JUSTICE RATHJE
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Gregory Madej, appeals from the decision of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for relief from judgment (see 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 1998)) and denying his petition for writ of mandamus (see 735 ILCS 5/14 — 101 et seq. (West 1998)). Intervenor, Consul General for the Republic of Poland in Chicago, also appeals from the dismissal of the petition for writ of mandamus. Moreover, the Consul General appeals the trial court’s denial of the Consul General’s motion to intervene in the section 2 — 1401 proceeding.
BACKGROUND
Original Criminal Proceedings
This case began in 1981 when the police arrested defendant after he led them on a car chase through Chicago. When the officers arrested defendant, his hands and head had blood on them, and his shirt, pants, and undershorts were heavily stained with blood. Defendant also had deep scratches on his face and scratches on his chest, arms, and back.
Shortly thereafter, Barbara Doyle, the owner of the car in which defendant fled from the police, was found in an alley on the northwest side of Chicago. Doyle was naked and had died from multiple stab wounds. Her missing clothes were found in the car defendant was driving.
After defendant was arrested, he told the police that a friend named Hojamoto was driving the victim’s car. Defendant rode around with Hojamoto, who jumped from the car a block before the police overtook the car. At trial, defendant testified that he was in the car with the victim and twice had consensual sex with her. He explained that the victim pulled a knife during an argument over drugs. They struggled, and the victim began bleeding. He then threw her from the car and left the scene.
Defendant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, rape, and deviate sexual assault and sentenced to death. This court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985). Thereafter, defendant filed a post-conviction petition and amended it in 1993. The trial court dismissed defendant’s petition, and this court affirmed that dismissal. People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116 (1997). Subsequently, defendant sought leave from this court to file a petition for writ of mandamus. This court denied that motion.
Current Proceedings
In July 1998, defendant filed the current action. Defendant filed his section 2 — 1401 petition in the criminal division. Because of local court rules, defendant filed his petition for writ of mandamus in the chancery division.
Defendant’s section 2 — 1401 petition alleged that his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, and the Consular Convention of 1972 between Poland and the United States,1 May 31, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 1231, were violated when the police failed to inform defendant that, as a Polish citizen, he had a right to contact a consular official from Poland. Defendant also alleged that, after he was arrested, the United States had a duty to notify the Polish consular that a Polish national had been arrested and detained.2 Defendant’s mandamus petition alleged that he was entitled to relief because his conviction and sentence are void under international law.
In December, the Consul General sought leave to intervene in both actions. Judge Albert Green, who was presiding over the mandamus proceedings, granted the Consul General’s petition. Thereafter, Judge Green transferred the mandamus proceedings to Judge Thomas Fitzgerald, who was presiding over the section 2 — 1401 proceedings. Thereafter Judge Fitzgerald denied the Consul General’s motion to intervene in the section 2 — 1401 proceeding. Subsequently, Judge Fitzgerald denied both petitions. Defendant and the Consul General now appeal.
While this appeal was pending, this court granted leave to the United Mexican States, the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, and the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in Chicago to file briefs as amici curiae.
ANALYSIS
Section 2 — 1401 Proceeding
Section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a method for obtaining relief from a judgment after more than 30 days have passed. See 735 ILCS 5/2— 1401(a) (West 1998). A section 2 — 1401 petition must be filed “not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401(c) (West 1998). Relief sought more than two years after the entry of judgment will not be considered absent a showing that the petitioner was under duress, or a legal disability, or that the grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211 (1997).
Here, judgment was entered in 1982. Defendant filed his petition in 1998, approximately 14 years after the limitation period expired. Defendant and the Consul General acknowledge that the petition is untimely, but argue that this court can consider the merits of the petition because (1) under international law defendant’s conviction and sentence are void; (2) the Consul General was never told of the treaty violation and thus could not preserve its rights sooner; (3) the State fraudulently concealed from defendant his rights under the Vienna Convention; and (4) the reliance on a state procedural rule to bar an action violates international law.
Voidness
Defendant contends that the principle restitutio in integrum, which is well established in international law, renders his conviction and sentence void. Restitutio in integrum is defined as:
“In the civil law, restoration or restitution to the previous condition. This was effected by the praetor3 on equitable grounds, at the prayer of an injured party, by rescinding or annulling a contract or transaction valid by the strict law, or annulling a change in the legal condition produced by an omission, and restoring the parties to their previous situation or legal relations. The restoration of a cause to its first state, on petition of the party who was cast, in order to have a second hearing.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
Although we acknowledge the important role that restitutio in integrum plays in international law, defendant has not cited any authority to support a conclusion that the principle renders defendant’s conviction and death sentence void. Instead, both the quotation from Black’s, upon which defendant relies, and the other authorities cited by defendant support the conclusion that restitutio in integrum is an equitable remedy for violations of a treaty. To say that the proper remedy for a treaty violation is to annul the act that caused the violation is a far cry from concluding that the remedy means that a court’s decision is void.
