NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2020 IL App (3d) 180731-U
Order filed December 10, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Tazewell County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0731 v. ) Circuit Nos. 17-TR-5299 and 17-TR- ) 5300 ) JACQUELINE M. CHAPLIN, ) Honorable ) Frank W. Ierulli, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. _______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s failure to ensure that defendant was understandingly waiving her right to trial by jury resulted in an invalid waiver of that right.
¶2 Defendant, Jacqueline M. Chaplin, appeals following her convictions for leaving the
scene of a motor vehicle accident and driving while license revoked. She contends that the
Tazewell County circuit court failed to ensure that her jury waiver had been expressly and understandingly made before proceeding with a bench trial. We vacate defendant’s convictions
and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State charged defendant via complaint with driving while license revoked (625 ILCS
5/6-303(a) (West 2016)), operating an uninsured motor vehicle (id. § 3-707(a)), and leaving the
scene of an accident that caused damage to a vehicle (id. § 11-402(a)).
¶5 The common law record shows that an order for continuance was entered on April 25,
2017. Defendant was present in court that day but was not represented by counsel. The docket
entry for that day only indicates that a continuance was entered as well as the next court date.
¶6 Private counsel entered an appearance on June 20, 2017. An order for continuance,
indicating defendant was again present in court, was entered the same day. The docket entry for
that day shows only the appearance of counsel and the order for continuance. The pattern held
for the next two court dates: defendant appeared in court, a continuance was ordered, and the
ensuing docket entry indicated nothing more than “Order for continuance” and the date set
therefore.
¶7 On September 22, 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The October 5
hearing on that motion is the first proceeding for which a report of proceedings has been
provided. The court denied the motion. Counsel subsequently informed the court: “We need to
set this for a bench trial.” The court responded: “We need to do a jury waiver and then set it over
for a bench trial at [defense counsel’s] convenience.” The report of proceedings ends following
that comment.
¶8 The common law record includes a written jury waiver filed on October 5, 2017—the
same day as the hearing on the motion to suppress. The form, signed by defendant, stated that
2 she “knowingly and understandingly waive[d] [her] right to a trial by jury” and consented “to a
trial by the Court without a jury.” A continuance was ordered setting the matter for a bench trial
on December 20, 2017. The docket entry for October 5 recorded defendant’s execution of a
written jury waiver simply as “jury waiver.”
¶9 A stipulated bench trial was held on the scheduled date. The court found defendant not
guilty of operating an uninsured motor vehicle but guilty of leaving the scene of an accident and
driving while license revoked. The court ultimately sentenced defendant to 12 months’ probation
and a term of 60 days in jail, held in remission pending the completion of 300 public service
hours.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court failed to adequately admonish her
regarding her right to a jury trial or otherwise ensure that her waiver of that right was expressly
and understandingly made. As a result, she contends, the court violated her constitutional right to
a trial by jury. Conceding that she did not preserve the error in question, defendant asks that we
conduct plain error analysis. In response, the State argues that insufficiencies in the record on
appeal preclude proper review of defendant’s claims, such that this court must affirm.
¶ 12 The United States and Illinois Constitutions provide the right to a trial by jury for every
defendant charged with an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment. U.S.
Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-
69 (1970). Any waiver of the right to a trial by jury must be made “understandingly *** by
defendant in open court.” 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2016); see also People v. Bannister, 232 Ill.
2d 52, 66 (2008).
3 ¶ 13 The circuit court has a duty to ensure that a defendant seeking to waive his or her right to
a jury does so understandingly. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66; People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462,
469 (1997). There is no specific admonition or advice required from the court in order for a
defendant to make a valid jury waiver. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66. “The determination whether a
jury waiver was made understandingly instead turns on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.” Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469. The operative inquiry for a court of review is whether
the record, including any admonishments and written waiver, “establishes that defendant knew
the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial and voluntarily chose the former.” Bannister,
232 Ill. 2d at 71; People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 271 (2004).
¶ 14 In the present case, defendant filed a jury waiver indicating that her waiver of the right to
a jury was being done “knowingly and understandingly.” While the court accepted that waiver, it
did so without any sort of admonitions to defendant regarding the nature of a jury trial or a bench
trial. There was no discussion of any sort with defendant or with counsel about the written
waiver, as the waiver was apparently filed after the proceedings had ended.
¶ 15 In People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 284 (1999), our supreme court held that a written
waiver alone does not constitute a valid jury waiver. In that case, the defendant signed a jury
waiver in his attorney’s office, and the waiver was filed outside of the defendant’s presence. Id.
