People v. Jenkins

2023 IL App (4th) 220173-U

Opinion

2023 IL App (4th) 220173-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under NO. 4-22-0173 March 3, 2023 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County DERRICK JENKINS, ) No. 16CM1656 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) William A. Yoder, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for obstructing a peace officer.

¶2 Defendant, Derrick Jenkins, appeals his conviction for obstructing a peace officer.

Defendant contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. We agree and reverse defendant’s conviction for obstructing a peace officer.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In October 2016, defendant received a citation and complaint for driving under

the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016)) in McLean County case No.

16-DT-702 and improper lane usage in McLean County case No. 16-TR-19088. The State

further charged defendant by information with obstructing a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)

(West 2016)) in the present case, McLean County case No. 16-CM-1656, alleging he knowingly obstructed the performance of Bloomington police officer Brandt Parsley of an authorized act

within his official capacity, being the custodial transportation of defendant, in that defendant

physically refused to enter a police vehicle for his transportation after being directed to do so by

Parsley, and he knew Parsley was a peace officer.

¶5 At defendant’s March 2017 jury trial, Bloomington police officer Bryce Janssen

testified he and Officer Parsley were on foot for an unrelated investigation at approximately

10:20 p.m. on October 10, 2016, when they “heard a loud crash.” As they walked toward the

crash scene, Janssen observed a Chevrolet Malibu that had struck a parked blue van. Defendant

was standing near the vehicles. Defendant declined an ambulance and told Janssen he was the

driver and only occupant of the vehicle. Parsley arrested defendant for DUI and transported him

to the police department for processing.

¶6 Janssen explained defendant was acting “belligerent almost” during processing.

Janssen stayed in the processing room with Parsley based on defendant’s actions. After

defendant was processed, the officers attempted to place defendant in Parsley’s car for transport

to the county jail. Parsley’s car did not have a divider to separate the rear passenger area from the

front of the vehicle, so the officers attempted to place defendant in the front seat. Janssen

described defendant’s refusal:

“Officer Parsley asked him to get in the car and he said he wasn’t getting

in the car. And at one point in time, he even leaned his body outside of the

vehicle. I’m not 100 percent positive, I believe he had his foot in the vehicle and

he refused to get his other foot in the vehicle. And based off of his unwillingness

to get in the vehicle, I told Officer Parsley we should put him in my vehicle.”

Janssen’s car did have a partition separating the rear passenger area.

-2- ¶7 Parsley testified he conducted field sobriety tests. During the tests, Parsley noted

defendant was “just unable to follow instructions” and refused to complete some tests. Parsley

arrested defendant and transported defendant to the police department in his squad car. During

the DUI processing, defendant was erratic. Parsley stated defendant “would go from being very

nice and cordial to just absolutely irate.” Due to defendant’s “hostile behavior,” Janssen stayed

with Parsley during DUI processing. Parsley described the attempt to place defendant in his car:

“We attempted to place him in the car. He refused. At that time we decided that

we would place him in Officer Janssen’s car which was directly behind mine. The

reason for that is that it had a Plexiglass divider where we put [defendant] away

from—away from me, basically.

***

He just leaned up against [the vehicle] like (indicating). I don’t really

know how to explain it. But he would put his back against the top portion of the

car. Making it to where we couldn’t push him into the car and have him sit

down.”

¶8 The State played a video of defendant refusing to get in Parsley’s vehicle for the

jury. Parsley testified the video was from Janssen’s squad car and caught the “initial attempt” to

put defendant in his car. The video begins with defendant partially in the front passenger side of

the car with an officer behind him. Within a few seconds, the officers removed defendant and

took him to Janssen’s car.

¶9 Defendant testified in his own defense. Defendant claimed Ladika Tolise was

driving the vehicle when a strut broke on the car. Defendant was on the phone with roadside

assistance and Tolise “walked off” because “[h]e was in a bit of a rush.” Officers arrived and had

-3- defendant perform field sobriety tests. Defendant informed one of the officers he needed to use

the restroom and believed it affected his ability to perform the tests. Defendant also claimed to

be taking prescription pain medication at the time. Defendant stated he was giving random

answers to the officers’ questions because he did not want to talk to the officers at all.

