People v. Higgs

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 260181-U NOTICE Decision filed 05/21/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-26-0181 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Effingham County. ) v. ) No. 26-DV-5 ) DUSTIN W. HIGGS, ) Honorable ) Bryan M. Kibler, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Bollinger concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and denying the defendant’s motions for relief are affirmed.

¶2 The defendant, Dustin W. Higgs, appeals the February 25, 2026, order from the trial court

of Effingham County that granted the State’s petition to deny release, and the March 4, 2026,

denial of his motion for relief. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On February 25, 2026, the defendant was charged with domestic battery in that he struck

Romeo Shumaker, a household member, in the head on February 23, 2026. 720 ILCS 5/12-

3.2(a)(2) (West 2024). The State filed a petition to deny pretrial release, asserting that the proof

was evident and presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense, being

1 domestic battery, and that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2024).

¶5 The matter proceeded to a hearing on February 25, 2026. The State presented its factual

basis by proffer, stating that law enforcement officers were called by a neighbor of the victim,

Shumaker, “indicating that there was a domestic disturbance in the area.” When officers arrived,

they spoke with Shumaker, who had visible injuries on his person, including a knot on the top of

his head. Shumaker and the defendant were roommates. When Shumaker arrived home, the

defendant told him that a court appearance earlier in the day “did not go well.” The defendant then

grabbed a barbell handle and struck Shumaker over the head, causing injury. Shumaker stated that

he shoved the defendant because of the attack, which caused the defendant to fall into a dresser.

Officers recovered the barbell, which weighed approximately two and two-thirds pounds. Officers

later located the defendant after he left the scene, and the only injuries noticed on the defendant

were scratches on his knuckles. The defendant told officers that Shumaker shoved him, but did not

recall if he was struck by Shumaker.

¶6 The State further proffered the defendant’s history, including aggravated battery of a victim

over the age of 60, a violation of order of protection, aggravated fleeing and eluding a police

officer, and residential burglary. The State said that the nature and circumstances of the offense

were significant and posed a danger to the public and Shumaker. The State argued that no

conditions would ensure the safety of the public. The defendant would not be able to return home

on conditions, as the victim also lives there and it was unclear if there would be anywhere else he

could reside. Even if another location was available, the State argued that there would not be “any

reason to believe that [the defendant] would cooperate with [conditions] given his history.”

2 ¶7 Defense counsel argued that the proof was not evident or presumption great that the

defendant committed a detention-eligible offense, as the evidence did not show it was evident that

the defendant was the aggressor. Shumaker admitted to shoving the defendant, and Shumaker was

under the influence of alcohol when officers spoke with him. Defense counsel argued that the

defendant did not pose a real and present threat. If he did pose a threat, conditions could mitigate

that threat. The defendant could reside with his grandmother under monitoring, and he could

undergo a mental health assessment.

¶8 The trial court stated that the proof was evident that the defendant committed a detainable

offense, being domestic battery, and that he posed a threat to the victim and to the community due

to his conduct and prior history. The court found that less restrictive conditions would not protect

Shumaker or the community. The trial court stated it based its decision due to the defendant’s

history of multiple plenary orders of protection against him, violation of an order of protection,

and aggravated battery. The defendant was ordered detained.

¶9 The defendant filed a motion for relief on February 27, 2026. The motion alleged that the

State failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant committed a detention-

eligible offense, posed a real and specific threat to the safety of an individual or the community,

and that no conditions or combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat. The

matter was set for hearing on March 4, 2026.

¶ 10 During the hearing, defense counsel alleged that the State failed to prove the elements listed

in the motion for relief. Defense counsel stated that while there were some concerns about the

defendant’s mental health, that should not be the only reason for detention, and he should receive

medical treatment. The State responded that all the elements were proven during the initial hearing

and there was not a less restrictive alternative to mitigate the real and present threat. The trial court

3 reiterated its findings from the initial hearing, stating that the defendant had a history of violence

and his mental health concerns were a contributing factor. The trial court denied the motion for

relief. The defendant appealed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant filed a notice in lieu of memorandum. As such, his motion for relief

serves as his argument on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). The defendant’s

motion for relief argues that the State failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

defendant committed a detention-eligible offense, posed a real and specific threat to the safety of

an individual or the community, and that no conditions or combination of condition could mitigate

the real and present threat. The motion did not contain any fact-specific argument as to how the

trial court erred.

¶ 13 A defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain statutorily limited situations,

pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code). 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1 (West 2024). Upon filing a timely verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the

State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the

presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s

pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or a

flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety

of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id.

§ 110-6.1(e), (f). The State or the defendant may present evidence to the trial court by way of

proffer based upon reliable information. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2). The trial court may order a defendant

detained pending trial if the defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the trial court

concludes the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

4 community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)).

¶ 14 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is dependent on whether the trial

court heard live witness testimony or whether the parties proceeded solely by proffer or submission

of documentary evidence. Where the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by

proffer or submission of documentary evidence, this court stands in the same position as the trial

court and may conduct its own independent review of the proffered evidence, thus reviewing the

record de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. As no live testimony was presented at

the detention hearing, we will employ a de novo standard.

