People v. Lundgren

Appellate Court of Illinois

People v. Lundgren

500 N.E.2d 727, 149 Ill. App. 3d 458, 102 Ill. Dec. 834, 1986 Ill. App. LEXIS 3064

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedNovember 14, 1986

Docket3-85-0749

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 500 N.E.2d 727 (People v. Lundgren) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Lundgren, 500 N.E.2d 727, 149 Ill. App. 3d 458, 102 Ill. Dec. 834, 1986 Ill. App. LEXIS 3064 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986).

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PRESIDING JUSTICE SCOTT

delivered the opinion of the court:

On July 5, 1985, the defendant, Christine Lundgren, was issued a citation and complaint for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident in violation of section 11 — 601(a) of article VI of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9572, par. 11-601(a)). In allowing the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found the complaint fatally deficient for not apprising the defendant of either her speed or the applicable speed limit in compliance with section 11—610(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 11—610(a)). The State appeals, arguing that section 11—610(a) was inapplicable to the instant section 11 — 601(a) charge.

Public Act 79—1069 (the amendment) amended section 11— 610(a) to provide that the complaint charging violations of speed regulations in article VI of the Illinois Vehicle Code shall specify the defendant’s alleged speed and the maximum applicable speed. To interpret the amendment, this court may consider the legislative history to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to unambiguous statutory language. People v. Scognamiglio (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 747, 457 N.E.2d 99.

We note that effective January 1, 1976, the amendment explicitly expanded the scope of section 11 — 610 to include any article VI speed regulation, and that on the date of the alleged offense the prohibition against failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident was one of the general speed restrictions set forth in section 11 — 601.

We acknowledge that a violation of section 11 — 601(a) only requires proof that the defendant drove carelessly and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with persons or property. (People v. Schumann (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 518, 458 N.E.2d 182.) However, we decline to exclude section 11—601(a) from the unambiguous legislative mandate of section 11—610(a). We find, therefore, that by not apprising the defendant of her alleged speed and the maximum speed applicable at the location of the accident, the complaint was fatally deficient. Consequently, the circuit court appropriately allowed the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

WOMBACHER, J., concurs.

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PRESIDING JUSTICE SCOTT

delivered the opinion of the court:

On July 5, 1985, the defendant, Christine Lundgren, was issued a citation and complaint for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident in violation of section 11 — 601(a) of article VI of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 9572, par. 11-601(a)). In allowing the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court found the complaint fatally deficient for not apprising the defendant of either her speed or the applicable speed limit in compliance with section 11—610(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 11—610(a)). The State appeals, arguing that section 11—610(a) was inapplicable to the instant section 11 — 601(a) charge.

Public Act 79—1069 (the amendment) amended section 11— 610(a) to provide that the complaint charging violations of speed regulations in article VI of the Illinois Vehicle Code shall specify the defendant’s alleged speed and the maximum applicable speed. To interpret the amendment, this court may consider the legislative history to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to unambiguous statutory language. People v. Scognamiglio (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 747, 457 N.E.2d 99.

We note that effective January 1, 1976, the amendment explicitly expanded the scope of section 11 — 610 to include any article VI speed regulation, and that on the date of the alleged offense the prohibition against failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident was one of the general speed restrictions set forth in section 11 — 601.

We acknowledge that a violation of section 11 — 601(a) only requires proof that the defendant drove carelessly and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with persons or property. (People v. Schumann (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 518, 458 N.E.2d 182.) However, we decline to exclude section 11—601(a) from the unambiguous legislative mandate of section 11—610(a). We find, therefore, that by not apprising the defendant of her alleged speed and the maximum speed applicable at the location of the accident, the complaint was fatally deficient. Consequently, the circuit court appropriately allowed the defendant’s motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

WOMBACHER, J., concurs.

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500 N.E.2d 727, 149 Ill. App. 3d 458, 102 Ill. Dec. 834, 1986 Ill. App. LEXIS 3064, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-lundgren-illappct-1986.

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