2022 IL App (1st) 210314-U No. 1-21-0314 Order filed February 22, 2022 First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 19 CR 3830 ) FLOYD JORDAN, ) Honorable ) Ursula Walowski, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Walker specially concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for armed habitual criminal over his contention that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant Floyd Jordan was convicted of the offense of Armed Habitual
Criminal (AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2018)) (predicated on prior felony convictions for
Manufacture/Delivery of a Controlled Substance and Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Intent to Manufacture/Deliver) and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant No. 1-21-0314
contends the State did not establish that he knowingly and intentionally possessed a firearm beyond
a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
¶3 At trial, Chicago police officer Michael Nelson testified that on March 1, 2019, at
approximately 10:56 p.m., he and his partner were in a marked police vehicle near the 500 block
of West 57th Street in Chicago. They responded to a “shot spotter” report of an incident in the
area, which was “vacant and desolate” with lighting near the streets and sidewalks.
¶4 Nelson observed defendant alone on the sidewalk, walking eastbound with his hands in his
pockets. Nelson pulled over, announced his office, and ordered the defendant to stop. Defendant
began running northwest through an empty field. Nelson chased defendant on foot as other officers
arrived on scene.
¶5 With the aid of his flashlight, Nelson saw defendant “manipulate his waistband and retrieve
a firearm,” and then drop the firearm with a “slight lob.” Nelson had an unobstructed view of
defendant dropping the firearm from approximately 10 feet away. After defendant dropped the
firearm, Nelson fell and lost sight of him for one or two seconds. When he resumed chasing
defendant, “he could see flashlights coming [his] way with other officers yelling for [defendant]
to stop.” Defendant was detained approximately 10 to 15 feet from where he dropped the firearm.
After defendant had been detained, Nelson “went back and retrieved the firearm.” He also removed
the magazine, which contained thirteen rounds with one live round in the chamber. The parties
stipulated that the firearm recovered was a “black Taurus PT 24 slash 7G2 9 millimeter
semiautomatic pistol.”
-2- No. 1-21-0314
¶6 Footage from a body worn camera (BWC) that Nelson was wearing during the incident
was admitted into evidence and published at trial. Nelson testified that still shots recovered from
that footage showed “a photograph of the gun laying on the ground” where he recovered it.
¶7 The BWC footage shows the illumination of Nelson’s flashlight during the chase and a
black firearm laying on the ground. Nelson can also be heard saying, “I got it. I got the gun.” The
footage does not show the defendant dropping the gun.
¶8 The State introduced stipulations that defendant did not have a properly issued Firearm
Owners Identification (FOID) or concealed carry license, and also entered certified copies of
defendants’ convictions for the manufacture and delivery of cocaine in case number 00 CR 11405
and delivery of a controlled substance in case number 00 CR 15878.
¶9 In his closing argument, defense counsel asserted that the State failed to prove defendant
had knowledge and control over the gun, that Nelson’s testimony was not credible or corroborated
by the BWC footage, and that no physical evidence linked defendant to the gun.
¶ 10 The court disagreed, finding Nelson to be a clear and credible witness who was not
“impeached in any way.” The court acknowledged that the BWC footage did not show defendant
dropping the firearm. However, the court did not find this to be “dispositive” because “it’s a quick
period of time, and as the officer is running the camera is moving and it’s not clear what is
happening *** doesn’t mean it didn’t happen. It’s just the video didn’t capture it because of where
it was placed on the body of the officer.” The court further found that the video corroborated that
the gun was “recovered right in the path of where the officer and the defendant just passed ***
within seconds of the defendant being detained.” The trial court found defendant guilty and
sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment.
-3- No. 1-21-0314
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues that Nelson’s testimony that he observed defendant “lob” a
gun on the ground while running through a dark lot is “contrary to human experience.” Defendant
further argues that the State did not present any evidence corroborating Nelson’s testimony (i.e.,
ammunition, gunshot residue, or fingerprint evidence), which was “contradicted” by the body
camera footage.
¶ 12 The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, ‘any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” People v. Belknap, 2014
IL 117094, ¶ 67 (quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)). This standard applies
whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007)
(citing People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000)). The trier of fact resolves conflicts in the
testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. This court will not retry the defendant or substitute its
judgment for that of the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence or credibility of witnesses. Id.
A reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution
(People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)) and will not reverse a conviction unless the
evidence is “unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt” (People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009)).
