People v. Higgs
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Opinion
NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 220788-U NOTICE Decision filed 08/12/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0788 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-1435 ) DEANGELO HIGGS, ) Honorable ) L. Dominic Kujawa Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McHaney ∗ and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance is without merit. The defendant’s sentence is reduced pursuant to Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(4) to comply with the statutory cap on consecutive sentences.
¶2 The defendant, Deangelo Higgs, appeals his convictions and sentences, following a jury
trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County, for seven counts of attempted first degree murder and
one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
the defendant’s convictions and reduce his sentence from 182 years to 120 years’ imprisonment to
comply with the statutory cap on aggregate maximum consecutive sentences pursuant to section
5-8-4(f)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2020)).
∗ Justice Welch participated in oral argument. Presiding Justice McHaney was later substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to the recording of oral argument. 1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Indictment
¶5 We recite only those facts necessary for an understanding of our disposition of this appeal.
On September 24, 2021, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury with a total of 16 counts.
Specifically, the defendant was indicted with seven counts of attempted first degree murder. Each
alleged that on September 9, 2021, the defendant, or one for whom he was accountable, without
justification, shot a named individual with intent to kill that individual: respectively, Marquise
Chairs, Trequion Holman, Camelita Lacroix, David Whitfield, Mark Williams, Jimmie Nicholson,
and a juvenile, M.M. In addition, the defendant was indicted on seven counts of aggravated battery
with a firearm as to the same individuals, as well as one count of aggravated battery of a child as
to M.M. and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. All counts were Class X
felonies except the possession of a weapon by a felon, which was a Class 2 felony. Each count of
attempted murder and aggravated battery named Cartez Beard and Lorenzo Bruce as codefendants.
¶6 B. Waiver of Counsel
¶7 On April 22, 2022, the defendant filed a pro se motion entitled, “Motion to Withdraw
Counsel,” wherein he alleged that he and his “attorney have had a number of disagreements which
render further representation impossible.” On the same date, the defendant filed a pro se “Demand
for Speedy Trial.” On May 4, 2022, the defendant appeared before the trial court and indicated
that he no longer wanted the public defender to represent him and that he would like to proceed
pro se. The defendant stated to the trial court, “With all due respect, I’ve already made the decision.
I unequivocally would like to represent myself. There is no need for second thought about it.” With
agreement from the defendant, the trial court continued his request to proceed pro se to May 17,
2 2022, to give the defendant time to “really think about this.” On May 17, 2022, the following
colloquy took place between the defendant and the trial court:
“THE COURT: I know we were here a week or so ago, maybe two weeks ago, Mr. Higgs. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: And I think at that time you stated that you wanted to represent yourself in this matter. Correct. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: What—do you remember what I said to you? THE DEFENDANT: You gave me some time to think about it. THE COURT: All right. Now, I gave you some time to think about it. Do you still want to go down that route? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, I’m going to go over some things with you, and then I’m going to ask you again if you still want to go down that route, so I want you to listen real close to me. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Looking at the charges, I have a sixteen-count—sixteen counts in front of me; seven of them being aggravated battery, discharge of a firearm; Count 8, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon; 9 through 15, attempted first degree murder; Count 16, aggravated battery of a child. All of these—all of these are Class X felonies, punishable by six to thirty years Department of Corrections, up to three years of mandatory-supervised release. At this time, I—I don’t know if they run consecutively or not, meaning boom boom boom (indicating). Do you understand that, Mr. Higgs? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand what I mean by that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: You are looking at—if—if found guilty, you are looking at a potential of a long time— THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT:—in the Department of Corrections. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: I fully understand.”
¶8 The trial court then inquired about whether the defendant had any legal training or
experience. The defendant responded that he had faced a jury trial before and that he is familiar
with the proceedings. The defendant stated that he went to trial in Georgia in 2011, he had legal
representation for the trial, and that he was found guilty. The trial court then stated the following:
“THE COURT: I also want you to understand that—well, obviously you already know that if you can’t afford an attorney, an attorney could—would be appointed to
3 represent you, and you have Mr. Philo representing you now from the Public Defender’s Office. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand. THE COURT: All right. I want you to listen to me closely. I’m going to read this exhaustive list. I want you to understand presenting a defense is not simply a matter of telling one’s story; so you just can’t get up there and tell your story. There may be objections. You may not be able to get the story out because you’re going—will be going against individuals who are trained in the legal field, so do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. *** THE COURT: Do you also understand by what I told you that naturally they’re going to have an advantage over you for the simple fact that they’re trained in the legal field. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: Also, I want you to understand that just because you’re proceeding pro se you’re not going to be able to complain about the representation on appeal. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor.”
¶9 The trial court then cautioned the defendant again regarding self-representation and went
through various example scenarios that could occur at trial where the court could not give the
defendant special consideration simply because he is a pro se defendant and may not understand.
The defendant indicated that he understood.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 220788-U NOTICE Decision filed 08/12/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-22-0788 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-1435 ) DEANGELO HIGGS, ) Honorable ) L. Dominic Kujawa Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McHaney ∗ and Justice Cates concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s convictions are affirmed. Defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance is without merit. The defendant’s sentence is reduced pursuant to Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(4) to comply with the statutory cap on consecutive sentences.
¶2 The defendant, Deangelo Higgs, appeals his convictions and sentences, following a jury
trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County, for seven counts of attempted first degree murder and
one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
the defendant’s convictions and reduce his sentence from 182 years to 120 years’ imprisonment to
comply with the statutory cap on aggregate maximum consecutive sentences pursuant to section
5-8-4(f)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2020)).
∗ Justice Welch participated in oral argument. Presiding Justice McHaney was later substituted on the panel and has read the briefs and listened to the recording of oral argument. 1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Indictment
¶5 We recite only those facts necessary for an understanding of our disposition of this appeal.
On September 24, 2021, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury with a total of 16 counts.
Specifically, the defendant was indicted with seven counts of attempted first degree murder. Each
alleged that on September 9, 2021, the defendant, or one for whom he was accountable, without
justification, shot a named individual with intent to kill that individual: respectively, Marquise
Chairs, Trequion Holman, Camelita Lacroix, David Whitfield, Mark Williams, Jimmie Nicholson,
and a juvenile, M.M. In addition, the defendant was indicted on seven counts of aggravated battery
with a firearm as to the same individuals, as well as one count of aggravated battery of a child as
to M.M. and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. All counts were Class X
felonies except the possession of a weapon by a felon, which was a Class 2 felony. Each count of
attempted murder and aggravated battery named Cartez Beard and Lorenzo Bruce as codefendants.
