People v. Littlejohn

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Littlejohn

403 N.W.2d 215, 157 Mich. App. 729

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedFebruary 17, 1987

DocketDocket 90969

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 403 N.W.2d 215 (People v. Littlejohn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Littlejohn, 403 N.W.2d 215, 157 Mich. App. 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).

Pincite

Opinions

Per Curiam.

Defendant, Mario Wardell Little-john, pled guilty to embezzlement, MCL 750.174; MSA 28.371, and to being an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. Defendant was sentenced to serve not less than one and one-half nor more than ten years in prison, which sentence was enhanced because of the habitual offender conviction to not less than four nor more than fifteen years in prison. Defendant was also [731]*731ordered to pay restitution in the amount, of $15,000. Defendant now appeals as of right.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court was without authority to order restitution in the amount of $15,000. Defendant in this case was convicted of one offense which occurred on July 16, 1985. On that date, defendant, while employed by Montgomery Ward in parcel pick-up, removed from the store one video cassette recorder and sold it to his codefendant. Upon being discovered and arrested, defendant admitted to having previously removed other merchandise totalling approximately $15,000 in value.

In the within case, we are dealing with restitution, which is governed by the recently enacted statute, MCL 769.1a; MSA 28.1073, which provides that a court may order a convicted felon to make "full or partial restitution to the victim of the defendant’s course of conduct which gives rise to the conviction or to the victim’s estate.” (Emphasis added.) This language is essentially identical to that employed in People v Pettit1 and People v Seda-Ruiz,² cases which concerned the ordering of restitution as a condition of probation. In Pettit, the defendant was required to pay restitution for the funeral expenses and automobile repairs of the victim of his automobile accident, when all he was convicted of was driving while impaired. In SedaRuiz, a defendant who pled guilty to passing three insufficient checks was made to pay restitution including many other checks. The case was remanded because the defendant did not have an opportunity to examine all the checks and claimed on appeal that some of them were not his, but no such claim is made in this case.

Pettit went on to hold that there must be per[732]*732suasive support on the record for the sentencing judge’s conclusion that the losses for which restitution is ordered were caused by the criminal conduct of defendant.³ That requirement was fulfilled, however, because the presentence report contained the statement that defendant was responsible for the collision, and both defendant and his counsel agreed with the contents of the presentence report. In People v Alvarado,4 we discussed the standard of proof required of a prosecutor seeking to enforce restitution for embezzlements other than that of which the defendant was found guilty. In this case, the predisposition investigation report contained the statement that defendant was responsible for the embezzlement of $15,000 worth of goods from Montgomery Ward. Defense counsel stated on the record that the report was factually accurate.

Defendant’s other argument on appeal is without merit. The trial court adequately articulated its reasons for imposing a sentence of from one and one-half to ten years in prison, subsequently replaced by an enhanced sentence of from four to fifteen years on the basis of the habitual offender conviction. The court noted that defendant had committed this offense while on probation and that defendant had a past criminal record. The court further considered the fact that defendant had admitted to having engaged in similar embezzlement activities over a period of time. In imposing its sentence, the trial court relied upon the need to protect society, the need to deter others from committing the same offense and its desire to provide for defendant’s rehabilitation. We find not only that the trial court adequately explained its [733]*733sentence, but that the sentence arrived at was well within its sentencing discretion.⁵

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Per Curiam.

Defendant, Mario Wardell Little-john, pled guilty to embezzlement, MCL 750.174; MSA 28.371, and to being an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. Defendant was sentenced to serve not less than one and one-half nor more than ten years in prison, which sentence was enhanced because of the habitual offender conviction to not less than four nor more than fifteen years in prison. Defendant was also [731]*731ordered to pay restitution in the amount, of $15,000. Defendant now appeals as of right.

On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court was without authority to order restitution in the amount of $15,000. Defendant in this case was convicted of one offense which occurred on July 16, 1985. On that date, defendant, while employed by Montgomery Ward in parcel pick-up, removed from the store one video cassette recorder and sold it to his codefendant. Upon being discovered and arrested, defendant admitted to having previously removed other merchandise totalling approximately $15,000 in value.

In the within case, we are dealing with restitution, which is governed by the recently enacted statute, MCL 769.1a; MSA 28.1073, which provides that a court may order a convicted felon to make "full or partial restitution to the victim of the defendant’s course of conduct which gives rise to the conviction or to the victim’s estate.” (Emphasis added.) This language is essentially identical to that employed in People v Pettit1 and People v Seda-Ruiz,² cases which concerned the ordering of restitution as a condition of probation. In Pettit, the defendant was required to pay restitution for the funeral expenses and automobile repairs of the victim of his automobile accident, when all he was convicted of was driving while impaired. In SedaRuiz, a defendant who pled guilty to passing three insufficient checks was made to pay restitution including many other checks. The case was remanded because the defendant did not have an opportunity to examine all the checks and claimed on appeal that some of them were not his, but no such claim is made in this case.

Pettit went on to hold that there must be per[732]*732suasive support on the record for the sentencing judge’s conclusion that the losses for which restitution is ordered were caused by the criminal conduct of defendant.³ That requirement was fulfilled, however, because the presentence report contained the statement that defendant was responsible for the collision, and both defendant and his counsel agreed with the contents of the presentence report. In People v Alvarado,4 we discussed the standard of proof required of a prosecutor seeking to enforce restitution for embezzlements other than that of which the defendant was found guilty. In this case, the predisposition investigation report contained the statement that defendant was responsible for the embezzlement of $15,000 worth of goods from Montgomery Ward. Defense counsel stated on the record that the report was factually accurate.

Defendant’s other argument on appeal is without merit. The trial court adequately articulated its reasons for imposing a sentence of from one and one-half to ten years in prison, subsequently replaced by an enhanced sentence of from four to fifteen years on the basis of the habitual offender conviction. The court noted that defendant had committed this offense while on probation and that defendant had a past criminal record. The court further considered the fact that defendant had admitted to having engaged in similar embezzlement activities over a period of time. In imposing its sentence, the trial court relied upon the need to protect society, the need to deter others from committing the same offense and its desire to provide for defendant’s rehabilitation. We find not only that the trial court adequately explained its [733]*733sentence, but that the sentence arrived at was well within its sentencing discretion.⁵

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

403 N.W.2d 215, 157 Mich. App. 729, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-littlejohn-michctapp-1987.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack