he could be fair to both sides and would judge the believability of all witnesses using the same standard for everyone. He had no criminal record, had never been a crime victim, and had not been involved in any lawsuits. A.C. stated that he had received two speeding tickets since he came to this country. Defense counsel then questioned A.C. When counsel asked A.C. how he felt about sex offenders, A.C. responded that they should be “locked up for life.” The following exchange then occurred:
“Q. *** What if the law permitted that he not be locked up for life or she not be locked up for life? Do you still think that should be the case? Do you think you would be able to listen to a case and render a judgment on a case that’s separate and distinct from the sex offender case?
A. Yes.
Q. Even though that person may have that background?
Q. Is that background going to influence you at all do you believe in your decision on the case?
A. I don’t think so.
Q. You don’t think so?
A. No.
Q. Can you be more specific? Can you say that it’s not going to?
Q. You cannot?
A. No. I said it’s not going to change. I cannot he fair with the case.
Q. You can be fair, or you cannot?
A. No, I cannot be fair.
Q. You can be fair?
A. No, I cannot be fair. I could not be fair also.”
Defense counsel did not move to strike A.C. for cause nor did he use a peremptory challenge to remove him from the jury. Counsel did excuse another juror who said her opinion of defendant “dropped drastically” when she learned of his sex offender status. In all, counsel used five of defendant’s seven available peremptory challenges.
At the trial, special agent Matthew Gainer of the Illinois State Police testified that at the time of defendant’s arrest, he was assigned to the Du Page County Metropolitan Enforcement Group, which investigated street-level narcotics trafficking. On July 14, 2005, Gainer and his fellow officers were investigating defendant. Gainer posed as a taxi driver. He and a passenger in the car drove to 37 Sunset Court in Bensenville, where Gainer parked the car. The passenger went inside and when he came back out, defendant was with him. The two stood by the passenger door of the car, where the passenger purchased two bags of crack cocaine from defendant for $40. Gainer asked if he could purchase some cocaine. Defendant went back into 37 Sunset Court and returned a short time later. Defendant gave Gainer three bags of crack cocaine in exchange for $60. Defendant then returned to the residence.
Gainer further testified that he and other officers executed a search warrant at the residence on July 28, 2005. They searched the basement, where they found men’s clothing and three bags of cocaine, a scale, and identification documents. In another part of the residence, the officers found two more bags of cocaine. Gainer seized defendant’s Illinois identification card, issued on January 29, 1995, with an address of 37 Sunset Court. He also seized a checkbook with the address of 212 West Sunny Lane. Officers also found a piece of mail addressed to defendant at the Sunset Court address and another addressed to him at the West Sunny Lane address with a forwarding address to Sunset Court.
Officer Michael Hanrahan testified that he and another officer spoke to defendant at the police station. While taking defendant’s personal history, defendant told them that he lived at 37 Sunset Court. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant gave a statement in which he again said that he lived at 37 Sunset Court, that he had resided there for approximately 10 months, and that he had sold cocaine there for a year. Defendant told the officers they could find heroin in a freezer at the residence that he was holding for someone else. When this information was relayed to officers on the scene, they found 14 tinfoil packets of heroin in the freezer. Defendant prepared a written statement in which he again confirmed his residence as 37 Sunset Court.
Former Bensenville police detective Maria Hernandez testified that she monitored sex offenders. As a registered sex offender, defendant was not allowed to live within 500 feet of a park. Because the residence at 37 Sunset Court was closer than 500 feet to a park, Hernandez ordered defendant to move in December 2004. She could not verify whether he had complied, although defendant told her he had moved to Maywood.
Bensenville police officer Todd Zoglman testified that in May 2005, he stopped defendant for driving on a suspended license. The Secretary of State’s records showed defendant’s address as being in Maywood. However, suspended licenses could not be updated and Zoglman testified that the records on defendant’s identification card listed his current address as 37 Sunset Court.
