Opinion
PARRILLI, J.
J.A jury convicted appellant Mark A. Kroncke of failing to stop and report an auto accident (Veh. Code, §§ 20001, 20003),1 a felony, and giving false information to a police officer (Veh. Code, § 31), a misdemeanor.
The principal issue is whether sections 20001 and 20003 require that a driver involved in an injury-producing accident identify himself as the driver, when that is not reasonably apparent. As we shall explain, the pertinent sections do impose such a duty. We further conclude that requiring the driver to inform investigating officers that he or she was the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident does not violate the driver’s constitutional right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgment.
[1539]*1539I
Facts
Overview
This case arises from the death of Martin Jacobsen, a 21-year-old Danish tourist. According to Kroncke, he met Jacobsen in the early morning hours in San Francisco and offered to drive him to Marin County. Immediately after they drove across the Golden Gate Bridge, Jacobsen suddenly jumped from Kroncke’s pickup truck and suffered injuries that were eventually fatal. Kroncke got off at the next freeway exit and returned to where Jacobsen lay on the side of the road. Within a minute, a Golden Gate Bridge officer also arrived at the scene. Kroncke gave his name and other identifying information to the officers at the scene. He also told the officers he was driving on Highway 101 when he spotted Jacobsen on the side of the road and stopped to render aid. In instructing the jury, the court stated that sections 20001. and 20003 impose a duty on a driver to “disclose to the investigating officers that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, if such involvement is not reasonably apparent.” Kroncke contends the pertinent Vehicle Code sections impose no such duty, and the trial court prejudicially erred when it gave the instruction.
Prosecution Evidence
On September 28, 1995, Danish tourists Martin Jacobsen and his cousin Nikolas Sorensen arrived in San Francisco, where they stayed in a downtown youth hostel. A few days later, Jacobsen told his cousin he was going to the Haight-Ashbury district to sleep with the homeless in the park. At 12:30 a.m. on October 4, Jacobsen left for the Haight with his sleeping bag and a small amount of money. He left his identification and most of his money at the hostel. He told Sorensen he would meet him at the hostel in the afternoon.
About 3:30 a.m., some three hours after Jacobsen left his hostel, a witness saw Jacobsen’s body lying against the guard rail in the northbound lane of Highway 101, just before the Waldo tunnel in Marin County. The witness stopped at a turnout before the tunnel and used a call box to summon help. While he was at the call box, the witness saw a pickup truck pull up to Jacobsen’s body. A heavyset man — Kroncke—got out of the truck, walked to Jacobsen’s body, and shook him. Emergency vehicles arrived at the scene approximately one minute later.
Golden Gate Bridge District Sergeant David Mills was the first officer to arrive at the scene. He saw Kroncke’s pickup truck stopped in the slow lane [1540]*1540and Jacobsen lying by the guardrail. Jacobsen was seriously injured and gasping for air. Mills called for an ambulance. Mills did not believe that either Kroncke or his truck was connected to Jacobsen or the accident. Kroncke did not volunteer any information about how Jacobsen came to be on the roadway, nor did he tell Mills he was involved in the incident.
A few minutes later, District Lieutenant Michael Locati arrived at the scene. In response to Locati’s questions, Kroncke said he was going northbound when he happened to see Jacobsen lying by the side of the road. Kroncke also said he was a Golden Gate Transit bus driver. Kroncke gave Lieutenant Locati his name and address and Locati wrote down Kroncke’s license plate number. Nothing at the scene or in what Kroncke said led Locati to believe Kroncke was connected with Jacobsen or the accident.
Marin County Deputy Sheriff Fred Marziano also stopped at the scene to render assistance. Marziano, who knew Kroncke casually from various professional and social contacts, asked Kroncke if he knew what had happened. Kroncke said he did not know what had happened. He said he was driving up the freeway when he saw a person by the side of the road. There was nothing about the position of Kroncke’s pickup or Jacobsen’s body that indicated the pickup had struck Jacobsen or that he had fallen from that vehicle.
Jacobsen was taken to Marin General Hospital where the treating doctor determined he had a terminal brain injury. He was placed on life support, but died three days later. At the time he entered the hospital Jacobsen had a .16 percent blood-alcohol level. An autopsy revealed Jacobsen had suffered a “contrecoup” injury, from which the expert opined Jacobsen’s head was in motion when he suffered a blunt force trauma.
The prosecution’s accident reconstruction expert opined Jacobsen was sitting upright and facing to the rear when he stepped or jumped from a moving vehicle near the .6 mile marker on Highway 101. Jacobsen rolled on the asphalt for about 56 to 84 feet and came to rest 70 feet north of the .6 mile marker.
