ERICKSON, Justice.
The defendant Thomas Edward Jackson, appeals his convictions by a jury for two counts of theft over $200 but less than $10,000, section 18-4-401, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); two counts of theft by receiving, section 18-4-410, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); and two counts of conspiracy to commit theft and theft by receiving, section 18-2-201, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). He was sentenced to concurrent sentences in the custody of the Department of Corrections of 0 to 4 years for theft and theft by receiving, and 0 to 3 years for conspiracy. The sentences were suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for 3 years and ordered to pay his attorney fees. We affirm the defendant’s convictions for theft by receiving and conspiracy to commit theft by receiving. We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to vacate the defendant’s convictions for theft and conspiracy to commit theft.
The convictions in this case arise out of a widely publicized police store-front or sting operation in Lakewood, Colorado, which the police used as a means for curbing theft in the greater Denver area. Stolen items such as firearms, stereos, television sets, musical instruments, and automobiles were purchased by undercover agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Lakewood Department of Public Safety at a Lakewood building that was set up to give the impression that it was the headquarters for a major fencing operation. Between 100 and 200 fencing transactions involving the undercover agents and suspects were monitored and video taped.
The defendant was hired by two men, Sanchez and Ruthewic, to drive stolen automobiles to the store-front operation in Lakewood. Testimony at trial established that the undercover agents had dealt with Sanchez and Ruthewic on at least a dozen occasions. The defendant drove a stolen 1976 Volvo to the store-front operation and received $200. Later that same day, the defendant delivered a stolen 1977 Oldsmobile to the store-front and received an additional $400. These fencing transactions were monitored and video taped for use at trial.
At trial, the defendant admitted his participation in the fencing of the stolen automobiles. He asserted, however, diminished responsibility as a result of alcoholism and drug addiction, and denied participation in the theft of the automobiles.
The primary issues asserted on appeal relate to the prejudice that the defendant suffered when the jury was allowed to view the video tape of the fencing transactions in its entirety, the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on entrapment, and the failure of the trial court to require the prosecution to elect between the charges of theft and theft by receiving in accordance with People v. Lamirato, 180 Colo. 250, 504 P.2d 661 (1972). Our review of the record satisfies us that no error occurred in the admission of the video tape or the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on entrapment. However, the failure of the trial court to require the prosecution to elect between the theft and theft by receiving counts requires that we reverse the defendant’s convictions for theft and conspiracy to commit theft.
Video Tape
The defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the jury to view the entire video tape of the fencing transactions. Central to the defendant’s objection to the admission of the video tape is his admission of prior crimes and his [744]*744willingness to participate in future criminal activity, including murder and robbery, to obtain firearms for sale to the store-front operation.
The general rule governing the admissibility of other crimes is set forth in Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 96 P. 556 (1908), where we stated that evidence is not admissible which shows, or tends to show, that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial.
In Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959), we imposed limitations on the admission of evidence of other crimes by requiring a showing of a nexus between the offense for which the defendant is presently charged and other criminal transactions, acts, or conduct. In those cases where evidence of other crimes is admissible to show scheme, plan, design, or intent, the trial court is required to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is offered. People v. Geller, 189 Colo. 338, 540 P.2d 334 (1975); People v. Ihme, 187 Colo. 48, 528 P.2d 380 (1974); Stull v. People, supra.
The defendant alleges first that the video tape contained evidence of other crimes that were not admissible under any of the exceptions to the general rule of exclusion. Second, he alleges that if the evidence of other crimes was admissible under an exception to the general rule, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the limited purpose which the evidence served. We disagree.
The rule enunciated in Stull v. People, supra, and its progeny, does not govern this fact situation. Stull involved the admission of evidence of other crimes of a similar nature which were wholly independent of the offense charged. See also, People v. Geller, supra. Here, the evidence of other crimes was intertwined with the commission of the offense charged, and was part of the res gestae.
The defendant’s admission of past criminal misconduct and his willingness to participate in future criminal conduct was clearly prejudicial. However, where evidence of other crimes occurs as part of the res gestae of the offense, evidence of other crimes is admissible, provided that the evidence is relevant and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice to the accused. United States v. Childs, 598 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir.1979). See People v. Shackelford, 182 Colo. 48, 511 P.2d 19 (1973).
In White v. People, 177 Colo. 386, 494 P.2d 585 (1972), we held that evidence of other crimes was admissible where that evidence was not wholly independent of the offense charged. Here, the defendant’s statements occurred as part of his efforts to gain credibility in the fencing of stolen automobiles and in an effort to lay the groundwork for future fencing transactions. The evidence relating to the defendant’s willingness to commit other crimes was admissible to show the defendant’s knowledge and criminal intent, and fell short of establishing the commission of another crime.
The evidence of other crimes in this case was part of the res gestae of the fencing transactions. The probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice to the defendant.1
[745]*745Throughout the trial the defendant contended that due to alcoholism and his former addition to heroin, he did not have the mental capacity to exercise the specific intent required by the theft statute.