Defendant testified that he moved from Sunset Court to Maywood in December 2004. He updated some of his records but not others. He did register his Maywood address with the local police department. In March 2005, he was arrested for driving under the influence. A certified copy of the traffic citation introduced into evidence showed defendant’s address as 2033 South Third Avenue in Maywood. Defendant testified that he frequently visited his girlfriend and her three children, who lived at the Sunset Court address. On July 28, 2005, he drove to Sunset Court to take his girlfriend to Rockford. The police drove up and arrested him. When he got to the police station, an officer told defendant to initial and sign a Miranda waiver. He did so after reading it. The interrogating officers accused him of selling drugs. When defendant stated that he wanted an attorney, the officers told him he would get one later in Wheaton. Defendant testified that the only reason he wrote and signed a statement was because the officers threatened to take custody of his girlfriend’s children. The officers told him to write 37 Sunset Court as his address on his statement. Defendant denied that he had sold any drugs.
Hanrahan testified in rebuttal, denying defendant’s claim that he had asked for an attorney. He denied that defendant was threatened or that he was told to write down the 37 Sunset Court address.
Defendant was convicted and sentenced as stated. On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to excuse A.C. from the venire due to his statements that he could not be fair to defendant because of his sex offender status. The appellate court rejected this argument, noting that under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (adopted by this court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984)), defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice. The court noted that, generally, counsel’s conduct during jury selection is considered to involve matters of trial strategy not subject to scrutiny under Strickland. The court concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice because the evidence against him was overwhelming. In addition, the court rejected defendant’s argument that prejudice should be presumed where a biased juror sat on his jury. No. 2 — 07—0846 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to challenge A.C. for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge. He further argues that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure. In the alternative, he argues that this court should find that jury bias is presumptively prejudicial under Strickland.
Claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are judged under the familiar standard set forth in Strickland. A defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694.
“In order to satisfy the deficient-performance prong of Strickland, a defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was so inadequate that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed hy the sixth amendment. Counsel’s performance is measured by an objective standard of competence under prevailing professional norms. Further, in order to establish deficient performance, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged action or inaction may have been the product of sound trial strategy. People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 73-74 (1997). Matters of trial strategy are generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418 (1999).” People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179, 188 (2000).
Defendant first argues that the appellate court applied the wrong standard of review on the prejudice prong of Strickland. Initially, the court stated the test correctly, i.e., that defendant must show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. However, later in the opinion, the court stated that it could not say that the result of defendant’s trial “would have been different” had A.C. not served on the jury. Defendant also alleges similar inconsistencies in other cases.
Defendant is correct that the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard does not require that a defendant demonstrate that the result of his trial would have been different. Rather, although a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different, “the prejudice prong of Strickland is not simply an ‘outcome-determinative’ test but, rather, may be satisfied if defendant can show that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 259 (2001); see also People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004) (“a reasonable probability that the result would have been different is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome — or put another way, that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or fundamentally unfair”).
Despite the appellate court’s misstatement of the standard, we do not find that the court erred in applying it to defendant’s case.
In addressing defendant’s ineffectiveness argument, the appellate court found this court’s decision in People v. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d 544, 562 (2002), to be dispositive of defendant’s appeal. In Metcalfe, the defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that he was denied his right to a fair trial when one of the members of his jury, a woman named Grevus, indicated during voir dire that she could not be fair and impartial. The appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to excuse Grevus even though defendant’s counsel had not challenged her for cause or exercised a peremptory challenge. During voir dire, Grevus indicated that she and her parents had been crime victims. She had been robbed at gunpoint and the perpetrator “got off because of a technicality.” Grevus noted that the defendant’s attorney had tried to discredit her trial testimony identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. Defense counsel asked Grevus whether the result of that case would cause her to be biased in any way. She answered that it would and stated that she felt the perpetrator was clearly guilty. Defense counsel excused two other prospective jurors but did not excuse Grevus. The appellate court reviewed the defendant’s claim under the second prong of the plain-error rule. The court found that Grevus was biased against the defendant and held that when a prospective juror indicates bias or prejudice and counsel does not move to excuse the prospective juror, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to do so. This court disagreed, holding that no sua sponte duty exists. Id. at 551, 557.
