People v. Johnson

New York Court of Appeals

People v. Johnson

706 N.E.2d 742, 92 N.Y.2d 976, 683 N.Y.S.2d 754, 1998 N.Y. LEXIS 4040

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedNovember 24, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by17 cases

This text of 706 N.E.2d 742 (People v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Johnson, 706 N.E.2d 742, 92 N.Y.2d 976, 683 N.Y.S.2d 754, 1998 N.Y. LEXIS 4040 (N.Y. 1998).

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Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

*978 Defendant’s argument that the trial court should have used the “grossly unqualified” standard contained in CPL 270.35 in determining whether the subject juror should be discharged is unpreserved for appellate review, having been raised for the first time in support of defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict (see, People v Laraby, 92 NY2d 932; People v Lawrence, 85 NY2d 1002, 1005). Applying the “for cause” standard of CPL 270.20 (1) (b), which defendant conceded in the pretrial colloquy was the applicable standard, the trial court did not err as a matter of law in discharging the subject juror. On this record, we agree with the majority at the Appellate Division that we should defer to the assessment of the trial court — which had the advantage of observing the juror’s overall demeanor and body language — that the juror had “a state of mind that [was] likely to preclude [her] from rendering an impartial verdict” (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]).

We also agree with the Appellate Division majority that the record supports the trial court’s refusal to permit a defense witness to testify regarding the out-of-court statements of another person. The trial court correctly concluded that these statements were hearsay and defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the declarant was aware at the time he made the statements that they were against his penal interest (cf., People v Fields, 66 NY2d 876, 877-878).

In addition, careful parsing of the various parts of the declarant’s statements is required, and those portions of the declarant’s statement that arguably support defendant’s duress defense were not against the declarant’s penal interest when made and thus were not admissible (see, People v Brensic, 70 NY2d 9, 16, remittitur amended 70 NY2d 722; People v Thomas, 68 NY2d 194, 198, cert denied 480 US 948).

We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are either unpreserved or without merit.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Levine, Ciparick and Wesley concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order affirmed in a memorandum.

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OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

*978 Defendant’s argument that the trial court should have used the “grossly unqualified” standard contained in CPL 270.35 in determining whether the subject juror should be discharged is unpreserved for appellate review, having been raised for the first time in support of defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict (see, People v Laraby, 92 NY2d 932; People v Lawrence, 85 NY2d 1002, 1005). Applying the “for cause” standard of CPL 270.20 (1) (b), which defendant conceded in the pretrial colloquy was the applicable standard, the trial court did not err as a matter of law in discharging the subject juror. On this record, we agree with the majority at the Appellate Division that we should defer to the assessment of the trial court — which had the advantage of observing the juror’s overall demeanor and body language — that the juror had “a state of mind that [was] likely to preclude [her] from rendering an impartial verdict” (CPL 270.20 [1] [b]).

We also agree with the Appellate Division majority that the record supports the trial court’s refusal to permit a defense witness to testify regarding the out-of-court statements of another person. The trial court correctly concluded that these statements were hearsay and defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the declarant was aware at the time he made the statements that they were against his penal interest (cf., People v Fields, 66 NY2d 876, 877-878).

In addition, careful parsing of the various parts of the declarant’s statements is required, and those portions of the declarant’s statement that arguably support defendant’s duress defense were not against the declarant’s penal interest when made and thus were not admissible (see, People v Brensic, 70 NY2d 9, 16, remittitur amended 70 NY2d 722; People v Thomas, 68 NY2d 194, 198, cert denied 480 US 948).

We have examined defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that they are either unpreserved or without merit.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Levine, Ciparick and Wesley concur.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order affirmed in a memorandum.

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Bluebook (online)

706 N.E.2d 742, 92 N.Y.2d 976, 683 N.Y.S.2d 754, 1998 N.Y. LEXIS 4040, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-johnson-ny-1998.

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