¶ 13 To sustain defendant’s conviction for AHC, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant possessed a firearm after having been convicted two or more times of certain
qualifying offenses. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)(3) (West 2018).
-4- No. 1-21-0314
¶ 14 To establish the element of possession, the State may introduce evidence that a defendant
had actual or constructive possession of a firearm. People v. McCurine, 2019 IL App (1st) 160817,
¶ 21. Actual possession is proved where the evidence shows the defendant “exercised some form
of dominion” over the item, “such as trying to conceal it or throwing it away.” People v. Scott, 152
Ill App. 3d 868, 871 (1987).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2022 IL App (1st) 210314-U No. 1-21-0314 Order filed February 22, 2022 First Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 19 CR 3830 ) FLOYD JORDAN, ) Honorable ) Ursula Walowski, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Pucinski and Walker specially concurred.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for armed habitual criminal over his contention that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶2 After a bench trial, defendant Floyd Jordan was convicted of the offense of Armed Habitual
Criminal (AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2018)) (predicated on prior felony convictions for
Manufacture/Delivery of a Controlled Substance and Possession of a Controlled Substance with
Intent to Manufacture/Deliver) and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, defendant No. 1-21-0314
contends the State did not establish that he knowingly and intentionally possessed a firearm beyond
a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
¶3 At trial, Chicago police officer Michael Nelson testified that on March 1, 2019, at
approximately 10:56 p.m., he and his partner were in a marked police vehicle near the 500 block
of West 57th Street in Chicago. They responded to a “shot spotter” report of an incident in the
area, which was “vacant and desolate” with lighting near the streets and sidewalks.
¶4 Nelson observed defendant alone on the sidewalk, walking eastbound with his hands in his
pockets. Nelson pulled over, announced his office, and ordered the defendant to stop. Defendant
began running northwest through an empty field. Nelson chased defendant on foot as other officers
arrived on scene.
¶5 With the aid of his flashlight, Nelson saw defendant “manipulate his waistband and retrieve
a firearm,” and then drop the firearm with a “slight lob.” Nelson had an unobstructed view of
defendant dropping the firearm from approximately 10 feet away. After defendant dropped the
firearm, Nelson fell and lost sight of him for one or two seconds. When he resumed chasing
defendant, “he could see flashlights coming [his] way with other officers yelling for [defendant]
to stop.” Defendant was detained approximately 10 to 15 feet from where he dropped the firearm.
After defendant had been detained, Nelson “went back and retrieved the firearm.” He also removed
the magazine, which contained thirteen rounds with one live round in the chamber. The parties
stipulated that the firearm recovered was a “black Taurus PT 24 slash 7G2 9 millimeter
semiautomatic pistol.”
-2- No. 1-21-0314
¶6 Footage from a body worn camera (BWC) that Nelson was wearing during the incident
was admitted into evidence and published at trial. Nelson testified that still shots recovered from
that footage showed “a photograph of the gun laying on the ground” where he recovered it.
¶7 The BWC footage shows the illumination of Nelson’s flashlight during the chase and a
black firearm laying on the ground. Nelson can also be heard saying, “I got it. I got the gun.” The
footage does not show the defendant dropping the gun.
¶8 The State introduced stipulations that defendant did not have a properly issued Firearm
Owners Identification (FOID) or concealed carry license, and also entered certified copies of
defendants’ convictions for the manufacture and delivery of cocaine in case number 00 CR 11405
and delivery of a controlled substance in case number 00 CR 15878.
¶9 In his closing argument, defense counsel asserted that the State failed to prove defendant
had knowledge and control over the gun, that Nelson’s testimony was not credible or corroborated
by the BWC footage, and that no physical evidence linked defendant to the gun.
¶ 10 The court disagreed, finding Nelson to be a clear and credible witness who was not
“impeached in any way.” The court acknowledged that the BWC footage did not show defendant
dropping the firearm. However, the court did not find this to be “dispositive” because “it’s a quick
period of time, and as the officer is running the camera is moving and it’s not clear what is
happening *** doesn’t mean it didn’t happen. It’s just the video didn’t capture it because of where
it was placed on the body of the officer.” The court further found that the video corroborated that
the gun was “recovered right in the path of where the officer and the defendant just passed ***
within seconds of the defendant being detained.” The trial court found defendant guilty and
sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment.
-3- No. 1-21-0314
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argues that Nelson’s testimony that he observed defendant “lob” a
gun on the ground while running through a dark lot is “contrary to human experience.” Defendant
further argues that the State did not present any evidence corroborating Nelson’s testimony (i.e.,
ammunition, gunshot residue, or fingerprint evidence), which was “contradicted” by the body
camera footage.