In addition, this court addressed the defendant’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Grevus and that prejudice should be presumed due to the fact that an actually biased juror served on his jury, invoking the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). This court noted Cronic held that there are certain circumstances that are so likely to prejudice an accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. This includes a complete denial of counsel, where counsel fails to subject the prosecution’s case to any meaningful adversarial testing. This court found Cronic to be inapplicable, noting that an attorney’s failure in this regard must be complete. The defendant in Metcalfe did not claim that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution completely during voir dire as a whole, but only as to one prospective juror. In fact, defense counsel had exercised five peremptory challenges. Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 560-61. Instead, the court addressed the defendant’s argument under the Strickland standard. Noting that defense counsel’s strategic choices are virtually unchallengeable, this court rejected the defendant’s claim that his counsel’s actions were deficient. It was possible that defense counsel believed Grevus’s bias was directed at the criminal justice system or at the prosecution, rather than at the defendant himself. Accordingly, the court found that counsel’s decision not to challenge Grevus was a matter of trial strategy. This court further found that, assuming there was deficient performance, the defendant suffered no prejudice because the evidence at trial was more than sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 561-62.
In his petition for leave to appeal, defendant in this case argued that this court should “reconsider” our decision in Metcalfe because juror bias is structural error, and since Metcalfe was decided, other courts have held that a biased juror is inherently prejudicial. Asking this court to reconsider Metcalfe is tantamount to asking us to overrule that decision. It is unclear to us how we could reconsider it without overruling it. Defendant also now argues in his brief that Metcalfe is distinguishable because the biased juror there only might have been biased toward the accused, whereas the biased juror here was deeply biased against defendant. Thus, according to defendant, his trial counsel’s failure to challenge A.C. for cause or use a peremptory challenge to remove him from the jury was objectively unreasonable.
We first address defendant’s argument that this court should overrule Metcalfe.
Defendant argues that prejudice should be “presumed” under Strickland. He argues that Strickland assumed jury impartiality in its prejudice analysis. (Prejudice requires a “showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.” Id. at 685.) Defendant cites federal cases and cases from other states which he says found juror bias prejudicial under Strickland and he asks this court to “refine the Metcalfe analysis” or “go in a different direction” in light of these cases. As with the request to reconsider Metcalfe, these suggestions essentially ask this court to overrule Metcalfe.
Defendant contends that some courts have focused on the lack of an impartial jury and, thus, the evaluation of prejudice “requires a showing that, as a result of trial counsel’s failure to exercise peremptory challenges, the jury panel contained at least one juror who was biased.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 643 (9th Cir. 2004). Defendant cites as an example the case of People v. Vieyra, 169 E3d 205 (Colo. App. 2007), in which the defendant alleged in postconviction proceedings that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to exercise an unused peremptory challenge. The court declined to find that prejudice is presumed when defense counsel fails to exercise all of the defendant’s peremptory challenges, holding instead that the defendant must establish prejudice under Strickland. The court held that the defendant had not done so, noting that he had failed to establish which juror he would have struck with the remaining challenge and he had failed to establish facts suggesting bias on the part of any of the jurors who sat on his jury. Id. at 210.
Another case defendant cites is Whitney v. State, 857 A.2d 625 (Md. App. 2004), where the defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to realize that defendant was entitled to 10 peremptory strikes. The trial court had told counsel that they each had four strikes and defense counsel failed to object. She exercised all four of the defendant’s challenges. The appellate court found that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable. In discussing the prejudice prong of Strickland, the court declined to find that prejudice was presumed. The court stated that, considering the record, it could not perceive any prejudice resulting from counsel’s mistake that was shown to have resulted in the impairment of the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury and the trial was not unreliable or fundamentally unfair. Id. at 637. In State v. Carter, 2002 WI App 55, U15, 641 N.W.2d 517, the court found that counsel’s failure to strike or further question a juror who admitted bias denied the defendant an impartial jury and rendered the outcome of the trial unreliable and fundamentally unfair, thus presuming prejudice regardless of whether the deficient performance had any impact on the result of the trial. Similarly, Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 613 (5th Cir. 2006), found that the seating of biased jurors, without more, made the result of the defendant’s trial unreliable; thus, prejudice was presumed.
