Opinion
PUGLIA, P. J.
— A jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder by explosive. (Pen. Code, §§ 182, 189; further statutory references to sections of an undesignated code are to the Penal Code.) On [22]*22appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred: (1) in failing adequately to deal with the jury’s request for further instruction, and (2) in denying his new trial motion which was based on jury misconduct in considering the issue of penalty during deliberations. We shall affirm, holding, inter alla, that Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), which excludes evidence of the jurors’ subjective reasoning processes to impeach their verdict, has not been abrogated by the “Right to Truth in Evidence” provision of the California Constitution (art. I, § 28, subd. (d)).
In early 1987, defendant came to Chico to live near his estranged wife, Vicky Hill. Defendant wanted to reconcile with Vicky or failing that, to have her killed. On April 20, 1987, Vicky and defendant had a violent argument. Shortly thereafter, Dalton Moss sold defendant six or seven sticks of dynamite, several blasting caps and fuse cord. Defendant planned to dynamite Vicky’s truck or trailer home. Defendant’s daughter, Shanna Lopes, recommended John Keefe to defendant to carry out his plan. In early May 1987, Keefe agreed for the sum of $1,000 to be paid by defendant to dynamite Vicky’s trailer home while Vicky was inside. Defendant gave Keefe some dynamite, blasting caps and fuse cord. Subsequently, Keefe decided not to blow up Vicky’s trailer home, but told defendant he would dynamite her truck for the same $1,000 fee. On May 29, 1987, Keefe threw dynamite near Vicky’s unoccupied truck, where it exploded.
Defendant still wanted Vicky killed. Dalton Moss delivered four more sticks of dynamite to Lopes for defendant. Lopes arranged for Mike Hoskison to dynamite Vicky’s trailer home or truck. On June 25,1987, Vicky shot Hoskison as he attempted to light dynamite just outside her trailer home. Hoskison ran off a short distance where he collapsed. He died soon thereafter.1
Defendant denied any involvement in the May 29 bombing or the June 25 bombing attempt. Defendant specifically denied an agreement with Keefe to dynamite Vicky’s trailer home in order to kill her.
[23]*23The information charged that defendant “conspire[d] with another person [sic] to commit the crime of First Degree Murder by Explosive.” The theory of the prosecution was that Keefe, Lopes and Moss, all of whom testified for the prosecution under grants of immunity, were coconspirators.
In convicting defendant of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the jury found two overt acts: (1) defendant obtained dynamite and fuse cord from Dalton Moss in April or May of 1987 and (2) defendant supplied dynamite and fuse cord to John Keefe in May of 1987.
I
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error by failing adequately to respond to the jury’s apparent difficulty with the definitions of “conspiracy” and “overt act.” During the second day of deliberations, the jury foreman sent the following note to the trial court: “At what point of time does a person’s frame of mind hold them [szc] responsible for the act of conspiracy to commit murder [?] Example: At first conspirators planned to commit murder[,] then before act was actually committed they changed their minds and agreed to just do damage to property — And please help clarify pages [] 43 & 43A [No. 6.10] in the CALJIC.” (Italics in original.)2
[24]*24Upon receiving the note, the trial court ordered counsel to appear the next morning to discuss an appropriate response to the jury’s question. At the conference, defense counsel suggested the trial court instruct that under the circumstances presented in the jury’s example there would be no conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Defense counsel agreed the jurors need not be reminded they could submit additional questions to the court. The prosecutor argued the defendant’s suggested instruction would impinge upon the jury’s role as fact finder. The trial court decided to refocus the jury’s attention upon the conspiracy instructions, CALJIC Nos. 6.10 through 6.24, and directed the jurors to reread those instructions and to consider them in the light of all the other instructions.
When a deliberating jury desires to be informed “on any point of law arising in the case,” the jury must be returned to court and “the information required must be given.” (§ 1138.)
Defendant asserts the trial court’s response to the jury’s inquiry was inadequate, because instead of clarifying or enlarging upon the explanation of “conspiracy” and “overt act” in CALJIC No. 6.10, the trial court simply had the jurors reread the conspiracy instructions which presumably they already had read.