¶6 B. Waiver of Counsel
¶7 On April 22, 2022, the defendant filed a pro se motion entitled, “Motion to Withdraw
Counsel,” wherein he alleged that he and his “attorney have had a number of disagreements which
render further representation impossible.” On the same date, the defendant filed a pro se “Demand
for Speedy Trial.” On May 4, 2022, the defendant appeared before the trial court and indicated
that he no longer wanted the public defender to represent him and that he would like to proceed
pro se. The defendant stated to the trial court, “With all due respect, I’ve already made the decision.
I unequivocally would like to represent myself. There is no need for second thought about it.” With
agreement from the defendant, the trial court continued his request to proceed pro se to May 17,
2 2022, to give the defendant time to “really think about this.” On May 17, 2022, the following
colloquy took place between the defendant and the trial court:
“THE COURT: I know we were here a week or so ago, maybe two weeks ago, Mr. Higgs. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: And I think at that time you stated that you wanted to represent yourself in this matter. Correct. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: What—do you remember what I said to you? THE DEFENDANT: You gave me some time to think about it. THE COURT: All right. Now, I gave you some time to think about it. Do you still want to go down that route? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Well, I’m going to go over some things with you, and then I’m going to ask you again if you still want to go down that route, so I want you to listen real close to me. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Looking at the charges, I have a sixteen-count—sixteen counts in front of me; seven of them being aggravated battery, discharge of a firearm; Count 8, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon; 9 through 15, attempted first degree murder; Count 16, aggravated battery of a child. All of these—all of these are Class X felonies, punishable by six to thirty years Department of Corrections, up to three years of mandatory-supervised release. At this time, I—I don’t know if they run consecutively or not, meaning boom boom boom (indicating). Do you understand that, Mr. Higgs? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you understand what I mean by that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: You are looking at—if—if found guilty, you are looking at a potential of a long time— THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT:—in the Department of Corrections. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: I fully understand.”
¶8 The trial court then inquired about whether the defendant had any legal training or
experience. The defendant responded that he had faced a jury trial before and that he is familiar
with the proceedings. The defendant stated that he went to trial in Georgia in 2011, he had legal
representation for the trial, and that he was found guilty. The trial court then stated the following:
“THE COURT: I also want you to understand that—well, obviously you already know that if you can’t afford an attorney, an attorney could—would be appointed to
3 represent you, and you have Mr. Philo representing you now from the Public Defender’s Office. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand. THE COURT: All right. I want you to listen to me closely. I’m going to read this exhaustive list. I want you to understand presenting a defense is not simply a matter of telling one’s story; so you just can’t get up there and tell your story. There may be objections. You may not be able to get the story out because you’re going—will be going against individuals who are trained in the legal field, so do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. *** THE COURT: Do you also understand by what I told you that naturally they’re going to have an advantage over you for the simple fact that they’re trained in the legal field. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: Also, I want you to understand that just because you’re proceeding pro se you’re not going to be able to complain about the representation on appeal. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor.”
¶9 The trial court then cautioned the defendant again regarding self-representation and went
through various example scenarios that could occur at trial where the court could not give the
defendant special consideration simply because he is a pro se defendant and may not understand.
The defendant indicated that he understood. The trial court stressed to the defendant that if he
chose to proceed pro se he would be going into this alone and the trial court could not help him
other than the basic instructions. The defendant indicated he understood. In addition, the trial court
asked if the defendant persisted in his demand for a speedy trial, which the defendant responded
to in the affirmative. The trial court then inquired about the defendant’s age and level of education.
The defendant stated that he was 35 years old and that he had “three years of college, business,
office administration” and “a year and a half of technical school.” The defendant stated that he was
a “fabricator/welder.” The following exchange then occurred:
“THE COURT: All right. All right. Mr. Higgs, I’ll ask—I’ll ask the question again. Do you wish to proceed to trial— THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT:—as a self-represented litigant? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Philo, you’re dismissed from the representation of Mr. Higgs. Mr. Higgs, I’ve gone through—I’ve admonished Mr. Higgs on numerous aspects of going to trial on his own. He’s entering into this knowingly and voluntary, and I will accept his waiver of counsel.”
Immediately following, the defendant requested to renew his motion to reduce bond. The trial
court held a hearing, at which the State informed the trial court that, if found guilty, the defendant
faced several Class X felony offenses that “could be run consecutively.” The defendant’s motion
to reduce bond was ultimately denied.
¶ 10 Throughout the defendant’s pretrial settings, the trial court would continue to inquire of
the defendant whether he wished to continue pro se. Specifically, on August 3, 2022, five days
before the trial was scheduled, the following discussion occurred:
“THE COURT: We’re going to Monday. It’s happening on Monday. I’ll ask you this again. I’ve asked you three or four times now. Do you still wish to proceed as a self- represented litigant on Monday? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: Again, I want you to understand that you will be treated as a trained lawyer. So I will not allow during jury selection, during any part of this trial to—you to make any remarks that, well, I’m doing this by myself, I don’t know what I’m doing, I’m not a trained lawyer. That’s not going to happen. That’s not going to happen during jury selection. That’s not going to happen during trial. You will be held to the same standard as I’m holding the State to. I want you to understand that. THE DEFENDANT: I fully understand. THE COURT: Then again I ask you do you still wish to proceed Monday to trial represent is [sic] yourself? THE DEFENDANT: What was this great country founded on? THE COURT: That’s a yes? THE DEFENDANT: That’s a yes. I’m definitely representing myself. *** THE COURT: Mr. Higgs, we’ve also—I know probably at least twice that we’ve gone over the possible sentences. Do you understand the possible sentences? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor, I understand the possible sentences. THE COURT: Do you remember us going over them? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I’m not worried about it, Your Honor. I’m innocent.”
¶ 11 On August 10, 2022, the morning of trial, the following final discussion took place between
the trial court and the defendant:
5 “THE COURT: All right. And I will ask you one more time, Mr. Higgs, is this what you want to do? Do you want to proceed to trial representing yourself? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this question. Let me ask you a couple more questions in fact. No one’s put any undue influence on you to act as a self-represented litigant, no one’s pressured you or anything? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: And no one’s made any kind of promises to you or anything? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. THE COURT: All right. And you’re doing this of your own free will, correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.”
After the trial court discussed trial procedures and ruled on the final pretrial motions, the defendant
requested counsel but withdrew that request after a recess. The trial court again confirmed the
defendant wanted to represent himself.
¶ 12 C. Diagram of Incident for Reference
¶ 13 Below is a diagram of the location where the incident took place for reference and is not to
scale. This diagram is solely to aid the understanding of the evidence presented at trial and show
the locations of the defendant, codefendants, and victims at the time of the shooting.
