People v. Jordan

891 P.2d 1010, 19 Brief Times Rptr. 462, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 65, 1995 WL 117062

• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado
• Decided: March 20, 1995
• Docket: 94SA401
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice YOLLACK

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People bring this interlocutory appeal to challenge the district court’s order suppressing a statement made to police by the defendant, Johnathan Holden Jordan (the defendant). The district court found that, although the defendant voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), he did not do so knowingly and intelligently. We find that the record does not support the district court’s suppression of the defendant’s statement. We therefore reverse the suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

On the evening of March 29, 1994, John Leonardelli was stabbed to death in an Aurora, Colorado, parking garage, during the course of a robbery. Based on information received from several witnesses, the Aurora police department arrested the defendant on March 30, 1994, for his involvement in the murder. The defendant was charged by information with first-degree murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated motor vehicle theft, theft, and mandatory sentencing for a crime of violence.¹

On August 15, 1994, the defendant filed a motion to suppress an inculpatory statement made to police shortly after his arrest, on the ground that the statement was made involuntarily and that it was taken in violation of the defendant’s rights under Miranda. The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress, at which the following facts were established.

On March 30, 1994, sometime around midnight the day after the murder, the defendant was taken to the Aurora police department, and was fingerprinted and booked. The defendant was placed in a holding room in the Aurora police department at approximately 2:00 in the morning on March 31, 1994. He was later escorted to an interview room in the detective bureau by an Aurora police officer and an Aurora police department homicide detective, Detective Dan Dai-ley. Detective Dailey provided the defendant with coffee and cigarettes, and began to interview him approximately two hours later.²

At the beginning of the interview, Detective Dailey advised the defendant that he was a police officer and that he wanted to question the defendant “about first degree murder.” Detective Dailey proceeded to advise the defendant of his rights under Miranda. Detective Dailey produced a standard advisement of rights form, and asked the defendant to follow along as the rights were read to him. After each of the rights was read to the defendant, Detective Dailey asked the defendant if he understood, and the defendant said “Yes.” Additionally, the defendant signed his initials on the advisement form, indicating that he understood each of his rights. Detective Dailey then asked the defendant: “Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?” The defendant answered affirmatively, wrote the word “yes” as the answer to the same question on the advisement form, and signed his signature on the advisement form.

Before Detective Dailey began to question the defendant about the murder, the detective ascertained that the defendant had a tenth-grade education, and that he could both read and write in the English language. The detective also questioned the defendant about his recent drug or alcohol use. The defendant said that the last time he had marijuana and alcohol was a couple of days prior to the interview. Finally, the defendant said that no one had made any threats or promises to him to cause him to talk to the police.

Detective Dailey interviewed the defendant for approximately one and one-half hours. The defendant initially told Detective Dailey that, although he was on both the second and third floors of the parking garage the evening the murder took place, he and a companion named Tom were just “passing through” the garage. The defendant said that he heard about the murder later the next day on the news.

When Detective Dailey confronted the defendant with the fact that the police knew of the defendant’s involvement in the murder from an interview with the defendant’s roommate, the defendant said: “I’ll tell you the whole story, the truth now. All right.” The defendant eventually confided to Detective Dailey that he and a person named Jeff had gone to the parking garage to steal a car.³ He said that they saw a white Jaguar, and waited in a stairwell near the Jaguar for the owner of the car to appear.⁴

As the victim came into the parking lot and walked towards the Jaguar, the defendant said that he hit him on the head. The victim struggled, and then the defendant saw Jeff stab the victim with a knife a number of times. According to the defendant, after the stabbing, the two men took the victim’s watch, bracelet, ring, and keys, and then they got into the Jaguar with Jeff driving, and drove out of the garage.

Jeff and the defendant drove to an interstate highway, and proceeded to an apartment complex, where they parked and left the Jaguar. The defendant told Detective Dailey that he ran with Jeff to a bus stop, and took the bus to the Aurora mall. From the mall, the two men got on another bus. The defendant said that he rode the bus to a stop near his apartment, and went home.

After the prosecution presented evidence at the suppression hearing concerning the defendant’s arrest and subsequent statement to the police, the defendant presented evidence attempting to show that the waiver of his rights was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. The defendant testified on his own behalf, and called one other witness, a psychiatrist named Dr. Robert Fairbairn. In his testimony, the defendant said that he slept for a total of about four and one-half hours the day before he was arrested. Normally, the defendant said, he slept between ten and twelve hours per day. The defendant also testified that earlier on the day of his arrest, he consumed malt liquor, and smoked some marijuana either the day before or the day of the arrest.