More than three weeks after the accident, on October 31, 1995, Marin County Sheriff Detective Jeff Carroll interviewed Kroncke in connection with Jacobsen’s death. Kroncke told Carroll he had been in San Francisco early on the morning of October 4, and was driving back home to Marin County when he came across a body on the right shoulder of the roadway. Kroncke stopped to render aid and noted Jacobsen’s pupils were “blown,” which indicated to Kroncke that Jacobsen had suffered a head injury. Carroll [1541]*1541asked Kroncke if he had ever seen the injured person before. Kroncke responded he did not recognize the person and had never seen him before.
Three days later, Kroncke contacted Detective Carroll and said he wanted to give an additional statement. In a tape-recorded interview, Kroncke admitted Jacobsen had jumped from his truck. Kroncke said he drove to Haight Street in the early morning hours of October 4. There, he saw a person setting trash can fires and helped detain him until the police arrived. Afterwards, he saw Jacobsen ask a police officer for directions to the water. A few minutes later, Kroncke saw Jacobsen near Cala Foods with a group of homeless people. Kroncke offered Jacobsen a ride to his hostel, and Jacob-sen accepted.
After they drove around a bit, Jacobsen said his hostel was locked until morning and Kroncke asked Jacobsen if he wanted to go Marin for a drink. Jacobsen agreed. After they crossed the Golden Gate Bridge and passed Vista Point, Jacobsen started panicking, and said he wanted to go back to San Francisco. Kroncke said he would turn around and drive him back, but Jacobsen said he wanted to get out. Just north of Vista Point, Jacobsen suddenly opened the passenger door and stepped out of the pickup. Kroncke was traveling at 40 to 45 miles per hour at the time. Kroncke drove through the Waldo tunnel to the Spencer exit. He sat there in shock for “several minutes” before he decided to drive back to look for Jacobsen. When he returned he found Jacobsen lying on the side of the road.
Defense
Kroncke testified that on October 4, 1995, it was too hot to sleep and he went for a drive. His intent was to drive toward the Cliff House in San Francisco to get a view of the Mount Vision fire, which was then burning in western Marin County. He eventually ended up in the Haight-Ashbury district where he saw firefighters extinguishing a trash can fire. Kroncke saw a second fire and then saw a man light a third fire. Kroncke detained the man until Officer Ramos arrested him.2
While Kroncke was talking with the police, Jacobsen approached Officer Ramos and asked for directions to the water. Ramos suggested Jacobsen take a bus and pointed to a nearby bus stop. As he was leaving the area, Kroncke saw Jacobsen standing near several homeless people in front of Cala Foods. Concluding Jacobsen was “out of his element,” Kroncke approached him and asked if he wanted a ride. Jacobsen accepted. Following a brief skirmish with a drug dealer, Jacobsen got into Kroncke’s truck.
[1542]*1542After Jacobsen got into the truck, Kroncke drove out to Land’s End where they observed the Mount Vision fire. They then drove through the Marina and North Beach looking for Jacobsen’s hostel. Jacobsen could not remember where his hostel was, and Kroncke was unable to find it for him. Jacobsen eventually told Kroncke he had not checked out a key and would not be able to get into the hostel until 6:00 a.m. that morning in any event. Kroncke was not in any hurry because he had the next day off. Eventually they ended up at the Vista Point in San Francisco located at the southern end of the Golden Gate Bridge. There, Kroncke asked Jacobsen if he wanted to go across the Golden Gate Bridge into Marin County. Jacobsen agreed.
As they were driving across the bridge about 45 miles per hour, Kroncke pointed out various landmarks. Jacobsen was talkative at that point. However, after Kroncke crossed the bridge and arrived at a point where the view of San Francisco was cut off, Jacobsen’s demeanor changed. Jacobsen demanded that Kroncke stop and let him out. Kroncke explained he could not stop on the freeway, but said he would turn at the next exit (Spencer Avenue) and take Jacobsen back to the city. Jacobsen appeared to be panicking. Suddenly, Kroncke heard the sound of whooshing air, as if Jacobsen had opened the car door. He looked over towards Jacobsen and saw his back as he stepped from the truck. Kroncke was shocked.
Kroncke continued driving, passed two turnouts, and got off at the first exit (Spencer Avenue) where he stayed for a few minutes wondering what to do. Ultimately, he decided to return to the area where Jacobsen had jumped rather than calling for help on a nearby phone. Kroncke returned to that area by the shortest route possible. Kroncke stopped his truck 20 feet from Jacobsen so he could see him in his headlights. Kroncke shook Jacobsen, and noticed blood coming from his nose, and that his eyes were half open but unfocused. Kroncke, who had training as an emergency medical technician, determined Jacobsen’s injuries were severe and there was nothing he could do. Kroncke was still in shock at that point.