We first reject the People’s contention that defendant waived this issue by failing to object. (See People v. Kageler (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 738, 746 [108 Cal.Rptr. 235]; People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422, 432-433 [193 Cal.Rptr. 711].) Although defense counsel stated he did not want the jurors specifically reminded they could submit to the court additional questions, he did not “tacitly approve” the trial court’s instruction to the jurors to reread CALJIC Nos. 6.10-6.24 in light of all the other instructions. Defense counsel specifically requested that the jury’s inquiry be answered directly. The trial court refused that request. No objection was required to preserve the point for appeal. (§ 1259.)
The jury’s question indicated uncertainty as to the synergizing effect of an overt act upon an agreement to commit a crime. This is [25]*25explained in CALJIC No. 6.10 which defines conspiracy as an agreement to commit a crime “followed by” an overt act done for the purpose of accomplishing the object of that agreement.
“The court has a primary duty to help the jury understand the legal principles it is asked to apply. (People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 244, 250-251 [240 Cal.Rptr].) This does not mean the court must always elaborate on the standard instructions. Where the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request for information. (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1213 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P. 2d 1159].) Indeed, comments diverging from the standard are often risky. (E.g., People v. Lee (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 707, 716 [155 Cal.Rptr. 128].)” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].)
After consulting counsel and considering the matter, the trial court in its discretion decided a direction to the jury to reread certain instructions was the appropriate response. Although the court did not directly address the issue of abandonment of the conspiracy implied in the example given in the jury’s inquiry, its response was adequate to the occasion. (Cf. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 96-97.) There was no error.
Moreover, if, as defense counsel urged, the trial court had directly answered the jury’s inquiry, it would have been constrained to inform the jury that once conspirators agree to murder and one of the conspirators commits an overt act in furtherance of that end, the crime of conspiracy to murder is complete, and the conspirators are not relieved of criminal liability therefor even though they subsequently agree to abandon that object and agree instead only to damage property. The conspirators’ abandonment of the agreement to murder would preclude conviction for conspiracy to commit murder only if such abandonment precedes the commission of an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the object of murder. (People v. Sconce (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 693, 701-703 [279 Cal.Rptr. 59]; see 4 Wharton’s Criminal Law (14th ed. 1981) § 734, p. 557.)
Given the evidence before the jury, this clarifying instruction could hardly have been to defendant’s advantage. The prosecution evidence established that defendant and Keefe agreed to murder Vicky Hill, and to achieve [26]*26that object defendant gave Keefe dynamite, blasting caps and fuse cord. The defense was denial of any involvement in a conspiracy, a defense which the jury disbelieved, implicitly finding an agreement to murder and expressly finding the transfer of explosive materials from defendant to Keefe occurred and constituted an overt act. The prosecution evidence consistently shows that the crime of conspiracy was complete before Keefe changed his mind and told defendant he would dynamite Vicky’s truck but not her trailer house. There was no evidence the conspirators abandoned their original objective before an overt act was performed, i.e., before Keefe received the explosive materials from defendant. Had the court delivered a legally correct exegesis on the jury’s hypothetical question, the jury, having rejected defendant’s evidence, would have been led inexorably to the identical verdict that was in the event returned, guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Thus, even if it were error not to answer directly the jury’s question, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
II
Defendant contends the jurors improperly considered the question of penalty during deliberations. Defendant’s motion for new trial (§ 1181) was supported by the declarations of three jurors who stated they had heard in deliberations that defendant would probably face only six months in jail if convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. We find no error.
Juror Terri Miller declared that during deliberations she had been undecided on the conspiracy count. The reason she voted guilty was because she was “convinced by other jurors that [defendant] had committed an overt act of the conspiracy.” Her declaration continued: “[D]uring this period when I changed my mind from undecided to guilty, I heard another juror whose identity is unknown state that [defendant] probably would only get six months for what he had done.” Miller then attempted to persuade Juror Jean Passmore, who was undecided, to vote guilty because defendant had committed an overt act. Miller also related to Passmore that defendant “would probably only get six months for what he had done . . . .”