6 Martin Luther King Dr.
Cam elita
M.M. Marquis~ a Chairs
~ h ... ... C Trequion Holman ~ C
·; ~ CD ·; "ii ... (cm CD > l.. Jimmi«! Lorenzo Bruce- + ~ e a n g elo .. ....GI Nicholson ... GI
r§ ~ Higgs ( Def) ..c ..... :E 0 C ct GI dJ :E t V') Mark w,11 ,ams ~ artez Beard tJz David Whitfield Parking Lot
,i 14 D. Summary ofEvidence at Trial
,i 15 The trial began on August 10, 2022, and ended on August 17, 2022. The State had entered
into an agreement with codefendant Caiiez Beai·d, in which he pled guilty to aggravated batte1y
with a fireaim as to M.M. , in exchange for a 22-yeai· sentence and his trnthful testimony at trial.
Codefendant Lorenzo Brnce had not entered into any agreement with the State and did not testify
at trial.
,i 16 Beard was the defendant's cousin and knew Lorenzo Brnce. Beai·d testified that several
weeks prior to September 9, 2021 , he was with the defendant and Brnce at defendant's
grandfather's house in East St. Louis. The defendant and Brnce left in Brnce's vehicle to sell
someone a "little weed." About 20 minutes later, the defendant and Brnce ran back to the house.
They were "emaged" and told Beai·d they had just been "robbed by Pee-wee and them." Beai·d
later leained that "Pee-wee" was Mai·quise Chairs. The defendant and Brnce left and then returned
7 in Bruce’s vehicle. Beard testified he heard both the defendant and Bruce say there were “going to
get back with them and get up with them,” which he understood to mean “when I see you, like I
was going to kill you.” The defendant and Bruce later showed Beard photographs of Chairs “and
the other guy” who robbed them. Beard testified that the defendant and Bruce looked for those
men over the next several weeks.
¶ 17 Marquise Chairs entered into an agreement with the State in which he would plead guilty
to unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon in exchange for a sentence of 5 to 12 years and his
truthful testimony. Chairs testified that he had been told his uncle and “Zoe” 1 had “supposedly got
robbed” prior to September 9, 2021. Chairs’ uncle told him to “be watching out for anything” from
Zoe. Chairs did not know the defendant, Beard, or Bruce, had never seen the defendant before, and
denied robbing the defendant or Zoe.
¶ 18 Trequion Holman testified that he had never seen the defendant before and did not know
Zoe. Holman denied robbing anyone and denied hearing Chairs robbed anyone.
¶ 19 Beard testified that on September 9, 2021, the defendant borrowed his blue Dodge Journey,
and both the defendant and Bruce returned in the Journey that afternoon. Bruce was in the front
passenger seat with an “ARP pistol” and an “AK” rifle. The defendant “had an assault rifle” and a
“ball magazine,” which he took with him from the driver’s seat to the back seat. All three men
were wearing black. Beard then entered the driver seat and drove to the East Side Meat Market
(Market), located at 510 Martin Luther King Drive, East St. Louis, Illinois.
¶ 20 The Market had entrances to the parking lot on King Drive and 6th Street. The State
obtained several surveillance videos, particularly from the Market and Another Level, a business
1 Based on the record, “Zoe” refers to Lorenzo Bruce. 8 across the street. The State introduced into evidence two disks containing all of the videos, Exhibits
3 and 4, and a third disk containing selected clips, Exhibit 56.
¶ 21 Beard pulled into the Market parking lot from 6th Street at approximately 4 p.m. At that
time, the people in the lot included Jimmie Nicholson, Mark Williams, and David Whitfield,
gathered around Nicholson’s white SUV near the Market building. Marquisha Collins was sitting
in the driver’s seat of her gray Mazda parked facing toward Nicholson’s vehicle, with her two sons
in the back seat, including three-year-old M.M. Between Collins’ vehicle and the Market was
parked a blue Toyota Rav4 with Demarcus Reed inside. Further from the Market and to the left of
Collins’ vehicle was Davianna Jennings in the driver seat of her silver Dodge Charger facing King
Drive and the bus stop. Chairs was wearing a white t-shirt, and Holman was wearing a black tank
top. They were standing at Jennings’ vehicle on the driver’s side. At the bus stop on King Drive
was Camelita Lacroix with her fiancé and her two children.
¶ 22 As Beard pulled into the lot, he saw the defendant and Bruce look toward Chairs, and heard
them say, respectively, “[T]hat’s little dude,” and, “[Y]eah.” As the defendant told Beard to stop,
Beard saw the defendant and Bruce “grabbing their guns” and “pulling *** their little ski masks
down.” When Beard stopped in the middle of the parking lot, the defendant and Bruce exited the
vehicle on the passenger side armed with rifles and fired shots at Chairs, towards King Drive.
¶ 23 Camelita Lacroix testified that as she sat at the bus stop, she heard gunfire, the plexiglas
pane behind her shattered, and she was shot in the elbow. She then fell onto her children in an
effort to shield them from the gunfire. Lacroix lost the use of her arm.
¶ 24 Jennings testified that she heard shots from behind her vehicle and drove on to King Drive.
Several bullets hit the rear and passenger side of her vehicle. Jennings did not see Chairs or anyone
else with a gun.
9 ¶ 25 Both Chairs and Holman testified that a dark SUV pulled into the lot. According to Chairs,
three men dressed in black and wearing masks got out of the SUV and fired shots at him. Holman
testified that two men wearing black with black masks armed with rifles got out of the passenger
side of the SUV and fired shots at him. Holman saw a third man exit the driver’s side. Chairs was
not armed and neither Chairs nor Holman heard any shots prior to that moment. One bullet grazed
Holman’s left cheek, requiring stitches. Holman had a handgun in his pocket and fired one shot at
the men as he fled. Chairs ran across King Drive and was shot in the back.
¶ 26 According to Beard, after Bruce and the defendant started shooting, a man next to the blue
Rav4, Demarcus Reed, fired return shots in their direction. Beard grabbed the “AR pistol,” got out,
and started shooting at Reed. Beard saw Reed run around the Rav4, then run alongside Collins’
Mazda after she drove around the Rav4. Beard continued firing at Reed as he fled. Surveillance
video from the Market showed Reed holding a gun as he ran. On the Another Level video, Beard
identified puffs of smoke around the Mazda and Rav4 as the shots he fired at Reed.
¶ 27 Collins testified that as she sat in her vehicle, she saw three people near the dark SUV fire
“three big guns” at Chairs and Holman, then saw Chairs and Holman return fire. Collins drove
around the Rav4 and exited left on King Drive. A bullet entered Collins’ vehicle through the rear
passenger-side door. Collins observed that M.M. had been shot and drove to the police station
where officers then drove M.M. to the hospital. M.M. had injuries to his arm, abdomen, and spinal
cord, leaving his legs paralyzed.
¶ 28 Beard testified that during the gunfire, the defendant ran around to the driver’s side of the
Journey. According to Beard, a man by the white SUV to his left started firing at them, and the
defendant stated that he had been shot and returned fire in that direction.