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ERICKSON, Justice.
The defendant Thomas Edward Jackson, appeals his convictions by a jury for two counts of theft over $200 but less than $10,000, section 18-4-401, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); two counts of theft by receiving, section 18-4-410, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); and two counts of conspiracy to commit theft and theft by receiving, section 18-2-201, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). He was sentenced to concurrent sentences in the custody of the Department of Corrections of 0 to 4 years for theft and theft by receiving, and 0 to 3 years for conspiracy. The sentences were suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for 3 years and ordered to pay his attorney fees. We affirm the defendant’s convictions for theft by receiving and conspiracy to commit theft by receiving. We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to vacate the defendant’s convictions for theft and conspiracy to commit theft.
The convictions in this case arise out of a widely publicized police store-front or sting operation in Lakewood, Colorado, which the police used as a means for curbing theft in the greater Denver area. Stolen items such as firearms, stereos, television sets, musical instruments, and automobiles were purchased by undercover agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Lakewood Department of Public Safety at a Lakewood building that was set up to give the impression that it was the headquarters for a major fencing operation. Between 100 and 200 fencing transactions involving the undercover agents and suspects were monitored and video taped.
The defendant was hired by two men, Sanchez and Ruthewic, to drive stolen automobiles to the store-front operation in Lakewood. Testimony at trial established that the undercover agents had dealt with Sanchez and Ruthewic on at least a dozen occasions. The defendant drove a stolen 1976 Volvo to the store-front operation and received $200. Later that same day, the defendant delivered a stolen 1977 Oldsmobile to the store-front and received an additional $400. These fencing transactions were monitored and video taped for use at trial.
At trial, the defendant admitted his participation in the fencing of the stolen automobiles. He asserted, however, diminished responsibility as a result of alcoholism and drug addiction, and denied participation in the theft of the automobiles.
The primary issues asserted on appeal relate to the prejudice that the defendant suffered when the jury was allowed to view the video tape of the fencing transactions in its entirety, the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on entrapment, and the failure of the trial court to require the prosecution to elect between the charges of theft and theft by receiving in accordance with People v. Lamirato, 180 Colo. 250, 504 P.2d 661 (1972). Our review of the record satisfies us that no error occurred in the admission of the video tape or the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on entrapment. However, the failure of the trial court to require the prosecution to elect between the theft and theft by receiving counts requires that we reverse the defendant’s convictions for theft and conspiracy to commit theft.
Video Tape
The defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the jury to view the entire video tape of the fencing transactions. Central to the defendant’s objection to the admission of the video tape is his admission of prior crimes and his [744]*744willingness to participate in future criminal activity, including murder and robbery, to obtain firearms for sale to the store-front operation.
The general rule governing the admissibility of other crimes is set forth in Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 96 P. 556 (1908), where we stated that evidence is not admissible which shows, or tends to show, that the accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is on trial.
In Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959), we imposed limitations on the admission of evidence of other crimes by requiring a showing of a nexus between the offense for which the defendant is presently charged and other criminal transactions, acts, or conduct. In those cases where evidence of other crimes is admissible to show scheme, plan, design, or intent, the trial court is required to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is offered. People v. Geller, 189 Colo. 338, 540 P.2d 334 (1975); People v. Ihme, 187 Colo. 48, 528 P.2d 380 (1974); Stull v. People, supra.
The defendant alleges first that the video tape contained evidence of other crimes that were not admissible under any of the exceptions to the general rule of exclusion. Second, he alleges that if the evidence of other crimes was admissible under an exception to the general rule, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the limited purpose which the evidence served. We disagree.
The rule enunciated in Stull v. People, supra, and its progeny, does not govern this fact situation. Stull involved the admission of evidence of other crimes of a similar nature which were wholly independent of the offense charged. See also, People v. Geller, supra. Here, the evidence of other crimes was intertwined with the commission of the offense charged, and was part of the res gestae.
The defendant’s admission of past criminal misconduct and his willingness to participate in future criminal conduct was clearly prejudicial. However, where evidence of other crimes occurs as part of the res gestae of the offense, evidence of other crimes is admissible, provided that the evidence is relevant and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice to the accused. United States v. Childs, 598 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir.1979). See People v. Shackelford, 182 Colo. 48, 511 P.2d 19 (1973).
In White v. People, 177 Colo. 386, 494 P.2d 585 (1972), we held that evidence of other crimes was admissible where that evidence was not wholly independent of the offense charged. Here, the defendant’s statements occurred as part of his efforts to gain credibility in the fencing of stolen automobiles and in an effort to lay the groundwork for future fencing transactions. The evidence relating to the defendant’s willingness to commit other crimes was admissible to show the defendant’s knowledge and criminal intent, and fell short of establishing the commission of another crime.
