T IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 2 ) ';;':7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE 3 ) F COURT 4 vs. ) BY ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 AHRT BALDOZA LAGRIMAS, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on January 30,2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Samp ath. The People are represented by 11 Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs 12 herein, the Court DENIES the motion. 14 On September 18, 2011, at approximately 9:20 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police 15 Department (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter 16 "Lagrimas") on Adrian Sanchez Rd. going towards Mcdonalds on Route #16. Officers observed 17 a Toyota Tercel (STR6805) approach the intersection with the right turn signal on, but executed 18 a left turn onto Route 16. The Officers noted a strong odor of intoxicating beverage from within 19 the vehicle, slurred speech, and bloodshot watery eyes. When Officer asked Lagrimas whether 20 or not he had been drinking alcohol, D admitted to drinking 2-3 beers. Largrimas agreed to 21 perform the Standardized Field Sobriety Test ("SFST"), which he was unable to complete. 22 Officer then proceeded to administer a breath test, Largrimas blew a reading of 0.169% BAC. 23 Largrimas was arrested at 10:00 p.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On September 20, 24 2011, Largrimas was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a 25 misdemeanor; and 2) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC) 27 Largrimas moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result 28 of an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60,
Page 1 of4 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 2 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 3 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Largrimas argues 4 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 5 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Largrimas cites the Court to an 6 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 7 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 8 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 9 its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 10 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the II police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 12 offense. 8 G.C.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 13 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 14 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 15 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 16 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 17 At 9:20 p.m. on September 18, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 18 'investigatory stop' because he made a left tum with the right tum signal on at the Mcdonalds 19 intersection on Route #16. Based on the Defendant's admittance to drinking two-three cans of 20 Beer, Officer arrested Largrimas at 10:00 p.m. for Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. 21 During the investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest Largrimas shortly before 22 10:00 p.m. based on his admission to having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed 23 during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 24 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass 25 constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth 26 Amendment. 27 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 28 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
Page 2 of4 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 2 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 3 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 4 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 5 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 6 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 7 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 8 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 9 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 10 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 11 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 12 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 13 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 14 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 15 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 16 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 17 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 18 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 19 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 20 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 21 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 22 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 23 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 24 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 25 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 26
Page 3 of4 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santos. CM 0332-11, 2 Superior Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos I wherein it 3 concluded police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of 4 probable cause following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to 5 such analysis. People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People 6 v. Tedtaotao CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 7 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppressiOn IS not an 8 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 9 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 10 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b( c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 11 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 12 afforded right to the people of Guam.
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T IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 2 ) ';;':7 PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) CRIMINAL CASE 3 ) F COURT 4 vs. ) BY ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 AHRT BALDOZA LAGRIMAS, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on January 30,2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Samp ath. The People are represented by 11 Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs 12 herein, the Court DENIES the motion. 14 On September 18, 2011, at approximately 9:20 p.m., Officers of the Guam Police 15 Department (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter 16 "Lagrimas") on Adrian Sanchez Rd. going towards Mcdonalds on Route #16. Officers observed 17 a Toyota Tercel (STR6805) approach the intersection with the right turn signal on, but executed 18 a left turn onto Route 16. The Officers noted a strong odor of intoxicating beverage from within 19 the vehicle, slurred speech, and bloodshot watery eyes. When Officer asked Lagrimas whether 20 or not he had been drinking alcohol, D admitted to drinking 2-3 beers. Largrimas agreed to 21 perform the Standardized Field Sobriety Test ("SFST"), which he was unable to complete. 22 Officer then proceeded to administer a breath test, Largrimas blew a reading of 0.169% BAC. 23 Largrimas was arrested at 10:00 p.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On September 20, 24 2011, Largrimas was charged with 1) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a 25 misdemeanor; and 2) Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC) 27 Largrimas moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result 28 of an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60,
Page 1 of4 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under 2 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 3 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Largrimas argues 4 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 5 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Largrimas cites the Court to an 6 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 7 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 8 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 9 its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 10 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the II police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 12 offense. 8 G.C.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 13 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 14 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 15 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 16 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 17 At 9:20 p.m. on September 18, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 18 'investigatory stop' because he made a left tum with the right tum signal on at the Mcdonalds 19 intersection on Route #16. Based on the Defendant's admittance to drinking two-three cans of 20 Beer, Officer arrested Largrimas at 10:00 p.m. for Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. 21 During the investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest Largrimas shortly before 22 10:00 p.m. based on his admission to having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is formed 23 during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 24 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass 25 constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth 26 Amendment. 27 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 28 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685
Page 2 of4 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 2 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 3 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 4 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 5 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 6 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 7 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 8 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 9 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 10 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 11 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 12 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 13 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 14 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 15 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 16 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 17 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 18 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 19 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 20 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 21 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 22 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 23 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 24 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 25 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 26
Page 3 of4 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santos. CM 0332-11, 2 Superior Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos I wherein it 3 concluded police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of 4 probable cause following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to 5 such analysis. People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People 6 v. Tedtaotao CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 7 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppressiOn IS not an 8 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 9 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 10 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b( c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 11 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 12 afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section 30.50 only applies to weapons search 13 and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search occurred. Section 30.60 provides 14 the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by § 30.50 to be limited to 15 weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the suppression of 16 evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's Motion to 17 Suppress is DENIED. 18 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting on JUNE 4, 2012 at 9:30 a.m. 19 SO ORDERED: 20
22 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 23
27 1 More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on p. 5 '12. "The existence ofprobabJe cause does not alter the time and place limitations of8 G.c.A. §30.20" Instead, the Court find 28 the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. If probable cause is foun during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration of the fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
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