2025 IL App (1st) 230177-U No. 1-23-0177 Order filed March 6, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 07 CR 9982 ) TERREL JENKINS, ) Honorable ) Neera Walsh, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Martin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Vacated and remanded with instructions. Trial court erred in resentencing defendant as adult without permitting discretionary transfer hearing.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Terrel Jenkins was found guilty of murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1) (West 2002)) while personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused death to
another person. At the time of the offense, defendant was 15 years old. Defendant was sentenced
to 25 years’ imprisonment for murder and an additional 25 years’ imprisonment for the firearm No. 1-23-0177
enhancement, for a total of 50 years in prison. This court affirmed. People v. Jenkins, 2013 IL App
(1st) 103006-U, appeal denied, vacated, No. 115979 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order).
Later, pursuant to the Illinois Supreme Court’s supervisory order, this court entered an agreed
order vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding to the circuit court for a new sentencing
hearing. People v. Jenkins, No. 1-10-3006 (Sept. 14, 2020) (dispositional order).
¶3 On remand, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court
where the State could “petition for a discretionary transfer *** to adult criminal court,” and
subsequently imposed 20 years’ imprisonment for murder and 25 years’ imprisonment for the
firearm enhancement for a total of 45 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues, and the State
agrees, that the circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion to transfer to juvenile court. He
also argues his sentence was excessive. We vacate the sentence and remand with instructions.
¶4 We set forth only the facts necessary to understand the issue on appeal.
¶5 In May 2007, the State charged defendant with multiple counts of murder for the September
15, 2002, shooting death of Lloyd Ware. Because defendant was 15 years old at the time of the
offense, he was prosecuted as an adult pursuant to the automatic transfer provision then in effect
(705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006)), which provided in part that 15- and 16-year-old
defendants charged with murder were to be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961
(720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2006)).
¶6 In his first direct appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and certain
evidentiary rulings, argued the automatic transfer provision was unconstitutional, and contended
that his 50-year sentence was excessive. We affirmed. Jenkins, 2013 IL App (1st) 103006-U, ¶ 2.
In September 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court initially granted defendant’s petition for leave to
-2- No. 1-23-0177
appeal. People v. Jenkins, No. 115979 (Ill. Sept. 25, 2013) (supervisory order). In March 2020,
however, our supreme court reversed and denied the petition, but exercised its supervisory
authority to order this court to vacate the direct appeal decision and “consider the effect of ***
People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, on the issue of whether defendant’s sentence constitutes a de
facto life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012), and determine if a different result is warranted.” Jenkins, No. 115979 (Ill.
Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order).
¶7 On September 14, 2020, this court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded to the
circuit court for a new sentencing hearing in compliance with Miller, Buffer, People v. Holman,
2017 IL 120655, overruled by People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, and section 5-4.5-105 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)). Jenkins, No. 1-10-3006 (Sept.
14, 2020) (dispositional order).
¶8 While defendant’s appeal pended before the Illinois Supreme Court, the Juvenile Court Act
was amended. See Pub. Act 99-258, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a)).
Under the amended statute, a 15-year-old accused of murder is not automatically transferred to
adult court. Id. Instead, the State can file a petition under section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile
Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2020)) for the defendant to be sentenced in adult
court. Further, our supreme court held that the amendment to section 5-130 applies retroactively
to cases pending trial. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28; see also People v.
Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 43 (clarifying that the amendment applies to cases that are still in “trial
court proceedings” and not cases “pending in the appellate court”).
-3- No. 1-23-0177
¶9 Defendant filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court where the State could
“petition for a discretionary transfer *** to adult criminal court,” asserting the Illinois Supreme
Court’s holding in Howard applied to his case. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that
transfer to juvenile court was beyond the appellate court’s mandate and would be impractical
because defendant was over 21 years old. At resentencing, defendant received 45 years in prison.
The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider, which did not include the claim that the
amended section of the Juvenile Court Act should apply to his case.
¶ 10 On appeal, defendant first contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to
transfer the case to juvenile court and that the amended version of section 5-130 of the Juvenile
Court Act should apply to his case for resentencing.
