People v. Jeffries

197 N.W.2d 903, 39 Mich. App. 506, 1972 Mich. App. LEXIS 1463

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 27, 1972
• Docket: Docket 10796
• Status: Published

Opinions

Fitzgerald, P. J.

On the evening of October 11, 1969, a police officer for the City of Kalamazoo was approached by an unidentified male and told, that an individual by the name of Robert L. Jeffries was waving a pistol around in a nearby cafe. He and another officer then proceeded to enter the cafe where they observed an individual fitting the description as related by the unknown informant. The suspect then proceeded to leave the bar and walk down the street and the two police officers who had followed him, asked him to stop and identify himself. The suspect identified himself as Robert Jeffries.

When asked if he was carrying a pistol, the defendant answered, “Yes, sir, I have a gun. I don’t have papers for it. A colored fellow gave it to me at McKerring’s”. The suspect then started to reach into his left hand pocket and the police officer stopped him and removed from the pocket a small caliber pistol. The suspect was then arrested and read his Miranda rights.

Prior to trial, the defendant made a motion to suppress his statement that he did possess a gun, and also to suppress the pistol itself. The defendant contended that these pieces of evidence were the result of an illegal search and seizure. The judge denied the motion to suppress.

On October 14, 1970, the defendant was tried on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon.¹ The judge, sitting as trier of fact, found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years probation.

On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction was obtained through the use of illegally obtained evidence, arguing that when the police officers stopped him, he was under arrest. He theorizes that at that point, he was so substantially deprived of his liberty that it was an in-custody interrogation and since he was not given his Miranda rights, the statement he made referring to possession of a gun should have been suppressed.

Defendant also claims that because the above-mentioned statement could not be used, the police officers did not have probable cause to stop him and make a search and an arrest. As a result, he says, the gun found was illegally obtained evidence and under the rule of Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), the evidence should have been suppressed.

Defendant further argues that the case of Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), should not apply in that the facts of the present case show that the police officers were motivated hy a desire to seek evidence rather than by any fear for their own protection.

The defendant’s contention that this is an in-custody interrogation cannot be sustained. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 439; 86 S Ct 1602, 1609; 16 L Ed 2d 694, 704 (1966), specifically states that “we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation”. Further on in the case, the Court announced that:

“General on the scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact finding process is not affected by our holding.” 384 US at 477; 86 S Ct at 1629; 16 L Ed 2d at 725.

In the case at hand, the police officers merely asked the defendant to stop. He was only asked one question, and the answer was readily given to the police officers. Neither officer had his gun drawn nor made any threatening gestures.

Under the above facts, it is clear that the defendant was not substantially deprived of his freedom of action, nor was he threatened or coerced into making any kind of a statement; therefore, it should be found that the defendant’s statement was voluntarily given and properly admitted into evidence.

As to the defendant’s contention that the search was illegal, this also cannot be sustained. The case of Terry v Ohio, supra, authorizes police officers to stop and frisk an individual when they are conducting legitimate investigations of suspicious circumstances, and where the officers reasonably fear for their safety. The officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant. The police conduct in this case cannot be grounds for reversal.

The case of Orozco v Texas, 394 US 324; 89 S Ct 1095; 22 L Ed 2d 311 (1969), relied on by defendant is not analogous. The fact that the Orosco case followed a shooting and related to subsequent investigations removes it from serious consideration as controlling precedent in the instant case.

Affirmed.

R. B. Burns, J., concurred.

1 MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424.