Opinion
COLOGNE, Acting P. J.
Thomas Ray Jamison appeals his jury-tried conviction of forcible rape (Pen. Code,1 § 261, subd. (2)) with use of a firearm during the rape (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)) and robbery (§ 211) with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5). The trial court sentenced him under section 667.6, subdivision (c), to a full, separate and consecutive term of eleven years for the rape with firearm use (eight years upper term plus three years enhancement), and to three years, the middle term, for the robbery, staying the firearm use enhancement connected with the robbery.
Catherine S., a 21-year-old college student, met Jamison for the first time on January 18, 1982, at a farewell party for Timothy Peete, Jamison’s neighbor. Jamison attended the party a total of about five minutes and conversed briefly with Catherine about her brother whom Jamison knew. A few days later, while driving by Catherine’s apartment, Jamison told Peete Jamison would “like to get some of that,” meaning he would like to have sex with Catherine. Peete pointed out the exact apartment in which Catherine lived.
On March 31 at about 6:30 p.m., Jamison rapped on the screen door of Catherine’s apartment and walked inside. Catherine looked to see who it [1170]*1170was and Jamison reminded her he was Peete’s friend. Catherine recalled having met Jamison and she offered him a glass of wine. The two conversed for about 45 minutes before Jamison said he wanted to make love to her but could not do anything about it because Peete liked her. Catherine became extremely nervous and Jamison pursued the matter, trying to kiss her. Catherine pushed him away. Jamison asked her if she thought he was not good enough for her and she replied “no,” she just did not want to kiss him.
Jamison again tried to kiss her and she pushed him away once more. He then drew a gun. He showed her the gun’s clip was fully loaded. He put the gun next to her temple and said, “give me your tongue.” He kissed her again, then said he was going to a next door apartment and “get” its occupant because Jamison did not like the way he looked at him as Jamison walked by. Catherine pleaded with Jamison not to shoot the neighbor. In response, Jamison required Catherine to get on the floor on her stomach and he tied her hands behind her back and to an ironing board using a telephone cord. He announced he was doing this so he could go next door and “get” the neighbor. When Catherine began to cry, Jamison told her if she kept doing so he would have to shoot her. She stopped crying and again asked him not to hurt the neighbor. He answered if she were “real sweet” to him, he would not “get” the neighbor. Jamison then untied Catherine’s wrists, had her turn over and retied them. He proceeded to remove her clothes and continued kissing her. He fondled her private parts, causing bleeding, then raped her. During intercourse, he said, among other things, he wished he was white so he could marry her.
Afterward he told Catherine he wanted money. When she explained she had none, he decided to take some of her property, including a television, two typewriters, a stereo receiver, two speakers, a calculator, a camera and two gold necklace chains. In order to do so, he required Catherine to help him conceal the belongings in luggage, boxes and a laundry basket, and to carry her property to his car. Jamison took Catherine’s telephone number and told her if he found the police were looking for him he would kill her and the neighbor. When he left, Catherine told her neighbors about the events, including the gun, the rape and the robbery. She warned them not to call the police, but one of them did anyway.
When Catherine returned to her apartment, she received a phone call from Jamison who again told her if police were looking for him he would come back and get her.
Later, in April, Jamison again called Catherine to ask her why she had called police. He was arrested not long afterward. Most of Catherine’s property which he had attempted to dispose of was recovered.
[1171]*1171Jamison’s defense was, essentially, the intercourse and taking of property were accomplished with Catherine’s consent. His testimony was impeached by evidence of irreconcilable statements he made to the police shortly after his arrest to the effect he was not in Catherine’s apartment at the time in question and he had not taken any property.
Jamison contends admission of evidence of a prior rape was prejudicial error. The prior rape occurred when Jamison knocked on the door of the home of Janet D., whom Jamison had seen once before, and told Janet her daughter had been hurt on the playground. When Janet opened the door, Jamison pushed his way into the house, threatened Janet with a knife, turned on some music, directed her to go upstairs and raped her. He then tied her arms and legs, using Janet’s pantyhose, and asked her for money. He searched through her wallet, purse and drawers, taking some money and jewelry, including necklaces and bracelets. He also took some photographs of Janet and her daughter. He told Janet if she called the police, he would come back and kill her and her daughter.