In finding the waiver invalid, the supreme court observed: “We have never found a valid jury
waiver where the defendant was not present in open court when a jury waiver, written or
otherwise, was at least discussed.” Id. at 285. In this case, defendant was present when the court
stated: “We need to do a jury waiver ***.” Certainly, this bare mention of a jury waiver—the last
line of the report of proceedings from that day—does not amount to the discussion contemplated
4 in Scott. In any event, the court fell well short of ensuring that defendant’s waiver was made
understandingly. See Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469.
¶ 16 In reaching the conclusion that defendant did not validly waive her right to a jury, we are
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2020 IL App (3d) 180731-U
Order filed December 10, 2020 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Tazewell County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0731 v. ) Circuit Nos. 17-TR-5299 and 17-TR- ) 5300 ) JACQUELINE M. CHAPLIN, ) Honorable ) Frank W. Ierulli, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment. _______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s failure to ensure that defendant was understandingly waiving her right to trial by jury resulted in an invalid waiver of that right.
¶2 Defendant, Jacqueline M. Chaplin, appeals following her convictions for leaving the
scene of a motor vehicle accident and driving while license revoked. She contends that the
Tazewell County circuit court failed to ensure that her jury waiver had been expressly and understandingly made before proceeding with a bench trial. We vacate defendant’s convictions
and remand for further proceedings.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State charged defendant via complaint with driving while license revoked (625 ILCS
5/6-303(a) (West 2016)), operating an uninsured motor vehicle (id. § 3-707(a)), and leaving the
scene of an accident that caused damage to a vehicle (id. § 11-402(a)).
¶5 The common law record shows that an order for continuance was entered on April 25,
2017. Defendant was present in court that day but was not represented by counsel. The docket
entry for that day only indicates that a continuance was entered as well as the next court date.
¶6 Private counsel entered an appearance on June 20, 2017. An order for continuance,
indicating defendant was again present in court, was entered the same day. The docket entry for
that day shows only the appearance of counsel and the order for continuance. The pattern held
for the next two court dates: defendant appeared in court, a continuance was ordered, and the
ensuing docket entry indicated nothing more than “Order for continuance” and the date set
therefore.
¶7 On September 22, 2017, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The October 5
hearing on that motion is the first proceeding for which a report of proceedings has been
provided. The court denied the motion. Counsel subsequently informed the court: “We need to
set this for a bench trial.” The court responded: “We need to do a jury waiver and then set it over
for a bench trial at [defense counsel’s] convenience.” The report of proceedings ends following
that comment.
¶8 The common law record includes a written jury waiver filed on October 5, 2017—the
same day as the hearing on the motion to suppress. The form, signed by defendant, stated that
2 she “knowingly and understandingly waive[d] [her] right to a trial by jury” and consented “to a
trial by the Court without a jury.” A continuance was ordered setting the matter for a bench trial
on December 20, 2017. The docket entry for October 5 recorded defendant’s execution of a
written jury waiver simply as “jury waiver.”
¶9 A stipulated bench trial was held on the scheduled date. The court found defendant not
guilty of operating an uninsured motor vehicle but guilty of leaving the scene of an accident and
driving while license revoked. The court ultimately sentenced defendant to 12 months’ probation
and a term of 60 days in jail, held in remission pending the completion of 300 public service
hours.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court failed to adequately admonish her
regarding her right to a jury trial or otherwise ensure that her waiver of that right was expressly
and understandingly made. As a result, she contends, the court violated her constitutional right to
a trial by jury. Conceding that she did not preserve the error in question, defendant asks that we
conduct plain error analysis. In response, the State argues that insufficiencies in the record on
appeal preclude proper review of defendant’s claims, such that this court must affirm.
¶ 12 The United States and Illinois Constitutions provide the right to a trial by jury for every
defendant charged with an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment. U.S.
Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 8, 13; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-
69 (1970). Any waiver of the right to a trial by jury must be made “understandingly *** by
defendant in open court.” 725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2016); see also People v. Bannister, 232 Ill.
2d 52, 66 (2008).
3 ¶ 13 The circuit court has a duty to ensure that a defendant seeking to waive his or her right to
a jury does so understandingly. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66; People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462,
469 (1997). There is no specific admonition or advice required from the court in order for a
defendant to make a valid jury waiver. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66. “The determination whether a
jury waiver was made understandingly instead turns on the facts and circumstances of each
particular case.” Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469. The operative inquiry for a court of review is whether
the record, including any admonishments and written waiver, “establishes that defendant knew
the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial and voluntarily chose the former.” Bannister,
232 Ill. 2d at 71; People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 271 (2004).
¶ 14 In the present case, defendant filed a jury waiver indicating that her waiver of the right to
a jury was being done “knowingly and understandingly.” While the court accepted that waiver, it
did so without any sort of admonitions to defendant regarding the nature of a jury trial or a bench
trial. There was no discussion of any sort with defendant or with counsel about the written
waiver, as the waiver was apparently filed after the proceedings had ended.
