2014 IL App (1st) 131950
THIRD DIVISION August 27, 2014
No. 1-13-1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 12 MC1 197585 ) CARMELITA MADISON, ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Michael B. McHale, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court with opinion. Justices Neville and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant-appellant, Carmelita Madison, appeals from an order entered by the circuit
court of Cook County finding her unfit to stand trial. On appeal, Madison contends that the State
failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate her lack of fitness, and she argues a number of
grounds for reversing the finding of unfitness. After Madison’s notice of appeal was filed in this
case, she was found fit to stand trial with medication. The State does not respond to Madison’s
arguments on the merits and instead contends that her appeal is moot. The State maintains that
because Madison has now been found fit to stand trial, this court is unable to afford her any relief
and the appeal should be dismissed. We agree that Madison's appeal is moot and dismiss this
appeal.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Madison was charged with one count of misdemeanor battery after she allegedly struck
the victim in the face on April 19, 2012. On June 29, 2012, the trial court ordered a behavioral No. 1-13-1950
clinical examination for Madison. On September 11, 2012, Dr. Erick Neu, a licensed clinical
psychologist with Cook County Forensic Clinical Services, evaluated Madison and concluded
that she was unfit to stand trial and that she “suffered from a psychotic disorder and her
symptoms were of sufficient severity to significantly impede her ability to assist in her defense.”
¶4 On January 31, 2013, the trial court ordered a second examination to be conducted by an
evaluator other than Dr. Neu, because more than 45 days had passed since Dr. Neu’s report. See
725 ILCS 5/104-16(a) (West 2012).
¶5 The evaluation was assigned to Dr. Christofer Cooper, who first met with Madison on
February 28, 2013. The evaluation lasted only 20 minutes because Madison declined to
participate. After answering some initial questions, Madison refused to continue the evaluation
because she claimed that Dr. Cooper did not have her academic transcripts dating back to college
and that without them, Dr. Cooper would not be able to “understand her language or accurately
diagnose her.” Shortly after her initial meeting with Dr. Cooper, Madison sent a letter to Dr.
Cooper’s office. The lengthy letter expressed Madison’s complaints about the initial evaluation,
contained various comments about her Judeo-Christian beliefs, and asked that Dr. Cooper read
all of her academic transcripts. In her letter, Madison expressed her belief that Dr. Cooper must
“black out all theological, philosophical references” in her file because Madison believed that
Judge Gloria Chevere already “found me guilty based upon her prejudice.”
¶6 Madison failed to appear for her second appointment with Dr. Cooper scheduled for
March 25, 2013. Before her third appointment scheduled for April 16, 2013, Dr. Cooper received
a CD-ROM containing Madison’s various academic transcripts, which he reviewed in
preparation for the April 16 evaluation. But when Dr. Cooper met with Madison on April 16,
2013, the evaluation only lasted about 10 minutes. Dr. Cooper told Madison that he had received
2 No. 1-13-1950
and reviewed her academic transcripts, but she demanded that Dr. Cooper take out her records
and review them with her. Dr. Cooper told Madison that he was seeking information directly
from her, not from her records, and that he wanted to ask her questions. Madison then refused to
answer any more questions or to participate in the evaluation. Dr. Cooper was unable to ask
Madison if she understood the function of a trial or whether she would be able to rationally assist
her attorney in preparing her defense.
¶7 After the April 16, 2013 evaluation, Madison sent Dr. Cooper a second letter. In that
letter, Madison stated that she “boldly, angrily and self-righteously rendered a statement that I
truly presented to you as having psychiatric mental illness.” Madison also wrote, “I dismissed
my adult presence before you and proceeded as if I was nothing. Is this not so? You, sir, are not
who you think you are.” Madison also wrote the victim an 18-page letter stating that, “[the
victim], the Pope and the President were involved in sex trafficking of Black children in her
neighborhood.” Based on everything that Dr. Cooper reviewed, including Dr. Neu’s report,
Madison’s letters, the police report, and the misdemeanor complaint, as well as his two
attempted evaluations of Madison, Dr. Cooper stated that his “clinical concerns are that
[Madison] suffers from a mental illness, specifically a psychotic or delusional mental illness and
that this presents possible concerns regarding her fitness to stand trial.”
¶8 On May 9, 2013, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. Dr. Cooper testified that he
was unable to proffer a clinical opinion as to whether or not Madison was fit to stand trial,
because she had refused to participate in the evaluation. Dr. Cooper expressed “clinical
concerns” regarding Madison’s fitness for trial based on all of the information available to him.