The prosecutor offered the evidence of the earlier rape to corroborate Catherine’s testimony the rape was not consensual, to show, as to a burglary count against Jamison, his intent was to commit rape, and to show his common design. In admitting the evidence, the trial court identified 11 points of similarity in that the victims were “both single, females alone in their apartment, females observed on a prior occasion, entered under false pretenses,” “knew someone close to the victim, used a weapon once inside, both victims tied, demanded money, took jewelry in both cases, necklaces,” “told both victims upon leaving, ‘Better not call the police,’ and in both cases he threatened someone else in addition to the victim.”
Both Jamison and the Attorney General agree the evidence of the prior rape bears on the material issue of corroboration. Jamison contends, however, none of the features of the prior rape are sufficiently distinctive so as to corroborate Catherine’s testimony. Jamison criticizes the finding certain features were similar, noting such things as that Catherine lived alone while Janet lived with a daughter, a gun was used in Catherine’s rape and a knife in Janet’s, the tying occurred before and during the rape of Catherine but after the rape of Janet, and there were differences in the entry into the victims’ homes. Jamison further claims the remaining features are not distinctive in the sense that the stealings, warnings not to call police and threats directed to the victims as well as others are not so distinctive as to conclude if he committed the prior rape he must have committed the present one (see People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 465 [143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433]). Finally, Jamison points to certain dissimilarities in that Catherine was a 21-year-old student who socialized with friends common to herself [1172]*1172and Jamison, while Janet was a 42-year-old nurse who had a daughter about the age of Jamison, whom she did not know; and the rape of Catherine took place after 45 minutes of conversation, while Janet’s rape involved an immediate assault when she opened the door.
We observe certain of Jamison’s descriptions of the evidence are tainted with subjectivity understandably born of advocacy.
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Opinion
COLOGNE, Acting P. J.
Thomas Ray Jamison appeals his jury-tried conviction of forcible rape (Pen. Code,1 § 261, subd. (2)) with use of a firearm during the rape (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)) and robbery (§ 211) with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5). The trial court sentenced him under section 667.6, subdivision (c), to a full, separate and consecutive term of eleven years for the rape with firearm use (eight years upper term plus three years enhancement), and to three years, the middle term, for the robbery, staying the firearm use enhancement connected with the robbery.
Catherine S., a 21-year-old college student, met Jamison for the first time on January 18, 1982, at a farewell party for Timothy Peete, Jamison’s neighbor. Jamison attended the party a total of about five minutes and conversed briefly with Catherine about her brother whom Jamison knew. A few days later, while driving by Catherine’s apartment, Jamison told Peete Jamison would “like to get some of that,” meaning he would like to have sex with Catherine. Peete pointed out the exact apartment in which Catherine lived.
On March 31 at about 6:30 p.m., Jamison rapped on the screen door of Catherine’s apartment and walked inside. Catherine looked to see who it [1170]*1170was and Jamison reminded her he was Peete’s friend. Catherine recalled having met Jamison and she offered him a glass of wine. The two conversed for about 45 minutes before Jamison said he wanted to make love to her but could not do anything about it because Peete liked her. Catherine became extremely nervous and Jamison pursued the matter, trying to kiss her. Catherine pushed him away. Jamison asked her if she thought he was not good enough for her and she replied “no,” she just did not want to kiss him.
Jamison again tried to kiss her and she pushed him away once more. He then drew a gun. He showed her the gun’s clip was fully loaded. He put the gun next to her temple and said, “give me your tongue.” He kissed her again, then said he was going to a next door apartment and “get” its occupant because Jamison did not like the way he looked at him as Jamison walked by. Catherine pleaded with Jamison not to shoot the neighbor. In response, Jamison required Catherine to get on the floor on her stomach and he tied her hands behind her back and to an ironing board using a telephone cord. He announced he was doing this so he could go next door and “get” the neighbor. When Catherine began to cry, Jamison told her if she kept doing so he would have to shoot her. She stopped crying and again asked him not to hurt the neighbor. He answered if she were “real sweet” to him, he would not “get” the neighbor. Jamison then untied Catherine’s wrists, had her turn over and retied them. He proceeded to remove her clothes and continued kissing her. He fondled her private parts, causing bleeding, then raped her. During intercourse, he said, among other things, he wished he was white so he could marry her.
Afterward he told Catherine he wanted money. When she explained she had none, he decided to take some of her property, including a television, two typewriters, a stereo receiver, two speakers, a calculator, a camera and two gold necklace chains. In order to do so, he required Catherine to help him conceal the belongings in luggage, boxes and a laundry basket, and to carry her property to his car. Jamison took Catherine’s telephone number and told her if he found the police were looking for him he would kill her and the neighbor. When he left, Catherine told her neighbors about the events, including the gun, the rape and the robbery. She warned them not to call the police, but one of them did anyway.
