2015 IL App (1st) 131022 No. 1-13-1022 Opinion filed August 5, 2015 Third Division
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 12 CR 2715 ) STEVEN LENGYEL, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Michael Brown, ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Pucinski and Justice Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant Steven Lengyel and his father Richard Lengyel got into a verbal argument that
escalated into a physical altercation. Steven punched Richard, and, two days later, Richard died
at the hospital after suffering a stroke. The State charged Steven with first degree murder. The
jury convicted Steven of second degree murder, and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison.
¶2 On appeal, Steven argues: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of second degree
murder beyond a reasonable doubt because he did not have the requisite intent or knowledge for
murder but instead, he committed involuntary manslaughter by recklessly punching Richard; (2)
ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial attorney’s alleged failure to present the defense of 1-13-1022
involuntary manslaughter; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 18
years' imprisonment.
¶3 Based on the evidence that Steven acted recklessly and without the intent to kill Richard,
he should have been convicted of involuntary manslaughter, not second degree murder.
Accordingly, we reverse Steven's second degree murder conviction, enter a conviction for
involuntary manslaughter, and remand for resentencing.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 Steven Lengyel was 22 years old and living with his father, Richard Lengyel, in a one-
bedroom apartment on the north side of Chicago. Unemployed, Steven took care of Richard, who
received disability benefits stemming from his diabetes. Steven took care of Richard by shopping
for him, taking him to dialysis, and managing his finances. Steven and Richard argued daily over
things like cigarettes, DVDs, and car parts.
¶6 On January 3, 2012, Steven was in the bedroom with his girlfriend, Alexandra Cort, when
he decided to go to the living room and talk to Richard about a pizza menu. Steven and Richard
got into a verbal, and then a physical, altercation, after which Richard was taken to the hospital
where he died two days later following a stroke.
¶7 On January 4, Steven voluntarily surrendered to police and, while Richard was still alive,
was charged with aggravated battery. He gave videotaped statements to detectives on January 4
and January 5.
¶8 Steven told detectives that he had issues with his father and his inner rage against Richard
had been building for years. He was frustrated that “[Richard] wouldn’t let me get my shit and
leave.” He also said, “I’m not proud of what happened at all.”
-2- 1-13-1022
¶9 On the day of the fight, Steven asked Richard about a pizza menu, and Richard accused
him of stealing a lighter. Steven then went to his room and started going through his DVDs, and
noticed that some were missing. He asked his father if he knew where the DVDs were, and then
Steven and Richard began arguing over the DVDs and other grievances.
¶ 10 As the argument escalated, Richard, who was sitting in his recliner, grabbed Steven's
shirt. To disentangle himself, Steven punched Richard in the head four or five times. Steven
acknowledged that he hit his father but said Richard touched him first, and he was only trying to
get away from Richard. Steven said he paused for a second after the first contact, then continued.
Steven stopped as soon as he saw Richard was bleeding. Steven denied hitting Richard in the
back or chest, explaining that Richard fell a couple months earlier, which could account for the
broken ribs and bruising on Richard’s back.
¶ 11 After Steven saw the blood, he went back to his bedroom, locked the door, and told Cort
that they needed to leave the apartment. Richard then broke through the bedroom door. Steven
pushed him out and Richard fell down to his hands and knees. Richard got up on his own and
went to the kitchen to get a towel. At Richard's request, Steven called for an ambulance. He told
the operator that Richard had fallen and needed help. Steven did not wait for the ambulance to
arrive; Richard told him to leave before the paramedics got there.
¶ 12 Steven and Cort left the apartment and went to a friend’s apartment. Steven told his
friend that he and his father had gotten into a fight, and that Richard had again blamed him for
stealing his things. Steven called his mother because he was worried about his father and wanted
to know if Richard was okay. Eventually, Steven and Cort went back to the apartment to gather
some clothes and DVDs to pawn, and spent the night at Cort's apartment. The next morning,
-3- 1-13-1022
Steven agreed to meet with detectives at a McDonald's. Meanwhile, Richard was in the hospital
in critical condition.