After hearing Dr. Cooper’s testimony and considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court
found Madison unfit to stand trial. The trial court disagreed with defense counsel’s argument that
3 No. 1-13-1950
there was no evidence of unfitness, noting Dr. Cooper’s clinical concerns regarding an
underlying paranoid delusional ideation. The trial court also stated that based on the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (see 725 ILCS 5/104-14(c) (West 2012)), the court was allowed to
consider Madison’s continued refusal to cooperate with any of the Forensic Clinical Services’
evaluations. The court ordered Madison committed to the Department of Human Services for
inpatient treatment. On May 10, 2013, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the finding of
unfitness and the ruling committing Madison to inpatient treatment. The trial court denied the
motion to reconsider the fitness finding, but granted the motion to allow Madison to undergo
outpatient treatment.
¶9 Several months later, Madison was again evaluated by Dr. Neu. Although Madison
reported that she had not taken her prescribed psychotropic medication for several weeks, Dr.
Neu nevertheless concluded that she was fit to stand trial in that she displayed an understanding
of the role of various courtroom personnel, understood the charges against her and appeared able
to cooperate with defense counsel. At a later restoration hearing, the parties stipulated to Dr.
Neu's findings and the trial court found Madison fit to stand trial.
¶ 10 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 In this appeal, Madison challenges the trial court’s finding that she was not fit to stand
trial. Because Madison was found fit to stand trial during the pendency of this appeal, the issue
of her fitness is now moot. Nevertheless, Madison argues that the issue presented by her appeal
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2014 IL App (1st) 131950
THIRD DIVISION August 27, 2014
No. 1-13-1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 12 MC1 197585 ) CARMELITA MADISON, ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Michael B. McHale, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court with opinion. Justices Neville and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant-appellant, Carmelita Madison, appeals from an order entered by the circuit
court of Cook County finding her unfit to stand trial. On appeal, Madison contends that the State
failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate her lack of fitness, and she argues a number of
grounds for reversing the finding of unfitness. After Madison’s notice of appeal was filed in this
case, she was found fit to stand trial with medication. The State does not respond to Madison’s
arguments on the merits and instead contends that her appeal is moot. The State maintains that
because Madison has now been found fit to stand trial, this court is unable to afford her any relief
and the appeal should be dismissed. We agree that Madison's appeal is moot and dismiss this
appeal.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Madison was charged with one count of misdemeanor battery after she allegedly struck
the victim in the face on April 19, 2012. On June 29, 2012, the trial court ordered a behavioral No. 1-13-1950
clinical examination for Madison. On September 11, 2012, Dr. Erick Neu, a licensed clinical
psychologist with Cook County Forensic Clinical Services, evaluated Madison and concluded
that she was unfit to stand trial and that she “suffered from a psychotic disorder and her
symptoms were of sufficient severity to significantly impede her ability to assist in her defense.”
¶4 On January 31, 2013, the trial court ordered a second examination to be conducted by an
evaluator other than Dr. Neu, because more than 45 days had passed since Dr. Neu’s report. See
725 ILCS 5/104-16(a) (West 2012).
¶5 The evaluation was assigned to Dr. Christofer Cooper, who first met with Madison on
February 28, 2013. The evaluation lasted only 20 minutes because Madison declined to
participate. After answering some initial questions, Madison refused to continue the evaluation
because she claimed that Dr. Cooper did not have her academic transcripts dating back to college
and that without them, Dr. Cooper would not be able to “understand her language or accurately
diagnose her.” Shortly after her initial meeting with Dr. Cooper, Madison sent a letter to Dr.
Cooper’s office. The lengthy letter expressed Madison’s complaints about the initial evaluation,
contained various comments about her Judeo-Christian beliefs, and asked that Dr. Cooper read
all of her academic transcripts. In her letter, Madison expressed her belief that Dr. Cooper must
“black out all theological, philosophical references” in her file because Madison believed that
Judge Gloria Chevere already “found me guilty based upon her prejudice.”
¶6 Madison failed to appear for her second appointment with Dr. Cooper scheduled for
March 25, 2013. Before her third appointment scheduled for April 16, 2013, Dr. Cooper received
a CD-ROM containing Madison’s various academic transcripts, which he reviewed in
preparation for the April 16 evaluation. But when Dr. Cooper met with Madison on April 16,
2013, the evaluation only lasted about 10 minutes. Dr. Cooper told Madison that he had received
2 No. 1-13-1950
and reviewed her academic transcripts, but she demanded that Dr. Cooper take out her records
and review them with her. Dr. Cooper told Madison that he was seeking information directly
from her, not from her records, and that he wanted to ask her questions. Madison then refused to
answer any more questions or to participate in the evaluation. Dr. Cooper was unable to ask
Madison if she understood the function of a trial or whether she would be able to rationally assist
her attorney in preparing her defense.