¶ 10 The jury found defendant guilty of DUI in case No. 16-DT-702, improper lane

usage in case No. 16-TR-19088, and obstruction of a peace officer in case No. 16-CM-1656. The

trial court sentenced defendant to 150 days in jail for obstruction and DUI.

¶ 11 Defendant appealed his convictions for DUI and obstruction in consolidated

appeals. (We note defendant did not appeal his conviction for improper lane usage in case No.

16-TR-19088.) After a series of remands related to Krankel hearings (People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.

2d 181 (1984)), the trial court held a final Krankel hearing on February 28, 2022. See People v.

Jenkins, 2019 IL App (4th) 170319-U; People v. Jenkins, 2020 IL App (4th) 190878-U; People

v. Jenkins, No. 4-21-0134 (Ill. Mar. 17, 2022) (appeal dismissed) (dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction on defendant’s motion).

¶ 12 On March 4, 2022, defendant filed a timely separate notice of appeal in case No.

16-DT-702 (docketed as No. 4-22-0187) and case No. 16-CM-1656, the present case. This court

granted the Office of the State Appellate Defender’s motion to withdraw as counsel on appeal

and affirmed defendant’s conviction for DUI. See People v. Jenkins, No. 4-22-0187 (Dec. 6,

2022) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). This appeal

pertains only to case No. 16-CM-1656, defendant’s conviction for obstruction of a peace officer.

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 A reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is

so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People

-4- v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979)).

¶ 15 The trier of fact has the responsibility to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh

their testimony, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d

36, 84 (1999). A reviewing court will not reverse a conviction simply because the evidence is

contradictory. People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 306 (1978). We will not substitute our judgment

for that of the trier of fact. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000); People v. Kotlarz, 193

Ill. 2d 272, 298 (2000).

¶ 16 Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides, “[a] person who

knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer

*** of any authorized act within his or her official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.”

720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2016). Defendant does not dispute he knew Officer Parsley was a

peace officer performing an authorized act within his official capacity.

¶ 17 Defendant argues the State “failed to present any evidence that [defendant’s]

conduct materially obstructed Officer Parsley for more than a de minimis period of time.”

Defendant argues his case is analogous to People v. Gotschall, 2022 IL App (4th) 210256.

¶ 18 In Gotschall, the defendant was arrested and placed in the back seat of an

officer’s squad car. Id. ¶ 5. The defendant’s foot was still on the pavement, so the officer was

unable to close the door. The officer repeatedly asked the defendant to place his foot in the car,

and the defendant did not comply. Id. The officer attempted to physically put the defendant’s

-5- foot in the car, and the defendant resisted by pushing his foot back down to the pavement. The

officer threatened to spray the defendant with pepper spray, and the defendant complied. Id.

Thirty seconds elapsed from the time the officer first told the defendant to get in the car and the

point when the officer shut the car door. Id. ¶ 6. The defendant was charged with obstruction of a

peace officer. Id. ¶ 3.

¶ 19 This court held “the offense of obstructing a peace officer *** includes a material

impediment requirement.” Id. ¶ 26. In reversing the defendant’s conviction, we found the

“defendant’s brief refusal to place his foot inside the squad car did not materially impede [the

officer] from performing the authorized act of transporting defendant to the county jail.” Id. ¶ 29.

The defendant’s refusal lasted less than 30 seconds and did not “threaten [the officer’s] safety

nor did it delay his transport by any appreciable period of time.” Id. We noted, however, “a

defendant’s conduct may be found to materially impede an authorized act of a peace officer,

even if it causes only a brief delay, if it threatens officer safety.” Id. ¶ 30.

¶ 20 Defendant argues this case is substantially similar to Gotschall. Defendant’s

refusal to get into Parsley’s squad car was brief. The recording of the incident lasted only four

seconds, and Parsley testified it showed the “initial attempt” to place defendant in his car. Even

the most generous definition of “initial attempt” would still mean a very brief period elapsed

before the officers decided to place defendant in Janssen’s squad car. Defendant’s refusal to sit in

Parsley’s car, therefore, did not delay his transport by any appreciable time period.

