People v. Hunter

2026 IL App (1st) 230444-U

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 230444-U

SECOND DIVISION March 17, 2026

No. 1-23-0444

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 84C14268 ) MARCUS HUNTER, ) Honorable ) Sophia Atcherson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Van Tine and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court properly denied defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition.

¶2 Defendant Marcus Hunter 1 appeals the trial court’s denial of his pro se motion for leave

to file a successive postconviction petition and argues that a recent amendment to the habitual

1 Marcus Hunter has spelled his name as both “Marcus” and “Markus” throughout this appeal. The State Appellate Defender has advised this court that the correct spelling of defendant’s name is “Marcus,” which we will use on appeal. No. 1-23-0444

criminal statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2022)) was a legislative clarification to be

applied retroactively, entitling him to a new sentencing hearing.

¶3 Following a jury trial, defendant and his four codefendants William Glover, Marvin

Barber, David DuPree, and Marvin Bryant were convicted of armed robbery, home invasion, and

aggravated battery after they entered an unlicensed club operated by Eddie Morris on the first

floor and the basement of a building on South Ellis in Chicago. Morris resided with his family on

the second floor. Trial testimony showed that a witness saw defendant point a gun at the head of

a woman who worked there and forced the woman and another individual into the basement to

look for Morris.

¶4 Morris’s wife testified that she was in the kitchen when defendant entered carrying a

pistol. He ripped the phone off the wall and asked where Morris was. When she explained that

Morris was in the back of the house, defendant pointed the gun at her head and walked with her

to the back of the house where he pushed his way into the bathroom. Then he forced both Morris

and his wife into their bedroom, demanded money from them, tore a phone off the bedroom wall,

took a number of items and put them in a pillowcase, and then followed Morris downstairs.

Morris’s testimony substantially corroborated his wife’s account. In total, there were seven

eyewitnesses to the robberies whose accounts of the incident were substantially the same in all

essential respects. A thorough recitation of the facts is set forth in the direct appeal. People v.

Glover, 173 Ill. App. 3d 678, 680-83 (1988).

¶5 Before sentencing, the State filed a petition for the imposition of a natural life sentence

under the habitual criminal statute. The statute in effect at the time provided that every offender,

convicted of three Class X felonies, separated in time as stated in the statute in a twenty year

period had be sentenced to mandatory natural life. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1(e) (now

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codified as 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2024)). According to the petition, defendant pled

guilty in 1975 to two separate armed robbery offenses committed before he was 21 and was

sentenced to a term of 4 to 7 years in the Department of Corrections. In 1980, defendant pled

guilty to two armed robberies and received a sentence of 8 years. Upon conviction of this

offense, defendant was subsequently sentenced as an habitual criminal to a mandatory term of

natural life. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1(e).

¶6 In a consolidated direct appeal with his codefendants, defendant challenged his life

sentence, which this court affirmed. Glover, 173 Ill. App. 3d 678 (1988). Defendant has

unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and sentence in several collateral proceedings. People

v. Hunter, Nos. 1-00-4043 and 1-01-3195 (Cons.) (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23), No. 1-09-0198 (2010) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), 2013

IL App (1st) 123192-U (summary order), 2014 IL App (1st) 120301-U, 2016 IL App (1st)

140294-U (summary order), 2018 IL App (1st) 160402-U (summary order), and 2021 IL App

(1st) 191364-U.

¶7 In June 2022, defendant sought leave to file a pro se successive postconviction petition

challenging his natural life sentence. He argued that pursuant to a 2021 amendment to the

habitual criminal statute, he was no longer eligible to be sentenced as a habitual criminal because

two of his prior Class X felonies were committed when he was under the age of 21. The trial

court subsequently denied him leave to file his successive petition.

¶8 On appeal, defendant argues that his mandatory natural life sentence violated his due

process rights. Specifically, he contends that, following a recent amendment, this sentence was

unauthorized under the habitual criminal statute because two of his predicate felonies were

committed before his 21st birthday.

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¶9 Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018)),

those under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the result of a

substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution

or both. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-79 (1998). Although only one postconviction

proceeding is contemplated under the Act, a defendant seeking to file a successive

postconviction petition may obtain leave of court by establishing “cause and prejudice” for the

failure to raise the claim earlier. People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 22-23. Under the cause

and prejudice test, a defendant must establish both (1) cause for his or her failure to raise the

claim earlier and (2) prejudice stemming from his or her failure to do so. Edwards, 2012 IL

111711, ¶ 22 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002)). Defendant contends

that he has established the requisite cause and prejudice based on recent case law interpreting the

2021 amendment to the habitual criminal statute.

¶ 10 Defendant asserts that two of his triggering Class X felonies were committed before he

turned 21. As noted above, the State’s petition for the imposition of a natural life imprisonment

disclosed that defendant pled guilty in 1975 to two separate armed robbery charges, committed

when defendant was 19 and 20 years old. He later pled guilty in 1980 to two separate armed

robberies. Under the habitual criminal statute in effect at the time of defendant’s sentencing, a

person was eligible for a natural life sentence as a habitual criminal after having been convicted

of three Class X felonies within 20 years, excluding time spent in custody. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983,

ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1(a). The statute required the second felony to be committed after the conviction

for the first felony and the third felony be committed after the conviction for the second felony.

Id. (d)(3), (4). According to the statute, defendant’s two armed robberies committed when he was

under 21 count as one conviction because the convictions were entered at the same time. The

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second triggering Class X felony was based on the 1980 convictions for armed robbery with the

third offense being the 1984 armed robbery in this case. Thus, defendant’s suggestion that two of

his predicate felonies were committed under the age of 21 is without merit.