¶7 After the April 16, 2013 evaluation, Madison sent Dr. Cooper a second letter. In that
letter, Madison stated that she “boldly, angrily and self-righteously rendered a statement that I
truly presented to you as having psychiatric mental illness.” Madison also wrote, “I dismissed
my adult presence before you and proceeded as if I was nothing. Is this not so? You, sir, are not
who you think you are.” Madison also wrote the victim an 18-page letter stating that, “[the
victim], the Pope and the President were involved in sex trafficking of Black children in her
neighborhood.” Based on everything that Dr. Cooper reviewed, including Dr. Neu’s report,
Madison’s letters, the police report, and the misdemeanor complaint, as well as his two
attempted evaluations of Madison, Dr. Cooper stated that his “clinical concerns are that
[Madison] suffers from a mental illness, specifically a psychotic or delusional mental illness and
that this presents possible concerns regarding her fitness to stand trial.”
¶8 On May 9, 2013, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. Dr. Cooper testified that he
was unable to proffer a clinical opinion as to whether or not Madison was fit to stand trial,
because she had refused to participate in the evaluation. Dr. Cooper expressed “clinical
concerns” regarding Madison’s fitness for trial based on all of the information available to him.
After hearing Dr. Cooper’s testimony and considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court
found Madison unfit to stand trial. The trial court disagreed with defense counsel’s argument that
3 No. 1-13-1950
there was no evidence of unfitness, noting Dr. Cooper’s clinical concerns regarding an
underlying paranoid delusional ideation. The trial court also stated that based on the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (see 725 ILCS 5/104-14(c) (West 2012)), the court was allowed to
consider Madison’s continued refusal to cooperate with any of the Forensic Clinical Services’
evaluations. The court ordered Madison committed to the Department of Human Services for
inpatient treatment. On May 10, 2013, defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the finding of
unfitness and the ruling committing Madison to inpatient treatment. The trial court denied the
motion to reconsider the fitness finding, but granted the motion to allow Madison to undergo
outpatient treatment.
¶9 Several months later, Madison was again evaluated by Dr. Neu. Although Madison
reported that she had not taken her prescribed psychotropic medication for several weeks, Dr.
Neu nevertheless concluded that she was fit to stand trial in that she displayed an understanding
of the role of various courtroom personnel, understood the charges against her and appeared able
to cooperate with defense counsel. At a later restoration hearing, the parties stipulated to Dr.
Neu's findings and the trial court found Madison fit to stand trial.
¶ 10 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 In this appeal, Madison challenges the trial court’s finding that she was not fit to stand
trial. Because Madison was found fit to stand trial during the pendency of this appeal, the issue
of her fitness is now moot. Nevertheless, Madison argues that the issue presented by her appeal
falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine that would allow for appellate review of the
trial court’s finding of unfitness. Whether this appeal is moot presents a question of law. See In
re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 350 (2009).
4 No. 1-13-1950
¶ 12 Generally, a party resisting a finding of mootness has the burden to show an exception to
the mootness doctrine on at least one of three grounds: that the case falls into the category of one
that is “capable of repetition but evading review”; that the case involves an issue of great public
importance; or that there are collateral consequences of the order appealed from such that it
"could return to plague the [defendant] in some future proceedings or could affect other aspects
of [the defendant’s] life." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Holt, 2013 IL App (2d)
120476, ¶ 4, appeal allowed, No. 116989 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2014). Madison relies on the last
exception in this case, contending that even if this appeal is moot, review is nonetheless
appropriate under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine. Madison
contends that the finding that she was unfit to stand trial has collateral consequences in that (i) it
could prevent her from obtaining a firearm owners’ identification (FOID) card or obtaining
licensure in a number of professions; (ii) it could be used in other proceedings to undermine her
credibility; and (iii) the medication that has restored her to fitness imposes ongoing financial and
physical burdens.
¶ 13 The collateral consequences doctrine allows for appellate review after a court order has
ceased to be effective if the party seeking review has suffered, or is threatened with, an actual
injury that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d
345, 361 (2009). While our supreme court has recognized that reversal of a mental health
admission or treatment order could provide a “host of potential legal benefits,” it concluded that
application of the collateral consequences exception must be decided on a case-by-case basis and
that the finding of collateral consequences has to be tailored to the facts of each case. Id. at 362.