¶ 13 Following Richard’s death, Steven was charged by indictment with two counts of first
degree murder. Count I alleged that Steven intentionally or knowingly beat, struck, and killed
Richard with his hands (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)), and count II alleged that Steven
struck and killed Richard with his hands, knowing that such acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2012)).
¶ 14 At trial, Carol Lengyel, Richard’s sister, testified that on January 5, Richard was taken off
of life support and died. At the time of his death, Richard was 55-years-old and the father of two
children, Steven and Tiffany.
¶ 15 Steven’s girlfriend, Alexandra Cort, testified that she was in the apartment during the
fight. For most of the day, Cort and Steven were cleaning the bedroom and watching movies,
while Richard stayed in the living room. At about 5:00 p.m., Steven found a pizza menu in the
bedroom and went to ask Richard if he wanted to keep it. Cort stayed in the bedroom. She heard
Richard ask Steven where his lighter was, and then she heard arguing, which escalated to yelling,
over who owned the lighter and the DVDs.
¶ 16 According to Cort, Steven felt Richard was a bad father and never around. Richard
countered that Steven had been a horrible son, refused to pay rent, and would not go to school.
Steven accused Richard of getting high. Cort did not see what was happening because it
“sounded like every other fight [Richard and Steven] had.” After ten minutes, Steven ran back
into the bedroom and locked the door. Steven said that they had to leave because he had just hit
his father. Steven appeared worried, scared, and angry. She saw a rip in his shirt.
-4- 1-13-1022
¶ 17 Steven’s in-court testimony largely follows his videotaped statements to the police.
Steven testified that after he approached his father with the pizza menu, Richard accused him of
stealing a lighter. Steven went to the bedroom, and after about 15 to 20 minutes went back to
speak with his father after noticing some of his DVDs were missing. Richard was sitting in the
recliner. Steven asked Richard if he knew the whereabouts of the DVDs, after which he and
Richard began yelling at one another. Steven said he was angry but did not want to kill Richard.
¶ 18 As the argument escalated, Richard got up from the recliner and grabbed Steven’s shirt
with both hands. Steven walked Richard back to the recliner because he was worried that
Richard might fall. Richard repeatedly stood and fell back into his recliner. Unable to pull away
because Richard would not let go of his shirt, Steven hit his father.
¶ 19 Steven testified to hitting Richard in the head four or five times. He stopped after he
noticed blood on the fourth or fifth strike. Steven’s shirt ripped when he was finally able to free
himself from his father's grasp. Steven went into the bedroom and locked the door.
¶ 20 A few minutes later, Richard broke down the bedroom door and entered yelling and
swearing at Steven, ordering him to leave the apartment, and stating he wished Steven was never
born. Steven responded by pushing Richard in his chest, causing Richard to fall down to his
hands and knees. Richard was talking and crying, but he did not look like he was injured.
¶ 21 While Richard lay on the floor, Steven yelled that Richard was a horrible father. Richard
told Steven to call 911, which Steven did. Richard got up on his own and walked into the kitchen
to get a towel for his head, then sat down in his recliner and told Steven and Cort to leave. They
gathered some belongings and left before the ambulance arrived.
¶ 22 Cort and Steven went to their friend Tabish Dean’s place. Dean testified that Steven told
him, “I just beat up my dad.” Steven also said Richard was pushing him more and more, and that
-5- 1-13-1022
was “the last straw.” Steven did not say he killed or wanted to kill his father, but that he hit
Richard to get away from him. After a few hours, Steven and Cort left to retrieve their personal
belongings at the apartment.
¶ 23 Steven and Cort knew that Richard was in the emergency room. Steven thought his father
would need some stitches. Steven told Cort that he could not stay with Richard anymore, and
would sell all of his DVDs and video games to live on his own. After receiving a call from
detectives, Steven turned himself into the police.