10 ¶ 29 Williams and Whitfield both testified that they and Nicholson were shot while standing
near Nicholson’s white SUV. They did not know who fired the shots and denied that any of the
three of them were armed. Nicholson was shot in the chest and buttock and had several internal
injuries. Williams was shot in the knee. Whitfield was shot in the back and had two broken ribs.
The passenger side of Nicholson’s SUV was hit by several shots and the police found no guns or
ammunition inside.
¶ 30 The defendant, Bruce, and Beard ran from the lot on foot toward 6th Street. Beard testified
that he knew that what he had been involved in was wrong. After running a few blocks, they
dropped their guns and jumped down into the basement of a concrete structure. The police
surrounded the structure and attempted for several hours to get them to come out. In the early
morning hours on September 10, 2021, the defendant and codefendants exited the basement and
were arrested. The defendant was taken to the hospital for gunshot wounds. Beard told the police
they were “ambushed,” but testified that was “a lie.”
¶ 31 Near the concrete structure, the police found a black mask with Bruce’s DNA and three
guns: a “Cugir 7.62” rifle, a “Stag” rifle, and an “AR15 pistol.” The Cugir 7.62 had been fired
until empty. The Stag rifle was loaded with 58 rounds and had DNA from both the defendant and
Beard. A total of 46 discharged shell casings were collected as evidence.
¶ 32 The State introduced the defendant’s prior 2009 Georgia robbery conviction for the
purposes of establishing his felon status for the possession of a weapon by a felon charge.
¶ 33 The defendant asserted the affirmative defense of self-defense at trial. He testified that he
did not know Chairs or Holman and was never robbed by them. He testified that Beard picked him
up in the Journey at 3:45 p.m. on September 9, 2021. The defendant got into the back seat, saw
Bruce in the front passenger seat, and saw ammunition and several guns in the car. As Beard pulled
11 into the Market parking lot, the defendant saw “the guy in the blue car” aiming a gun “out the
window” with the door “slightly ajar,” then saw Holman to his right “reaching for a gun.” The
defendant feared they were being “boxed in” by “guys pulling guns.” The defendant grabbed the
Stag rifle as their vehicle was being shot at and he was shot in the arm. The defendant exited the
vehicle and fired two shots towards Jennings’ Charger but denied “aiming at anyone.” The
defendant was then shot in the chest. The defendant ran to the driver’s side of the Journey, where
he was shot in the back as he opened the door to look for his cellphone. The defendant denied
firing any other shots. He testified that he fled behind Bruce and Beard and they all hid in the
basement of the concrete structure. He dropped the Stag rifle before jumping down into the
structure. Beard had a cellphone but did not call for help. He testified that, due to his injuries, he
was unconscious much of the time before the police helped him out of the basement and took him
to the hospital. The defendant did not recall talking to the police at the hospital and denied saying
he did not remember the incident.
¶ 34 In rebuttal, the State introduced the defendant’s video-recorded statement at the hospital,
during which he said, “I don’t remember nothing. Besides being shot, I don’t know exactly what
happened.” The State also impeached the defendant with statements from his pro se pretrial
motions denying he possessed a gun.
¶ 35 E. Jury Instructions
¶ 36 The State requested that one instruction be given for the seven counts of first degree
murder. The instruction was the standard IPI 6.07X issues instruction for attempted murder with
additions to include the defendant’s theory of self-defense and the State’s theory of accountability.
The issue instruction was granted over the defendant’s objection and read as follows:
“To sustain the charge of attempt first degree murder, the State must prove the following propositions:
12 First Proposition: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward the killing of an individual; and Second Proposition: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, did so with the intent to kill an individual. Third Proposition: That the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, was not justified in using the force which he used. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty.”
Separate verdict forms for attempted first degree murder were given for each of the seven victims
alleged in the State’s indictment.
¶ 37 The State also requested one instruction for each potential firearm enhancement for
attempted first degree murder, asking the jury to decide whether the defendant, “during the
commission of the offense of attempt first degree murder,” was “armed with a firearm” or
“personally discharged a firearm,” and one set of verdict forms for each enhancement. The trial
court gave these instructions and verdict forms.
¶ 38 Additionally, the State requested an instruction for IPI 24-25.10, “Forcible Felon Not
Entitled To Use Force.” The instruction tendered read as follows: “A person is not justified in the
use of force if he is attempting to commit first degree murder or committing aggravated battery
with a firearm or committing aggravated battery of a child.” The defendant initially objected but
then withdrew his objection, and the instruction was given by the trial court.
¶ 39 F. Closing Arguments
¶ 40 The State argued that a person is guilty of attempted murder if he, or someone for whom
he is accountable, takes “a substantial step toward the killing of an individual,” and did so “with
the intent to kill an individual.” The State argued that the “substantial step” element for “each of 13 those counts of attempt first degree murder” was proven by evidence that the defendant and Bruce
were “shooting in the direction of Marquise Chairs.” Additionally, the State argued that the
defendant, Bruce, and Beard intended to kill Marquise Chairs and were all engaged in the same
intent, “shooting up that parking lot trying to kill Marquise Chairs.” The State emphasized as proof
of “an intent to kill an individual” that Bruce fired 26 shots at Chairs. The State urged the jury to
convict the defendant on all seven counts of attempt murder because “[w]hen they get out of that
car and they’re shooting at Marquise Chairs with the intent to kill him, that intent transfers to
everybody else that’s on that lot.” The State also argued that the defendant admitted to exiting the
vehicle with the “Stag Arms” rifle and shooting in the direction of the silver Charger that Chairs
was standing beside. The State argued he was accountable for the conduct of Bruce and Beard,
and that it was no coincidence that he exited the vehicle at the same time as Bruce, armed with a
rifle, dressed in black, with a ski mask over his face. The State argued the video and the witness’s
testimony clearly demonstrates that the first shots were fired by the defendant, Bruce, and Beard.
Further, the State argued that they were not acting in self-defense because they were the initial
aggressors.
¶ 41 The defendant argued that when he got into the vehicle with Bruce and Beard he did not
have “any knowledge of any intended act” and “at no point did [he] intend to harm anyone.” He
argued that he did not have on a “hoodie or an assassin’s outfit or a mask.” He stated that the story
that Beard gave “never happened” and was a “flat out lie.” In addition, he stated that both Chairs
and Holman denied that a robbery ever happened and that they do not know him. The defendant
also argued that Demarcus Reed, the individual in the blue Rav4, was the first person to fire shots.
The defendant claimed that the video may not clearly show it, but “[Reed] possessed this weapon
and he was firing this weapon as we approached, and I saw it coming.” The defendant stated he
14 grabbed the weapon in self-defense, got out of the vehicle, and “let off two shots and went for
cover.” He argued that he was not the aggressor and that he did not shoot anyone.