Passmore’s declaration confirmed that Miller told her defendant “would only receive six months for what he had done.” “Shortly after hearing this comment,” Passmore declared, she “changed [her] vote by stating to [the foreman], ‘if that’s the way it has to be then that’s the way it has to be.’ ” Aside from this cryptic statement, Passmore did not expressly state in her declaration why she changed her vote. To the contrary, her declaration is ambiguous as to whether she in fact voted guilty. Therein Passmore asserts [27]*27she did not find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; she did not want to vote guilty, and her affirmative response when the clerk polled the jury meant only that the verdict as read “[is] the one that had been filled out in the jury room.”
A third juror, Charlet Manjeot, stated in her declaration that she recalled hearing somebody say “something to the effect of a six-month sentence or he would only get six months.” Manjeot did not claim to have been influenced to vote guilty by this statement and, accepting her declaration at face value, it is difficult to perceive how she could have been because she flatly denied she had voted guilty. According to her declaration, she did not realize a verdict of guilty was being taken into court by the jury, and she did not remember being polled by the clerk or stating “yes” in response to the clerk’s poll whether the verdict as read was her verdict.
The declarations of the other nine jurors were presented by the prosecution. All of these jurors stated they had heard nothing during deliberations concerning penalty or punishment
Juror Miller did not testify at the hearing on the new trial motion. Juror Manjeot did testify and affirmed her declaration was correct but did not expressly mention the subject of penalty or punishment. Her testimony dealt exclusively with her insistence that she had never voted guilty. Juror Pass-more also testified and affirmed her declaration was correct. She then testified that she changed her vote to guilty because she heard it said that defendant “would only get six months.”
Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) states: “Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.”
Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), “thus makes a ‘distinction between proof of overt acts, objectively ascertainable, and proof of the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror, which can be neither corroborated nor disproved . . . .’ (People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349 [78 Cal.Rptr. 196, 455 P. 2d 132].) ‘This limitation prevents one juror from upsetting a verdict of the whole jury by impugning his own or his fellow jurors’ mental processes or reasons for assent or dissent.’ (Id., at [28]*28p. 350; People v. Ozene (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 905, 914 [104 Cal.Rptr. 170].)” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 694 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].)
Defendant now raises an issue not tendered in the trial court. For the first time on appeal, defendant contends that the second sentence of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), prohibiting the admissibility of evidence of a juror’s subjective reasoning process, has been abrogated by article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, (section 28(d)) enacted at the June 1982 election as part of Proposition 8. That provision states in pertinent part: “Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, [sic] Sections 352, 782, or 1103.” [Italics added.]
Defendant asserts the evidence regarding the jurors’ subjective mental processes, which would otherwise be excluded by Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), should now by force of section 28(d) be deemed admissible.
Section 28(d) deals with the admission of “relevant evidence.” As we shall explain, the second sentence of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), embodies a substantive rule of law, derived from the common law, which renders a juror’s subjective reasoning process irrelevant.
“Relevant Evidence” is defined by Evidence Code section 210 which provides: “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”
We are cited to no authority, nor are we aware of any, to the effect that the meaning of the term “relevant evidence” as used in section 28(d) is not precisely congruent with the meaning of that same term as defined in Evidence Code section 210. Indeed, nothing to the contrary appearing, it is reasonable to assume, and we do so assume, that the enactors of section 28(d) intended the Evidence Code definition, which was enacted in 1965, to govern the interpretation of “relevant evidence” as used in the later enacted section 28(d). (See Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645-646 [335 P.2d 672].)
[29]*29In defining “relevant evidence,” Evidence Code section 210 encompasses a broad concept of relevance. That concept comprehends both the probative value of evidence and its relationship to a matter which is provable in the action. Relevance in the narrower sense deals with the probative value of evidence. The relationship of evidence to a provable matter is, properly understood, a question of materiality. Due to imprecise usage and misunderstanding, “materiality” is commonly used interchangeably and synonymously with “relevance.” To avoid confusion, the Evidence Code “substitutes the word ‘disputed’ for ‘material’ and covers this correct concept of materiality in the single definition of ‘relevant evidence’ ” in Evidence Code section 210. (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) § 286, pp. 255-256.)