When Catherine returned to her apartment, she received a phone call from Jamison who again told her if police were looking for him he would come back and get her.
Later, in April, Jamison again called Catherine to ask her why she had called police. He was arrested not long afterward. Most of Catherine’s property which he had attempted to dispose of was recovered.
[1171]*1171Jamison’s defense was, essentially, the intercourse and taking of property were accomplished with Catherine’s consent. His testimony was impeached by evidence of irreconcilable statements he made to the police shortly after his arrest to the effect he was not in Catherine’s apartment at the time in question and he had not taken any property.
Jamison contends admission of evidence of a prior rape was prejudicial error. The prior rape occurred when Jamison knocked on the door of the home of Janet D., whom Jamison had seen once before, and told Janet her daughter had been hurt on the playground. When Janet opened the door, Jamison pushed his way into the house, threatened Janet with a knife, turned on some music, directed her to go upstairs and raped her. He then tied her arms and legs, using Janet’s pantyhose, and asked her for money. He searched through her wallet, purse and drawers, taking some money and jewelry, including necklaces and bracelets. He also took some photographs of Janet and her daughter. He told Janet if she called the police, he would come back and kill her and her daughter.
The prosecutor offered the evidence of the earlier rape to corroborate Catherine’s testimony the rape was not consensual, to show, as to a burglary count against Jamison, his intent was to commit rape, and to show his common design. In admitting the evidence, the trial court identified 11 points of similarity in that the victims were “both single, females alone in their apartment, females observed on a prior occasion, entered under false pretenses,” “knew someone close to the victim, used a weapon once inside, both victims tied, demanded money, took jewelry in both cases, necklaces,” “told both victims upon leaving, ‘Better not call the police,’ and in both cases he threatened someone else in addition to the victim.”
Both Jamison and the Attorney General agree the evidence of the prior rape bears on the material issue of corroboration. Jamison contends, however, none of the features of the prior rape are sufficiently distinctive so as to corroborate Catherine’s testimony. Jamison criticizes the finding certain features were similar, noting such things as that Catherine lived alone while Janet lived with a daughter, a gun was used in Catherine’s rape and a knife in Janet’s, the tying occurred before and during the rape of Catherine but after the rape of Janet, and there were differences in the entry into the victims’ homes. Jamison further claims the remaining features are not distinctive in the sense that the stealings, warnings not to call police and threats directed to the victims as well as others are not so distinctive as to conclude if he committed the prior rape he must have committed the present one (see People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 465 [143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433]). Finally, Jamison points to certain dissimilarities in that Catherine was a 21-year-old student who socialized with friends common to herself [1172]*1172and Jamison, while Janet was a 42-year-old nurse who had a daughter about the age of Jamison, whom she did not know; and the rape of Catherine took place after 45 minutes of conversation, while Janet’s rape involved an immediate assault when she opened the door.
We observe certain of Jamison’s descriptions of the evidence are tainted with subjectivity understandably born of advocacy. When he says the entry into Catherine’s apartment was “totally consensual,” we cannot but point out Jamison had knocked and was inside Catherine’s apartment before she even looked to see what or who it was, and she was surprised. Moreover, it hardly conveys an accurate impression to say Catherine “socialized with some friends common to both herself and [Jamison],” in comparison to Janet’s not knowing Jamison at all, when the fact is Catherine had met Jamison only once before, at a party he attended for five minutes, and they talked inconsequentially about her brother and perhaps his travel plans. Thus, we disregard these assertions of mistaken similarity or dissimilarity.
The remaining points raised in Jamison’s critique of the trial court’s ruling simply are not sufficiently significant to permit the conclusion there was error in the admission of the prior rape evidence. The 11 points of similarity the trial court identified are ample support for the admission of the evidence, in combination creating a picture sufficiently distinctive to corroborate Catherine’s testimony. Contrary to Jamison’s assertion, this evidence was not solely relevant to the improper purpose of admissibility, propensity of Jamison to commit the crime (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 316 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]). We note the jury was properly instructed in the words of CALJIC No. 2.502 on the limited use to which the evidence could be put, and we find no error in the admission of the evidence.