¶ 12 The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is “whether,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, ‘any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” People v. Belknap, 2014
IL 117094, ¶ 67 (quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)). This standard applies
whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007)
(citing People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000)). The trier of fact resolves conflicts in the
testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. This court will not retry the defendant or substitute its
judgment for that of the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence or credibility of witnesses. Id.
A reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution
(People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004)) and will not reverse a conviction unless the
evidence is “unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt” (People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009)).
¶ 13 To sustain defendant’s conviction for AHC, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant possessed a firearm after having been convicted two or more times of certain
qualifying offenses. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)(3) (West 2018).
-4- No. 1-21-0314
¶ 14 To establish the element of possession, the State may introduce evidence that a defendant
had actual or constructive possession of a firearm. People v. McCurine, 2019 IL App (1st) 160817,
¶ 21. Actual possession is proved where the evidence shows the defendant “exercised some form
of dominion” over the item, “such as trying to conceal it or throwing it away.” People v. Scott, 152
Ill App. 3d 868, 871 (1987). “Because possession is often difficult to prove directly, proving
possession frequently rests upon circumstantial evidence.” People v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784,
788 (2010). The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to convict if the testimony is positive
and credible, even where contradicted by the defendant. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36.
¶ 15 Nelson testified that while chasing defendant, he observed him remove a firearm from his
waistband and “lob” it on the ground. After defendant was detained by other officers, Nelson
retrieved the firearm. The State introduced a video showing the chase and Nelson’s subsequent
retrieval of the firearm, as well as still frames showing the firearm on the ground after the chase.
Because the State introduced evidence that defendant exercised control over the firearm by
carrying and discarding it, the court properly determined that defendant actually possessed the
firearm and committed the offense of AHC. See Scott, 152 Ill App. 3d at 871.
¶ 16 Defendant nevertheless contends that the State did not prove he discarded the firearm. He
argues that Nelson’s testimony is contradicted by his own body camera footage that shows he was
“well-over 10 feet” from defendant when he was detained. Defendant disputes that Nelson actually
observed defendant throw the firearm while running in a poorly-lit area.
¶ 17 Where a finding of guilty depends on eyewitness testimony, the reviewing court must
decide whether a factfinder could reasonably accept the testimony as true beyond a reasonable
doubt. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36. Testimony is insufficient only “where the record evidence
-5- No. 1-21-0314
compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280.
¶ 18 We defer to the trial court’s judgment regarding Nelson’s credibility and the impact of any
inconsistencies in his testimony. See Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. The trial court stated that “as
the officer is running the camera is moving.” Although it was not entirely “clear as to what was
happening,” that “doesn’t mean that it didn’t happen. It’s just the video didn’t capture it because
of where it is placed on the body of the officer.”
¶ 19 The body camera footage does not contradict Nelson’s testimony in any significant way.
For example, even if Nelson was more than 10 feet from defendant when he fell, this discrepancy
does not establish that Nelson’s entire testimony was unworthy of belief. See Cunningham, 212
Ill. 2d at 284 (noting the record contained no evidence showing that the only reasonable inference
was that the discrepancies made the entirety of the testimony unworthy of belief). The record does
not support the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept Nelson’s version of events.
¶ 20 Finally, we do not agree with defendant’s argument that the State was required to present
corroborative evidence that he possessed the firearm. Nelson observed defendant demonstrate
control over the firearm by discarding it while fleeing. See People v. Herron, 2012 IL App (1st)
090663, ¶ 23 (where the testimony of a single eyewitness is positive and the witness is credible,
the State is not required to present corroborating physical evidence at trial). This evidence is
consistent with video footage showing Nelson chasing defendant and subsequently retrieving a
firearm. The evidence in the record does not compel “the conclusion that no person could accept
it beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280.
-6- No. 1-21-0314
¶ 21 Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find a rational trier of fact
could have found defendant possessed a firearm. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
¶ 23 JUSTICE PUCINSKI and JUSTICE WALKER, specially concurring:
¶ 24 Although our precedent does not require fingerprint testing to prove possession, such
testing is the better practice for police so that the case does not come down to a witness credibility
contest, and, more importantly to ensure accuracy in convictions. This court has recognized that
evidence of fingerprint testing of the firearms “would have strengthened the State’s case.” People
v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 122581-U, ¶ 20.
-7-