As Witkin explains: “A ‘material matter’ is one ‘the existence or nonexistence of which is provable in the action.’ (Model C., Rule 1(8).) In other words, materiality depends on the issues in the case; evidence which does not relate to a matter in issue is immaterial. (See 29 Cal. L. Rev. 690; McCormick 3d, § 185; 1 Wigmore (Tillers Rev.) §2; 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 251.)” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986), § 286, p. 255, original italics.) Thus, as broadly defined by Evidence Code section 210, “relevant evidence” has two distinct dimensions: (1) probative value, i.e., the “tendency [of the evidence] in reason to prove or disprove” the proposition for which it is offered and (2) relationship to a matter which is provable in the action, i.e., the “tendency [of the evidence] in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Under the broad definition of “relevant evidence” in Evidence Code section 210, evidence which has no “tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact of consequence to the determination of the action” is irrelevant. So also is evidence which does have “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any . . .” fact which is not of consequence to the determination of the action.
Materiality, i.e., what matters are in issue, “is determined mainly by the pleadings, the rules in pleading and the substantive law relating to the particular kind of case. (See 29 Cal. L. Rev. 690; McCormick 3d, § 185; 2 Wigmore (Tillers Rev.) § 2; . . .” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, op. cit. supra, § 286, pp. 255-256.)
As Wigmore explained it, the common law rule prohibiting a juror from impeaching his own verdict derived from three general and independent principles, those relating to privileged communications, paroi evidence, and self-stultifying testimony. (8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton ed. 1961) § 2345, p. 677.) Under the paroi evidence aspect of the rule, the “verdict of a jury is an operative act, like a will or a contract or a judgment, [30]*30and the paroi evidence rules govern it in special applications adopted to its circumstances.” (Ibid.; citations omitted.) Thus, among other restrictions, “[t]he negotiations and motives preceding and leading up to the final act of uttering the verdict are immaterial and cannot be used to set aside or to vary the verdict as uttered.” (Ibid.; citation omitted and italics in original.) The principle underlying this feature of the paroi evidence rule is that “where the existence and tenor of a jurai act — i.e., an utterance to which legal effects are attached — are in issue, the outward utterance as finally and formally made, and not the prior and private intention, is taken as exclusively constituting the act; and therefore where the act is required (as judicial proceedings are) to be made in writing, the writing is the act.” (Id., § 2348, p. 679, citations omitted.) Consequently, the “'jurors’ deliberations during retirement, their expressions, arguments, motives and beliefs represent that state of mind which must precede every legal act and is in itself of no jurai consequence. The verdict as finally agreed upon and pronounced in court by the jurors must be taken as the sole embodiment of the jury’s act. Hence it stands irrespective of what led up to it in the privacy of the jury room, precisely as the prior negotiations of the parties to a contract disappear from legal consideration when once the final agreement is reduced to writing and signed.” (Id., § 2348, p. 680; citations omitted and italics in original.) “The policy which requires this,” Wigmore continues, “is the same which forbids a consideration of the negotiations of parties to a contract leading up to the final terms as deliberately embodied in their deed, namely, the loss of all certainty in the verdict, the impracticability of seeking for definiteness in the preliminary views, the risk of misrepresentation after disclosure of the verdict, and the impossibility of expecting any end to trials if the grounds for the verdict were allowed to effect its overthrow.” (Id., § 2349, p. 681; fn. omitted.) Thus, the rule renders the jurors’ subjective thought processes immaterial and of no jurai consequence. From this it follows that evidence that the jurors misunderstood the judge’s instructions, were influenced by an improper remark of a fellow juror, assented under an erroneous belief that the judge would use clemency or had the legal right to vary the sentence, or had been influenced by inadmissible evidence is simply of no legal significance. (Ibid.) In short, under both the common law and Evidence Code section 1150, the jurors’ motives, beliefs, misunderstandings, intentions, and the like are immaterial.
The federal analogue to Evidence Code section 1150 is rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (tit. 28, U.S.C.A. Fed. Rules of Evidence).3 “As a practical matter, ... the exclusionary principle [embodied in rule 606(b)] [31]*31imposes what amounts to limits upon the ground of permissible impeachment of jury verdicts. That is the obvious result of a rule which significantly restricts the use of the only sure source of information as to occurrences during the jury’s deliberations.” (3 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence § 286, p. 118 (1979).) Thus, although a “sure source of information” may yield evidence of probative value, that evidence is nonetheless excluded from an inquiry into the validity of a verdict.
“Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is grounded in the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception for juror testimony relating to extraneous influences.” (Tanner v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 107, 121 [97 L.Ed.2d 90, 107 S.Ct. 2739].) As explained by the federal high court, the rule finds its rationale in “[substantial policy considerations [which] support the common-law rule against the admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict. As early as 1915 this Court explained the necessity of shielding jury deliberations from, public scrutiny: [¶] ‘[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.’ McDonald v. Pless, [(1915)] 238 U.S. [264,] 267-268 [59 L.Ed. 1300, 1302, 35 S.Ct. 783] . ..[][]... Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process. [Citation.] Moreover, full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct. See Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 888-892 (1983).” (Tanner v. United States, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 119-121 [97 L.Ed.2d at pp. 105-106].)
Although the Tanner court acknowledged “[t]here is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead [32]*32to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior” (483 U.S. at p. 120 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 106]), it nevertheless concluded, portentously: “It is not at all clear . . . that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.” (483 U.S. at p. 120 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 106].)
Like rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), expresses a substantive policy delimiting the issues “[u]pan an inquiry as to the validity of the verdict” The first sentence of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), in effect provides that objectively ascertainable overt acts “of such a character as [are] likely to have influenced the verdict improperly” are material upon such an inquiry. The second sentence of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), in effect declares that the subjective reasoning process of a juror is not material upon such an inquiry. By force of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), the subjective reasoning process of a juror is not a “disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action” within the meaning of Evidence Code section 210. With respect to that which is material upon such an inquiry, i.e., objectively ascertainable overt acts likely to have influenced the jury improperly, evidence “having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove” such acts is relevant (Evid. Code, § 210) and, subject to the provisions of Evidence Code section 352, is admissible.
The same policy considerations which underpin Federal Rules of Evidence rule 606(b) also inform the limiting effect of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), in relation to which it has been said: “[I]f the law were that reviewing courts could consider jurors’ statements about the effect of error on the verdict, jurors would be hounded for their statements by losing parties in every case, not just in cases of juror misconduct, and the whole nature of appellate review for prejudice would be degraded from a consideration of the objective record to an attempt to delve into the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of the jurors who often would not accurately be able to trace or articulate their different paths to the verdict. Such a trial of the jury would make the jury system completely unworkable.” (People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1200, fn. 6 [264 Cal.Rptr. 167].)
Section 28(d) commands that “relevant evidence” not be excluded in a criminal case. As defined by Evidence Code section 210, “relevant evidence” has two distinct characteristics: (1) probative quality and (2) materiality. Materiality is generally a function either of the issues tendered by the pleadings or of substantive law expressive of public policy. As a matter of policy, Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), excludes evidence of the subjective reasoning processes of jurors to impeach their verdicts. Since [33]*33such evidence is not material, it is not “relevant evidence” as defined in Evidence Code section 210, nor, perforce, as used in section 28(d).4
It remains for us to determine whether, given the admissible evidence adduced to impeach the verdict, the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial.5 According to that evidence, jury deliberations spanned two days, commencing at 1 p.m. on April 20 and concluding at 2:40 p.m. on April 22. During this period the jury submitted two questions to the court, one regarding immunity granted to certain witnesses and the other regarding conspiracy and overt act, as previously described in part I, ante. Several votes, both written and oral, were taken during this period. The final vote finding defendant guilty was an oral vote. The record does not show precisely when during the course of the two day deliberations any of these votes was taken.
