People v. Lagrimas

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2

) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0986-ll 4 vs. ) 5 ) DECISION AND ORDER AHRT BALDOZA LAGRIMAS, ) 6 ) Defendant. ) 7

8 INTRODUCTION 9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on Defendant's second motion 10 to reconsider, filed October 15, 2012. Oral arguments were heard on November 26, 2012. II Assistant Attorney General Frances DeCecco, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Government and 12 Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant. Having considered 13 the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now issues the following 14 Decision and Order. 15 BACKGROUND 16 Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol based upon the 17 following events. On September 18, 2011 at approximately 9:25 p.m., Guam Police Officer 18 Julian Laxamana stopped Defendant's car when it blinked a right turn signal and made a left 19 turn. (Testimony of Julian Laxamana, Record Log at 2:56, Nov. 26, 2012.) Officer Laxamana 20 observed that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes, red face, slurred speech; and he smelled of 21 alcohol. !d. At about 9:30 p.m., Defendant affirmed that he was drinking and Officer 22 Laxamana asked him to participate in a standardized field sobriety test. !d. Defendant failed 23 each portion ofthe test multiple times after he asked to try again and was allowed to do so. Id. 24 At approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Laxamana informed Defendant he was under arrest, 25 placed him in handcuffs and placed him in the back of his patrol vehicle to transport to the 26 police station. Jd 27 On December 1, 2011, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 28 investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes, in violation of 8

Page 1 of 11 GCA § 30.30. Defendant asserted his initial detention was an unreasonable seizure and that all 2 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. The Government 3 opposed suppression on the bases that: 1) Defendant consented to an extended detention when 4 he participated in field sobriety tests; 2) probable cause to arrest appeared before 15 minutes of 5 alleged detention; and 3) suppression should be limited to evidence obtained after 15 minutes of 6 detention and before arrest. 7 The Court denied suppression on the grounds that probable cause to arrest appeared 8 before fifteen minutes of detention elapsed. (Decision and Order, Jun. 1, 2012.) On June 12, 9 2012, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider because disputed facts were considered as 10 undisputed. On reconsideration, the Court denied suppression because the disputed facts did II not change its probable cause analysis. (Decision and Order, Oct. 2, 2012.) The matter was 12 thereafter reassigned to the Hon. James L. Canto II. 13 On October 15, 2012, Defendant filed a second motion to reconsider on the basis that 14 material facts remain in dispute. The Government agreed that an evidentiary hearing is 15 necessary pursuant to People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ~~ 16-25 and further argued that the 16 Court's prior probable cause analysis must be applied pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. 18 1. Reconsideration and the Law of the Case 19 The law of the case doctrine generally precludes a court from reconsidering an issue it 20 has already decided unless: 1) the first decision is clearly erroneous; 2) the law, evidence or 21 other circumstances have changed; or 3) manifest injustice would result. People v. Hualde, 22 1999 Guam 3 ~ 13. However, the trial court, "always has the power to reexamine, modify, 23 vacate, correct and reverse its prior rulings and orders," and the, "[l]aw of the case does not ... 24 preclude the court from reconsidering an earlier ruling if the court feels that the ruling was 25 probably erroneous and more harm would be done by adhering to the earlier rule than from the 26 delay incident to a reconsideration and the possible change in the rule of law to be applied." 27 People v. Gutierrez, 2005 Guam ~ 40 n. 7 (quoting Chun v. Board of Trustees of Employees' 28 Retirement System of State of Hawaii, 992 P.2d 127, 136 (Hawai'i 2000)). Furthermore, "[a]

Page 2 of ll judge may reexamine his earlier ruling (or the ruling of a judge previously assigned to the case 2 ... ) if he has a conviction at once strong and reasonable that the earlier ruling was wrong, and if 3 rescinding it would not cause undue harm to the party that had benefitted from it." Jd. (quoting 4 Avitia v. Afetro. Club ofChicago, Inc .. 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995)). 5 In this case, the Government asserts the Court cannot reexamine the suppression 6 analysis of the previously assigned judge. The Court does not agree. The law of the case 7 doctrine should not be applied here where new testimony is considered for the first time. Based 8 upon the discussion infra, the Court holds a strong and reasonable conviction that the earlier 9 analysis was incorrect. Furthermore, a reexamination of the suppression decision and a 10 rescinded order shall not cause undue harm before trial. Cf Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1227-1228 ll (prejudice may result without notice of jury instruction). For these reasons, the Court shall 12 grant reconsideration and reexamine the issues presented by Defendant's motion to suppress 13 under 8 GCA § 30.30. 14 2. The Stop and Frisk Statutes 15 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 16 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v. 17 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the "Stop and Frisk" 18 statutes at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40. 19

20 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states: 21 Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 22 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person. 23 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states: 24 Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the 25 identity of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, 26 or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be 27 compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.