The defendant said that he remembered Detective Dailey telling him that he had certain rights under Miranda. He also said that he remembered Detective Dailey telling him that he had a right to remain silent, but said that he thought he would have to talk to the detective sooner or later. The defendant testified that he understood that he could have a lawyer with him in court, but not during the questioning, and that he thought he would have to pay for the lawyer. He said that if he had known he could have had a lawyer during the time the detective was talking to him, he would have asked for one. On direct examination, defense counsel asked the defendant if he understood the word .“appointed.” He responded: “Same thing as given something, right?”

Regarding his educational background, the defendant said that he completed ninth grade, but that he received failing grades. The defendant testified that he was allowed to proceed to the tenth grade, but that he did not go to school all the time.

Additionally, the defendant said that he had experienced other problems with the law before his arrest for the homicide. The defendant remembered being charged as a juvenile for felony theft, and pleading guilty to the charge. The defendant admitted that he had been arrested before his arrest in this ease, more than once. He also testified that he had spent time in jail on three separate occasions, and that he had been in front of a judge on a criminal case five or more times, either as an adult or a juvenile.

On cross-examination, the defendant remembered Detective Dailey telling him that anything he said could be used against him in a court of law, and he said that he understood it to mean that “whatever I told him he was going to bring it up in court.” The defendant also testified on cross-examination that he never told Detective Dailey that he was tired or sleepy, that he did not want to talk to him, or that he did not understand his questions.

Dr. Fairbairn testified on direct examination that he met with the defendant two times for a total of approximately three and a quarter hours. He said that the defendant came from a troubled background, that he had below-average intelligence, and that he had a poor self-image. The psychiatrist further testified that the defendant had experienced a period of depression, and had been prescribed the antidepressant Prozac, but that the defendant had stopped taking the Prozac a few months before the homicide took place because he felt that it did not have any effect.

Dr. Fairbairn also said that the defendant had “serious difficulty” with abstract concepts, and that, in his opinion, the defendant did not understand his Miranda rights. Specifically, the psychiatrist said that the defendant had an inadequate understanding of the future impact of his answers. Dr. Fairbairn testified that he believed that, although the defendant did not understand his rights, the defendant told police that he understood his rights as a way of placating the police as an authority figure, in order to “get the whole thing over with.” Dr. Fairbairn additionally noted that the defendant’s behavior after the homicide — pawning the victim’s bracelet, and telling his roommate of the homicide — showed that the defendant’s judgment was impaired. Dr. Fairbairn testified that he asked the defendant why he talked to the police, and that the defendant responded: “I don’t know, I just felt they’d find out anyways, I was busted anyway, I didn’t want to take all the blame for it, I told them what my part was, what I did.”

On cross-examination, Dr. Fairbairn conceded that it was possible that the defendant spoke to the police, and initially denied his involvement in the murder, because he did not want to admit what he had done, and because he was hoping to escape punishment. Specifically, the doctor testified that the defendant most likely said what he did to Detective Dailey

[bjecause he was tired, he wanted to get it over with. Also that he figured the police would be hearing very critical comments about him from the codefendant, from his roommate, from his mother, and he wanted to get his less incriminating version in before they heard the more incriminating version.

Dr. Fairbairn admitted that such behavior was an example of someone who is able to consider the consequences of his actions, and that “[t]o a degree” it was an example of someone engaging in abstract thought. Dr. Fairbairn also testified that he believed that the defendant did understand that Detective Dailey was going to ask him questions about his involvement in the murder case.

In an oral ruling on November 8, 1994, the district court suppressed the defendant’s statement, holding that the defendant did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. In its findings, the district court found that the defendant had been sleep-deprived and on Prozac when he was interviewed by the police. The court also found that the Miranda advisement was a “very, very perfunctory type advisement.” The district court concluded that, under the circumstances, the defendant’s waiver was not a “voluntary waiver.”

The next day, on November 9, 1994, the district court was asked to clarify its ruling. The court found that the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, and not a result of coercive police conduct. Nevertheless, the court went on to find that the defendant’s waiver was not knowing and intelligent because the defendant had “demonstrated an inability ... to appreciate and ... assimilate the consequences of making a statement and ... the ramifications of [that] statement.”

The People then filed this interlocutory appeal to challenge the district court’s order suppressing the defendant’s statement.

II.

The prosecution argues that the district court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard when it found that the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. According to the prosecution, the district court improperly focused on the wisdom of the defendant’s decision to speak to the police, rather than whether the defendant understood the consequences of his waiver.⁵ We find that, although the district court used the proper standard for determining whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent, the district court’s decision is not supported by the evidence in the record and must be reversed.

Under Miranda, before a person can be subjected to custodial interrogation by the police, he must be advised of the following rights: that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he makes can be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; People v. Dracon, 884 P.2d 712, 716 n. 8 (Colo.1994). If the Miranda advisement is not given, or if there is not a valid waiver of the rights contained in the advisement, any statement subsequently made to the police by the person interrogated is inadmissible in a criminal case against him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630; Dracon, 884 P.2d at 716.