¶ 15 In People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 284 (1999), our supreme court held that a written
waiver alone does not constitute a valid jury waiver. In that case, the defendant signed a jury
waiver in his attorney’s office, and the waiver was filed outside of the defendant’s presence. Id.
In finding the waiver invalid, the supreme court observed: “We have never found a valid jury
waiver where the defendant was not present in open court when a jury waiver, written or
otherwise, was at least discussed.” Id. at 285. In this case, defendant was present when the court
stated: “We need to do a jury waiver ***.” Certainly, this bare mention of a jury waiver—the last
line of the report of proceedings from that day—does not amount to the discussion contemplated
4 in Scott. In any event, the court fell well short of ensuring that defendant’s waiver was made
understandingly. See Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469.
¶ 16 In reaching the conclusion that defendant did not validly waive her right to a jury, we are
aware of our supreme court’s comments in People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327 (1984). There the
court stated:
“Recognizing that the accused typically speaks and acts through his attorney, we
have given effect to jury waivers made by defense counsel in defendant’s
presence where defendant gave no indication of any objection to the court hearing
the case. [Citations.] In [People v.] Murrell [60 Ill. 2d 287 (1975)] and [People v.]
Sailor [43 Ill. 2d 256 (1969)], for instance, defense counsel’s single statement that
defendant was waiving a jury was held to constitute a valid waiver since
defendant was present in the courtroom and failed to object.” Id. at 332.
Under Frey, the mere statement by defense counsel that a defendant was waiving her right to a
jury trial would, as long as defendant was present for the statement, amount to a valid waiver of
the right to a jury trial. This seems antithetical to the court’s more recent observation that “our
decisions have imposed on a trial court the duty of ensuring that a defendant waives the right to a
jury trial expressly and understandingly.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66; Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d at 469.
The Bannister court further demanded that “[w]hen a defendant waives the right to a jury trial,
the pivotal knowledge that the defendant must understand—with its attendant consequences—is
that the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.” Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at
69. The present case, however, does not call on us to reconcile these disparate points of law.
Counsel did not affirmatively state that defendant was waiving her right to a jury trial. Rather, he
5 merely asked to set a date for a bench trial. Even under Frey, this cannot be considered a valid
waiver of the right to trial by jury.
¶ 17 Finally, we reject the State’s contention that the record on appeal is insufficient. The
State points out that no reports of proceedings were compiled from four court dates at which
defendant was present prior to the October 5 written jury waiver, and thus argues that the court
may have delivered the necessary admonitions on one of those dates.
¶ 18 In People v. Smith, 106 Ill. 2d 327, 334 (1985), the court found that “[g]iven the statutory
requirement that a jury waiver be made in open court, a suitable report of the proceeding in
which the waiver is supposed to have occurred will be an essential part of the record in an appeal
that raises the question.” (Emphasis added.); see also id. at 335 (“[W]hen an entry in the
common law record indicates that a jury waiver has been made, a defendant seeking review of
that question should include in the record on appeal a transcript *** of the corresponding
proceeding.” (Emphasis added.)).
¶ 19 Relying on Smith, the court in People v. Majka, 365 Ill. App. 3d 362, 369-70 (2006),
rejected a similar argument to that raised by the State here. After observing that a defendant need
only provide a transcript of the proceeding at which the jury waiver was made, the court held:
“If the State contends that the court accepted the waiver at some other time, the
burden is on it to supplement the record to show this. [Citation.] Thus, despite the
burden on the appellant to provide a record complete enough for review, the
appellee cannot force the appellant to provide an exhaustive record by speculating
that a partial record is misleading. The appellee has the burden of providing a
record that shows that there is substance to its speculations.” Id.
6 ¶ 20 We reach the same conclusion here. The written jury waiver was filed following the
proceedings on October 5, 2017. A full transcript of those proceedings appears on the record,
and, as discussed above, it clearly demonstrates that the court did not ensure defendant was
understandingly waiving her right to trial. Moreover, the docket entries from the dates in
question provide no indication that any matters of substance were discussed. Defendant was
under no obligation to provide transcripts of court proceedings wholly unrelated to the purported
jury waiver. The State was free to provide transcripts, or some adequate substitute, to support its
speculation that the court actually delivered proper admonishments on some date other than the
day the written waiver was filed.
¶ 21 Defendant argues that the lack of a valid jury waiver in this case requires reversal under
the second prong of plain error. The State does not refute this argument. Indeed, it is well-settled
that the lack of a valid jury waiver is reversible plain error. E.g., Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270, 273;
Smith, 106 Ill. 2d at 333, 337. We therefore vacate defendant’s convictions for driving while
license revoked and leaving the scene of an accident and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is vacated and remanded for further
¶ 24 Vacated and reversed.
¶ 25 Cause remanded.