Jamison contends instruction in the language of CALJIC No. 10.21 was prejudicial error. The instruction given was: “It is not essential to a conviction of a charge of rape that the testimony of the witness with whom [1173]*1173sexual intercourse is alleged to have been committed be corroborated by other evidence.” The court also gave CALJIC No. 2.27, as follows: “Testimony which you believe given by one witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact. However, before finding any fact required to be established by the Prosecution to be proved solely by the testimony of such a single witness, you should carefully review all the testimony upon which the proof of such fact depends.”
This court disposed of Jamison’s contention in People v. McIntyre (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 899 [176 Cal.Rptr. 3], involving a defendant convicted of forcible rape and forcible oral copulation. In McIntyre, we said (at p. 907): “It is apparent CALJIC No. 2.27 refers to reliability of all witnesses’ testimony in proving a fact. CALJIC No. 10.21, on the other hand, deals with the need (or lack of it) for corroboration of the victim’s testimony in the act constituting the crime of rape.
“While certain crimes require corroboration (obtaining money under false pretenses, Pen. Code, § 1110; perjury, Pen. Code, § 1103a; abortion, Pen. Code, § 1108), rape does not. It is not appropriate, of course, to instruct that corroboration is not necessary in all other crimes, but rape has some special features which make such an instruction on lack of corroboration most proper. The proof of the elements of this crime often turns on a credibility contest between the accused and the accuser alone, since the act is most often committed in private (see People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 881 . . .). Permitting a jury to operate under the misconception corroboration is required would put the value of the victim’s testimony on a level below that of the defendant’s testimony, credibility aside, and that is not the law. We hold CALJIC No. 10.21 is proper in combination with CALJIC No. 2.27.
“In any event, we believe the instruction correctly states the law, a matter McIntyre concedes, and is not so repetitious on the subject of a witness’ testimony as to give undue emphasis to the victim-witness’ testimony and be prejudicial to him. We note we cannot accept McIntyre’s assertion Rincon-Pineda, supra, disapproved CALJIC No. 10.21 sub silentio. We conclude, moreover, even if error exists, it does not require reversal (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 . . .).”
None of the points made by Jamison changes our view of the matter as expressed in McIntyre which applies fully to Jamison’s case. It remains a correct observation that “[p]ermitting a jury to operate under the misconception corroboration is required would put the value of the victim’s testimony on a level below that of the defendant’s testimony, credibility aside, and that is not the law.” (McIntyre, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 907.) This [1174]*1174observation supports giving the instruction. Nor can we accept as having substance Jamison’s assertions concerning the order of the trial court’s reading of the instruction and the constitutionality of the instruction under principles of equal protection and due process. Finally, we wish to emphasize, contrary to Jamison’s point of view, this case was not close and the giving of CALJIC No. 10.21, even if considered error, could not have affected the outcome.
Jamison contends the full sentence for the robbery consecutive to the single sex offense was improper. First, Jamison contends the sentence imposed was incorrect because the so-called “box theory” (see People v. Ottombrino (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 574, 588, fn. 4 [179 Cal.Rptr. 676]) only applies to sentences for multiple sex crimes, not merely multiple crimes. Here, of course, we have sentencing involving a single forcible sex offense mentioned in section 667.6, subdivision (c) (§ 261, subd. (2)), and an offense, the robbery, not mentioned in section 667.6, subdivision (c). Subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 667.6 read:
“(c) In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction. If such term is imposed consecutively pursuant to this subdivision, it shall be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment, and shall commence from the time such person would otherwise have been released from imprisonment. Such term shall not be included in any determination pursuant to Section 1170.1. Any other term imposed subsequent to such term shall not be merged therein but shall commence at the time such person would otherwise have been released from prison.
“(d) A full, separate, and consecutive term shall be served for each violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261, Section 264.1, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 289, or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of Section 286 or 288a by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm if such crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions.
“Such term shall be served consecutively to any other term of imprisonment, and shall commence from the time such person would otherwise have been released from imprisonment. Such term shall not be included in any determination pursuant to Section 1170.1. Any other term imposed subsequent to such term shall not be merged therein but shall commence at the [1175]*1175time such person would otherwise have been released from prison.” (Italics added.)
In addressing the issue, we apply the following rules of statutory construction: “The fundamental rule is that a court ‘should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In determining such intent ‘[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.’ [Citation.] ‘If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. ’ [Citation.] When used in a statute words must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear, and the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.] In addition, we consider the legislative history of the statute as well as the historical circumstances of its enactment in determining the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.]” (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 [184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104];3 italics added.)