¶ 15 A. Detainable Offense

¶ 16 At this stage, the State does not need to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 13. Instead, the State needs only to show that

the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense

“by clear and convincing evidence.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2024). The Code provides

that the State need not actually introduce the underlying evidence at the hearing, and may satisfy

its burden of persuasion by presenting evidence “at the hearing by way of proffer based upon

reliable information.” Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2).

¶ 17 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial

detention hearing and the hearing on the defendant’s motion for relief. The defendant was charged

with domestic battery, which is detainable under the Code. Id. § 110-6.1(a)(4). As to whether the

State proved the defendant committed the offense, the State’s proffer was based on law

enforcement’s report of the offense. Officers spoke with Shumaker, who stated that he and the

defendant lived together. When the defendant came home from a court appearance, he hit

5 Shumaker in the head with the handle of a barbell. Officers observed a visible injury to Shumaker’s

head, consistent with being hit by the defendant as reported. Thus, the record shows that the

reliable information provided by the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

defendant committed a detainable offense. As such, we find that the proof is evident or

presumption great that the defendant committed domestic battery.

¶ 18 B. Real and Present Threat

¶ 19 The court is provided a nonexhaustive list of factors it should consider when determining

whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any individual(s) or the

community. These include the following:

“(1) The nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the

offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon, or a sex offense.

(2) The history and characteristics of the defendant including:

(A) Any evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal history indicative of

violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior. Such evidence

may include testimony or documents received in juvenile proceedings, criminal,

quasi-criminal, civil commitment, domestic relations, or other proceedings.

(B) Any evidence of the defendant’s psychological, psychiatric or other

similar social history which tends to indicate a violent, abusive, or assaultive nature,

or lack of any such history.

(3) The identity of any person or persons to whose safety the defendant is believed

to pose a threat, and the nature of the threat.

(4) Any statements made by, or attributed to the defendant, together with the

circumstances surrounding them.

6 (5) The age and physical condition of the defendant.

(6) The age and physical condition of any victim or complaining witness.

(7) Whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapon or

weapons.

(8) Whether, at the time of the current offense or any other offense or arrest, the

defendant was on probation, parole, aftercare release, mandatory supervised release, or

other release from custody pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for

an offense under federal or State law.

(9) Any other factors, including those listed in Section 110-5 of this Article

deemed by the court to have a reasonable bearing upon the defendant’s propensity or

reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or lack of such behavior.” 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(9) (West 2024).

No one factor is determinative, and the court must base its decision on an individualized

assessment. People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 15 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7)

(West 2022)).

¶ 20 We have conducted our own independent review of the proffered evidence and the relevant

factors. First, the nature and circumstances of the offense charged against the defendant involve a

crime of violence. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1) (West 2024). Next, the history and characteristics of

the defendant include aggravated battery, violation of an order of protection, aggravated fleeing

law enforcement, residential burglary, and disorderly conduct. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(2). The defendant

also had a history of three plenary orders of protection and one emergency order of protection. The

defendant’s release would pose a risk directly to Shumaker, as the parties lived together and

Shumaker was injured at the residence. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(3). Further, the defendant was on

7 probation in three cases at the time of this offense. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(8). Accordingly, this court

agrees with the trial court, that based on the specific, articulable facts and the Code’s factors, the

defendant posed a real and present threat to Shumaker and the community as a whole.

¶ 21 C. Conditions

¶ 22 Once a court determines that the defendant poses a threat to the safety of any individual or

the community, the trial court must determine whether the State has met its burden of proving by

clear and convincing evidence what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the

appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the

likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS

5/110-5(a) (West 2024). In reaching its determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature

and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant;

(3) the history and characteristics of the person; 1 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific,

real, and present threat to any person that would be posed by the person’s release; and (5) the

nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice

process. Id. The Code lists no singular factor as dispositive. See id. The nature and circumstances

of the underlying offense is “just one factor to consider in determining whether the threat posed

can be mitigated by conditions of release.” People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 19.

¶ 23 As we are employing de novo review, we will apply these same factors to the evidence

proffered. We find the following factors support the conclusion that no condition or combination

1 The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A), (B) (West 2024). 8 of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat posed by the defendant. First, the nature

and circumstances of the offense charged. The defendant was charged with domestic battery,

which included violence. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1) (West 2024). The weight of the evidence against

the defendant included a factual account from Shumaker and information from law enforcement

about his injuries, which were consistent with the account. Id. § 110-5(a)(2). The defendant’s

history includes aggravated battery, violation of order of protection, and multiple orders of

protection against him from different parties. Id. § 110-5(a)(3). The defendant posed a risk to

Shumaker and the community as a whole if released due to his behavior and history. Id. § 110-

5(a)(4). Accordingly, based on our independent review, we agree with the trial court that no

condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the threat posed by the defendant.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders of February 25, 2026,

and March 4, 2026.

¶ 26 Affirmed.