¶ 42 G. Jury Deliberations
¶ 43 Jury deliberations began on August 17, 2022, at 12:37 p.m. and were held in a vacant
courtroom. At 1:35 p.m., the jury sent a note to the court. The first note stated the following:
“For the propositions #1 & #2, when they state ‘an individual,’ does this mean any individual or just the individual mentioned in each individual charge? This related to - any - of the first degree murder charges.” (Emphasis in original.)
The trial court, the State, and the defendant discussed on the record what the court’s response
should entail. As to the first note, the State argued that the doctrine of transferred intent applies to
attempt first degree murder charges and cited authority in support. The State argued that the trial
court should instruct the jury that “when considering an individual, they may consider any
individual.” The defendant objected and argued the jury was asking whether the propositions
applied to “each individual” named in the seven counts of attempted murder. The State noted that
the language in the instruction does state “an individual,” then argued that “[t]hose instructions do
not have to apply specifically to set that specific intent against a person that was harmed by the
action.” Over the defendant’s objection, the court replied to the first note in writing, “An individual
may be any individual.”
¶ 44 At 1:47 p.m., the jury sent a second note to the court stating, “We would like to view the
videos of exhibits 3 & 4. (Another Level & Meat Market Surveillance).” The State argued the jury
should view the exhibits in the manner similar to how they were viewed during trial. The jury
should take their seats back in the jury box and the deputy clerk should set up the system and play
the exhibits for the jury. The defendant objected arguing that the jury be allowed to watch the
videos as they wished, with the ability to pause or slow the videos and to “get up close to the
15 screen.” The State argued that People’s Exhibits 3 and 4 contained additional files that were not
published to the jury and giving the jury those exhibits without any sort of monitoring was a
concern. The trial court suggested that it could admonish the jury not to view any subfolders on
the exhibits, but the State was concerned that too many admonishments could create the
appearance that the State is “trying to hide something when really we are simply trying to preserve
the record of evidence that was admitted.” By allowing the deputy clerk to play the exhibits, that
would be avoided. The defendant continued to object and requested that the jury view the videos
as close as possible. In addition, he argued that the exhibits were admitted into evidence and the
jurors should be able to view any portion of those videos. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial
court ruled the jurors would watch the videos from the jury box, as at trial. The trial court
confirmed both exhibits were admitted into evidence but limited the jurors to “the portions ***
viewed” at trial.
¶ 45 The defendant objected again and the State argued that the “scope” of each exhibit was
“limited” to “what was played off of that exhibit.” The State added that it could be “prejudiced”
by allowing the jury to watch unpublished portions of the exhibits because they will wonder “[w]hy
were those not shown to us.” The trial court suggested giving the jury the “consolidated video,”
Exhibit 56, to view. The defendant objected and argued the jurors requested the exhibits they did
because “the consolidated portion is probably too small for them” and they wanted a “better view.”
The trial court then ordered the parties to create a list of files on Exhibits 3 and 4 containing videos
published to the jury in Exhibit 56.
¶ 46 At 3:16 p.m., the jury sent a third note which contained, inter alia, questions concerning
the “intent” element of the charged offenses:
“If a person intended to harm person A, but others are harmed in the process, does the intent to harm person A also apply to the other persons who are harmed unintentionally?
16 If it has been established that intent of harm toward one individual or individuals has been established, does that mean that all parties are included in that intent?”
The State, citing the doctrine of transferred intent, submitted that the following language be used,
“If you determine that a person has the requisite intent to harm an individual, that intent applies to
all other individuals unintentionally harmed.” The defendant initially objected, but the parties later
agreed to a written response, which stated, “If you determine that a person has the requisite intent
to harm an individual and acts so as to harm that individual that intent applies to all other
individuals unintentionally harmed.”
¶ 47 At 3:58 p.m., the jury sent out a fourth note asking the trial court when they will be able to
view the videos they had requested. The jury explained they needed to view the videos before
continuing with their deliberations and expressed frustration at the “slow pace.” The prosecutor
reported that he and the defendant had completed the list of files on Exhibit 3 the jury would be
allowed to watch and were nearly done with Exhibit 4. The trial court sent a clerk into the jury
room with instructions to play the designated portions of Exhibit 3 and 4.
¶ 48 At 4:15 p.m., the jury sent a fifth note asking if they could “watch the videos up closer
rather than from the jury box, *** stop and start the videos, *** [and] zoom in and play at ½
speed.” The State argued the manner of presentation of the videos during deliberations should be
the same as during trial and cited authority. The defendant argued the jurors should be allowed to
view the videos as they wished. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court replied to the fifth
note writing, “No.”
¶ 49 At 7:45 p.m., the jury sent out its sixth and final note, which read as follows:
“If we find the defendant guilty on several of the same charges, do we also have to find the defendant guilty on the rest of the same charges? If we believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty on some of the same charges, but we have reasonable
17 doubts about the remaining same charges with other victims, can we have a different verdict on those charges? Also, your answer to a previous question states that ‘intent applies to all other individuals unintentionally harms.’ [sic] This seems to suggest that if we find the defendant guilty of one charge (like attempt first degree murder toward one individual), we must find the defendant guilty of all the like charges against other victims (for example, attempt first degree murder) even though we may have reasonable doubt. Please clarify. Thank you.”
The State suggested telling the jurors they have their instructions and should continue
deliberations. The following exchange between the defendant and the trial court then occurred:
“THE COURT: Mr. Higgs? THE DEFENDANT: I mean, simply put, if they have reasonable doubt, it’s already in the instruction. If they have reasonable doubt, this tells them not to find me guilty. THE COURT: So are you—let me ask you this, Mr. Higgs. Mr. Lewis [assistant state’s attorney] made a suggestion to the response, what the Court should respond to the jurors. Are you making argument right now or are you suggesting some other type of response? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. I’m telling you that it’s already in the instruction that if they’re having reasonable doubt to render a verdict of not guilty. THE COURT: You want me to instruct—so I’m clear, you want me to write back and instruct the jurors to find you not guilty? THE DEFENDANT: That’s not what I’m saying. You’re simply mischaracterizing my words, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, that’s why I’m trying to get to the bottom of it. THE DEFENDANT: The question here says even though we may have reasonable doubt. It’s already in the instructions for the charges if they have reasonable doubt, they’re instructed to find me not guilty. The State must prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The trial court determined that the State’s response would be given and wrote in response to the
note, “You’ve received the jury instructions you are to follow the instructions and continue to
deliberate.” The trial court then stated to the defendant that “what you’ve offered as to a response
to the jurors, I’m not allowing that response.” The defendant indicated that he understood.
¶ 50 At 9:25 p.m., the jury found the defendant guilty on all seven counts of attempted murder
and seven counts of aggravated battery with a firearm, as well as unlawful possession of a weapon
by a felon, but found him not guilty of aggravated battery of a child. With respect to “attempt first
18 degree murder,” the jury also found the defendant was armed with a firearm and personally
discharged a firearm during the offense.
