O’Hara, J.
We accept the statement of facts as set forth in Judge Cavanagh’s opinion. We, however, arrive at a different legal conclusion.
The Constitution of 1963, art 6, § 5 provides in relevant part:
"The supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state.”
Amongst the reports of our Supreme Court the cases are cohort if not legion which recognize that this state’s highest court has broad powers to promulgate rules to assist in the efficient administration of justice. For example, see Perin v Peuler, 373 Mich 531; 130 NW2d 4 (1964), and Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474; 189 NW2d 202 (1971). That such rules take precedence over and supercede inconsistent legislation in the area of practice and procedure is hardly open to question. Perin v Peuler and Buscaino v Rhodes, supra.
GCR 1963, 927 (1) expressly authorizes certain courts to make local rules of practice with respect to matters not covered by nor in conflict with the Michigan General Court Rules.
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules, enacted pursuant to GCR 927, supra, provides:
[424]*424"Sec. 1. Issuance of Warrants. Requests for arrest warrants, and search warrants in cases of alleged felonies and high misdemeanors shall be presented to, and the warrant shall issue in the name of the Examining Magistrate. In his absence such warrants may be issued and signed by any available regular Judge of this Court. Bench warrants and capias writs shall be signed by the Judge who ordered their issuance.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In contradistinction to Recorder’s Court Rule 9 are various statutes such as MCLA 766.2; MSA 28.920 and MCLA 764.1; MSA 28.860 which authorize all Recorder’s Court judges to issue warrants.
What then of this conflict, real or imagined? This necessitates a review of one Supreme Court case and two other cases out of our own Court.
As to the first of these cases, we have no quarrel with the basic proposition as set forth in Krell v Wayne Circuit Judge, 246 Mich 412; 224 NW 392 (1929), which holds that a local court rule cannot govern the same subject matter as that governed by a statute. Krell is simply inapposite since that case involved a iocal court rule as to which the Supreme Court had taken no action. Per contra, the Supreme Court has specifically approved Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules. See People v Mordell, 55 Mich App 462, 463; 223 NW2d 10 (1974), lv den 393 Mich 771 (1974).
People v Williams #2, 45 Mich App 630; 207 NW2d 180 (1973), presents a closer case to the situation herein. While Williams does state that only the Supreme Court can supercede a legislative enactment pursuant to its broad constitutional prerogatives under the 1963 Constitution, art 6, § 5, at no place does the Williams opinion directly discuss the extremely sticky situation as to whether or not a local court rule approved by the Supreme Court takes precedence over a conflicting [425]*425statutory provision concerned solely with matters of practice and procedure.
In the last of these cases, People v Mordell, supra, the defendant attacked the validity of a search warrant issued by a Recorder’s Court judge other than the examining magistrate. This Court did not resolve the alleged conflict between the Supreme Court-approved local rule, the same Recorder’s Court Rule 9 involved herein, and the statute, but held that even if Rule 9 did take precedence, failure to follow it did not affect defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Court reached this decision by balancing the interests of the defendant against the interests of protecting the public. No claim was made as to the search being unreasonable or improper. In effect the Court applied a harmless error standard and held the trial judge erred in suppressing the evidence and dismissing the case.
Since none of the cited cases .are controlling decisionally we feel free to write to the issue as one of apparent first impression in this state.
