People v. Ames

24 Colo. 422
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedSeptember 15, 1897
DocketNo. 3807
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 24 Colo. 422 (People v. Ames) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Ames, 24 Colo. 422 (Colo. 1897).

Opinion

Chiee Justice PIayt

delivered the opinion of the court.

We will consider the objections urged in the order in which they are presented. It is true that there is no direct statutory provision, requiring the assessor to extend the military poll tax upon the assessment roll; but the law does require the commissioners to cause to be levied “ an annual poll tax of one dollar upon each male inhabitant over the age of twenty-one years, except members of the national guard [427]*427and such other persons as may be exempt by law; ” and it provides a penalty for failure on the part of the commissioners to levy such tax. The constitution provides that there shall be elected, biennially, in each county, one county assessor, and in the absence of any constitutional or statutory provision as to the duties of such assessor, his duties will be held to be such as are usually incumbent upon such an officer. The statute requires the assessor to leave with all owners of property residing in his county, a tax schedule, upon which the number of the polls, among other things, is to be entered. When this schedule is completed, it is to be returned to the assessor, and it is made his duty to deliver to the county treasurer the assessment book or roll, with the taxes extended. The statute requires the number of polls to be included in the schedules returned to the assessor, and it would be doing violence to the intelligence of the legislature to hold that this is a mere useless formality, and that the assessor has no duty to perform in the premises. Why require the number of polls to be returned to such officer, except for the purpose of having the same extended in order that the poll tax may be collected as other taxes are collected? We think it is clearly his duty to extend the military poll tax with the other taxes upon this assessment list. This is in accordance with the uniform practice that has prevailed in this state for many years. Poll taxes have been levied and assessed from the earliest formation of the territorial government, without question; and while it is true that this does not make such levy and assessment right, a precedent so long followed is entitled to great weight.

The levy of this tax is not in violation of section 11 of article X of the state constitution, as this section only fixes a limitation upon the rate of taxation for state purposes on property, and a poll tax is not a tax upon property. It is a capitation tax; that is, a specific sum levied upon each person. It is a fundamental principle, that the taxing power of the state is unlimited, except as the same is restricted by the constitution, and there is no constitutional limitation [428]*428with reference to a capitation tax. In the case of R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, Mr. Justice Strong says:

“No one ever doubted that before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States each of the states possessed unlimited power to tax, either directly or indirectly, all persons and property within their jurisdiction, alike by taxes on polls, or duties on internal production, manufac ture, or use, except so far as such taxation was inconsistent with certain treaties which had been made. * * * The extent to which it shall be exercised, the subjects upon which it shall be exercised, and the mode in which it shall be exercised, are all equally within the discretion of the legislatures to which the states commit the exercise of the power.”

In the return to the alternative writ, it is shown that the respondent Ames, on the 3d day of June, 1896, received from the governor an order, dispensing with the military enrollment for 1896, and that in March, 1897, he received from the same source a like order, dispensing with the military enrollment for 1897; and the respondent says, that in obedience to such order he has refrained from preparing the list of persons liable to enrollment in Ms county. As this is a proceeding to compel the extension of the military poll tax for the year 1896, the order relating to 1897 will not be considered. An examination of the statutes discloses that the military enrollment and the assessment of a military poll tax are two separate and distinct tilings. The military enrollment is made for the purpose of ascertaining the number, names, etc., of all persons subject to military duty. The governor is given the power to dispense with this enrollment whenever he sees fit, or he may order such enrollment at any time whenever, in his opinion, there is a necessity therefor. Such enrollment has nothing to do with the levy of the military poll tax.

It is contended that it is the duty of the commissioners to furnish the assessor with a list of the male Mhabitants of the state subject to the payment of tliis tax, and that no [429]*429duty devolves upon the assessor until such list is furnished. The statute—-2 Mills’ Ann. Stats, sec. 3082—provides that the commissioners shall cause to be levied an annual poll tax. There is nothing in the statute which requires the commissioners to designate by name the persons subject to such tax; this is properly left with the assessor, with his better facilities for ascertaining the facts requisite for such action.

There are several other statutes of the state, whereby it is made the duty of the county commissioners to cause to be levied certain other taxes, etc. We think such statutes are complied with by the passage of a resolution, as in this case, providing for the levy of such taxes, the mere clerical work of extending the tax devolving upon the county assessor. This has been the uniform practice in the past, and we see no reason to depart from it at this time.

Sec. 3082, Mills’ Ann. Stats., provides that the military poll tax “shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as is now or may be by law provided for the assessment and collection of other state poll taxes.” It is contended that there is no provision for either the assessment or collection of other state poll taxes; and hence, it is argued, that the military poll tax can neither be extended by the assessor or collected by the treasurer. Literally speaking, at the time of the passage of the act there was no other state poll tax, but we must ascertain the intent of the legislature at the time the original act was adopted, of which the above section is a part. This was under the territorial government, and the word “ territory ” was originally used instead of the word “ state,” so that the statute read “ as other territorial taxes,” and the word “ state ” was subsequently substituted for territory, in compliance with the general law, passed upon the organization of the state, for the purpose of making the statutes conform to the changed conditions incident to a state government. See General Laws, 1877, p. 9, sec. 1.

Under the territorial government poll taxes in various amounts were from time to time levied by the several boards of county commissioners in their respective counties. It is [430]*430shown by the brief of the attorney general that these taxes were extended by the county assessors; and collected by the county treasurers. Such practice having been followed for thirty years or more, it should not now be set aside for any but the weightiest reasons.

An examination of the statute shows that it is made the duty of the county commissioners to levy this military poll tax in their respective counties, and the statutes provide severe penalties for their failure or neglect so to do.

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Bluebook (online)
24 Colo. 422, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-ames-colo-1897.