¶ 51 H. Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 52 The defendant filed five handwritten, pro se posttrial motions each consisting of several
pages. Among his claims, he argued the “failure to properly instruct the jury on such issues as
‘Transferred Intent’ possibly influenced the jury.” On September 21, 2022, the trial court held a
hearing and heard arguments regarding the defendant’s pro se posttrial motions. The trial court
took the matter under advisement and issued a written order on September 27, 2022, denying the
defendant’s motions.
¶ 53 On September 29, 2022, at the defendant’s request, the trial court appointed counsel for
the defendant and the sentencing hearing was continued. On November 2, 2022, a hearing was
held regarding defense counsel’s motion to establish a sentencing range. The State argued the
range for each count of attempted murder was 26-50 years—6-30 years for the Class X offense,
plus a 20-year firearm enhancement for personally discharging a firearm during the commission
of the offense. The State also argued all seven counts of attempt murder were mandatory
consecutive because six victims suffered “severe bodily injury,” making the sentencing range 182-
380 years. The trial court determined that the defendant’s minimum sentence was 182 years but
noted the statute governing aggregate consecutive sentences set the maximum at 160 years—120
years for the two most serious felonies plus 40 years for the firearm enhancements. The State
indicated that there was a potential conflict between sections of the sentencing statute that set a
maximum aggregate consecutive sentence (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2020)), but mandated a
consecutive sentence under section 5-8-4(d)(1) of the Code (id. § 5-8-4(d)(1)). The trial court
stated that it would not sentence the defendant to anything other than 182 years or 160 years to be
19 served consecutively at 85% depending on its determination as to which section of the statute to
apply.
¶ 54 On November 7, 2022, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 182 years in prison,
consisting of seven consecutive terms of 26 years for each attempted murder count with the firearm
enhancement applied. The trial court merged the seven convictions for aggravated battery with a
firearm with the attempted murder convictions and imposed a concurrent term of seven years for
the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The trial court made the following finding
regarding the aggregate maximum consecutive sentence issue:
“I have discussed previously the Court is left with two sentencing issues, a sentencing enhancement under 720 ILCS 5/8-4 which leads to a conclusive sentence at a minimum of 182 years. And then 730 ILCS 5/4-8-5/8-4 with a minimum of 160 years in the aggregate. The Court finds that 720 ILCS 5/8-4 with the enhancement applies to this case.”
On December 1, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied after
argument on December 2, 2022. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 16,
2022.
¶ 55 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 56 On appeal, the defendant raises several issues. The defendant argues (1) the trial court erred
when it allowed the defendant to proceed pro se without first receiving a knowing waiver of his
right to counsel; (2) the trial court’s instructions to the jury denied him the right to a fair trial;
(3) the trial court placed improper restrictions on the jurors’ review of the video exhibits; (4) his
sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of more than one firearm
enhancement; and (5) his sentence should be reduced pursuant to section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Code.
¶ 57 A. Waiver of Counsel
¶ 58 The defendant argues that the trial court (1) violated the defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel where his waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily and (2) failed to substantially
20 comply with the admonishments required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a). The defendant
acknowledges that he did not preserve these claims in his posttrial motions, and thus he has
forfeited the claims. Failure to specify grounds in writing in a motion for a new trial has been held
to be a forfeiture of the issue on review in the absence of plain error. People v. Albea, 2017 IL App
(2d) 150598, ¶ 16. However, the defendant argues that his claims should be reviewed under the
second prong of the plain-error doctrine, because “the absence of an effective waiver of counsel
has consistently been treated as a serious error that warrants second-prong plain-error review.”
¶ 59 At the time the defendant filed his opening brief, the Illinois Supreme Court had yet to
issue its decision in People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356. We granted supplemental briefing on this
issue after the decision in Ratliff became final. Ratliff determined that “[b]ecause a Rule 401(a)
violation is not akin to structural error, such a violation, if not raised in a postplea or posttrial
motion, is not cognizable as second-prong plain error but only as first-prong plain error.” Id. ¶ 46.
Thus, the defendant’s claim of a Rule 401(a) violation under second-prong plain error is foreclosed
by Ratliff. In the defendant’s supplemental brief, he requests that his claims be reviewed under the
first prong of the plain-error doctrine and argues accordingly. Additionally, he asserts that the
decision in Ratliff only foreclosed Rule 401(a) violations from review under second-prong plain
error and not constitutional claims of error affecting his sixth amendment right to counsel.
¶ 60 The State responds by arguing that the defendant’s claim of a Rule 401(a) violation has
been waived, not forfeited and thus Ratliff is dispositive of the issue. In addition, the State
maintains that the defendant’s constitutional claim is entrenched in his Rule 401(a) claim of a
failure to substantially comply with the required admonishments, which is already waived and
foreclosed by Ratliff. Accordingly, the State argues the defendant should not be allowed to raise
21 these claims in a supplemental brief where the defendant did not originally argue them in his
opening brief.
¶ 61 Ordinarily “[p]oints not argued [in an opening brief] are forfeited and shall not be raised in
the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020). Considering the unique circumstances of this appeal, however, and the timing of the Ratliff
decision during its pendency, we address these issues.
¶ 62 It is axiomatic that we first address whether the defendant’s claims on appeal are waived
or forfeited. “[W]aiver of constitutional claims consequent to a guilty plea is distinguishable from
a forfeiture of such claims that may be excused under our plain error doctrine as memorialized in
Rule 615(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967)).” Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356, ¶ 22.
“Rule 615(a) is concerned with waivers that result from failing to bring an error to the trial court’s attention. Under that Rule, [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed [on appeal] although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. [Citation.] In relation to a guilty plea, by contrast, waiver refers to the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. [Citation.] *** Rule 615(a) in no way speaks to waivers ***.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 63 Unlike the defendant in Ratliff, here, the defendant did not plead guilty but was instead
convicted after a jury trial. This removes him from the purview of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
604(d) and the “waiver rule” it sets forth. Id. ¶ 23 n.2 (“ ‘by its explicit terms, Rule 604(d) states
that issues not preserved in a motion to vacate a guilty plea are waived’ ” (quoting People v.
Stewart, 123 Ill. 2d 368, 374 (1988))). Thereafter, the defendant failed to raise these claims in a
posttrial motion. Accordingly, where the defendant did not plead guilty and failed to raise his
claims in a posttrial motion, his claims are forfeited, not waived. Forfeiture is a limitation on the
parties and not the court. Id. ¶ 26. However, as discussed further below, we find that the
defendant’s forfeiture stands where the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of
22 Rule 401(a) and did not abuse its discretion in finding a valid waiver. Consequently, where there
is no error, plain-error review is unavailable. People v. Ryder, 2019 IL App (5th) 160027, ¶ 45.