¶ 21 The State concedes there are factual similarities between this case and Gotschall,

including that the length of defendant’s refusal was brief, but argues this case is distinguishable

because defendant’s conduct placed officers in fear for their safety. The State compares

-6- defendant’s case to People v. Mehta, 2020 IL App (3d) 180020, and People v. Synnott, 349 Ill.

App. 3d 223 (2004).

¶ 22 In Mehta, the defendant was convicted of obstructing a peace officer. Mehta,

2020 IL App (3d) 180020, ¶ 3. Officers pulled over a vehicle in which the defendant was a

passenger after receiving a report that two men had been chasing a victim with a gun. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9.

The defendant exited the vehicle, and officers ordered him to turn around multiple times. Id. ¶ 6.

The defendant did not turn around, but he eventually walked towards the officers, who took him

into custody. Id. The incident lasted three minutes or less. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11. Officers described the

stop as a “ ‘very high stress situation,’ ” and the defendant’s refusal to turn around put officers at

risk and impeded the officers’ ability to investigate any other occupants of the vehicle or whether

there was a gun in the vicinity. Id. ¶ 11. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the defendant’s

conviction, finding, although the defendant’s conduct caused only a brief delay in the traffic

stop, the nature of the obstructive act and the nature of the act being obstructed were relevant

considerations. Id. ¶¶ 32-35. The court noted the conduct occurred in a “high-tension situation,”

as officers stopped the defendant’s vehicle on suspicion the occupants possessed a firearm in an

area known for gang-related violence. Id. ¶ 35. The court found, “ ‘[A]ny behavior that actually

threatens an officer’s safety or even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a significant

impediment to the officer’s performance of his or her duties.’ ” Id. (quoting Synnott, 349 Ill.

App. 3d at 228).

¶ 23 In Synnott, an officer stopped the defendant’s vehicle for speeding 20 miles per

hour over the posted speed limit. Synnott, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 224. After observing signs the

defendant was intoxicated, the officer asked the defendant to turn off the engine and step out of

the car. Id. The trial court explained the situation as follows:

-7- “ ‘[T]he officer four times told the defendant to exit the vehicle, the defendant

repeatedly refused to do so. He grasped the steering wheel firmly at one point in

an obvious indication he was refusing to leave the vehicle and after four occasions

did not remove himself, and then momentarily did not comply with the officer

pulling his arm; although he then immediately did comply.’ ” Id. at 224-25.

The defendant was found guilty of obstructing a peace officer. In affirming the defendant’s

conviction, the appellate court found, “It seems clear that any behavior that actually threatens an

officer’s safety or even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a significant impediment

to the officer’s performance of his or her duties.” Id. at 228.

¶ 24 We fail to see how defendant’s actions in this case placed the officers’ safety at

risk. Mehta and Synnott involve officers conducting traffic stops on unfamiliar subjects. In both

cases, the defendants refused to comply with direct orders from officers, heightening existing

concerns for officer safety. In this case, defendant was already in custody in a police parking

garage. Defendant had been in custody for over an hour by this point, and he had already safely

been transported in Parsley’s squad car. Even after defendant’s “erratic” behavior in the DUI

processing room, Parsley was still willing to transport defendant in his squad car prior to

defendant’s refusal. That the officers decided it would be safer to transport defendant in

Janssen’s vehicle after defendant’s refusal does not demonstrate the officers felt actually

threatened by defendant’s actions or feared for their safety.

¶ 25 We conclude, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, defendant’s brief refusal to get into Parsley’s squad car did not materially impede the

officers from transporting defendant to the county jail. The partial recording of the incident

reflects defendant only briefly refused to sit in Parsley’s car before officers decided to place him

-8- in Officer Janssen’s squad car. Defendant’s brief refusal to sit in Parsley’s car while handcuffed

in a police parking garage did not threaten the safety of the officers.

¶ 26 Because we find the trial evidence was insufficient to prove defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of obstructing a peace officer, we reverse defendant’s conviction.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 29 Reversed.

-9-