About 30 seconds later, Sergeant Mills arrived at the scene. A few minutes after Mills arrived, Kroncke voluntarily gave Mills his driver’s license and vehicle registration and said, “Hére’s my info, I’m the driver, and this is the vehicle.” Kroncke did not recall having any substantive conversations with any other officer that night. He was in “no shape to talk” and didn’t say anything. Kroncke waited until an ambulance took Jacobsen away, and then went home to sleep.
Kroncke denied he was attempting to deceive the officers at the scene. He gave the officers his identification and thought it was fair to assume they [1543]*1543would know he was the driver. Kroncke believed he had identified himself “as being involved in what was going on. . . . [The truck] was the one involved and I am the driver, not just someone who happened along.” Given the position of his pickup, Kroncke assumed the officers would reasonably conclude he was connected to the body on the road.
On October 31, when Detective Carroll asked Kroncke if he had seen Jacobsen before, Kroncke answered no because he had not seen him before the day of the accident. Kroncke admitted he told Carroll he had been driving northbound on Highway 101 when he saw the body on the side of the road, and that he may have left Carroll with the impression he found Jacobsen on the side of the road. On November 3, after speaking with his brother who is a highway patrol officer, Kroncke decided to speak with Detective Carroll again. Kroncke’s motive was “to set the story straight,” even though he did not believe he had previously told Carroll anything that was false or inaccurate.
Over defense objection, the court instructed the jury that sections 20001 and 20003 impose a duty on a driver to “disclose to the investigating officers that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, if such involvement is not reasonably apparent.”
The jury returned a verdict finding Kroncke guilty of violating sections 20001 (failure to report an accident) and 31 (giving false information to a police officer.) The court sentenced Kroncke to three years’ probation, conditioned on his serving six months in county jail. This timely appeal followed.
II
Discussion
A. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury That Sections 20001 and 20003 Impose a Duty on a Driver to Disclose That He Was the Driver of a Vehicle Involved in an Accident, If Such Involvement Is Not Reasonably Apparent.
Kroncke first contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury he had a statutory duty to disclose to the investigating officers that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident. Kroncke contends sections 20001 and 20003 contain no express requirement to that effect, and therefore the trial court erred when it gave the instruction. We reject this contention.
Section 20001, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person, other [1544]*1544than himself or herself, or in death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004.” Section 20003, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall also give his or her name, current residence address, . . . the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and the name and current residence address of the owner to . . . any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident.”
Kroncke correctly points out that the quoted sections do not explicitly impose a requirement that a person identify himself as the driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-producing accident. However, in People v. Monismith (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 762 [81 Cal.Rptr. 879] (Monismith), the court rejected such a literal interpretation of sections 20001 and 20003, and concluded that to comply with section 20001 the driver must identify himself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, at least where such is not reasonably apparent from the circumstances. In Monismith, as here, the defendant was charged with violating sections 20001 and 20003.3 Although the defendant gave identifying information, he failed to inform the officers at the scene that he was the driver of a car involved in the accident. The trial court specifically instructed the jury that the defendant had a duty to “ ‘identify himself as the driver involved in the accident.’ ” (1 Cal.App.3d at p. 765.) As Kroncke does here, the defendant argued on appeal that the pertinent sections do not require the driver of a vehicle to report that his vehicle was involved in the accident, but only to give the specific information the sections specify. (Ibid.) In rejecting this contention, the Monismith court stated:
“[Defendant’s] contention flies in the face of the language of both sections 20001 and 20003, since the introductory sentence of each refers to the ‘driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury.’ Clearly, the code sections are concerned not with just a driver and not with just a vehicle, but with the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident. [Citations.] While it is true, as defendant argues, a court cannot, by an extension of the language of a statute, make something a crime which the Legislature has not defined as criminal, it is also true that a court, in interpreting legislation of this character, looks at the evil which the statute is designed to remedy. [1545]*1545Obviously the statute here is designed to prevent the driver of a car involved in an accident from leaving the scene without furnishing information as to his identity. It seems equally clear that the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident can furnish such identification only by identifying himself as the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. (§ 20001.)” (Monismith, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at p. 766, italics in original.) Thus, the Monismith court concluded the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury “that to comply with section 20001 defendant was under a duty not only to identify himself, as he did, but also to identify himself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident.” {Id. at pp. 767-768, italics in original.)4
The facts in Monismith are similar to those in the case at bench. In Monismith, the defendant’s car struck and fatally injured a pedestrian. However, the defendant’s companion was actually driving at the time of the accident. Because the companion did not have a driver’s license, he asked the defendant to say that he (the defendant) was driving. The defendant returned to the scene of the accident and gave the investigating officers his name, address, registration, and driver’s license, but falsely told the officers he was driving. He did not tell the officers his car was involved in the accident, nor did his companion disclose this information. (1 Cal.App.3d at p. 764.) The defendant and his companion both denied to bystanders that their car had struck the victim. The defendant was convicted of violating sections 20001 and 20003 because he failed to disclose his car was involved in the accident, even though he was not actually driving at the time of the accident.5 (Monismith, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at pp. 764-765, 766.)