Prior to the last written vote juror Miller heard an unidentified juror state defendant probably would receive only a six-month sentence. In the last written vote, 10 voted for guilty and 2, Passmore and Manjeot, were undecided. Miller voted with the majority for guilt. The record does not disclose [34]*34at what point in time during the deliberations the last written vote was taken. Sometime during the period between the last written vote and the final, oral vote Miller sought to persuade Passmore to vote guilty because defendant had committed an overt act. At this time Miller also told Passmore that defendant would probably be sentenced to only six months. During this time Manjeot “heard somebody state” defendant would receive only a six-month sentence. “Shortly after” her discussion with Miller, Passmore apparently advised the jury foreman she would change her vote to guilty by stating, “if that’s the way it has to be, then that’s the way it has to be.” When this change of vote occurred in relation to the final, oral vote, the record does not disclose. As demonstrated by her response to the jury poll, at some undisclosed time after the last written vote, Manjeot also changed her vote to guilty.6
Before beginning deliberations the jury was instructed: “In your deliberations the subject of penalty or punishment is not to be discussed or considered by the jury. That is not [sic] a matter which must not in any way affect your verdict.”7
According to the record, juror Miller and an unidentified juror disregarded the trial court’s instruction not to discuss penalty or punishment. This constituted juror misconduct. We must determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the presumption such misconduct is prejudicial had been dispelled.
Juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice. (People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108 [269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327]; Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 416 [185 Cal.Rptr. 654, 650 P.2d 1171]; People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156 [141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050].) “The presumption of prejudice is an evidentiary aid to those parties who are able to establish serious misconduct of a type likely to have had an effect on the verdict or which deprived the complaining party of thorough consideration of his case, yet who are unable to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that actual prejudice occurred. The law thus recognizes the substantial barrier to proof of prejudice which Evidence Code section 1150 erects, and it seeks to lower that barrier somewhat.” (Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 416.)
[35]*35It does not, however, eliminate the barrier altogether. The defendant, as the moving party, must still prove serious misconduct of a nature likely to have affected the verdict. And even where the presumption arises, “it may be rebutted by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court’s examination of the entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining party resulting from the misconduct.” (Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 417; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 117 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].)
In People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676], the Supreme Court reexamined the prejudice analysis in connection with juror misconduct and adopted the following objective test taken from the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 8-3.7 (2d ed. 1980) p. 8.57): “A judgment adverse to a defendant in a criminal case must be reversed or vacated ‘whenever... the court finds a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial matter relating to the defendant or to the case itself that was not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury.’ ...
“ ‘The ultimate issue of influence on the juror is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard. In effect, the court must examine the extrajudicial material and then judge whether it is inherently likely to have influenced the juror.’ Q[] Such ‘prejudice analysis’ is different from, and indeed less tolerant than, ‘harmless-error analysis’ for ordinary error at trial. . . . When the misconduct in question supports a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that at least one juror was impermissibly influenced to the defendant’s detriment, we are compelled to conclude that the integrity of the trial was undermined: under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the jury was impartial. By contrast, when the misconduct does not support such a finding, we must hold it nonprejudicial.” (People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 950-951; citations omitted.)
Under this objective standard emphasis is on the nature and extent of the alleged misconduct and not other extraneous but objectively verifiable facts. Thus, regardless of evidence that one or more jurors changed their votes after receiving extrajudicial information, our concern is with the misconduct itself and whether it is “inherently likely” to have influenced a reasonable juror.
This objective approach finds justification in the inherent mystery of jury deliberations. In a given case it is virtually impossible to determine what influenced a particular juror’s vote; an unlimited number of factors may contribute to such a decision. In order to assess fully the impact of any one [36]*36factor it would be necessary to analyze the personality of each juror and recreate the entire deliberation process, a virtually impossible task. Instead, an objective standard permits a court to look at the misconduct alone as it relates to the issues in the case and determine whether it is substantially likely to have affected the vote of a reasonable juror.
The alleged misconduct here is distinguishable from that in cases where information was received by deliberating jurors from an outside source. In contrast to jurors themselves, outside sources of information often have about them an aura of authoritativeness. For example, in People v. Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d 150, a first degree murder prosecution, a juror contacted an attorney friend and obtained an explanation regarding an involuntary manslaughter charge and diminished capacity; in People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1098, a first degree murder prosecution, a juror read a newspaper story during trial indicating defendant was on parole after having served time for assault; in People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189], one juror consulted a dictionary to clarify the court’s instruction on “mitigating” a possible death sentence and another juror resorted to a local library for books written by a defense expert. Here the source of the extrajudicial information was one or more of the jurors themselves. There is no evidence this source was either represented or perceived as being specially informed or knowledgeable on the subject of punishment for crime.