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JUSTICE RATHJE
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Gregory Madej, appeals from the decision of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for relief from judgment (see 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401 (West 1998)) and denying his petition for writ of mandamus (see 735 ILCS 5/14 — 101 et seq. (West 1998)). Intervenor, Consul General for the Republic of Poland in Chicago, also appeals from the dismissal of the petition for writ of mandamus. Moreover, the Consul General appeals the trial court’s denial of the Consul General’s motion to intervene in the section 2 — 1401 proceeding.
BACKGROUND
Original Criminal Proceedings
This case began in 1981 when the police arrested defendant after he led them on a car chase through Chicago. When the officers arrested defendant, his hands and head had blood on them, and his shirt, pants, and undershorts were heavily stained with blood. Defendant also had deep scratches on his face and scratches on his chest, arms, and back.
Shortly thereafter, Barbara Doyle, the owner of the car in which defendant fled from the police, was found in an alley on the northwest side of Chicago. Doyle was naked and had died from multiple stab wounds. Her missing clothes were found in the car defendant was driving.
After defendant was arrested, he told the police that a friend named Hojamoto was driving the victim’s car. Defendant rode around with Hojamoto, who jumped from the car a block before the police overtook the car. At trial, defendant testified that he was in the car with the victim and twice had consensual sex with her. He explained that the victim pulled a knife during an argument over drugs. They struggled, and the victim began bleeding. He then threw her from the car and left the scene.
Defendant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, rape, and deviate sexual assault and sentenced to death. This court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. Madej, 106 Ill. 2d 201 (1985). Thereafter, defendant filed a post-conviction petition and amended it in 1993. The trial court dismissed defendant’s petition, and this court affirmed that dismissal. People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116 (1997). Subsequently, defendant sought leave from this court to file a petition for writ of mandamus. This court denied that motion.
Current Proceedings
In July 1998, defendant filed the current action. Defendant filed his section 2 — 1401 petition in the criminal division. Because of local court rules, defendant filed his petition for writ of mandamus in the chancery division.
Defendant’s section 2 — 1401 petition alleged that his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, and the Consular Convention of 1972 between Poland and the United States,1 May 31, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 1231, were violated when the police failed to inform defendant that, as a Polish citizen, he had a right to contact a consular official from Poland. Defendant also alleged that, after he was arrested, the United States had a duty to notify the Polish consular that a Polish national had been arrested and detained.2 Defendant’s mandamus petition alleged that he was entitled to relief because his conviction and sentence are void under international law.
In December, the Consul General sought leave to intervene in both actions. Judge Albert Green, who was presiding over the mandamus proceedings, granted the Consul General’s petition. Thereafter, Judge Green transferred the mandamus proceedings to Judge Thomas Fitzgerald, who was presiding over the section 2 — 1401 proceedings. Thereafter Judge Fitzgerald denied the Consul General’s motion to intervene in the section 2 — 1401 proceeding. Subsequently, Judge Fitzgerald denied both petitions. Defendant and the Consul General now appeal.
While this appeal was pending, this court granted leave to the United Mexican States, the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, and the Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany in Chicago to file briefs as amici curiae.
ANALYSIS
Section 2 — 1401 Proceeding
Section 2 — 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a method for obtaining relief from a judgment after more than 30 days have passed. See 735 ILCS 5/2— 1401(a) (West 1998). A section 2 — 1401 petition must be filed “not later than 2 years after the entry of the order or judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1401(c) (West 1998). Relief sought more than two years after the entry of judgment will not be considered absent a showing that the petitioner was under duress, or a legal disability, or that the grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211 (1997).
Here, judgment was entered in 1982. Defendant filed his petition in 1998, approximately 14 years after the limitation period expired. Defendant and the Consul General acknowledge that the petition is untimely, but argue that this court can consider the merits of the petition because (1) under international law defendant’s conviction and sentence are void; (2) the Consul General was never told of the treaty violation and thus could not preserve its rights sooner; (3) the State fraudulently concealed from defendant his rights under the Vienna Convention; and (4) the reliance on a state procedural rule to bar an action violates international law.
Voidness
Defendant contends that the principle restitutio in integrum, which is well established in international law, renders his conviction and sentence void. Restitutio in integrum is defined as:
“In the civil law, restoration or restitution to the previous condition. This was effected by the praetor3 on equitable grounds, at the prayer of an injured party, by rescinding or annulling a contract or transaction valid by the strict law, or annulling a change in the legal condition produced by an omission, and restoring the parties to their previous situation or legal relations. The restoration of a cause to its first state, on petition of the party who was cast, in order to have a second hearing.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1313 (6th ed. 1990).