¶ 24 Chicago Police Officer George Scoufis testified that when he arrived at the apartment
paramedics were administering first aid. Richard told Scoufis, “my son beat me up.” Scoufis
asked Richard how and where he had been hit. Richard replied, “[Steven] used his fists” and
“struck [him] about the head and the face.” Richard said Steven did not use any weapons and
never mentioned that he had been hit anywhere else on his body. Scoufis observed a small
amount of blood about Richard's head. After the paramedics transported Richard to the hospital,
Scoufis attempted to interview Richard but Richard could not speak and was slipping in and out
of consciousness. About two and half hours later, Scoufis learned that doctors assessed Richard’s
condition as critical.
¶ 25 Chicago Police Detective Michelle Wood testified that the day after the altercation, she
contacted Steven and met him at a McDonald’s. Detective Wood arrested Steven for aggravated
domestic battery and transported him to the Area 3 Detective Division. Detective Wood and
Detective John Korolis informed Steven of his Miranda rights. Steven agreed to be interviewed.
The police videotaped the interviews, which took place on January 4, and January 5, the day
Richard died.
-6- 1-13-1022
¶ 26 Detective Wood testified that after Richard’s death, she executed a search warrant for the
apartment and recovered Steven’s ripped shirt with Richard’s blood on it.
¶ 27 Dr. Lauren Woertz of the Cook County Medical Examiner’s Office performed Richard’s
autopsy. She attributed Richard's death to a stroke due to an increase in blood pressure caused by
stress from injuries. She said the blunt force trauma to the head, in and of itself, did not cause the
stroke. Most of the injuries were on Richard’s scalp, a laceration on the top of the scalp and some
bruising on the scalp and forehead. She found diffuse bruising on the left side of the body, a
diffuse bruise on the left side of the back, and scrapes on the knees and legs.
¶ 28 Dr. Woertz saw bleeding in the brain, which was consistent with a stroke. Richard had
some fractures of the spine as well as multiple rib fractures but no skull fractures. She believed
that all of the injuries had been incurred recently and the rib and spinal fractures likely happened
at the same time. She also indicated that Richard had many health problems in addition to the
diabetes, including peripheral vascular disease, diverticulosis, kidney disease, heart disease, and
high blood pressure. In addition, Richard had a previous stroke. The urine drug screen performed
by the hospital indicated the presence of opiates. Dr. Woertz stated these underlying natural
diseases weakened Richard’s body and that it takes less insult on this type of person to cause a
potentially catastrophic effect than on a healthy person.
¶ 29 Over the State’s objection, the court granted Steven a second degree murder instruction
based on an unreasonable belief in self-defense.
¶ 30 The jury convicted Steven of second degree murder. The defense filed a motion for a new
trial, which the trial court denied. At sentencing, Steven received 18 years in prison. The defense
filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which the trial court denied as well.
-7- 1-13-1022
¶ 31 ANALYSIS
¶ 32 Steven raises three issues for review: (1) whether the State proved him guilty of second
degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether his counsel was ineffective for failing to
present an involuntary manslaughter defense; and (3) whether the trial court exercised
appropriate discretion in imposing the 18 year sentence.
¶ 33 Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 34 Steven challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent or knowledge for second degree
murder. Rather, Steven contends, he committed involuntary manslaughter by recklessly
punching his father.
¶ 35 Standard of Review
¶ 36 The due process clause protects an accused against conviction absent proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he or she is charged.
U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970);
People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, this court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brown,
2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48.
¶ 37 A reviewing court may set aside a criminal conviction only where the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v.
Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). A court of review will not retry a defendant when
considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541
-8- 1-13-1022
(1999). While we give deference to a fact finder’s decision to accept testimony, the fact finder's
decision is neither conclusive nor binding. People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).