If anything, the facts of the present case present a more compelling case in favor of the People’s position than those in Monismith, because here [1546]*1546Kroncke was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, both Monismith and Kroncke failed to identify the “driver involved” in their respective accidents.
Kroncke makes several arguments to discredit and distinguish Monismith, none of which are persuasive. We note that Monismith has been the law of this state for nearly 30 years without drawing criticism from any published case.
First, Kroncke contends Monismith erroneously interprets the language of section 20003. We disagree. We agree with Monismith that “. . . the code sections are concerned not with just a driver and not with just a vehicle, but with the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident.” (1 Cal.App.3d at p. 766, italics in original.) Consequently, to comply in a meaningful way with the statute, a driver must identify himself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident.
As the Monismith court observed, in understanding the meaning and scope of a criminal statute, we must be guided by the evil the Legislature sought to avert and the method chosen to do so. (People v. Berry (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 778, 783 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 416].) Moreover, “ “‘[t]he primary rule of statutory construction, to which every other rule as to interpretation of particular terms must yield, is that the intention of the legislature must be ascertained if possible, and, when once ascertained, will be given effect, even though it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. . . ’ ” (Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 802 [151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R. 324], quoted in Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 311 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 830].) Thus, “ ‘[i]n the analysis of statutes for the purpose of finding the legislative intent, regard is to be had not so much to the exact phraseology in which the intent has been expressed as to the general tenor and scope of the entire scheme embodied in the enactments. [Citation.]’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 639 [122 P.2d 526], quoted in Bell v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 311; see also People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1625 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268] [applying similar rules to section 20001], disapproved on another point in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 419, 427 fn. 7 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027].)
Here, sections 20001 and 20003 are part of a statutory scheme which imposes on drivers the obligation to self-report when the driver’s vehicle has been involved in an accident. The purpose of these státutes is “to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents. . . .” (California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 424, 430 [91 S.Ct. 1535, [1547]*15471539, 29 L.Ed.2d 9]; see also People v. Jimenez, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1625 & 1628, fn. 10.) In those cases where it is not apparent that a person was driving, section 20003 would fail to serve the purpose of the statutory scheme if it did not impose a requirement that the person at the scene disclose that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident.6
Second, Kroncke contends Monismith “has no precedential value” because that court stated it found no error in the trial court’s instructions “under the facts peculiar to this case.” (Monismith, supra, 1 Cal.App.3d at p. 767.) Obviously, the fact the Monismith court was considering particular facts does not deprive the court’s statutory interpretation of precedential value. Moreover, as we have already explained, the facts here are closely analogous to those in Monismith and, if anything, present a more compelling case in favor of the People’s argument.
Third, Kroncke contends Monismith is distinguishable because in Mo-nismith the vehicle struck a pedestrian, while in the present case Jacobsen jumped from the vehicle. Although Kroncke does not make the argument in so many words, he effectively contends that Jacobsen’s decision to jump from Kroncke’s vehicle did not constitute a reportable “accident” within the meaning of sections 20001 and 20003. We disagree. In People v. Green (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 283 [215 P.2d 127], the court applied section 20001’s predecessor statute to a case in which a person fell out of a car as it was making a turn. The court concluded this constituted an accident within the meaning of the statute. (96 Cal.App.3d at pp. 286-289.) The court stated: “As defined in Webster’s Dictionary, an accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event.” {Id. at p. 288.) Certainly, from Kroncke’s perspective, Jacob-sen’s decision to leave the vehicle as he was traveling down the freeway was an event that took place without Kroncke’s foresight or expectation. (See also People v. Jimenez, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1625 [“The broad legislative purpose behind the enactment of Vehicle Code section 20001 requires us to give the word ‘accident’ its broadest possible meaning so as to extend the requirements of the statute to all injury-producing events involving vehicles.”].)