28 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states:

Page 3 of 1 l No person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event 2 longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the 3 place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.

4 Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states: 5 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.1 0, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after 6 an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable 7 cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released.

8 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 9 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 10 activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20. When this investigative detention reveals probable cause II for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. However, "in no event [shall a 12 person be detained] longer than fifteen (15) minutes," and the person "shall be released," if no 13 probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 and 30.40. 14 In this case, the parties dispute the application and effect of the 15 minute time limit for 15 investigative detentions. The Government argues that any appearance of probable cause to 16 arrest within 15 minutes removes the need to apply the time limitation. Alternatively, the 17 Government contends that any suppression applies only to evidence obtained after 15 minutes 18 and before arrest. Defendant asserts that if he is not arrested or released within 15 minutes 19 pursuant to the Stop and Frisk statutes, then all evidence from the investigative detention must 20 be suppressed unless it comes from an independent source. 21

22 3. Violation of the IS-Minute Time Limit 23 a. Meaning of the "Stop and Frisk" Act. 24 Title 8 GCA Chapter 30 and the 15-minute time limit are derived from former Penal 25 Code Sections 735 through 736.4. See 8 GCA § 30.10, COMMENT; Guam Pub. L. 10-99 (June 26 19, 1969). Former Sections 735 through 736.4 were enacted as original statutes and ·without 27

Page 4 of 11 any statement oflegislative findings or intent. P.L. 10-99. There is an absence of controlling 2 authority to interpret the 15 minute time limit. 1 Without clear legislative intent or authority to 3 the contrary, the Court shall interpret the Stop and Frisk statutes according to their plain 4 meaning. See Guam Resorts, Inc. v. G. C. Corporation, 2012 Guam 13 , 7 ("When the plain 5 reading of a statute is 'clear on its face' and yields to an unambiguous definition, we will not 6 look past that plain reading."); Castino v. G.C. Corp., 2010 Guam 3 , 29 ("A plain reading 7 construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly 8 what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms."); People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ,, 9 11-14. 10 An examination of the plain language ofthe 15-minute time limit within the context of 8 II GCA Chapter 30 does not reveal ambiguity or absurd and unworkable consequences. See 12 Sumitomo Canst., Co., Ltd v. Government of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 , 17; People v. Flores, 13 2004 Guam 18 , 18. The Stop and Frisk statutes state that a person shall be detained, "in no 14 event longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30. If probable cause to arrest appears, "at 15 any time after the onset of the detention ... the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. If 16 probable cause does not appear, "he shall be released." !d. This language clearly contemplates 17 that any investigative detention must end by arrest or release within 15 minutes. Even where 18 probable cause to arrest appears within 15 minutes of detention, the plain language of 8 GCA § 19 30.30 does not allow the detention to continue beyond 15 minutes. When a person is detained 20 without arrest for more than 15 minutes, although probable cause to arrest may appear, the Stop 21 and Frisk statutes are violated. 22

24 1 For example, Guam law does not explicitly discredit any detention beyond the time limit nor does it converse!

hold that the time limit is merely a guide for law enforcement. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 500, 103 25 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary t effectuate the purpose of the stop."), and US. v. Shmpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("I 26 assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider i appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm o 27 dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."), with US. v. Place, 46 U.S. 696, 709 n.IO, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2646 (1983) ("We understand the desirability of providing law enforcemen 28 authorities with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.