¶ 11 Defendant argues that once his case was remanded for resentencing, his trial proceedings
had not concluded because a conviction is not final until after sentencing. See People v. Vara,
2018 IL 121823, ¶ 14; People v. Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 70; People v. Price, 2018 IL
App (1st) 161202, ¶ 20. Thus, according to defendant, the amendments to the juvenile-sentencing
law should apply to him for resentencing. Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 70; Price, 2018 IL
App (1st) 161202, ¶ 22 (amended section 5-130 applied to sentencing hearing held after
amendment became law). He requests the same relief granted in Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533,
¶ 86: vacate his sentence and remand the case to allow the State to file a petition under section 5-
130(1)(c)(ii) for adult sentencing. The State agrees.
¶ 12 Defendant’s claim was not included in his motion to reconsider sentence. Thus, the issue
was forfeited and may not be considered on appeal except under plain error review. Ill. S. Ct. R.
615(a) (eff. Jan.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2025 IL App (1st) 230177-U No. 1-23-0177 Order filed March 6, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 07 CR 9982 ) TERREL JENKINS, ) Honorable ) Neera Walsh, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Martin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Vacated and remanded with instructions. Trial court erred in resentencing defendant as adult without permitting discretionary transfer hearing.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Terrel Jenkins was found guilty of murder (720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1) (West 2002)) while personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused death to
another person. At the time of the offense, defendant was 15 years old. Defendant was sentenced
to 25 years’ imprisonment for murder and an additional 25 years’ imprisonment for the firearm No. 1-23-0177
enhancement, for a total of 50 years in prison. This court affirmed. People v. Jenkins, 2013 IL App
(1st) 103006-U, appeal denied, vacated, No. 115979 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order).
Later, pursuant to the Illinois Supreme Court’s supervisory order, this court entered an agreed
order vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding to the circuit court for a new sentencing
hearing. People v. Jenkins, No. 1-10-3006 (Sept. 14, 2020) (dispositional order).
¶3 On remand, the circuit court denied defendant’s motion to transfer the case to juvenile court
where the State could “petition for a discretionary transfer *** to adult criminal court,” and
subsequently imposed 20 years’ imprisonment for murder and 25 years’ imprisonment for the
firearm enhancement for a total of 45 years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues, and the State
agrees, that the circuit court erred in denying defendant’s motion to transfer to juvenile court. He
also argues his sentence was excessive. We vacate the sentence and remand with instructions.
¶4 We set forth only the facts necessary to understand the issue on appeal.
¶5 In May 2007, the State charged defendant with multiple counts of murder for the September
15, 2002, shooting death of Lloyd Ware. Because defendant was 15 years old at the time of the
offense, he was prosecuted as an adult pursuant to the automatic transfer provision then in effect
(705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2006)), which provided in part that 15- and 16-year-old
defendants charged with murder were to be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961
(720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2006)).
¶6 In his first direct appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and certain
evidentiary rulings, argued the automatic transfer provision was unconstitutional, and contended
that his 50-year sentence was excessive. We affirmed. Jenkins, 2013 IL App (1st) 103006-U, ¶ 2.
In September 2013, the Illinois Supreme Court initially granted defendant’s petition for leave to
-2- No. 1-23-0177
appeal. People v. Jenkins, No. 115979 (Ill. Sept. 25, 2013) (supervisory order). In March 2020,
however, our supreme court reversed and denied the petition, but exercised its supervisory
authority to order this court to vacate the direct appeal decision and “consider the effect of ***
People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, on the issue of whether defendant’s sentence constitutes a de
facto life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012), and determine if a different result is warranted.” Jenkins, No. 115979 (Ill.
Mar. 25, 2020) (supervisory order).
¶7 On September 14, 2020, this court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded to the
circuit court for a new sentencing hearing in compliance with Miller, Buffer, People v. Holman,
2017 IL 120655, overruled by People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, and section 5-4.5-105 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)). Jenkins, No. 1-10-3006 (Sept.
14, 2020) (dispositional order).
¶8 While defendant’s appeal pended before the Illinois Supreme Court, the Juvenile Court Act
was amended. See Pub. Act 99-258, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a)).
Under the amended statute, a 15-year-old accused of murder is not automatically transferred to
adult court. Id. Instead, the State can file a petition under section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile
Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2020)) for the defendant to be sentenced in adult
court. Further, our supreme court held that the amendment to section 5-130 applies retroactively
to cases pending trial. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 28; see also People v.
Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 43 (clarifying that the amendment applies to cases that are still in “trial
court proceedings” and not cases “pending in the appellate court”).