Fourth, Kroncke cites People v. Bammes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626 [71 Cal.Rptr. 415], where the court stated that “Section 20001 does not require [1548]*1548that the driver involved disclose that he was involved in the accident. He merely is required to identify himself as the driver of a vehicle which was at or near the scene of the accident when it occurred.” (Id. at p. 635.) However, as Kroncke himself notes, the Supreme Court later disapproved this interpretation of section 20001 in Byers v. Justice Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1039, 1045 [80 Cal.Rptr. 553, 458 P.2d 465], There, the Supreme Court criticized People v. Bammes, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 626, and found that “Bammes inaccurately characterized the ‘hit-and-run’ statute involved in that case (Veh. Code, § 20001), a statute similar in all relevant particulars to the statute involved in the present case .... First, although it is true that neither section 20001 nor section 20002 explicitly requires drivers involved in accidents to identify themselves as involved drivers, neither can fairly be read to require only that an involved driver identify himself as merely having been ‘at or near the scene of the accident when it occurred.’ ” (Byers v. Justice Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1045, italics in original.) Thus it is Bammes, and not Monismith, that lacks precedential value on this issue.
Finally, Kroncke contends Monismith is undermined by Byers v. Justice Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1039, and California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424, both of which concern whether California’s accident reporting statutes violate a driver’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We discuss those cases in detail below, but note for now that neither case overrules or undermines Monismith'' s statutory analysis.
B. The Statutory Requirement Does Not Violate a Person’s Constitutional Right Against Self-incrimination.
Kroncke next contends that if we interpret sections 20001 and 20003 to mean a person must disclose that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident, then those sections would violate the person’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. We disagree.
Both our own Supreme Court (Byers v. Justice Court, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1039) and the United States Supreme Court (California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424) have already addressed the constitutional validity of California’s compulsory accident reporting statutes vis-a-vis the Fifth Amendment. In Byers v. Justice Court, our Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of section 20002, subdivision (a), which required (and still requires) a driver involved in an accident causing property damage to stop and identify himself.7 (71 Cal.2d at pp. 1041-1042.) The California Supreme Court concluded the required disclosures did in fact compromise a driver’s [1549]*1549Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Id. at p. 1047.) The court nevertheless upheld the statute on the ground “that the state may require a person to disclose information otherwise subject to a claim of privilege if in place of the protection conferred by the privilege there is substituted another protection, having the same scope and effect as the privilege, namely, immunity from use of the information or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person.” (71 Cal.2d at p. 1049.) In short, the court concluded that although the required disclosures might indeed violate the driver’s right against self-incrimination, the state could nevertheless compel the disclosures provided the courts granted the driver use immunity with respect to the disclosed information. (Id. at pp. 1049-1050 [“[I]f the disclosures compelled by section 20002 . . . and the fruits of such disclosures may not be used in a criminal prosecution relating to the accident, the requirements of the privilege against self-incrimination are met.”].)
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the California Supreme Court’s decision in Byers v. Justice Court. (402 U.S. at p. 434 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1541].) In California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424, a four-judge plurality of the United States Supreme Court disagreed with the California Supreme Court and concluded that section 20002, subdivision (a)(l)’s8 disclosure requirements do not implicate the right against self-incrimination. The plurality determined that, unlike registration schemes aimed at identifying criminal behavior, the statute in question was essentially regulatory, its purpose being “to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents.” (Id. at p. 430 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1539].) Contrary to the kind of disclosure statutes that the court had found self-incriminating, section 20002 was not directed at a “ ‘highly selective group’ ” or one “ ‘inherently suspect of criminal activities,’ ” but was instead “ ‘directed at the public at large.’ ” (402 U.S. at p. 430 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1539].) In sum, the high court found “disclosures with respect to automobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination [1550]*1550involved in [other cases]” and “the statutory purpose is noncriminal and self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.” (Id. at p. 431 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1539]; see also Craib v. Bulmash (1989) 49 Cal.3d 475, 488-489 [261 Cal.Rptr. 686, 777 P.2d 1120]; Fahlgren v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 930, 937-938 [231 Cal.Rptr. 229].)
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, urged there was a “real" and not an “imaginary” risk of self-incrimination in complying with the statute. However, he determined that the “presence of a ‘real’ and not ‘imaginary’ risk of self-incrimination is not a sufficient predicate for extending the privilege against self-incrimination to regulatory schemes of the character involved in this case.” (California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. at p. 439 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1543] (cone. opn. of Harlan, J.).) He reasoned that California had a vital interest in the individual financial responsibility of those who own and operate vehicles; that “compelled self-reporting is a necessary part of an effective scheme of assuring personal financial responsibility for automobile accidents"; and that to extend the privilege against self-incrimination to the “compelled self-reporting . . . regulatory scheme” will impair the state’s capacity to pursue simultaneously the objectives of ensuring financial responsibility for accidents and criminal sanctions to deter dangerous driving. (California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. at p. 448 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1548] (cone, opn. of Harlan, J.).)