Page 5 of 11 To posit that probable cause arising before the expiration of 15 minutes somehow 2 negates the statute's time limit is to say that an officer may detain an individual indefinitely 3 without an arrest just because probable cause arose within the first 15 minutes. This would be 4 an illogical reading of the statute that subverts its entire purpose, and one which this Court 5 cannot reasonably adopt. The Guam Legislature has apparently narrowed the ability of any 6 officer to graduate an investigative detention according to the demands of a particular situation, 7 as the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise afford in the absence of an explicit time limit. 8 Based upon the plain meaning of the Stop and Frisk statutes, the Court holds that an 9 investigative detention must cease by arrest or release within 15 minutes of its initiation. 2 10 The Government argues that Defendant's voluntary consent to undergo a Standardized II Field Sobriety Test vitiates the effect of8 GCA § 30.30, tolling the 15-minute clock. 3 However, 12 the plain language of the statute is inescapable. It states in pertinent part: "No person shall be 13 detained ... longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of (Section 30.1 0], and in 14 no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes. 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). This 15 unconditional language unequivocally imparts that no circumstance may serve as an exception 16 to the time limit, be it exigency or even an express waiver by the detainee. 17 b. Application to the Facts of this Case. 18 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examme the 19 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has 20 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 21 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 22 2006 Guam 12 at~ 21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 23

24 Such a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to th demands of any particular situation."). 2 25 The Court recognizes this law's possibly impairing effect upon meaningful law enforcement investigatio technique; however, this Court is duty-bound to administer the law as the Legislature intended and may do no more 26 The only alternative is for the Legislature to re-examine whether the statute indeed withstands an effectiv application to real-world circumstances within the reasonable balance between individual liberty interests and th 27 Government's law enforcement interests. 3 See generally, People v. Santos, 1999 Guam 1 ~~ 33-37; People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ~~ 14-15 28

Page 6 of 1I 1877 ( 1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 2 Amendment seizure. See e.g Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be 3 recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 4 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 5 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. 6 Guam law defines an arrest as, "an actual restraint of the person, or ... submission to the 7 custody of the person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.1 0. An officer must announce the arrest 8 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful arrest 9 based upon probable cause. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~~ 35-36 and 25-26 (quoting People v. 10 Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 II (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. !d. at ~~ 19-20 4 12 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)). Even without physical 13 restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. ld. at ~~ 21-22 (quoting 14 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an

15 arrest and requires probable cause)). 16 In this case, Officer Laxamana stopped Defendant's car at approximately 9:25 p.m. 17 because Defendant made a left tum after signaling a right turn. A traffic stop is 18 "unquestionably a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." People v. Rasauo, 19 2011 Guam I ~ 26 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-439 (1984)). See also 20 People v. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 ~ 17. Under the circumstances of a traffic stop, Defendant 21 was detained pursuant to 8 GCA Chapter 30 because he could not reasonably believe that he 22 was free to disregard Officer Laxamana and drive away. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (no 23 detention if person can disregard and walk away). Defendant was not physically restrained or 24 interrogated under custody until 10:00 p.m. when he was formally arrested. The detention 25

27 4 Cf People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 n 44-45; People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 ~51 (police custody ultimate!_ 28 determined by use of physical restraint comparable to formal arrest).

Page 7 of 11 lasted more than thirty minutes before it ended with an arrest. For this reason, the investigative 2 detention violated the IS-minute time limit of the Stop and Frisk statutes. 3

4 4. The Exclusionary Remedy 5 The Stop and Frisk statutes do not provide an explicit remedy for a person who is 6 detained by law enforcement for more than IS minutes. See 8 GCA Chapter 30. However, an 7 unreasonable investigative detention implicates the Fourth Amendment under Guam law. See 8 e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam I2 at 'if 40; Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at 'if 20 ("[T]he Fourth 9 Amendment is only at issue where the police detain or seize an individual while posing 10 investigative questions.") (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 II (1983)). When the Fourth Amendment is violated by an unlawful seizure or investigative 12 detention, evidence obtained during the detention must be suppressed pursuant to the l3 exclusionary rule. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at 'if 51; Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-IS. Evidence 14 that is obtained during or derived from an unlawful detention must be suppressed pursuant to 15 the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at 'if 41 (citing Wong Sun v. 5 16 United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); People v. Santos, 2003 Guam I 'if 64). On this basis, the 17 Court shall apply the ordinary exclusionary rule and fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to the 18 Stop and Frisk statutes and suppress all evidence obtained or derived from an unlawful 19 detention that exceeds the time limit; specifically meaning any and all evidence obtained during 20 the entire detention, and not just that evidence obtained after the IS-minute time limit has 21 elapsed. 22 In order to suppress evidence under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court 23 must determine, "whether the challenged evidence was come at by exploitation of the initial 24