Jamison posits his argument on the fact the word “crimes,” in the plural, is used in both subdivisions as indicated in the above italicized phrases, and on the fact that in cases involving multiple violent sex crimes within subdivision (c) descriptive language refers to those provisions as applicable to “multiple violent sex offenses” (People v. Masten (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 579, 592 [187 Cal.Rptr. 515]; People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 242 [182 Cal.Rptr. 406]) or “multiple forcible sex crimes” (People v. Ottombrino, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d 574, 586). Those descriptions certainly are correct, but does subdivision (c) also apply to a case involving only a single forcible sex crime mentioned in the subdivision when another nonlisted offense is also committed?
Jamison’s emphasis on the plural use of the word “crimes” is unwarranted in light of the fundamental principle of statutory construction enunciated for the Penal Code itself that “the singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular” (§7; italics added). Nor can any weight be put on the descriptive statements in the cases as they do not represent [1176]*1176holdings on the issue presented, whether subdivision (c) can apply to a single forcible sex offense mentioned in its provisions, when there is sentencing involving another or other offenses outside its provisions.4
It is clear, looking at the two subdivisions from the standpoint of their purpose, to deter forcible, violent sex crime, mandatory subdivision (d) applies only to multiple violent sex offenses, as listed, because subdivision (d) becomes applicable only where a listed crime is committed against “separate victims” or “the same victim on separate occasions,” in each instance requiring more than one violent sex crime. On the other hand, viewed from the standpoint of the same legislative purpose to deter forcible, violent sex crime, discretionary subdivision (c) encompasses both multiple and single forcible sex crimes as listed. The language of neither subdivision leads to any other conclusion. To the contrary, the language of subdivision (c), “a full, separate, and consecutive term . . . for each violation ... by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction” (italics added), quite clearly includes within its terms a single violent sex crime of the type listed. We note the subdivision (c) language "the crimes . . . during a single transaction” (italics added), would apply to crimes not listed as well as those listed but, by comparison, the subdivision (d) language "such crimes” (italics added) is limited to the listed offenses. Since in order to impose a consecutive sentence some other crime is necessary, the difference in the language of the subdivisions permits the conclusion “the crimes” was purposefully intended to include both nonsubdivision (c) crimes and crimes listed in the subdivision. This conclusion that the subdivision (c) language is applicable to a single violent sex offense, as listed, when another offense is also committed, carries forward the obvious legislative purpose of subdivision (c) to provide for harsher punishment and thus a deterrent to those multiple offenders who would commit a violent sex offense. There is no indication to the contrary in the legislative history of the section, part of chapter 944 of the Statutes of 1979, which dealt with individual as well as multiple crimes predominantly in the sex offense area (see Review of Selected 1979 California Legislation (1980) 11 Pacific L.J. 429, 431-432, 438).
Support for this conclusion is found in the case of People v. Belasco (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 974, 983-984 [178 Cal.Rptr. 461], which involved sentencing on a single count for an offense mentioned in subdivision (c), [1177]*1177forcible rape, and on another count for an offense not mentioned in the subdivision, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5). Belasco approved application of subdivision (c) in those circumstances. Though not addressing the issue expressly, Belasco said, in part: “Under section 667.6, if the defendant commits a violent sex crime [fn. omitted] in conjunction with other offenses, whether or not the crimes were committed during a ‘single transaction,’ the court may, in lieu of the term prescribed in Penal Code section 1170.1, impose a full, separate and consecutive term for the violent sex crime. . . . [T]he court properly exercised its discretion pursuant to section 667.6, subdivision (c) and imposed sentence on count II (non-violent sex crime) as the principal term and a sentence on count I (violent sex crime) as the subordinate term.” (Id. at pp. 983-984.)5
Jamison conducts an extensive analysis of sentencing practice under section 667.6, subdivisions (c) and (d), and in connection with section 1170.1, relating to consecutive sentencing in general. Much of what he says has been cleared up by the recent case of People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d 335, which held subdivision (c) is not an exclusive means for punishing violations of crimes within its provision, i.e., section 1170.1 may be used instead of or in combination with section 667.6 in the trial court’s discretion (id. at pp. 345-346) and so long as a statement of reasons accompanies each such sentencing choice (id. at pp. 347-348).
Here, after extended briefing and argument on the subject, the trial court expressed its awareness of its discretion, as outlined in Belmontes, and otherwise correctly exercised it, properly stating its reasons for the sentencing choices as required by Belmontes.6 There was no error in Jamison’s sentencing.
Judgment affirmed.
Staniforth, J., concurred.