¶ 64 Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court “had a duty to ensure” that he
understood the legal concepts of accountability and transferred intent that applied to the case.
Additionally, the defendant argues that the trial court failed to admonish him of the “mandatory
minimum sentence [of 182 years] if he was found guilty on all counts and if all sentencing
enhancements sought by the State applied.” Instead, it only informed him of the sentencing range
on a Class X felony being 6-30 years. The defendant also argues that the trial court’s statement
that it did not know whether the sentences would run consecutively and that he was “looking at a
potential of a long time” in prison does not substantially comply with the Rule. Additionally, he
argues that the trial court never mentioned the possible firearm enhancements. Lastly, he argues
that, due to the above failures, no waiver of counsel could have been valid.
¶ 65 Whether the trial court properly admonished the defendant presents a question of law we
review de novo. People v. Pike, 2016 IL App (1st) 122626, ¶ 114. However, the court’s ultimate
finding of a valid waiver of counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
¶ 66 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend VI) guarantees
an accused in a criminal proceeding both the right to the assistance of counsel and the correlative
right to proceed without counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-34 (1975). Our courts
have long recognized that the right to self-representation is “as basic and fundamental as [the] right
to be represented by counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Nelson, 47 Ill. 2d 570,
574 (1971). An accused may therefore waive his constitutional right to counsel as long as the
waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 235 (1996).
“Although a court may consider the decision unwise, a defendant’s knowing and intelligent
23 election to represent himself must be honored out of ‘ “that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law.” ’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Silagy, 101 Ill. 2d 147, 180 (1984), quoting Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
¶ 67 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) governs the trial court’s acceptance of an accused’s
waiver of counsel in Illinois. Rule 401(a) states:
“Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver
of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by
addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that
he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including,
when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of
prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and
(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel
appointed for him by the court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).
¶ 68 Illinois courts have recognized that compliance with Rule 401(a) is required for an effective
waiver of counsel. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d at 236. For 30 years, Illinois courts have recognized that
“[s]trict technical compliance with Rule 401(a), however, is not always required. Rather,
substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the
waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did
not prejudice his rights.” Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987)). Imperfect or
incomplete admonishments regarding the potential sentencing range may still comply with the rule
24 if the record otherwise demonstrates a knowing and intelligent waiver. See People v. Wright, 2017
IL 119561, ¶¶ 51, 55.
¶ 69 Upon careful review of the record in this case and the detailed recitation of the facts above,
there was substantial compliance with Rule 401(a). When the defendant initially indicated that he
wished to proceed pro se, the trial court gave him additional time to think about the decision.
Thereafter, the defendant was unequivocal in his request to proceed pro se. The trial court then
took exceptional time to admonish the defendant pursuant to the Rule while even providing
example scenarios or potential complications with self-representation. The trial court informed the
defendant of each of the three essential admonishments required by Rule 401(a). The trial court
examined the charges with the defendant and explained each offense relative to the 16 counts
charged in the indictment. The trial court explained that each offense was a Class X felony
punishable by 6 to 30 years in prison with 3 years of mandatory supervised release. We note that
count 8, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, is not a Class X felony, but find that this
omission did not invalidate the defendant’s waiver of counsel where the defendant was not
prejudiced by the admonishment of a more severe penalty and that count was to run concurrent to
the others. Additionally, the trial court, although inartfully, explained to the defendant the
possibility of consecutive sentencing in his case. The defendant twice acknowledged that he
understood the trial court when it explained consecutive sentencing. Thus, the defendant
understood that he was facing numerous Class X felonies, each with a penalty of up to 30 years,
that could run consecutively. Again, when the trial court explained that he was “looking at a
potential of a long time” in prison, the defendant stated he “fully” understood. Further, the trial
court explained, and the defendant understood, that he had a right to counsel. Lastly, the trial court
25 informed him that if he proceeded pro se, he would be held to the same standards to which a lawyer
would be held and, if convicted, he could not complain of his own competency.
¶ 70 We do not diminish the importance of correct admonishments as to the actual maximum
sentence allowed. Each case, however, must be evaluated on its own particular set of facts. Based
upon the detailed facts recited above, we conclude that the trial court substantially complied with
Rule 401(a). See People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119, 132 (1987) (holding that the admonishment
the defendant received substantially complied with the rule despite the trial court incorrectly
informing the defendant under Rule 401(a) that the minimum sentence was a “number of years”
when it was actually natural life in prison).
¶ 71 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that the defendant’s decision to
waive counsel was made freely, knowingly, and intelligently. The trial court elicited from the
defendant that he was 35 years old, had “three years of college, business, office administration”
and “a year and a half of technical school,” and had previously faced a jury trial in a felony case.
He expressed an “unequivocal” desire to represent himself and reiterated that desire a number of
times. Additionally, he repeatedly indicated to the trial court that he was concerned for his speedy
trial rights and that he was “not worried” about the possible sentences, because he was “innocent.”
Defendant’s decision to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se did not hinge on the
maximum sentence allowed for the charged offenses. Accordingly, the record establishes that
defendant’s decision to waive counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. See People v.
Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d 321, 336 (1989) (holding that the record established that the defendant had
specific, legitimate reasons for waiving his right to counsel, including his dissatisfaction with
counsel’s representation, which demonstrated that he would have waived counsel regardless of the
length of the minimum sentences prescribed by law).
26 ¶ 72 Finally, there is no basis for us to conclude that the defendant was prejudiced by the trial
court’s failure to admonish him of the 182-year minimum sentence or the firearm enhancements.
The defendant does not even allege that he would not have proceeded to represent himself if he
had known the exact sentencing range with the enhancements included. Instead, the defendant
stated he was not concerned with the possible sentences, because he was “innocent.” Further, at
the time of the defendant’s waiver of counsel, the State was not seeking firearm enhancements for
the attempted murder charges. Only later did the State file a notice of intent to seek the
enhancements which was explained to the defendant in open court. The trial court informed the
defendant that he was “on notice” of the enhancements and the defendant acknowledged the same
without reinvoking his right to counsel.
¶ 73 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court substantially complied with Rule 401(a),
and the defendant made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of counsel prior to being
allowed to proceed pro se. Thus, where the trial court did not err, plain-error review under either
prong of the doctrine is unavailable and the defendant’s forfeiture stands.
¶ 74 B. Jury Instructions
¶ 75 Next, the defendant argues that the trial court’s “instructions to the jury denied [him] a fair
trial by (1) allowing the jury to find [him] guilty of seven counts of attempted murder based on
fewer than seven acts, (2) failing to correct the jurors’ belief that they were required to convict
[him] on all counts if they found any single count proven, and (3) introducing a new theory of guilt
during jury deliberations.”