The rights incorporated in the Miranda advisement may be waived, as long as the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 882 (Colo. 1993). The validity of the waiver involves a two-part inquiry. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 856-57, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 (Colo.1993). First, the relinquishment of the rights must be voluntary, in the sense that it is an act of deliberate choice, and not the result of police intimidation, coercion, or other misconduct. Spring, 479 U.S. at 573, 107 S.Ct. at 856-57; Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984. Second, the waiver must be made with full awareness of the nature of the rights abandoned, and the consequences of the decision to abandon those rights. Spring, 479 U.S. at 573, 107 S.Ct. at 856-57; Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984. When a defendant challenges the introduction of his statement on the ground that it was obtained in violation of Miranda, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984. In coming to a determination on the validity of a waiver, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation. Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984.

In its initial ruling, the district court recognized that the issue before the court was

whether [the defendant] can not only assimilate the Miranda warnings, but use them to protect himself. And that’s the critical issue that’s before the court.

In other words, it’s one thing for him to say, “I know on a superficial level what it means [the] right to remain silent, [but] what do I do with that right? I know I have a right to an attorney, [but] how do I exercise that right?”

In its clarified order the next day, the district court enunciated the correct standard for a determination of whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent: ■

Now the second portion is that the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it and that is what ... the real basis of the court’s ruling was....

The standard set forth by the district court is in keeping with our holdings in both Jiminez and May that a knowing and intelligent waiver is one made with a full awareness of not only the nature of the rights waived, but also the consequences of waiving those rights. Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 984; May, 859 P.2d at 882.

When reviewing the district court’s suppression motion, we must determine whether the district court applied the proper legal standard to the facts of the case. People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 706 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1663,128 L.Ed.2d 379 (1994); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 844 (Colo.1991). We must also determine on appeal whether the district court’s factual findings are adequately supported by competent evidence in the record. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d at 706; Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844. This second inquiry necessarily involves an examination of the evidence before the district court, and a determination of whether the evidence adequately supported the district court’s ultimate legal conclusion on the constitutionality of the waiver of Miranda rights. See Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844. Accordingly, we will defer to the district court’s findings only if they are adequately supported by evidence in the record. See Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 847 (reversing the trial court’s suppression order, in part because “the [trial] court’s ruling on custody was not adequately supported in the record”); People v. Mounts, 784 P.2d 792, 797 (Colo.1990) (also reversing the trial court’s suppression order, concluding that “the evidence in the record does not support the trial court’s finding that [the defendant’s] statement was involuntary”).

Keeping this standard of review in mind, we find that, despite the fact that the district court recognized the appropriate standard for a knowing and intelligent waiver, the district court’s application of the standard to the facts of this case was in error. We conclude that the district court’s ruling is not supported by the record, and that the defendant had a sufficient understanding of his rights, and a sufficient understanding of the consequences of relinquishing those rights, so that his waiver was a knowing and intelligent one.

First, the record does not support the district court’s finding that the defendant’s advisement was “very, very perfunctory.” The record indicates that Detective Dailey gave the defendant a written copy of the advisement form, read each right to him separately, and asked the defendant if he understood each right. The defendant acknowledged his understanding both verbally, and by writing his initials on the form next to each enumerated right. The defendant’s advisement was as complete as Miranda requires it to be, including informing him that he had a right to remain silent, that what he said could be used against him in a court of law, that he had the right to talk to a lawyer, and have the lawyer present during questioning, that a lawyer would be appointed if he could not afford one, and that he could exercise his rights at any time and not answer any questions or make any statements. Then, at the conclusion of the advisement, the defendant acknowledged both verbally and by placing his initials on the corresponding space on the form that he wished to talk to the police. Finally, the defendant signed the form. The defendant’s behavior during the advisement indicates that he understood his rights, and that he agreed to talk to police notwithstanding those rights. Under Miranda, the police are not required to tell the defendant that it might be against his self interest to confess to the police.

Furthermore, the only evidence that the defendant was unable to understand his rights, other than the self-serving testimony of the defendant, was the testimony of Dr. Fairbairn. Dr. Fairbairn testified that, in his opinion, the defendant had difficulty with abstract concepts, and did not understand his Miranda rights. However, Dr. Fairbairn’s testimony on direct examination was refuted by his concession on cross-examination that the defendant was capable of thinking abstractly and did understand the consequences of his actions. The defendant’s ability to reason in an abstract way is borne out by the record.