California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424, supports the conclusion that California’s accident reporting statutes — including sections 20001 and 20003 — do not violate a driver’s right against self-incrimination. However, Kroncke contends the plurality based their conclusion on the premise that the statute they were examining required disclosure of only the driver’s name and identifying information, and did not compel the driver to disclose he was “involved” in an accident. Consequently, Kroncke contends that if we construe section 20003 as requiring the driver to disclose that he was a driver involved in the accident, then the statute would violate the driver’s right against self-incrimination. We disagree.
It is true, as Kroncke points out, that the second section of the plurality opinion (and Justice Brennan’s dissent) suggests the plurality viewed the statute at issue as requiring the driver to disclose only his name and identifying information. (See, e.g., 402 U.S. at pp. 432, 433-434, & 468 [91 S.Ct. at pp. 1539-1541, & 1557-1558] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) Nevertheless, the central reasoning of the plurality was that there was no Fifth Amendment violation because “disclosures with respect to automobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved in [other cases]” and “. . . the statutory purpose is noncriminal and [1551]*1551self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.” (Id. at p. 431 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1539]; see also Craib v. Bulmash, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Fahlgren v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 937-938.)9
After reaching these conclusions, the plurality went on to express an alternative and separate rationale for the result it reached. In the second section of the plurality’s opinion, the court stated: “Even if we were to view the statutory reporting requirement as incriminating in the traditional sense, in our view it would be the ‘extravagant’ extension of the privilege Justice Holmes warned against to hold that it is testimonial in the Fifth Amendment sense.” (402 U.S. at p. 431 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1539], italics added.) It was in this portion of the opinion that the plurality suggested that the act of stopping and leaving identifying information was a “neutral act” not warranting application of the privilege against self-incrimination. The rationale of the first section of the opinion is not undermined in anyway by this second section. One cannot ignore the implication of such conduct and disclosure by a driver, however. By leaving his name and address, the person depositing the information implicitly discloses he was the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, the one who caused the damage. By describing this disclosure as a “neutral act,” the court was merely saying that compulsory self-identification of a driver in an accident does not warrant protection under traditional Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. This is because such compulsory disclosure, while it may reveal that the person was a driver involved in an accident, identifies, but does not necessarily implicate anyone in criminal conduct.10 The court quickly pointed out: “Whatever the collateral consequences of disclosing [a] name and address, the statutory purpose is to [1552]*1552implement the state police power to regulate use of motor vehicles.” (California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. at p. 432 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1540].)11
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan expressed concern that the privilege might impair the state’s interest in ensuring financial responsibility and deterring dangerous driving through criminal sanctions. He explained that the cases in which the Supreme Court found that disclosure requirements had violated the privilege against self-incrimination all involved registration laws that focused almost exclusively on criminal conduct. “In contrast,” he observed, “the ‘hit and run’ statute [in Byers] predicates the duty to report on the occurrence of an event which cannot, without simply distorting the normal connotations of language, be characterized as ‘inherently suspect’ .... And, having initially specified the regulated event— i.e., an automobile accident involving property damage — in the broadest terms possible consistent with the regulatory scheme’s concededly noncriminal purpose, the State has confined the portion of the scheme now before us ... to the minimal level of disclosure . . . .” (402 U.S. at p. 456 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1552] (cone. opn. of Harlan, J.); see also Craib v. Bulmash, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489 .)
Justice Harlan went on to reason: “California’s decision to compel Byers to stop after his accident and identify himself will not relieve the State of the duty to determine, entirely by virtue of its own investigation after the coerced stop, whether or not any aspect of Byer’s behavior was criminal. Nor will it relieve the State of the duty to determine whether the accident which Byers was forced to admit involvement in was proximately related to the aspect of his driving behavior thought to be criminal. In short, Byers having once focused attention on himself as an accident participant, the State must still bear the burden of making the main evidentiary case against Byers as a violator of [a criminal statute]. To characterize this burden as a merely ritualistic confirmation of the ‘conviction’ secured through compliance with the reporting requirement in issue would be a gross distortion of reality [1553]*1553■ • ■ • ffl] • • • RD Considering the noncriminal governmental purpose in securing the information, the necessity for self-reporting as a means of securing the information, and the nature of the disclosures involved, I cannot say that the purposes of the Fifth Amendment warrant imposition of a use restriction as a condition on the enforcement of this statute.” (402 U.S. at pp. 457-458 [91 S.Ct. at pp. 1552-1553], italics added, fns. omitted (cone. opn. of Harlan, J.).) Kroncke’s name could easily be substituted for Byers’s; Justice Harlan’s reasoning applies with equal force and the same conclusion should obtain.