The evidence of other crimes in this case was part of the res gestae of the fencing transactions. The probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the probability of unfair prejudice to the defendant.1
[745]*745Throughout the trial the defendant contended that due to alcoholism and his former addition to heroin, he did not have the mental capacity to exercise the specific intent required by the theft statute. Defense counsel in his opening statement asked the jury to pay particular attention to the video tapes and to observe the defendant’s demeanor. The defendant testified that the video tape accurately portrayed his acts and his contact with the sting operation, but said that he was drunk and was “jiving” or lying to the sting agents. He said that his only previous contact with the law was for fishing without a license, and that all reference to his criminal plans and past activities was to impress the sting agents. The trial court instructed the jury, at the instance of defense counsel, on the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition and on voluntary intoxication. The jury was also instructed on the defendant’s theory of the case. The defendant’s theory and claim was that his “mental and physical condition was such as to render him incapable of appraising the scope and nature of his conduct.” In short, the defendant admitted the commission of the acts, and the accuracy of the video tapes, but claimed that by reason of his impaired mental .condition and voluntary intoxication, he could not formulate the intent required to commit the crimes charged.
The evidence of guilt in this case was so overwhelming that to order a new trial would be tantamount to declaring the issue of guilt to be irrelevant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to view the video tape in its entirety.
Entrapment
The defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of entrapment and, alternatively, that the trial court should have submitted an entrapment instruction to the jury as the defendant’s theory of the case. We disagree.
Section 18-1-709, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), provides:
“The commission of acts which would otherwise constitute an offense is not criminal if the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement official or other person acting under his direction, seeking to obtain evidence for the purpose of prosecution, and the methods used to obtain that evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the acts would be committed by a person who, but for such inducement, would not have conceived of or engaged in conduct of the sort induced. Merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense is not entrapment even though representations or inducements calculated to overcome the offender’s fear of detection are used.”
The plain wording of the statute indicates that the defense of entrapment cannot be established in those cases where the police merely furnish the defendant with an opportunity to commit a crime. People v. Lee, 180 Colo. 376, 506 P.2d 136 (1973). The defense of entrapment is available only where the defendant shows that law enforcement agents, in fact, induce, instigate, and cause a criminal offense to be committed. People v. Bucher, 182 Colo. 211, 511 P.2d 895 (1973). See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 [746]*746L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). See also, Patterson v. People, 168 Colo. 417, 451 P.2d 445 (1969).
The agents’ conduct in this case falls short of instigation of a crime which would constitute entrapment. The record indicates that Sanchez initially contacted the undercover agents regarding the fencing of stolen property. The undercover agents did not contact the defendant to obtain delivery of the stolen property. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on entrapment, both as an affirmative defense and as the defendant’s theory of the case.
Motion to Elect
At the close of the prosecution’s case, the defendant made a motion to require the prosecution to elect between the theft and theft by receiving counts. The motion was denied and the defendant asserts that the prosecution should have been required to elect between the theft and theft by receiving counts. We agree with the defendant and reverse the convictions for theft and conspiracy to commit theft. We affirm the convictions for theft by receiving and conspiracy to commit theft by receiving.
People v. Lamirato, supra, declared that a person who has actively participated in a theft cannot be convicted of both the theft and theft by receiving of the stolen property. Accord, Glass v. United States, 351 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1965).
In enacting the theft by receiving statute, section 18-4-410, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), the General Assembly intended to reach a distinct group of wrongdoers. The class includes those persons who receive, retain, or dispose of property received from another person with the knowledge or reasonable belief that the property has been stolen. The legislative intent was not to expand the offense of theft, but to create a separate crime. See Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961).
Consistent with our directions in People v. Lamirato, supra, the trial court erred in not requiring the prosecution to elect between theft and the related conspiracy count on the one hand, and theft by receiving and the counterpart conspiracy on the other. Alternatively, the trial court could have instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of theft or theft by receiving, but not both, and if it found the defendant guilty of one theft count, it might find him guilty of the related conspiracy count, but not both conspiracy counts. Cf. Albernaz v. United States,U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). (Where Congress clearly intended to permit the imposition of consecutive sentences for violations of conspiracy to import and conspiracy to distribute marijuana and the statutory provisions involved specified different ends as the proscribed object of the conspiracy, the imposition of consecutive sentences for separate conspiracy violations of the two statutes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.)
A new trial is not necessary. The sentence imposed by the trial court is not affected by the dismissal of the theft and the conspiracy to commit theft convictions, if the theft by receiving and related conspiracy convictions are allowed to stand. From the record it is clear that the defendant’s conduct constituted the crimes of conspiracy to commit theft by receiving and theft by receiving. Therefore, we reverse the defendant’s convictions for theft and conspiracy to commit theft.
The defendant’s final argument that the theft by receiving statute, section 18-4-410, C.R.S.1973, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is without merit. People v. Stage, 195 Colo. 110, 575 P.2d 423 (1978); People v. Holloway, 193 Colo. 450, 568 P.2d 29 (1977).
Accordingly, the defendant’s convictions for theft by receiving and conspiracy to commit theft by receiving are affirmed. The defendant’s convictions for theft and conspiracy to commit theft are reversed and [747]*747the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss.
ROVIRA and LOHR, JJ., dissent.