People v. Kretchmer

272 N.W.2d 558, 404 Mich. 59, 1978 Mich. LEXIS 411

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: December 26, 1978
• Docket: 57997, (Calendar No. 15)
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per Curiam.

The issue is whether defendant’s acquittal of a charge of public intoxication bars, under the "same transaction” rule we adopted in People v White, 390 Mich 245, 258; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), a charge of resisting arrest arising out of the events which led to the charge of public intoxication.

We hold that prosecution is not barred because the two offenses involve laws intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil.

I

The police arrived at a tavern on March 31, 1974 after receiving a report of a disturbance from the owner. They saw a number of persons causing trouble and asked them to leave. As these persons were complying with the officers’ request, they received information that the defendant and a companion were causing a disturbance. The officers asked the companion to leave. The defendant intervened.

An officer testified at the preliminary examination that after an exchange of words, defendant was arrested, that he resisted the arrest and was subdued. Defendant was charged with an ordinance violation (public intoxication), and with a circuit-court misdemeanor (resisting a police officer in the discharge of his duty).¹

On August 13, 1974 the defendant was acquitted in the district court of the public intoxication charge. The circuit court concluded that the trial in district court barred prosecution for resisting arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 66 Mich App 548; 239 NW2d 658 (1976).

II

The offenses in White all involved an element of criminal intent. In Crampton v 54-A District Judge, 397 Mich 489, 499, 502; 245 NW2d 28 (1976), we held that the criterion applied in White² was inappropriate to a determination of whether a series of offenses arose out of the same transaction where at least one of those offenses did not involve an element of criminal intent. We developed the following criterion for such a situation:

"Where one or more of the offenses does not involve criminal intent, the criterion is whether the offenses are part of the same criminal episode, and whether the offenses involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil, not a substantially different, or a very different kind of, harm or evil.”

Public intoxication does not involve an element of criminal intent.

The people argue that the offenses were not "part of the same criminal episode” because the defendant’s public intoxication existed before the police arrived at the scene. Whether or not public intoxication and resisting arrest can be part of the same criminal episode, we are persuaded that the two laws are intended to prevent substantially different harm or evil.

The purpose of the public intoxication ordinance, as is the purpose of the law proscribing the driving under the influence of liquor offense involved in Crampton, was to protect the public, as it went about its business, from persons not in control of themselves.³ The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect persons (the officers) from physical violence and harm.

The enactment of 1977 PA 110; MCL' 325.763; MSA 18.1031(63) barring, after January 15, 1978, local ordinances imposing "a civil or criminal penalty for public intoxication, being a common drunkard, or being incapacitated” except as provided by MCL 750.167; MSA 28.364, as amended by 1977 PA 109, defining as "a disorderly person”, among others, "[a] person who is intoxicated in a public place and who is either endangering directly the safety of another person or of property or is acting in a manner that causes a public disturbance”, reflects the legislative judgment that public intoxication is so substantially different from conduct generally covered by the criminal law that it should not be a criminal offense at all.

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Kavanagh, C.J., and Williams, Levin, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.

1 MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747.

2 We found that the three crimes committed by the defendant were all part of a single criminal transaction because they "were committed in a continuous time sequence and display a single intent and goal”. People v White, 390 Mich 245, 259; 212 NW2d 222 (1973).

3 It may also have an aesthetic purpose. See Morris & Hawkins, The Honest Politician’s Guide to Crime Control (University of Chicago Press, 1970), p 7.