In the instant case we have a situation where the Supreme Court has approved a local court rule requiring inter alia all arrest warrants to issue in the name of the examining magistrate, subject to limited exceptions, even though this contravenes specific statutory authority permitting all Recorder’s Court judges to issue warrants. Parenthetically, we further hold that should Judge Cavanagh be correct in his view that the involved court rule was never formally approved by the Supreme Court that it in no manner affects the result which we reach. This because the Supreme Court in effect implicitly placed its stamp of approval on Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules by its silence or failure to affirmatively reject the rule [426]*426when proposed. Now it is true in the case of GCR 1963, 927 that it merely provides for the method to be followed by the particular court in adopting local rules and specifically states that the Supreme Court shall be notified in writing 10 days in advance of a rule’s adoption.1 Nowhere, we concede, does it expressly state that this procedure constitutes formal approval, or that the local rule is given the dignity of a rule originally promulgated by the Supreme Court or that such a rule takes precedence over a statute. But the irrefutable fact remains that GCR 927 expressly requires proper notice and additionally states that "[t]he adoption or continuance of any local court rules shall be subject to the superintending control of the Supreme Court”. Read in a common sense manner this implies none too subtlely that the purpose of the notice provision is to permit the state’s highest court to make a threshhold determination as to whether a proposed court rule or modification thereof should be promulgated at all. Since the local rule’s adoption or continuance is expressly made subject to the superintending control of the Supreme Court, it is stretching credulity a bit to say that initial promulgation and continued existence of such a rule does not stand as mute testimony to the fact that the Supreme Court has already given its tacit "approval” of the involved rule.
Since the Supreme Court has by its action or inaction raised the local rule to the dignity of a rule initially promulgated by the highest court itself and since the subject matter of the court rule relates to both "practice and procedure”, we are constrained to hold that the statutes authorizing [427]*427all Recorder’s Court judges to issue warrants must give way to the extent that they are inconsistent with Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules. See generally, Buscaino v Rhodes, and Perm v Peuler, supra.
Because of certain highly unusual circumstances involved in the present case we cannot see applying a "harmless error” or "manifest injustice” standard as did the Court in People v Mordell, supra. The Mordell
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O’Hara, J.
We accept the statement of facts as set forth in Judge Cavanagh’s opinion. We, however, arrive at a different legal conclusion.
The Constitution of 1963, art 6, § 5 provides in relevant part:
"The supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state.”
Amongst the reports of our Supreme Court the cases are cohort if not legion which recognize that this state’s highest court has broad powers to promulgate rules to assist in the efficient administration of justice. For example, see Perin v Peuler, 373 Mich 531; 130 NW2d 4 (1964), and Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474; 189 NW2d 202 (1971). That such rules take precedence over and supercede inconsistent legislation in the area of practice and procedure is hardly open to question. Perin v Peuler and Buscaino v Rhodes, supra.
GCR 1963, 927 (1) expressly authorizes certain courts to make local rules of practice with respect to matters not covered by nor in conflict with the Michigan General Court Rules.
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules, enacted pursuant to GCR 927, supra, provides:
[424]*424"Sec. 1. Issuance of Warrants. Requests for arrest warrants, and search warrants in cases of alleged felonies and high misdemeanors shall be presented to, and the warrant shall issue in the name of the Examining Magistrate. In his absence such warrants may be issued and signed by any available regular Judge of this Court. Bench warrants and capias writs shall be signed by the Judge who ordered their issuance.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In contradistinction to Recorder’s Court Rule 9 are various statutes such as MCLA 766.2; MSA 28.920 and MCLA 764.1; MSA 28.860 which authorize all Recorder’s Court judges to issue warrants.
What then of this conflict, real or imagined? This necessitates a review of one Supreme Court case and two other cases out of our own Court.
As to the first of these cases, we have no quarrel with the basic proposition as set forth in Krell v Wayne Circuit Judge, 246 Mich 412; 224 NW 392 (1929), which holds that a local court rule cannot govern the same subject matter as that governed by a statute. Krell is simply inapposite since that case involved a iocal court rule as to which the Supreme Court had taken no action. Per contra, the Supreme Court has specifically approved Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules. See People v Mordell, 55 Mich App 462, 463; 223 NW2d 10 (1974), lv den 393 Mich 771 (1974).
People v Williams #2, 45 Mich App 630; 207 NW2d 180 (1973), presents a closer case to the situation herein. While Williams does state that only the Supreme Court can supercede a legislative enactment pursuant to its broad constitutional prerogatives under the 1963 Constitution, art 6, § 5, at no place does the Williams opinion directly discuss the extremely sticky situation as to whether or not a local court rule approved by the Supreme Court takes precedence over a conflicting [425]*425statutory provision concerned solely with matters of practice and procedure.