Defendant argues that other cases focus on the structural nature of jury bias. The principal case defendant cites here is Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir. 2001). The court held there that the defendant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to strike a biased juror. The court further held that the impaneling of a biased juror requires a new trial and prejudice under Strickland is presumed. Id.-, see also State v. King, 2008 UT 54, ¶18, 190 P.3d 1283 (court stated that had the deficient performance of the defendant’s counsel permitted an actually biased juror to be seated, the court would presume that the defendant’s sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel had been violated, citing Hughes with approval).
Defendant’s request to this court to overrule Metcalfe implicates the doctrine of stare decisis. As we have explained:
“The doctrine of stare decisis expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points. [Citation.] This doctrine is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. [Citation.] Stare decisis enables both the people and the bar of this state to rely upon [this court’s] decisions with assurance that they will not be lightly overruled.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519 (2005) (quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81-82 (2004)).
We have also acknowledged that stare decisis is not an inexorable command. However, any departure from that doctrine must be specially justified; prior decisions should not be overruled absent good cause. Id. at 519-20.
We noted in Sharpe that good cause to depart from stare decisis exists when governing decisions are unworkable or badly reasoned. Id. at 520. Defendant here has not shown that this is the case with our decision in Metcalfe. Defendant merely prefers that this court adopt a different approach to claims of ineffectiveness of counsel during jury selection because some federal court circuits and a handful of state courts have done so. This hardly constitutes a groundswell of opposition to this court’s reasoning in Metcalfe.
In addition, it appears to us that the analysis defendant favors amounts to little more than an end run around Cronic. Once it is determined that counsel was deficient for not striking a biased juror, prejudice is presumed because the defendant was deprived of an impartial jury and that makes the trial fundamentally unfair. Thus, only the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test is considered, the defendant does not have to actually demonstrate prejudice, and a new trial is required. This court rejected the defendant’s Cronic argument in Metcalfe, 202 Ill. 2d at 560, and we similarly reject defendant’s indirect attempt to revisit that argument here.
We now turn to defendant’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek juror A.C.’s removal from the jury. As stated above, counsel’s actions during jury selection are generally considered a matter of trial strategy. Accordingly, counsel’s strategic choices are virtually unchallengeable. People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1994).
Defendant initially argues that voir dire is not “exempt” from a Strickland analysis. We point out, however, that this court has never held that an attorney’s performance during voir dire is not subject to scrutiny under Strickland, nor does defendant cite any case from this court so holding. Rather, we have recognized, as have other reviewing courts, that decisions made during jury selection involve trial strategy to which courts should be highly deferential. Strickland itself emphasized the deference due counsel’s strategic decisions:
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. [Citation.] A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort he made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ See Michel v. Louisiana, [350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)].” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Defendant portrays A.C. as unequivocally biased against him. In doing so, defendant focuses only on the last few answers A.C. gave in response to trial counsel’s questions. This selective focus on those answers given by A.C. that suit defendant’s argument skews the analysis of whether trial counsel was deficient. The entire voir dire of A.C. should be considered in evaluating whether and to what extent A.C. exhibited bias against defendant.
Even after saying that he believed sex offenders should be locked up for life, A.C. stated that, notwithstanding that belief, he would be able to listen to the evidence and render a decision apart from the sex offender issue. He said that he did not think a sex offender background would influence his decision on the case. Not satisfied with that answer, defense counsel pressed A.C. to state unequivocally that such a background would not influence his decision. Only then did A.C. state that he could not be fair with the case. Other prospective jurors also expressed negative feelings about sex offenders. Trial counsel exercised peremptory challenges to some, but not all, of these jurors. For example, juror 41 stated that he had young children at home. He was uncertain whether he could be neutral in making a decision about a sex offender. Defense counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to this juror. Juror 120 stated that a member of his family had an experience with a sex offender some years ago. When asked if that would affect him if he were dealing with a sex offender on an issue that had nothing to do with a sex offense, this juror stated that it probably would not. Defense counsel did not exercise any challenge to juror 120.