¶ 11 Public Act 101-652 amended section 5-4.5-95(a) to provide that the first qualifying

offense to be adjudged an habitual criminal must have been “committed when the person was 21

years of age or older.” Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-281 (eff. July 1, 2021) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

95(a)(4)(E))). At the time of defendant’s sentencing, there was no age requirement for any of the

Class X felonies under the habitual criminal statute. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 33B-1.

Relying on People v. Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, and People v. Durant, 2024 IL App (1st)

211190-B, defendant maintains that one of his prior Class X convictions no longer serves as a

qualifying predicate offense because it was committed when he was under the age of 21.

¶ 12 In Stewart, the issue before the supreme court was “whether the legislature intended a

prior felony conviction to be a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing if the same offense

would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication had it been committed on the date of the present

offense.” Stewart, 2022 IL 126116, ¶ 16.

¶ 13 Significantly, the Stewart court was reviewing a different subsection of the habitual

criminal statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2022)) than the provision defendant was

sentenced under (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2022)). The supreme court observed that prior to

the 2021 amendment of subsection (b), a division had arisen in the appellate court regarding

defendants who were under the age of 18 at the time of at least one predicate offense. Id. ¶ 21.

The court concluded that given the split in the appellate court, “Public Act 101-652 was intended

to resolve the conflict in the appellate court and clarify the meaning of the original statute.” Id.

¶ 22.

5 No. 1-23-0444

¶ 14 Following Stewart, a divided panel in Durant found that the supreme court’s

interpretation of the amended language in subsection (b) also applied to the identical language

contained in subsection (a). Durant, 2024 IL App (1st) 211190-B, ¶ 30. The reviewing court

reasoned that since the amendments for both subsections were enacted simultaneously and

contained identical language, the legislature had the same intent and purpose for both. Id. ¶ 32.

¶ 15 Recently, our supreme court considered the amendment to subsection (a) and at issue in

this case. People v. Brown, 2026 IL 130930. There, the supreme court concluded that the 2021

amendment of subsection (a) was neither retroactive, nor a clarification of a previous version of

the statute. Specifically, the Brown court found the legislature’s use of a delayed effective date

more than four months after the public act’s passage showed the legislative intent for the

amendment to apply prospectively. Id. ¶ 41. The court further rejected a retroactive application

by noting its precedent has consistently held that “a defendant is not entitled to resentencing

under an amendment that provides for a mitigated punishment.” Id. ¶ 42 (citing People v.

Bradford, 106 Ill. 2d 492, 504 (1985); People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 56); see 5 ILCS 70/4

(West 2024).

¶ 16 Further, in distinguishing its holding in Stewart, the Brown court found the 2021

amendment to subsection (a) was not a clarification of prior versions of the statute. Id. ¶¶ 43-58.

The supreme court recognized that prior to the 2021 amendment “[t]here was not, and has never

been, a division in the appellate court over the meaning of section 5-4.5-95(a) or its

predecessor.” Id. ¶ 51. The supreme court observed that it had “never found a clarification where

an amendment was substantively incompatible with the preamendment version of the statute.” Id.

¶ 55 (noting that the two versions of the statute are “incompatible and inconsistent with one

another” because the postamendment version of subsection (a) required that a defendant be 21

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years old or older at the time of the first qualifying offense to be subject to a mandatory natural

life sentence (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2022)) whereas the preamendment version of

section 5-4.5-95(a) required only that a defendant be 18 years old or older at the time of the third

qualifying offense (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (West 2016))). Moreover, the court observed the

legislature in 2021 could only have been clarifying the 2016 version of the statute, and not the

version in effect when the defendant was sentenced in 1995. Id. ¶ 56. The Brown court explicitly

overruled Durant and held “while Public Act 101-652 clarified section 5-4.5-95(b), because both

the amendment and the existing law were consistent, Public Act 101-652 did not clarify section

5-4.5-95(a), because the amendment and the existing law are inconsistent.” Id. ¶ 58.

¶ 17 The Brown decision is directly on point and we, as a reviewing court, are bound to apply

the supreme court’s precedent to the facts of the case before us. Yakich v. Aulds, 2019 IL

123667, ¶ 13; see People v. Blalock, 2020 IL App (1st) 170295, ¶ 37. Following the supreme

court’s holding in Brown, the 2021 amendment to subsection (a) applies only prospectively and

was not a clarification of the version in effect when defendant in this case was sentenced in 1985.

The use of an offense committed when defendant was under 21 to trigger the habitual criminal

finding was proper.

¶ 18 Additionally, we note that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure generally do not

apply retroactively on collateral review because of the State’s legitimate interest in the finality of

criminal convictions, without which “ ‘the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent

effect.’ ” People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 239 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,

309 (1989)). The legislature chose not to make the 2021 amendment retroactive, and we are

bound by the statutory language. It is our role to enforce clear, unambiguous statutes as written.

People v. Wells, 2023 IL 127169, ¶ 31. “ ‘The legislature has the power to prescribe penalties for

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defined offenses, and that power necessarily includes the authority to prescribe mandatory

sentences, even if such sentences restrict the judiciary’s discretion in imposing sentences.’ ”

People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 129

(2004)). “The legislature’s determination of a particular punishment for a crime in and of itself is

an expression of the general moral ideas of the people.” Id. ¶ 38.

¶ 19 Based upon both the supreme court’s holding in Brown, as well as the relevant statutory

language, defendant is not entitled to sentencing relief. Therefore, defendant cannot establish the

requisite cause to file successive petition. Because defendant cannot establish cause, we need not

consider whether defendant adequately set forth a prima facie showing of prejudice. People v.

Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42.

¶ 20 Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant leave to file his successive

postconviction petition and we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 21 Affirmed.