In the last of these cases, People v Mordell, supra, the defendant attacked the validity of a search warrant issued by a Recorder’s Court judge other than the examining magistrate. This Court did not resolve the alleged conflict between the Supreme Court-approved local rule, the same Recorder’s Court Rule 9 involved herein, and the statute, but held that even if Rule 9 did take precedence, failure to follow it did not affect defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Court reached this decision by balancing the interests of the defendant against the interests of protecting the public. No claim was made as to the search being unreasonable or improper. In effect the Court applied a harmless error standard and held the trial judge erred in suppressing the evidence and dismissing the case.
Since none of the cited cases .are controlling decisionally we feel free to write to the issue as one of apparent first impression in this state.
In the instant case we have a situation where the Supreme Court has approved a local court rule requiring inter alia all arrest warrants to issue in the name of the examining magistrate, subject to limited exceptions, even though this contravenes specific statutory authority permitting all Recorder’s Court judges to issue warrants. Parenthetically, we further hold that should Judge Cavanagh be correct in his view that the involved court rule was never formally approved by the Supreme Court that it in no manner affects the result which we reach. This because the Supreme Court in effect implicitly placed its stamp of approval on Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules by its silence or failure to affirmatively reject the rule [426]*426when proposed. Now it is true in the case of GCR 1963, 927 that it merely provides for the method to be followed by the particular court in adopting local rules and specifically states that the Supreme Court shall be notified in writing 10 days in advance of a rule’s adoption.1 Nowhere, we concede, does it expressly state that this procedure constitutes formal approval, or that the local rule is given the dignity of a rule originally promulgated by the Supreme Court or that such a rule takes precedence over a statute. But the irrefutable fact remains that GCR 927 expressly requires proper notice and additionally states that "[t]he adoption or continuance of any local court rules shall be subject to the superintending control of the Supreme Court”. Read in a common sense manner this implies none too subtlely that the purpose of the notice provision is to permit the state’s highest court to make a threshhold determination as to whether a proposed court rule or modification thereof should be promulgated at all. Since the local rule’s adoption or continuance is expressly made subject to the superintending control of the Supreme Court, it is stretching credulity a bit to say that initial promulgation and continued existence of such a rule does not stand as mute testimony to the fact that the Supreme Court has already given its tacit "approval” of the involved rule.
Since the Supreme Court has by its action or inaction raised the local rule to the dignity of a rule initially promulgated by the highest court itself and since the subject matter of the court rule relates to both "practice and procedure”, we are constrained to hold that the statutes authorizing [427]*427all Recorder’s Court judges to issue warrants must give way to the extent that they are inconsistent with Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules. See generally, Buscaino v Rhodes, and Perm v Peuler, supra.
Because of certain highly unusual circumstances involved in the present case we cannot see applying a "harmless error” or "manifest injustice” standard as did the Court in People v Mordell, supra. The Mordell opinion took the rather sensible view that the issuance of search warrants was a common procedure which could be handled as well by one judge as by another member of the judiciary and that it would unduly frustrate effective law enforcement to require that police delay obtaining warrants which could result in apprehension of narcotics dealers merely to comply with an "in-house court rule” intended for the convenience of the local judiciary. After balancing the interest of the defendant in a strict, literal compliance with the local court rule as against the interest of the public in ridding the streets of drug traffickers, Mordell concluded that the policy underlying the exclusionary rule did not dictate suppressing evidence obtained by a search and seizure which was unchallenged as to reasonableness.