¶ 38 Second Degree Murder Conviction
¶ 39 Steven was charged with two counts of first degree murder under sections 9-1(a)(1) and
(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012)). First degree
murder occurs when a person kills another person without lawful justification and, in performing
the acts that cause the death:
“(1) he [or she] either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or
another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) he [or she] knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to that individual or another[.]” 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 2012).
¶ 40 First degree and second degree murder share the same elements. People v. Flemming,
2015 IL App (1st) 111925, ¶ 53. The difference between the two is that second degree murder
involves the presence of a mitigating factor, such as serious provocation or an unreasonable
belief in justification. Id.
¶ 41 At trial, Steven requested an instruction on second degree murder based on an
unreasonable belief in self-defense. The State objected, arguing that the evidence did not show
Steven subjectively believed a danger existed. The trial court gave the instruction over the
objection. Because the jury found Steven guilty of second degree murder, they must necessarily
have concluded that the State proved the elements of first degree murder, and Steven proved by a
preponderance of the evidence a mitigating factor sufficient to reduce the offense to second
degree murder. We observe that the self-defense strategy was ill-conceived. Steven never
claimed that he believed a danger existed and that the amount of force he used was necessary to
-9- 1-13-1022
avert any danger. Steven testified he hit Richard to get away, not because he felt his physical
safety was threatened or to avoid any imminent danger of harm. Defense counsel should not have
pursued this strategy at the expense of an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
¶ 42 Intent
¶ 43 Steven contends that the State did not prove that he killed his father intentionally or
knowingly, but at most, recklessly. Thus, his conviction should be reduced to involuntary
manslaughter.
¶ 44 The difference between first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter involves the
mental state that accompanies the conduct resulting in the victim’s death. People v. DiVincenzo,
183 Ill. 2d 239, 249 (1998). Involuntary manslaughter requires less culpability than first degree
murder. Id. Involuntary manslaughter occurs when a person's actions are “likely to cause death or
great bodily harm to some individual, and he [or she] performs them recklessly.” 720 ILCS 5/9-
3(a) (West 2012).
¶ 45 A person acts recklessly “when [he or she] consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West
2012). In contrast, to act intentionally, the person must possess the conscious objective or
purpose to accomplish that result, and to act knowingly, the person must possess the conscious
awareness of his or her conduct being practically certain to cause that result. 720 ILCS 5/4-4, 4-
5(b) (West 2012).
¶ 46 Intentionally
¶ 47 First, Steven argues he did not intentionally kill his father. He points out that he called an
ambulance at Richard's insistence, and his father was alert and conscious when he left. Often, a
mental state can be inferred from the character of the defendant’s acts and the circumstances
-10- 1-13-1022
surrounding the commission of the offense. People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 133 (1997). The
surrounding circumstances include the character of the defendant’s acts and the nature and
seriousness of the victim’s injuries. People v. Castillo, 2012 IL App (1st) 110668, ¶ 52.
¶ 48 Steven, citing People v. Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d 1, 9-10 (1984), asserts that intent also can be
inferred from a defendant’s actions immediately after a crime. In Mitchell, our supreme court
found that the defendant mother did not intend to kill her 16-month-old daughter because, after
repeatedly striking her until she was unconscious, the mother could have completed the crime if
that had been her intention. Id. Instead, the mother ultimately took her daughter to the hospital.
Id. As in Mitchell, after he struck his father, Steven called for an ambulance almost immediately,
indicated concern for his father's condition, and told the police consistently that he was angry
with Richard, but was not trying to kill him. Considering all of the circumstances surrounding
the fight, the proof fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Steven intended to kill his
father.
¶ 49 Knowingly
¶ 50 Next, Steven argues that he did not knowingly kill his father, citing (1) the fight's brevity,
(2) the limited number of punches (four or five), and (3) the cause of death being attributed to a
stroke and not directly to his having struck Richard.