Thus, we find no Fifth Amendment violation under either the plurality or concurring opinions in California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424.
The dissent’s conclusion that it violates the Fifth amendment to require a driver involved in an accident to identify himself as such, is based on the dissent’s very different perspective on the issue before us. We believe that in light of the Fifth Amendment’s underlying purpose, in an increasingly complex society, the ability to invoke the privilege may be reduced when invocation would interfere with the effective operation of a generally applicable statute aimed at regulating civil responsibility. It is the context in which the disclosure is required and the underlying purpose of the disclosure that is most important and determines the analytical framework. We derive this framework from reading California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424, and Baltimore Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight (1990) 493 U.S. 549 [110 S.Ct. 900, 107 L.Ed.2d 992] and the Supreme Court’s analysis of its own precedent that each of those cases contains. The dissent believes it is the substance of the disclosure that controls the Fifth Amendment analysis. As we have indicated, however, the central teaching of California v. Byers is that “disclosures with respect to automobile accidents simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved in [other cases]” and “the statutory purpose [of the hit-and-run statutes] is noncriminal and self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment.” (Id. at p. 431 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1539]; see also Craib v. Bulmash, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489; Fahlgren v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 937-938.) Thus in cases which involve the “[t]ension between the State’s demand for disclosures and the protection of the right against self-incrimination,” we must balance the public need against the individual claim to constitutional protection in deciding whether the privilege applies. (California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. at p. 427 [91 S.Ct. at p. 1537].) Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the “testimonial” character of the disclosure is not dis-positive. As the United States Supreme Court has more recently observed: “The possibility that [a law] will compel testimonial assertions that may prove incriminating does not, in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist production.” (Baltimore Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, supra, 493 U.S. 549, 555 [110 S.Ct. 900, 905].)
[1554]*1554The dissent discounts the relevance of Bouknight, by claiming the Supreme Court’s analysis was based on the fact that Ms. Bouknight, who was ordered to produce a child over whom she had custody, had accepted child custody under conditions to which she had agreed. (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 1572-1573.) Although this is factually true, the important legal point in Bouknight was similar to that in California v. Byers, supra, 402 U.S. 424. As the Bouknight court put it, “Bouknight may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime, [f] The Court has on several occasions recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal law.” (493 U.S. at pp. 555-556 [110 S.Ct. at p. 905], italics added.) In fact, the Bouknight court specifically cited California v. Byers as “confirming] that the ability to invoke the privilege may be greatly diminished when invocation would interfere with the effective operation of a generally applicable, civil regulatory requirement.” (493 U.S. at pp. 557-558 [110 S.Ct. at p. 906].) The Bouknight court noted that the California v. Byers plurality focused on the insubstantial risk of incrimination and the noncriminal nature and broad applicability of the California statute, while the concurrence, although acknowledging that “in particular cases the California statute would compel incriminating testimony,” nevertheless concluded that the noncriminal purpose and the general applicability of the reporting requirement demanded compliance even in such cases. {Ibid.)
The dissent also observes the Bouknight court went on to note that the “testimonial aspects” involved in producing the child might require a limitation on the use of those testimonial aspects in a subsequent criminal proceeding. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1572.) More precisely, after holding that Ms. Bouknight could not invoke the privilege to resist the production order, the Bouknight court stated: “We are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the State’s ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight’s act of production in subsequent criminal proceedings. But we note that imposition of such limitations is not foreclosed.” (493 U.S. at p. 561 [110 S.Ct. at p. 908].) Similarly, in this case, we are not called upon to define the precise limitations on the state’s ability to use the “testimonial” aspect of the required disclosures. We hold only that a person may not rely on the Fifth Amendment privilege to resist making the disclosure in the first instance.
In contrast to our analysis, the dissent concludes that the central issue is whether the disclosures the statute requires are “testimonial in nature.” (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 1561-1564.) Even if we were to agree that [1555]*1555this is the central issue in this case, we believe the dissent has drawn an erroneous distinction between the disclosures the Supreme Court found proper in California v. Byers, and the disclosure the dissent claims is improper here.
