People v. Lovett

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Lovett

303 A.D.2d 952, 755 N.Y.S.2d 906, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2902

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 21, 2003

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 303 A.D.2d 952 (People v. Lovett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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People v. Lovett, 303 A.D.2d 952, 755 N.Y.S.2d 906, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2902 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

—Appeal from a judgment of Monroe County Court (Marks, J.), entered June 14, 2001, convicting defendant after a jury trial of, inter alia, robbery in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: County Court properly denied defendant’s motion to sever counts one and two of the 12-count indictment for trial. Although the offenses charged in the indictment involve four separate incidents, the offenses are “the same or similar in law” (CPL 200.20 [2] [c]) and thus are properly join-able (see generally People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1, 7 [1982]). A motion to sever counts joinable under CPL 200.20 (2) (c) “is addressed to the sound discretion of the court” (People v Daymon, 239 AD2d 907, 908 [1997], lv denied 94 NY2d 821 [1999]; see People v Spina, 275 AD2d 902, 903 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 969 [2000]). The burden on a defendant contending that the court abused its discretion in denying a severance motion is “a substantial one” (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 183 [1989]). Here, the evidence presented by the People with respect to each of the four incidents was “straightforward and easily segregated” (Daymon, 239 AD2d at 908; see People v McKnight, 284 AD2d 941, 942 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 921 [2001]), and defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that he would be “unduly and genuinely prejudiced by the joint trial of the charges” (People v Brown, 254 AD2d 781, 782 [1998] , lv denied 92 NY2d 1029 [1998]; see People v O’Connor, 242 AD2d 908 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 895 [1998]).

Defendant failed to request an expanded identification charge and thus failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in failing to give such a charge (see People v Rivera, 259 AD2d 637 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 977 [1999] ; People v Woods, 206 AD2d 901, 902 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 1040 [1995]). We decline to exercise our power to address that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Present — Green, J.P., Pine, Hurlbutt and Lawton, JJ.

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—Appeal from a judgment of Monroe County Court (Marks, J.), entered June 14, 2001, convicting defendant after a jury trial of, inter alia, robbery in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: County Court properly denied defendant’s motion to sever counts one and two of the 12-count indictment for trial. Although the offenses charged in the indictment involve four separate incidents, the offenses are “the same or similar in law” (CPL 200.20 [2] [c]) and thus are properly join-able (see generally People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1, 7 [1982]). A motion to sever counts joinable under CPL 200.20 (2) (c) “is addressed to the sound discretion of the court” (People v Daymon, 239 AD2d 907, 908 [1997], lv denied 94 NY2d 821 [1999]; see People v Spina, 275 AD2d 902, 903 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 969 [2000]). The burden on a defendant contending that the court abused its discretion in denying a severance motion is “a substantial one” (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 183 [1989]). Here, the evidence presented by the People with respect to each of the four incidents was “straightforward and easily segregated” (Daymon, 239 AD2d at 908; see People v McKnight, 284 AD2d 941, 942 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 921 [2001]), and defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that he would be “unduly and genuinely prejudiced by the joint trial of the charges” (People v Brown, 254 AD2d 781, 782 [1998] , lv denied 92 NY2d 1029 [1998]; see People v O’Connor, 242 AD2d 908 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 895 [1998]).

Defendant failed to request an expanded identification charge and thus failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court erred in failing to give such a charge (see People v Rivera, 259 AD2d 637 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 977 [1999] ; People v Woods, 206 AD2d 901, 902 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 1040 [1995]). We decline to exercise our power to address that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]). Present — Green, J.P., Pine, Hurlbutt and Lawton, JJ.

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303 A.D.2d 952, 755 N.Y.S.2d 906, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2902, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-lovett-nyappdiv-2003.

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