Although we acknowledge the important role that restitutio in integrum plays in international law, defendant has not cited any authority to support a conclusion that the principle renders defendant’s conviction and death sentence void. Instead, both the quotation from Black’s, upon which defendant relies, and the other authorities cited by defendant support the conclusion that restitutio in integrum is an equitable remedy for violations of a treaty. To say that the proper remedy for a treaty violation is to annul the act that caused the violation is a far cry from concluding that the remedy means that a court’s decision is void.
This court has explained that an order is void if it was entered by a court that lacked jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter or that lacked the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309 (1986). Here, the trial court clearly had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter and it had the inherent power to make or enter the orders involved. Consequently, we see no basis upon which to conclude that defendant’s conviction and sentence are void.
The Consul General’s Knowledge
The Consul General argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene in the section 2 — 1401 petition. It further argues that the limitation period does not apply to bar its claim because it “only recently became aware that the State of Illinois had tried and sentenced its national to death.” If we accept, without deciding, that the Consul General can intervene in the section 2 — 1401 petition (a proposition that the State vigorously disputes), we must conclude that the action would be time-barred.
Although a petitioner must demonstrate due diligence to obtain relief pursuant to section 2 — 1401 (Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 221 (1986)), a showing of due diligence does not obviate the need to file a section 2 — 1401 petition within the applicable limitation period. Our case law is clear:
“[T]he two-year limitation mandated by section 2 — 1401 and its predecessor, section 72 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110, par. 72), must be adhered to in the absence of a clear showing that the person seeking relief is under legal disability or duress or the grounds for relief are fraudulently concealed.” Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 211.
Here, the Consul General does not allege that it was under duress or a legal disability or that the grounds for relief were fraudulently concealed. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that it is entitled to seek relief under section 2 — 1401 outside the limitation period simply because it did not discover the underlying facts until after the limitation period had expired.
Fraudulent Concealment
Defendant argues that the limitation period was tolled for him because the State fraudulently concealed from him the fact that the Vienna Convention gave him the right to consular assistance. Defendant argues that he has certain rights under the Vienna Convention and that the State had the duty to inform him of these rights. Defendant concludes that the State’s failure to inform him of these rights constitutes fraudulent concealment. We disagree.
To toll the limitation period, the alleged fraud must consist of “affirmative acts or representations designed to prevent discovery of the cause of action or ground for relief.” Crowell v. Bilandic, 81 Ill. 2d 422, 428 (1980). Here, the fact that defendant was entitled to be informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention is a matter of international law. The rights that defendant asserts the State was obliged to inform him of are rights that are, by defendant’s own admission, contained in treaties that are public documents not only in this state, but also in countless countries around the world.
Even if we accept defendant’s contention that the State was obligated to inform defendant of these rights, we are unable to conclude that this failure can constitute fraud when the rights are a matter of public record. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that, by failing to inform defendant of his rights, the State fraudulently concealed defendant’s grounds for relief.
State Procedural Rule
Defendant also contends that the limitation period must be tolled because a state procedural rule cannot prevent defendant from seeking a remedy for a violation of international law. Defendant acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that, to determine whether a state’s procedural rules govern, a court must look to the treaty’s text and drafting history. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700, 100 L. Ed. 2d 722, 731, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2108 (1988); see also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529, 537, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 1354 (1998) (holding that, “absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rales of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State”).
Here, the Vienna Convention provides that the rights expressed in the Convention “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” 21 U.S.T. at 101; see also Breard, 523 U.S. at 375, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 537, 118 S. Ct. at 1355 (reaching a similar conclusion).
Defendant provides no explanation as to how section 2 — 1401’s limitation period prevents “full effect” from being given to the purposes of the Vienna Convention. Defendant had ample opportunity to raise his claim and have it considered on the merits during his trial, on direct appeal, and during the two years following the entry of judgment. We do not believe that a reasonable limitation period designed to preserve the public’s interest in the finality of judgments can be construed as a rule that frustrates the purposes of the Vienna Convention. Because the treaty specifically states that the forum court’s rules and regulations will govern, we have no basis to conclude that the reasonable limitation period violates international law.
Mandamus Proceeding
In the mandamus proceeding, defendant and the Consul General argue that mandamus relief is appropriate because (1) defendant’s conviction and sentence are void; and (2) they raise issues of great public importance and of great importance to the administration of justice.
We have already rejected the argument relating to voidness and need not consider it further.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to compel a public officer to perform a nondiscretionary act. Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229 (1999). This court will not issue a writ of mandamus absent a showing of “a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the [public officer] to act, and clear authority in the [public officer] to comply with the writ”’ Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d at 229.
Although this action may involve issues of “great public importance and of great importance to the administration of justice,” that, in and of itself, is not a reason to grant mandamus relief. Here, defendant and the Consul General have not demonstrated that they have a clear, affirmative right to relief. Absent such a showing, we will not issue a writ.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, November 22, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court shall be implemented. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119 — 5 (West 1998)). A certified copy of the mandate of this court shall be transmitted by the clerk of this court to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where defendant is confined.
Affirmed.