¶ 14 The supreme court further clarified the mootness doctrine and its three exceptions in In re
Rita P., 2014 IL 115798. In Rita P., respondent’s psychiatrist filed a petition seeking a court
5 No. 1-13-1950
order allowing the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. Rita P., 2014 IL
115798, ¶¶ 1-4. The circuit court granted the involuntary treatment order and set a treatment
period of 90 days. Id. ¶ 23. Respondent filed a notice of appeal, seeking reversal of the trial
court’s treatment order. Id. ¶ 24. During the pendency of the appeal, the treatment order expired.
Id. This court reviewed the case under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness
doctrine and reversed the trial court’s treatment order. Id. ¶ 25.
¶ 15 The State requested the supreme court to vacate the appellate court’s judgment, arguing
that “no per se exception to the mootness doctrine applies to first involuntary treatment orders, or
mental health cases generally, and that the appellate court should have dismissed respondent’s
appeal as moot.” Id. ¶ 30. The supreme court agreed and held that “a reviewing court must
consider all the relevant facts and legal issues raised in the appeal before deciding whether the
exception applies.” Id. ¶ 34. The court concluded that application of the collateral consequences
exception cannot rest upon the lone fact that no prior involuntary admission or treatment order
was entered, or upon a vague, unsupported statement that collateral consequences might plague
the respondent in the future. Id. Rather, the collateral consequences must be identifiable and stem
solely from the present adjudication. Id. The supreme court explained:
“Although amicus curiae argues that a first involuntary commitment or treatment
order should always satisfy the collateral consequences exception, we adhere to
our decision in Alfred H.H. and decline to adopt a blanket rule of appealability in
such cases. Appellate court opinions that hold otherwise, including the opinion
below, are overruled.” Id.
¶ 16 As a threshold matter, all of Madison's arguments regarding collateral consequences
overlook the fact that before the hearing at which the trial court found her unfit to stand trial, she
6 No. 1-13-1950
had already been determined to be unfit by Dr. Neu. Madison never sought to contest Dr. Neu's
determination that she was unfit to stand trial and because that finding will remain regardless of
the outcome of this appeal, it is unclear how resolution of the issues Madison raises could
alleviate any of the claimed collateral consequences she identifies. Nevertheless, we will address
whether the collateral consequences exception applies here.
¶ 17 Madison’s first argument that she will be unable to apply for a FOID card or pursue
various professional licenses is insufficient to bring this case within the collateral consequences
exception to the mootness doctrine. Madison is a 66-year-old female who has been receiving
social security disability benefits since 2002; her disability benefits converted into retirement
benefits once she turned 66. If a finding of unfitness will always hinder a party's ability to obtain
a FOID card or pursue certain professions, then as a matter of law, such orders would always
have collateral consequences and, therefore, would never be moot. But such reasoning runs
counter to the holdings of In re Alfred H.H and In re Rita P. We note that People v. Holt, 2013
IL App (2d) 120476, cited by Madison, was decided before In re Rita P. Its reasoning—that the
potential inability to obtain a FOID card is a collateral consequence sufficient to save an appeal
from mootness—we believe, runs afoul of In re Rita P. because there is no indication that
Madison is interested in owning a firearm or pursuing any licensed profession, and predicating
an exception to the mootness doctrine on such collateral consequences is purely speculative.
¶ 18 Madison’s second argument that a finding of unfitness may affect the assessment of her
credibility in other proceedings is likewise insufficient to bring this case within the collateral
consequences exception because it, too, is purely speculative. Madison identifies no other
proceedings in which her credibility is at issue and the possibility of her involvement in such
proceedings in the future is, like her first argument, purely speculative.
7 No. 1-13-1950
¶ 19 Madison's third argument focuses on the financial and physical burdens imposed by the
medication that has restored her to fitness. But as the State points out, the order Madison
appealed from does not require her to take medication; it only referred her for treatment. Further,
the record reflects that in connection with her evaluation before the restoration hearing at which
Madison was found fit to stand trial, she reported to Dr. Neu that she had not been taking her
medications for several weeks. Notwithstanding the cessation of her medication, Dr. Neu found
Madison fit to stand trial. Thus, as far as the record shows, Madison, by her own voluntary act,
has alleviated any arguable collateral consequences even secondarily related to the trial court's
finding of unfitness.
¶ 20 CONCLUSION
¶ 21 Because Madison has been found fit to stand trial and has failed to demonstrate that the
collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies, we find this appeal moot.
¶ 22 Appeal dismissed.