People v. Leddy

53 Colo. 109
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedApril 15, 1912
DocketNo. 7667
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 53 Colo. 109 (People v. Leddy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Leddy, 53 Colo. 109 (Colo. 1912).

Opinion

Mr. Justice White

delivered the opinion of the court:

The People, on the relation of the board of county commissioners of Prowers co-unty, instituted mandamus proceedings in the court below to compel Michael A. Leddy, as auditor of the state, to issue to Prowers county a state warrant, pay[111]*111able out of the “State Road Fund,” for the sum of $1,500, a voucher having been duly issued therefor in accordance with the provisions of a purported act of the general assembly, Session Laws of 1911, chapter 23, p. 79, and known as “House Bill No. 200.”

The defense was, that the purported legislative act was not passed in conformity with section 22 of article V of the constitution, which reads as follows:

“Every bill shall be read by title when introduced, and at length on two different days in each hpuse;. all substantial amendments made thereto, shall be printed for the use of the members before the final vote is taken on the bill, and no bill shall become a law except by a vote of a majority of all the members elected to each house, nor unless on its final passage the vote be taken by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting be entered on the journal.”

The court found the facts in favor of respondent, denied the writ, and assessed the costs against the petitioner, who brings the cause here for review.

As every enrolled bill, signed by the proper officers and lodged with the secretary of state, however repugnant to the constitution, has the appearance, semblance and force of law, the general rule is, that public officials shall obey its terms until some one, whose rights it invades, complains, and calls in the aid of the judicial power to pronounce it void as to him, his property or his rights. — People v. Ames, 24 Colo. 422; Ames, Co. Assess. v. The People, ex rel., 26 Colo. 83; People v. Airy, 21 Colo. 144, 155; Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300, 311; State ex rel. New Orleans, etc., v. W. W. Heard, State Auditor et al., 47 La. 1679.

However, it may be that the state auditor comes within that class whose rights may be injuriously affected, or that the nature of his office is such as to require him to raise the question of the validity of the apparent law when called upon to Issue his warrant for money appropriated thereunder. — In Re Appropriations, 13 Colo. 316; Henderson v. People, 17 [112]*112Colo. 587; Parks v. Hays, 11 Colo. App. 415, 427; Carlile v. Hurd, 3 Colo. App. 11, 15; State, ex rel. New Orleans, etc., v. W. W. Heard, State Auditor et al., supra, as annotated in 47 L. R. A. 512.

Whatever be the correct rule in that respect, or whether the decisions establish a particular rule in this jurisdiction, we shall not here determine, as the question is neither presented in the pleadings nor discussed in the briefs.

It is alleged that the bill is unconstitutional for the following reasons : (x) It was not read a third time in the senate; (2) It was never placed on final passage therein; (3) It never received, on final passage therein, a majority vote of the senators elected; (4) The vote therein on final,passage was not taken by aj^es and noes; (5) The names of the senators voting thereon were not entered on the journal of the senate.

While a properly signed, enrolled act of the general assembly, filed with the secretary of state, ■ is, prima facie, the law, nevertheless under our constitution, and court decisions, the proof may show otherwise, and it is competent to establish by the journals of either house that a particular act was not passed in the mode prescribed by the constitution, and when so proven, that which appeared to be the law has no validity and is not the law at all. — Colorado Constitution, sec. 22, art. V.; In Re Roberts, 5 Colo. 525; Robertson v. The People, 20 Colo. 279; Rio Grande S. Co. v. Catlin, 40 Colo. 450, 453.

However, in making such proof there are certain rules to- be observed, some of which are as follows: Where the constitution is silent as to whether a particular act, which is required to be performed in the passage of a bill, shall be entered on the journal, it is left to the discretion of either house to enter it or not; and, in such case the prima facie proof arising from the enrolled bill lodged with the secretary of state is not overcome by the silence of the journal on the subject.— Mass. M. L. Ins. Co. v. Colo. L. & T. Co., 20 Colo. 1; Andrews et al. v. The People, 33 Colo. 193, 199.

[113]*113But where the constitution makes it an essential. pre-. requisite to a bill becoming a. law, that the names of those voting upon its final passage be entered on the journal, the production of the journal, intact, which fails to show such entry, overcomes the prima facie proof that the purported legislative act is the law. In such case it affirmatively appears from the journals by necessary implication, if not expressly, that the provisions of the constitution were not observed.— Andrews et al. v. The People, supra.

These rules are recognized and applied in State of Illinois v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 33 Fed. 730, 762, where it is held, that the signatures of the presiding officers of the two branches of the legislature, together with that of the executive, to a purported legislative act, raises a strong presumption of regularity in its passage, and such presumption is not overthrown by the journal failing to show the doing of some act which is simply required to be done by the constitution; but is overthrown by the journal failing to show the doing of some act which the constitution requires to be entered in the journal. The court therein quotes from Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 181, as follows:

“The constitution does require that every bill shall be read three times in each branch of the general assembly before it shall be passed into a law; but the constitution does not say that these several readings shall be entered on the journals. Some acts performed in the passage of laws are required by the constitution to be entered on the journals, in order to make them valid, and among these are the entries of the ayes and nays on the final passage of every bill; and we held in the case of Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297, that, where the journal did not show this, the act never became a law. But, where the constitution is silent as to whether a particular act which is required to be performed shall be entered on the journals, it is then left to the discretion of either house to enter it or not; and the silence of the journal on the subject ought not to be held to afford evidence that the act was not [114]*114done. In such a case we must presume it was done, unless the journal affirmatively shows that it was not done.”

Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162, 163, in announcing the same doctrine, says:

. “If it should appear from these journals that any act did not receive the requisite majority, or that in respect to' it the legislature did not follow any requirement of the constitution, or that in any other respect the act was not constitutionally adopted, the courts may act upon this evidence, and adjudge the statute void.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State Ex Rel. Holmes v. Clawges
702 S.E.2d 611 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 2010)
No.
Colorado Attorney General Reports, 1980
In re Interrogatories of the Governor
578 P.2d 200 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1978)
Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love
322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colorado, 1971)
RESIDENT PARTICIPATION OF DENVER, INCORPORATED v. Love
322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colorado, 1971)
Department of State Highways v. Baker
290 N.W. 257 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1940)
People v. Bristol
20 P.2d 309 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1933)
Taylor v. State
162 S.E. 504 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1931)
In re Drainage District No. 1
143 P. 299 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1914)
People ex rel. Colorado Tax Commission v. Pitcher
138 P. 509 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 1914)
State ex rel. Davis v. Osborne
125 P. 884 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1912)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
53 Colo. 109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-leddy-colo-1912.