¶ 51 To the first point, Steven refers to the long-standing principle in Illinois that death is not
normally a reasonable or probable consequence of a barehanded blow. People v. Brackett, 117
Ill. 2d 170, 180 (1987); People v. Crenshaw, 298 Ill. 412, 416-17 (1921); People v. Gresham, 78
Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1007 (1979). While the intentional use of a deadly weapon presumes that the
individual knows his or her acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm,
generally, no similar presumption accompanies a fist fight. Id.
-11- 1-13-1022
¶ 52 The State contends that despite this principle, the disparity in size and strength between
Steven and Richard negates it and shows Steven acted with the knowledge that death or great
bodily harm was the practically certain outcome. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d at 180. In Brackett, during
the course of an evening, the defendant raped and beat the victim with his bare fists. Id. at 173.
The supreme court found that the disparity in size and strength between the 21-year-old male
defendant, who was six feet three inches tall and 175 pounds, and the 85-year-old female victim,
was sufficient to support the finding that he knew his acts created a strong probability of death or
great bodily harm. Id. at 179-80.
¶ 53 Unlike the victim and defendant in Brackett, the record shows that Richard and Steven
were similar in size. Richard was six feet two inches in height, and weighed 240 pounds and
Steven was six foot one inch in height, and weighed 220 pounds. Although Richard had multiple
health problems, he had enough strength after the fight to break open the locked bedroom door.
Richard was conscious, coherent, and ambulatory when Steven left. Furthermore, unlike in
Brackett, this was not an hours-long rape and beating. The physical altercation lasted a matter of
minutes. Steven did not use a weapon and stopped punching as soon as he saw blood.
¶ 54 To the second point, Steven contends that because the punches did not directly cause the
death, he could not be practically certain that his actions would cause death or great bodily harm.
In People v. Tainter, 304 Ill. App. 3d 847, 851 (1999), for example, the court held the victim’s
death from a bacterial infection related to a broken jaw after an assault warranted an instruction
on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The court reasoned that due to the
“unusual final cause of death,” a jury might find that the defendant did not know the beating
created a strong probability of great bodily harm. Id. Similarly, Steven’s punches did not directly
-12- 1-13-1022
cause Richard’s death, and a jury could find that Steven did not know that his actions created a
strong probability of great bodily harm.
¶ 55 Thus, where Steven punched Richard solely with his fists and where those punches did
not directly cause death, the proof fails to sufficiently establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Steven knowingly killed his father.
¶ 56 Involuntary Manslaughter
¶ 57 Steven argues that the evidence supports giving an involuntary manslaughter instruction
because a reasonable jury could find his acts were reckless.
¶ 58 To determine whether a defendant’s conduct reveals sufficient recklessness to warrant a
jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter, we consider: (1) the disparity in size between the
defendant and the victim; (2) the brutality and duration of the beating, and the severity of the
victim's injuries; and (3) whether the defendant used his or her bare fists or a weapon. People v.
DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 251 (1998). Our supreme court cautioned that, “an involuntary
manslaughter instruction is generally not warranted where the nature of the killing, shown by
either multiple wounds or the victim’s defenselessness, shows that defendant did not act
recklessly.” Id.
¶ 59 Steven focuses on the short time of the physical altercation and the lack of a weapon. He
contends a tense argument escalated when Richard grabbed his shirt and would not let go, and he
stopped as soon as he saw blood. Thus, at most, Steven contends that he acted recklessly by
disregarding the risk the punches could lead to a spike in blood pressure, which could eventually
lead to a stroke.
¶ 60 The State counters that taking all the factors into account, they militate against a finding
of recklessness. First, the State argues that there was a significant disparity in age, strength, and
-13- 1-13-1022
health. Second, the nature of the incident and severity of the injuries do not support a conclusion
of reckless behavior. Richard’s autopsy revealed lacerations on the top of his scalp, bruising on
his forehead and on the left side of his back, scrapes on the right forearm and hand, two scrapes
and a pink bruise on his right knee, and a scrape on his left leg. Richard also had bleeding in the
brain consistent with a stroke, bleeding on the surface of the brain, swelling of the brain, and rib
and spinal fractures.