Thus, counsel was sensitive to the fact that revealing defendant’s sex offender status might give rise to doubt on the part of some venire members that they could be fair and impartial. Defendant’s attorney was faced with a difficult case, given the strong evidence against defendant, and his chosen strategy reflected that difficulty. Highlighting defendant’s sex offender status was a risky choice, given largely negative views of sex offenders by the general public. Based upon his decisions as to when to exercise peremptory challenges, it does not appear that counsel expected prospective jurors to be able to completely put those views aside.
Considering the entire voir dire of A.C. in context, it is possible that defendant’s trial counsel decided that A.C. was not unequivocally biased. In addition, there were other factors that counsel may have taken into consideration, such as the fact that A.C. was not a native of this country and that he had had encounters with law enforcement officers in connection with his two speeding tickets. Attorneys consider many factors in making their decisions about which jurors to challenge and which to accept. As we have stated, this is part of trial strategy, which is generally not subject to challenge under Strickland. Reviewing courts should hesitate to second-guess counsel’s strategic decisions, even where those decisions seem questionable.
In People v. Begay, 377 Ill. App. 3d 417 (2007), the defendant challenged his trial attorney’s failure to seek removal of a juror for cause. During voir dire, the juror stated that her mother had been assaulted at knifepoint during a robbery. When the trial court asked the juror whether that experience would affect her ability to be fair and impartial, the juror said it would. The court then stated, “All right. So you wouldn’t be fair, either?” The juror replied, “No.” Id. at 423. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that her counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland, the appellate court theorized that defense counsel could have believed that the juror would sympathize with the defendant, who claimed that when the offenses occurred, she was being attacked by a knife-wielding aggressor. Thus, the appellate court found trial counsel’s decision to be a strategic one. Id.
Here, A.C., like the juror in Begay, stated that he could not be fair. However, unlike the juror in Begay, A.C. had earlier stated that he could be fair and that he believed he could put aside his prejudice against sex offenders in defendant’s case because no sex offense was involved. While some might find defense counsel’s failure to challenge A. C. questionable, this alone is insufficient to find that counsel’s conduct was deficient under Strickland. In addition, at the time of A.C.’s questioning, defense counsel had two remaining peremptory challenges and three more jurors remained to be seated, as well as an alternate. Under these circumstances, given A.C.’s conflicting answers regarding his impartiality, we cannot say that counsel’s decision to reserve his two remaining peremptory challenges was unreasonable. Thus, we disagree with defendant that A.C. was “plainly and deeply biased,” and we conclude that counsel’s actions were a part of his trial strategy and were not deficient under Strickland.
Defendant argues that Metcalfe is distinguishable because this court found that the prospective juror there, Grevus, could have been biased against the State and not the defendant; thus, the Metcalfe juror’s bias was less personal than the alleged bias of A.C. here. However, the bias of the juror in Metcalfe was very personal. She had been a crime victim and had had an unfavorable experience at the trial based on her cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel. While it is true that Grevus might have been prejudiced toward the criminal justice system as a whole based on the fact that her attacker was not convicted, she also may have been prejudiced against defendants and defense attorneys. Unlike the juror in the instant case, Grevus was definite that her experiences would affect her ability to be fair and impartial. A.C. here at first said he could set aside his view of sex offenders. Taking his entire voir dire questioning into account, A.C.’s expression of bias was not unequivocal. Thus, we do not find Metcalfe distinguishable on this basis.
Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to challenge juror A.C. was not objectively unreasonable and that defendant has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we decline to overrule our decision in Metcalfe. Further, we conclude that the failure of defendant’s trial attorney to challenge juror A.C. during voir dire was not objectively unreasonable. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Appellate court judgment affirmed.