-3- No. 1-23-0177
¶9 Defendant filed a motion to transfer the case to juvenile court where the State could
“petition for a discretionary transfer *** to adult criminal court,” asserting the Illinois Supreme
Court’s holding in Howard applied to his case. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that
transfer to juvenile court was beyond the appellate court’s mandate and would be impractical
because defendant was over 21 years old. At resentencing, defendant received 45 years in prison.
The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider, which did not include the claim that the
amended section of the Juvenile Court Act should apply to his case.
¶ 10 On appeal, defendant first contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to
transfer the case to juvenile court and that the amended version of section 5-130 of the Juvenile
Court Act should apply to his case for resentencing.
¶ 11 Defendant argues that once his case was remanded for resentencing, his trial proceedings
had not concluded because a conviction is not final until after sentencing. See People v. Vara,
2018 IL 121823, ¶ 14; People v. Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 70; People v. Price, 2018 IL
App (1st) 161202, ¶ 20. Thus, according to defendant, the amendments to the juvenile-sentencing
law should apply to him for resentencing. Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 70; Price, 2018 IL
App (1st) 161202, ¶ 22 (amended section 5-130 applied to sentencing hearing held after
amendment became law). He requests the same relief granted in Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533,
¶ 86: vacate his sentence and remand the case to allow the State to file a petition under section 5-
130(1)(c)(ii) for adult sentencing. The State agrees.
¶ 12 Defendant’s claim was not included in his motion to reconsider sentence. Thus, the issue
was forfeited and may not be considered on appeal except under plain error review. Ill. S. Ct. R.
615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967); People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 76 (2008) (to preserve a sentencing
-4- No. 1-23-0177
claim for appeal, a defendant must make a contemporaneous objection at the sentencing hearing
and raise the issue in a postsentencing motion). Defendant argues that plain error review is
warranted because he was “deprived of his substantial right to a hearing to determine whether he
should be sentenced as a juvenile pursuant to” section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act.
See People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 19 (“ ‘The imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects
substantial rights’ and, thus, may be considered by a reviewing court even if not properly preserved
in the trial court.” (quoting People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998))).
¶ 13 In Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, the defendant was convicted of murder and other
crimes he committed at age 15. Id. ¶ 1. Before the defendant’s sentencing (though after his
conviction), the new change to the juvenile-sentencing law went into effect. Id. ¶ 51. The defendant
filed a motion to remand his case to the juvenile court pursuant to the amendment. Id. The trial
court denied the request, did not apply the new law, and sentenced defendant as an adult to 18
years in prison. Id. ¶¶ 51, 67. We reversed, finding the amendment applicable because the trial
court proceedings had not yet concluded; they would not be deemed concluded until after
sentencing. Id. ¶ 70 (citing Price, 2018 IL App (1st) 161202, ¶ 20).
¶ 14 Following Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 41, which resolved a similar issue, this court then
remanded the cause to the trial court “with directions to vacate defendant's sentence and give the
State 10 days from the date the sentence is vacated to file a petition requesting a hearing pursuant
to section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) of the Act.” Clark, 2020 IL App (1st) 182533, ¶ 86. As in Fort, it ordered
that, “ ‘[s]hould the trial court find after the hearing that defendant is not subject to adult
sentencing, the proper remedy is to discharge the proceedings against defendant since he is now
-5- No. 1-23-0177
over 21 years of age and is no longer eligible to be committed as a juvenile under the Act.’ ” Id.
¶ 84 (quoting Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 41).
¶ 15 We agree with the parties that our case is indistinguishable from Clark. Here, the trial court
erred in imposing an adult sentence in violation of the statute and that error was so serious it
affected the fairness of defendant’s sentence and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.
See Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 41. We thus enter the same order with the agreement of the parties.
Defendant’s sentence is vacated. On remand, the State should be given an opportunity to petition
under section 5-130(1)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act to have defendant sentenced as an adult. If
it does not do so, or if the court determines that defendant is not subject to adult sentencing, the
proper remedy is to discharge defendant, as he is over 21 years of age.
¶ 16 Based on our decision, we need not consider defendant’s argument that his sentence was
excessive.
¶ 17 The judgment of the circuit court is vacated. The matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this order.
¶ 18 Vacated and remanded with instructions.
-6-