The instant case is distinguishable from Mordell. Here we are dealing with a truly extraordinary statutory procedure, MCLA 764.1; MSA 28.860, providing for the issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge upon complaint of a private citizen who is prepared to file security for costs. That such is not the usual manner of obtaining an arrest warrant need not be gainsaid. We see no reason why judicial notice may not be taken of the fact that the prosecutor is the public official entrusted under applicable statutory and case authority with the [428]*428basic and fundamental decision as to whether a warrant will in fact issue. In the case at bar the Wayne County Prosecutor had discharged the duties of his office by investigating the charges made against defendant Lindsay Joker and declining to take any further action. Quite obviously the prosecutor found insufficient merit in the charges to justify initiation of criminal proceedings. Only then did Judge Ravitz authorize the issuance of an arrest warrant not signed by the examining magistrate in direct contravention of Rule 9 of the Recorder’s Court Rules. This action constituted reversible error. Where there has been resort to such an extraordinary artifice to commence criminal proceedings following the good faith refusal of the prosecutor to act after investigation of a complainant’s story, basic fairness, if not due process, would seem to require that we adhere to fundamental principles by requiring that there be strict compliance with the applicable procedures. Should we do less do we not invite seriously the possibility, nay the likelihood, of frivolous proceedings instigated before a magistrate favorable to the alleged victim? Even if this not be true the appearance of impropriety certainly exists and the judiciary as guardians of the law must be not only concerned that justice in fact be done but that it also appear that proper procedures were followed.
Thus we hold that without a showing that the examining magistrate was absent or otherwise unavailable the warrant was improperly issued and the warrant should be quashed and the charges dismissed.
We also must record our vigorous disagreement with the contention made in Judge Cavanagh’s opinion that it would raise grave constitutional questions if the complainant’s alleged indigency [429]*429somehow precluded him from obtaining a warrant because of inability to post the requisite security for costs.
Unlike Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12; 76 S Ct 585; 100 L Ed 891 (1956), the complainant is not faced with a situation where he has been convicted of the commission of a crime and stands to be deprived of an opportunity for full appellate review solely because of his impecunious state. To the contrary, he merely seeks to vindicate his right to be free from alleged intrusions on his person. Admittedly, this interest is hardly insubstantial but it surely pales in comparison with the prospect of answering criminal charges and the very real possibility of having one’s personal liberty restrained for some indefinite period by imprisonment. Nor should it be overlooked that the complainant herein, in contrast with many indigents, such as in Griffin, supra, was not faced with obtaining a waiver of certain fees in order to assert his rights or totally foregoing any possibility of redress. Just as any other citizen the complainant could and, in fact, did importune the prosecutor’s office to issue an arrest warrant. That his efforts were unavailing is not to the point. What is to the point is that there was a reasonable, viable alternative open to the complainant to seek redress of his grievances. This more than satisfies Griffin and its progeny. Hence even if the complainant was indigent he was not entitled to post a purely nominal sum as security for costs.
In like manner, for yet another reason, we are more than a little puzzled by the apparent holding that it would be constitutionally impermissible to require that a reasonable security bond be posted in the case of an indigent. For purposes of discussion only, let us suppose that the complainant [430]*430herein was not so fortunate as to have the charges against him dismissed and was eventually bound over for trial. As a purported indigent, we presume that he would not be able to post bond and he would not be able to secure his freedom unless released on his own recognizance. By failing to. meet any bond set he necessarily would be incarcerated until the date of trial. The complainant would suffer the loss of his personal liberty solely because of his impoverished status. Yet this apparently raises no insurmountable constitutional obstacle since it happens countless times every day in Wayne County and no relief is granted to those individuals. Some may say that the two situations are not entirely comparable. Be that as it may, the interest of a criminal accused in not being deprived of his freedom is, in our view, substantially greater than the interest of a private citizen in seeking to right an alleged wrong. We also concede that the state’s interest in insuring that an accused criminal will show up for trial is likewise a not insubstantial interest. But if we may deprive a man of one of his most basic rights, the freedom to go where he pleases, prior to any final adjudication of his guilt, we fail to see why we cannot place a limited condition precedent in the way of one who seeks to invoke an extraordinary procedure in order to cause criminal process to issue.
We have not chosen to discuss the separation of powers doctrine but we add that in our view the examining magistrate arrogated to himself authority which properly is vested in the prosecuting attorney. See generally, People v Holbrook, 373 Mich 94; 128 NW2d 484 (1964).
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order of the trial judge denying defendant’s motion to quash the warrant.
T. M. Burns, P. J., concurred.