It cannot be gainsaid that jurors enter upon deliberations influenced by more than just the court’s instructions. “The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but also fundamentally human. Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience. That they do so is one of the strengths of the jury system. It is also one of its weaknesses: it has the potential to undermine determinations that should be made exclusively on the evidence introduced by the parties and the instructions given by the court. Such a weakness, however, must be tolerated. ‘[I]t is an impossible standard to require . . . [the jury] to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any external factors.’ (Rideau v. Louisiana (1963) 373 U.S. 723, 733 [10 L.Ed.2d 663, 669, 83 S.Ct. 1417] (dis. opn. of Clark, J.).) Moreover, under that ‘standard’ few verdicts would be proof against challenge.” (People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 950.)
For example, it is the rare juror indeed who does not suspect a defendant in a personal injury action is insured for any recovery awarded. It is also rare for jurors not to have some preconceived, and possibly ill-conceived, notion of the penalty associated with a particular crime. To harbor these thoughts is not misconduct. Only when a juror disregards an instruction and introduces [37]*37these matters into the jury’s deliberations does misconduct arise. When this occurs prejudice depends upon the nature and source of the information as well as how the information relates to the issues at hand.
Undoubtedly, statements regarding legal issues carry greater weight, and hence are more likely to prejudice the verdict, when they come from a juror trained in the law. Thus, in In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391 [220 Cal.Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260], a juror propounded an incorrect statement on the elements of robbery while vouching for the correctness of the statement with his 20 years of service as a police officer. The court concluded the presumption of prejudice was especially strong in this instance because it was a capital case and the misconduct went to a key issue in the prosecution’s felony-murder charge. (Id. at p. 402.)
By contrast, references to penalty here involved a matter not material to the issues presented to the jury. It is therefore more analogous to the alleged misconduct in Gorman v. Leftwich (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 141 [266 Cal.Rptr. 671], a medical malpractice action. There the defendant charged misconduct based on a declaration that “during deliberations the jurors ‘discussed whether [defendant] had medical malpractice insurance’ and that ‘[v]arious jurors said she most likely had medical malpractice insurance and the insurance company would pay the claim.’ ” The court pointed out “[t]he declaration contains no allegation that any of the jurors agreed to base their verdict upon this discussion regarding insurance. The other four juror declarations filed on behalf of defendant make no mention of insurance being discussed during deliberations.” (Id. at p. 147.) The court then rejected the charge of misconduct, concluding: “If insurance had any impact upon the verdict, the single declaration would have so stated. ‘[T]o establish misconduct requiring reversal, juror declarations must establish “[a]n express agreement by the jurors to include such [consideration of insurance] in their verdict, or extensive discussion evidencing an implied agreement to that effect.” [Citation.]’ (Moore v. Preventive Medicine Medical Group, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 728, 740 [223 Cal.Rptr. 859].) Here, as in Moore, the declaration does ‘not suggest an express agreement was reached and the discussion [it] relate[s] could hardly be characterized as extensive.’ (Id., at pp. 740-741, fn. omitted.) Upon this record, we are satisfied that if insurance was mentioned at all, the discussion was not, in the words of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), ‘of such a character as is likely to have influenced the jury improperly.’ ” (Gorman v. Leftwich, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 147.)8
[38]*38Here, as in Gorman, the allusions to improper matter were isolated and infrequent. There is no evidence of a multilateral discussion of penalty nor competent evidence that penalty was considered. The evidence shows only two or three isolated statements relating to penalty as to which there were no responses. The first of these isolated statements originated with an unidentified source within the jury itself and, as with the similar succeeding statements, was couched in terms merely of a probability that the defendant would receive a six-month jail sentence. Unlike in Stankewitz, where the extrajudicial information also originated with a juror, this information was neither represented nor presented as authoritative. Thus, even if there are circumstances where it would be objectively reasonable for a juror to believe and rely on a statement that one convicted of the serious crime of conspiracy to commit murder would receive only a six month jail sentence, those circumstances are not present here. Such reliance is not reasonable where, as here, the statement is mere speculation by someone with no special knowledge of the subject. Thus the misconduct here was not “inherently likely” (Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d pp. 950-951) to have affected the vote of any of the jurors.