26 5 See also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,442-443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508 (1984) ("The core rationale consistent! advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduc 27 has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations o constitutional and statutory protections. This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure sue 28 protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of lettin

Page 8 of ll illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 2 Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 41; Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at~ 65 (quoting Segura v. United States, 3 468 U.S. 796, 805-805, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385 (1984)). See also Segura, 468 U.S. at 815 4 ("[E]vidence will not be excluded as 'fruit' unless the illegality is at least the 'but for' cause of 5 the discovery of the evidence."). The coercive effect of an illegal seizure may attenuate and 6 dissipate with the passage of time. Santos, 2003 Guam 1 at~ 65 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470

7 U.S. 298,311-312, 105 S.Ct 1285, 1294 (1985)). 8 In this case, the unlawful Stop and Frisk detention ended when Defendant was arrested 9 at 10:00 p.m. All evidence obtained during the unlawful detention shall be suppressed pursuant 10 to the exclusionary rule. After the arrest at 10:00 p.m., Defendant was transported to the police II station where he may have performed a breath test. 6 The short passage of time between the 12 illegal detention and any evidence collected at the police station by itself does not likely 13 dissipate and purge the taint of the illegality. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-605, 95 14 S.Ct. 2254, 2262 (1975) (statement separated from illegal arrest by less than two hours does not 15 purge the taint of illegal arrest). Furthermore, any implied consent warning or Miranda warning 16 by itself does not purge the taint of the illegal detention. !d. at 601-603. In order to determine 17 whether Defendant's possible breath test is purged of the taint ofthe illegal detention, the Court 18 should consider the totality of the circumstances, including: 1) the temporal proximity between 19 the illegal detention and the evidence; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and 3) 20 particularly, the purpose and flagrance of the illegal conduct. Chargualaf, 2001 Guam 1 at~ 53

21 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-604). 22 As discussed above, the close temporal proximity between the illegal detention and the 23 evidence collected at the police station does not purge the taint of illegality. Furthermore, there 24

25 persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes. On this rationale, the prosecution is not to be put in a bette 26 position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired."). 6 At the evidentiary hearing, the Government presented no evidence of the events after the arrest at I 0:00 p.m

27 However the Complaint charges Defendant with driving a motor vehicle with more than 0.08% by weight of alcoho in his blood on the basis of a breath test performed at the police station. (Complaint, 2, Declaration, Sep. 20, 2011.) 28

Page 9 of II are no intervening circumstances to purge the taint of the illegal detention. See Johnson v. 2 Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1626 (1972) (lineup identification is purged of 3 illegal arrest when conducted with counsel and after magistrate hearing to advise rights and 4 commit under bail). However, it is particularly important here that the illegal detention did not 5 have an illegal purpose or constitute flagrant illegal conduct. During the period of unlawful 6 detention Officer Laxamana observed indicators of Defendant's intoxication, questioned him 7 about intoxication, conducted standardized field sobriety tests, and arrested Defendant when he 8 failed the tests. These actions are reasonably tailored to quickly confirm or dispel the suspicion 9 that Defendant drove under the influence of alcohol. See US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,686, 105 10 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). On this basis, the 35 minute detention was not conducted for an illegal II purpose nor did it constitute flagrant illegal conduct and the evidence obtained under custody at 7 12 the police station is purged ofthe taint ofthe illegal detention. 13 For all of these reasons, the police obtained Defendant's custodial breath test by means 14 sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint of the illegal detention, and the test 15 evidence shall not be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See Cundiff, 2006 16 Guam 12 at~ 41. 17 Ill 18 Ill 19 Ill 20

26 7 27 One example of an illegal purpose or flagrant illegal conduct under the Stop and Frisk statutes is a detention an investigation that exceeds the scope of the officer's reasonable suspicions, and which reveals evidence of wholl 28 unrelated conduct after more than 15 minutes, only because the detention continued indefinitely. See generall;

Page 10 of ll 3 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby GRANTED and all 4 evidence obtained from the onset of the detention and throughout the entire detention until his 5 arrest shall not be admissible against Defendant. 6

7 SO ORDERED this -1--nt day of February, 2013. 8

II HON. JAMES L. CANTO II Judge, Superior Court of Guam 12

27 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-219 (confession inadmissible where defendant was seized without probable cause in th 28 hope that something might turn up).

Page 11 of 11