¶ 61 Finally, the State cites People v. Viramontes in support of the contention that the extent
of Richard’s injuries belies a mental state of recklessness. In Viramontes, the defendant husband
was convicted of first degree murder in the fatal beating of his wife following the discovery of
her infidelity. People v. Viramontes, 2014 IL App (1st) 130075, ¶ 1. The defendant argued that
the trial court erred in denying an involuntary manslaughter instruction where he threw his wife
against the refrigerator and wall, did not use a weapon, did not strangle his wife, and did not
engage in acts known to kill. Id. ¶ 64. This court held that the trial court properly denied an
involuntary manslaughter instruction holding the evidence did not support a finding of
recklessness based on the disparity in size and strength of the parties and the nature and extent of
the victim’s injuries. Id. ¶ 65.
¶ 62 But in Viramontes, the severe and gruesome nature and extent of the wife’s injuries
transcended the nature and extent of Richard’s injuries. The wife’s autopsy revealed 27 external
evidences of injury, and a subdural hemorrhage to the skull and cerebral edema to the brain.
Richard’s autopsy revealed that he did not have a hemorrhage to the skull or a cerebral edema. In
fact, the physical violence Viramontes inflicted on his wife was significantly more brutal than
the exchange between Steven and his father. Viramontes did not merely hit his wife a few times
about the head; he threw his wife against the door, tossed her over a table, and threw her into the
-14- 1-13-1022
refrigerator and then onto the floor, each time causing her to hit her head. And, when his wife
retreated into the fetal position on the floor, he hit her in the face with his hands. In contrast,
Steven punched his father four or five times. In addition, Viramontes initiated the physical
altercation, while here, Richard instigated the fight by grabbing on to Steven's shirt.
¶ 63 Finally, the disparity in size and strength between Viramontes and his wife was far
greater than the disparity in size and strength between Steven and Richard. Viramontes weighed
30 pounds more than his wife, and admitted that he was stronger. Steven and Richard were about
the same height and weight. Although Richard had health problems and was older, he still had
enough strength to break a locked bedroom door. Thus, unlike Richard’s injuries, the wife’s
injuries were inconsistent with a mental state of recklessness.
¶ 64 Taking all the factors into consideration, the proof sufficiently shows Steven recklessly
punched Richard. The weaponless fight involved individuals of the same general size and
strength. Steven was in a tense argument with his father that escalated when Richard grabbed his
shirt and would not let go. Steven stopped punching when he saw blood and called the
ambulance soon after. When the paramedics arrived, Richard was conscious and responsive.
Accordingly, Steven acted recklessly by disregarding the risk that the punches could lead to a
spike in blood pressure, which eventually led to a stroke. Thus, we find that Steven's actions
constituted involuntary manslaughter, not second degree murder and remand for resentencing.
¶ 65 Because we are reducing Steven's conviction to involuntary manslaughter based on the
lack of evidence establishing second degree murder, we need not address his ineffective
assistance of counsel argument.
-15- 1-13-1022
¶ 66 Sentencing
¶ 67 We also need not address Steven's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him to 18 years in prison, close to the maximum for second degree murder, given his
age, his remorsefulness, and his lack of a prior criminal history. We remand and ask the trial
court to hold a new sentencing hearing based on involuntary manslaughter.
¶ 68 CONCLUSION
¶ 69 We find that the evidence presented at trial, considered in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, shows that Steven Lengyel acted recklessly and that his actions constituted
involuntary manslaughter, not second degree murder. Therefore, under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 615(b)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), we reduce Lengyel's conviction of second degree murder to
involuntary manslaughter and remand to the circuit court for resentencing.
¶ 70 Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
-16-