A review of the defendant’s interview with Detective Dailey and his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress indicates that he gave consistently appropriate answers to the questions asked of him. He said that he understood Detective Dailey’s advisement to mean that the things he told police could be used against him in court, and that when someone is “appointed” with something, it means to be given something.⁶

The record reflects that the defendant was sufficiently capable of comprehending his rights, and waiving them. Dr. Fair-bairn acknowledged that the defendant told him he talked to police because he “[did]n’t know, [he] just felt they’d find out anyways, [he] was busted anyway, [he] didn’t want to take all the blame for it.” The defendant’s response establishes that he knew full well that he was in trouble, and that, by getting his story to the police first, he might be able to extricate himself from the situation. Simply because the defendant’s decision to talk to the police might be ill-advised does not mean that the defendant’s decision was not knowingly or intelligently made.⁷

The record also shows that the defendant had the foresight to lie to Detective Dailey about his involvement in the murder, when he knew at the beginning of the interview that the detective intended to ask him about his involvement with “first degree murder.” The defendant fabricated a story that he and another person, “Tom,” were just passing through the garage. Not until the defendant was confronted by Detective Dailey with the information obtained from the defendant’s roommate did the defendant say, “I’ll tell you the whole story, the truth now.”

Finally, the defendant was involved in the criminal justice system in the past, and appeared in front of a judge on at least five occasions. The defendant therefore had some experience with the court system, and was not completely naive about the criminal process.⁸

This case is therefore distinguishable from People v. Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981 (Colo.1993), and People v. May, 859 P.2d 879 (Colo.1993). In both those cases, we held that the record supported the district court’s finding that the defendants did not knowingly and intelligently waive their rights under Miranda. In Jiminez, the defendant was a Native American, whose native language was Kickapoo. Nonetheless, when the police read him his rights, they read them to him in Spanish, a language in which his vocabulary was very limited. Jiminez, 863 P.2d at 985. There was also testimony in that ease that the concept of a “right” was not even incorporated in Jiminez’s native Kickapoo language, that he functioned at the six-year-old, level, and that he had no formal education whatsoever. Id. at 982, 985. According to the testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress his statement, Jiminez did not even understand the terms “lawyer” or “jury.” Id. at 982.

Similarly, in May, we said that May’s waiver of his rights was not knowing and intelligent because the record indicated that May was interviewed by police shortly after being airlifted to a hospital for treatment of injuries he suffered in a serious automobile accident. May, 859 P.2d at 883. While the police were interviewing May, he was drifting in and out of consciousness, and gave confused answers to questions asked of him. For instance, he did not know what day it was, where he was, where the accident had taken place, or who he was with in the car. Id. at 881-82, 883.

In contrast, the totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates that the defendant recognized the seriousness of his predicament, that he understood both the meaning and extent of his rights, and that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. We find that the district court’s ruling holding that the defendant’s waiver was not knowing .and intelligent is not supported by evidence in the record. Therefore, we reverse the ruling of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.

KIRSHBAUM, J., dissents, and LOHR and SCOTT, JJ., join in the dissent.

1 . The information charged a violation of the following statutory provisions: § 18 — 3—102(l)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (murder in the first degree); § 18-3-102(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.) (felony murder); § 18-2-201, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.) (conspiracy to commit first-degree murder); § 18-4-302(l)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986) (aggravated robbery); § 18-4-409(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.) (aggravated motor vehicle theft in the first degree); § 18-2-201 (conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery); § 18-4-401, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.) (theft); and § 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.) (mandatory sentencing for a crime of violence).

2 . Detective Dailey’s interview of the defendant was audiotaped in its entirety, and was later transcribed. A tape recording of the defendant's statement was admitted into evidence, as was a copy of the transcription of the tape recording.

3 . The defendant was charged with a co-defendant.

4 . During the investigation, the police determined that the Jaguar belonged to John Leonardelli, the victim.

5 . Although the defendant does not concede that his waiver was voluntary, the district court's ruling with respect to the voluntariness of the statement is not before us. The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that the defendant's waiver of his rights was invalid because it was not knowingly and intelligently made.

6 . The record reveals that, although the defendant did not complete high school, he attended school at least until the tenth grade. Although Dr. Fair-bairn testified that the defendant had a below-average intelligence, his conclusion was based in part on the defendant's inability to tell him what certain parables mean, and was not based on any written assessment of his IQ.

7 . The record also does not support the district court’s finding that the defendant was on the antidepressant Prozac when he gave his statement to police. The only testimony regarding Prozac was the testimony of Dr. Fairbairn, who said that the defendant told him he had stopped taking the medication months before the murder took place. In addition, there was no evidence that the medication would have affected the defendant's ability to comprehend his rights.

8 .See Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844 (holding that, when the trial court rules on the voluntariness of a confession, one consideration is whether the defendant had prior experience with tire criminal justice system).