We are further persuaded to this conclusion by the inconsistencies in the evidence of misconduct. In addition to the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, courts have recognized the strength of the evidence of misconduct and the probability that actual prejudice may have ensued is relevant to a determination whether the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted. (Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 417.) Here, Juror Miller indicated she heard the statement from an unknown source before the last written vote. Jurors Passmore and Manjeot heard it between the last written vote and the final vote which was oral. Passmore’s source was Miller; Manjeot’s source was unknown.
In order for Miller to have heard the statement prior to the last written vote, and thus before Passmore and Manjeot heard it, the source must have [39]*39been one of the other nine jurors. Yet the other nine swore they heard no such statement. Passmore indicated she heard the statement from Miller during a discussion “between jury members” and herself. Manjeot indicated she heard it “[djuring the discussion which ensued between the last written vote” and the final, oral vote. It is implicit in these declarations that the statements were made during general deliberations among the jurors, yet none of the other nine jurors heard them.9
The declaration and testimony of Manjeot is further suspect because she testified she never agreed to vote guilty of “conspiracy to commit first degree murder or committing first degree murder.” On motion for new trial, the trial court rejected this claim on the basis of Manjeot’s affirmative response to the jury poll after the verdict was read. The declaration and testimony of Passmore, being only slightly less fantastical than those of Manjeot, are also suspect. In her declaration, Passmore implied what Manjeot expressly asserted: that she did not vote guilty. That is the clear inference to be drawn from Passmore’s attempt to explain her affirmation of the guilty verdict during the jury poll by asserting that she meant to affirm thereby only that the verdict as read was the one filled out in the jury room. Six weeks after so stating in her declaration, Passmore affirmed the correctness of her declaration in testimony at the hearing on the new trial motion and then asserted, inconsistently, that she did vote for guilt.10
Considering the credibility issues raised by the conflicts in the declarations and testimony, the evidence of misconduct is not strong. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 232 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) The record discloses three jurors changed their votes to guilty after hearing a statement regarding penalty. However, the record is silent as to when during the 49 hours between the start and finish of deliberations the statements concerning penalty were made or the votes were taken. The final vote may have been taken well after the statements were made and following substantial discussion among the jurors of matters properly before them. Miller first heard a statement concerning penalty during a discussion of overt acts after [40]*40which she changed her vote to guilty. Both Passmore and Manjeot heard the statement in the midst of other discussions or other comments which were presumably relevant to the jury’s deliberations. There is no reason to believe the improper information was any more persuasive than the other information being discussed. In fact Miller indicated she tried to convince Passmore to vote guilty “due to the fact [defendant] had committed one of the overt acts as listed in the jury instructions.”11
Our task on appeal is to review the record independently. However, we still accord great deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of prejudicial effect. (Akers v. Kelley Company, Inc. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 633, 657 [219 Cal.Rptr. 513]; Andrews v. County of Orange (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 944, 954-955 [182 Cal.Rptr. 176].) The trial court concluded the declarations and testimony presented an insufficient basis for new trial. The court impliedly found there was not “a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial matter” (People v. Marshall, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 950) and concluded the presumption of prejudice had been rebutted.12 Considering the inconsistencies in and consequent weakness of the evidence of misconduct provided by the dissident jurors, and given the facts that the improper statements concerning penalty came from members of the jury, consisted at most of three isolated statements during two days of deliberations, were not represented as being based upon any special knowledge, were presented as merely probable, and were not of such a nature as would reasonably be relied upon given the seriousness of the crime charged, we agree with the trial court’s assessment.
“ ‘ “However strictly the decisions may lay down the rule as to the effect of misconduct of the jury that may well have prejudiced the parties, it [41]*41is settled in this state that a new trial will not be granted on that ground where the misconduct was of such a trifling nature that it could not in the nature of things have been prejudicial to the moving party, and that where it appears that the fairness of the trial has been in no way affected by such impropriety, the verdict will not be disturbed. . . .” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 117-118.)
The judgment is affirmed.
Sparks, J., concurred.