Section 20003 requires a driver involved in an accident to disclose “his or her name, current residence address, ... the registration number of the vehicle he or she is driving, and the name and current residence address of the owner to . . . any traffic or police officer at the scene of the accident.” We believe the dissent would agree that these explicit disclosures are permitted under California v. Byers.
As the dissent notes, the Supreme Court has held that “ ‘[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.’ ” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1562, quoting Doe v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 201, 210 [108 S.Ct. 2341, 2347-2348, 101 L.Ed.2d 184].) In the dissent’s own words, “a testimonial communication is one in which a person reveals knowledge or information from his own mind. Conversely, if all that is required is the production of ‘real or physical evidence’ or noncommunicative conduct the privilege is not violated.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1562.)
In our view, when a driver at the site of an accident gives his name, current residence address, registration number, and the name and current residence address of the vehicle’s owner, he reveals or discloses information — as opposed to “real or physical evidence” — that may not otherwise be available to the prosecuting authorities. We fail to see how disclosing such identifying information is any less “testimonial” than disclosing that he was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident. Moreover, the required disclosure of this identifying information also carries risks of self-incrimination — it could reveal, for example, that the driver was unlicensed, had outstanding warrants, or was" driving a stolen car. While any of this information could provide a link leading to criminal prosecution, the United States Supreme Court has concluded the Fifth Amendment does not make statutes requiring disclosure of identifying information in this context unconstitutional.
[1556]*1556In short, it appears the United States Supreme Court approaches the analysis first by looking at the nature of the statute requiring the disclosure. If the statute aims to regulate conduct in which the state has a legitimate interest, compliance serves to achieve important state goals of a noncriminal nature, and the disclosures do not entail a “substantial risk” of self-incrimination, then the court will not permit the Fifth Amendment privilege to block the regulatory scheme. Only when the law in question would primarily advance the state’s penal interests, or create a substantial risk of self-incrimination, does the Supreme Court appear willing to extend Fifth Amendment protection. (See Banks v. Commonwealth, supra, 230 S.E.2d at p. 259; People v. Samuel, supra, 327 N.Y.S.2d 321, 325, 328.) Thus the court has upheld an order requiring a mother to produce or disclose the location of an abused child over whom she had custody (Baltimore Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, supra, 493 U.S. 549), and a statute requiring a businessman to produce records he has maintained to show compliance with the Emergency Price and Control Act (Shapiro v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 1, 17-18, 32 [68 S.Ct. 1375, 1384-1385, 92 L.Ed. 1787]). In each of these cases, the parties were required to disclose knowledge and information otherwise unknown to the government; nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court denied their claims of Fifth Amendment protection.
Sections 20001, 20002, 20003, and 20004 all impose obligations on those who are privileged to drive in California. The Legislature requires drivers to self-report the fact of an accident and identify themselves and the owner of the vehicle involved. The state grants a substantial privilege when it licenses drivers to use California roadways. The exercise of that privilege includes the potential of placing others at significant risk, and may lead to injury and death as happened here. The statutes require the driver/owner to provide identifying information regarding both himself and the vehicle so that those who have been damaged or injured can collect from those who are at fault. The legitimate aim of the statutes is civil remediation and regulation of drivers who use the roadways in California. A driver in most circumstances will comply without providing any incriminating “testimony” against himself and is certainly free to claim a Fifth Amendment privilege after he has met the statutes’ requirements.
Kroncke testified at trial that he provided the officers at the scene with his name, driver’s license and vehicle registration. He also claimed to have identified himself, at least implicitly, as the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident.13 Like Kroncke, most citizens understand the reasonable and constitutional reporting requirements the Vehicle Code imposes. The dissent, [1557]*1557in its scholarly discussion of the Fifth Amendment, unnecessarily finds a conflict between a Constitutional right and a statutory responsibility reasonably imposed for civil purposes. The right at issue here, for a citizen to be free from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.) is not violated when a driver is compelled pursuant to section 20003 to identify himself as the driver of an automobile involved in an accident. The state still bears the responsibility of independently proving the driver’s conduct was criminal. The Fifth Amendment was never intended to be a refuge for those facing civil liability. It was not intended to force investigating agencies, or citizens, to invest time and energy puzzling out who was driving when injury accidents occur. Nor was it intended to permit drivers to engage in the obfuscation even Kroncke knew was wrong.
In sum, we follow what we believe to be the law announced in California v. Byers, and conclude that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not relieve a California driver of his duty to comply with the reporting requirements of sections 20001 and 20003, including his duty to identify himself as the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident.
C., D.*
Ill
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Walker, J., concurred.
See footnote, ante, page 1535.