People v. Ivan N. (In re Ivan N.)

202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 247 Cal. App. 4th 621
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal, 4th District
DecidedMay 20, 2016
DocketD068595
StatusPublished

This text of 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338 (People v. Ivan N. (In re Ivan N.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal, 4th District primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Ivan N. (In re Ivan N.), 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 247 Cal. App. 4th 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.

*627This appeal arises out of the juvenile court's dispositional and placement orders under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 and 727, adjudicating a minor to be a ward of the court and placing him under the custody and control of a probation officer.1 We consider the interaction of those delinquency provisions with the language of Education Code section 48853.5 ["Notice of educational rights of foster children ..."], which applies to foster children or other minors subject to juvenile court adjudication, and requires consideration of a preference to continue their attendance at their schools of origin.

In this case, the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing determined that Ivan N. (the minor), who had admitted to a felony sex offense, should be placed out of his home for treatment in a community-based organization (CBO), which could include, if necessary, education at a juvenile court school. (Ed.Code, § 48645.1 [defining juvenile court schools].) During further dispositional proceedings, the court denied the minor's motion for an additional hearing to consider whether he could be returned to his high school of origin after he received a short period of such treatment.

On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion and he should be entitled to further hearings on his educational preferences (i.e., returning him to his school of origin), as a person who fits the definition of a "foster child" under *628Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a) by remaining "the subject of a petition filed under [section 602 ]."2

The People respond that once the adjudication and placement occurred, the juvenile court properly resolved the motion by concluding that the minor, as a ward under the supervision of the probation officer, had not shown entitlement to further hearings on school of origin issues. (§ 727, subd. (a)(3), (4) ; Ed.Code, § 48853.5, subd. (h) ["section does not supersede other law governing the educational placements in *340juvenile court schools"]; see In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1398, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 [juvenile court's duties at disposition include accommodating and planning for a child's educational needs].)

We conclude the juvenile court was correct in determining that the Education Code provisions and related California rule of court relied upon by the minor (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651 ["Educational and developmental-services decisionmaking rights"] ) did not require it to grant a separate hearing on the request.3 (Ed.Code, § 48853.5, subd. (h).) The procedures created by Education Code section 48853.5, subdivisions (a) through (g) were intended to be primarily directory toward state and local educators and their designated staff educational liaisons who act on behalf of foster children. Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (h) carves out an exception to those administrative procedures, and prevents interference with the discretion granted to a juvenile court that has made section 602 jurisdictional findings that a minor is a ward of the court, to make related placement orders giving the probation officer the authority to determine the appropriate placement for the ward. (§§ 725, 726, 727, subd. (a)(4).) Once the true findings on the section 602 petition were made, the procedures of section 727 controlled the minor's dispositional proceedings. Based on the court's placement order under section 727, subdivision (a)(4), the probation officer could exercise authority without regard to the definitions of a "foster child" in Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a). We affirm the order and judgment.

*629I

BACKGROUND

When the minor was 17 years old and had been in his adoptive home for three years, his adoptive parents learned from an incident at their home that he had molested their daughter, age 7 (sometimes termed the "victim"). The minor admitted that he had used his hands and penis to touch her genital area several times over the past year. He was arrested and confined at juvenile hall. He was arraigned April 16, 2015 on a section 602 delinquency petition that charged him with two counts of committing a lewd act on a minor under the age of 14. (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (a).)

During an interview, the minor apologized and admitted he should not have molested the victim, which he did to get back at his parents. His psychological evaluator recommended referring him to an outpatient or residential facility that specialized in treating male adolescent sex offenders with therapy and programming.

After the minor admitted to one of the charged counts on May 4, 2015, the court dismissed the other count in the interest of justice. The minor was determined to be a person described by section 602 who was subject to being placed on probation. The social study prepared by the probation department recommended that he be placed at a CBO and receive appropriate treatment for a sex offender.

On May 18, 2015 at the dispositional hearing, the minor agreed to the proposed residential placement, but requested a hearing on whether he should be allowed to return to the North San Diego County high school he had previously attended, his "school of origin" within the meaning of Education Code section 48850 et seq. (ch. 5.5, "Education of Pupils in Foster Care and Pupils who are Homeless"). He had friends there and had been passing all of *341his classes. The court responded that although the Education Code sections relied on were applicable as to both dependency and delinquency matters, they were secondary to the current placement issues. (§§ 300, 602.)

At the disposition hearing, the court heard from the minor's parents. His mother (also the victim's mother) was concerned that it would not be appropriate to return the minor to his local high school, since their other children attend a grade school across the street and it would be difficult for them not to see him there. The court placed the minor under the custody and supervision of the probation department, and ordered that he continue to be detained in juvenile hall pending his placement in a CBO. (§ 726, subd. (a).)

*630The conditions of his probation included participation in a program of counseling or education as directed by the probation officer. (§ 727, subds. (c), (d).) The court discussed with the minor's attorney whether a special hearing would be required to address the minor's request to be placed near his school of origin.

At the next review hearings on June 3 and 17, 2015, the court indicated that the issues previously raised about the scope of legislation on the school of origin were still being reviewed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Juan C.
20 Cal. App. 4th 748 (California Court of Appeal, 1993)
Compulink Management Center, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
169 Cal. App. 4th 289 (California Court of Appeal, 2008)
R.R. v. Superior Court
180 Cal. App. 4th 185 (California Court of Appeal, 2009)
People v. Angela M.
4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 809 (California Court of Appeal, 2003)
People v. Luis F.
177 Cal. App. 4th 176 (California Court of Appeal, 2009)
People Ex Rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co.
11 P.3d 956 (California Supreme Court, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 247 Cal. App. 4th 621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-ivan-n-in-re-ivan-n-calctapp4d-2016.