¶ 76 Generally, the giving of jury instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v.
Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶ 45. However, when the question is whether the jury instructions
accurately conveyed to the jury the applicable law, our review is de novo. Id. A jury instruction
27 error, although one of constitutional magnitude, is not necessarily a structural error and therefore
does not result in automatic reversal. Id. ¶ 42. If the error was preserved, then harmless-error
analysis applies. Id. If the error was forfeited, then plain-error analysis applies. Id.
¶ 77 The defendant claims that he has preserved these issues for appeal based on his objections
at trial relating to the trial court’s responses to the jury’s questions during deliberations, and the
renewal of these objections in his posttrial motions. He points to two sentences contained within
his numerous, handwritten pro se posttrial motions to support this assertion: “The Jury was
vaguely instructed on transferred intent, causing damaging prejudice and causing me to stand an
unfair trial,” and “The failure to properly instruct the jury on such issues as ‘Transferred Intent’
possibly influenced the jury to vote on conviction.” The defendant then utilizes these two
generalized statements to extrapolate very specific and distinct arguments on appeal—arguments
he claims that the trial court “clearly had an opportunity to review,” and thus are preserved. We
find that the arguments the defendant now advances on appeal were not presented to the trial court
in a posttrial motion and are forfeited. See Albea, 2017 IL App (2d) 150598, ¶ 16. However, the
defendant argues that these unpreserved claims are reviewable under either prong of the plain-
error doctrine.
¶ 78 The plain-error rule bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to
consider unpreserved claims of error in specific circumstances. People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1, 18
(2010). We will apply the plain-error doctrine when:
“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error
alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious
that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the
28 judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.
2d 551, 565 (2007).
The first step of plain-error review is determining whether any error occurred. People v. Walker,
232 Ill. 2d 113, 124-25 (2009).
¶ 79 We first address the defendant’s third argument, that he was denied a fair trial by the trial
court introducing a new theory of guilt during jury deliberations. The defendant argues that the
trial court erred when it introduced the theory of transferred intent in response to the jury’s
questions during deliberations by responding that “an individual may be any individual.” Further,
he argues that the State “made no mention of transferred intent in the indictment” and did not
request a separate jury instruction on transferred intent or submit a modified instruction
incorporating the same. Thus, the defendant argues, that the State was precluded from arguing, as
it did in closing, that the intent to kill Chairs or Holman transferred to the unintended victims on
the lot, and the trial court erred when it provided instruction on the same.
¶ 80 Here, the law is clear: “a person may be properly convicted under the theory of transferred
intent even if the State does not specifically allege that theory in the charging instrument.” People
v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 683, 691 (1995). Further, the defendant did not object to the State arguing
transferred intent to the jury during trial or the lack of a separate transferred intent instruction.
Evidence was presented at trial and arguments made by both parties regarding the defendant’s
motive in the shooting, or lack thereof, regarding Chairs, Holman, and the five innocent bystanders
who were shot. Moreover, the law is well settled that the doctrine of transferred intent is applicable
in attempt murder cases. Id. at 688. While the defendant objected to the trial court’s initial response
to the jury during deliberations regarding transferred intent, the State’s requested instruction on
attempted murder, Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 6.07X, allowed for the theory 29 of transferred intent. The pattern jury instruction for attempted murder given at the defendant’s
trial stated,
“the State must prove *** [t]hat the defendant, or one for whose conduct he is legally
responsible, performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward the killing of an
individual” and that he, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, did such act
“with the intent to kill an individual.”
“Jury instructions for attempted murder generally do not specify a victim’s name, ‘nor is there a
place for the victim’s name in the Illinois Patter Jury Instructions.’ ” People v. Willingham, 2020
IL App (1st) 162250, ¶ 63 (quoting People v. Malone, 37 Ill. App. 3d 185, 191 (1976)). Indeed,
the pattern instructions intentionally refer to ‘an individual’ to allow for the doctrine of transferred
intent. Id. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err when it responded to the jury’s
questions regarding transferred intent and that the State was allowed to raise the theory based on
the attempted murder instructions given at trial.
¶ 81 Next, we address the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s instructions allowed the
jury to find the defendant guilty of seven counts of attempted murder for fewer than seven acts.
The defendant notes the State charged Higgs with seven counts of attempted murder, arguing each
shot that injured a victim was a separate act justifying a separate conviction. He argues that, while
the indictment properly alleged separate acts, the State failed to prove each count independently
at trial. Instead, it claimed that a single act—firing at one victim (Chairs)—satisfied the actus reus
element for all seven charges, including for victims not targeted or shot by the defendant.
Specifically, the defendant takes issue with the State’s argument during closing that “[w]hen they
get out of that car and they’re shooting at Marquise Chairs with the intent to kill him, that intent
transfers to everybody else that’s on that lot” and that the jury can use that as the “substantial step
30 toward the killing of an individual” to find the defendant guilty of each of the attempted murder
charges. We note here that the defendant never objected to the State’s arguments regarding
transferred intent during closing. Further, he argues that the trial court compounded this error by
issuing improper responses to the jury’s questions during deliberations. He claims that when the
trial court instructed the jury that “an individual may be any individual” and “[i]f you determine
that a person has the requisite intent to harm an individual and acts so as to harm that individual
that intent applies to all other individuals unintentionally harmed,” the trial court allowed the jury
to convict Higgs on all seven counts based on fewer than seven acts, “possibly only one.”
¶ 82 We are not persuaded by the defendant’s argument. The State chose to focus its closing
argument on the moment the defendant stepped out of the vehicle with the codefendants and began
firing his weapon toward Chairs and Holman, because this initial act was critical in establishing
the State’s theory of accountability, which would lead to convictions for each count alleged for the
unintended victims. That was the meaning of the State’s argument during closing. This singular
act solidifies the defendant’s participation in the crime and serves as the basis that the defendant
was engaged in a common criminal design. To prove that a defendant had the intent to promote or
facilitate the crime, the State must present evidence that establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt,
“that (1) defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal or (2) there was a common criminal
design.” People v. Willis, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, ¶ 79. The State recognized that once the
defendant’s accountability is established by this act, the acts that follow thereafter in furtherance
of that common purpose are attributable to the defendant and the codefendants. The common
design rule holds that “where two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or
agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are
considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible
31 for the consequences of the further acts.” In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995). When the
defendant, Bruce, and Beard were fired upon by a third party as a result of their initial firing at
Chairs and Holman, they returned fire in furtherance of that initial act injuring innocent bystanders.
This was exactly what codefendant Beard testified to at trial and the surveillance video of the
incident depicts the same.
¶ 83 Further, the doctrine of transferred intent applied to the unintended victims that were
injured during the course of these events. See People v. Edmondson, 2018 IL App (1st) 151381,
¶ 65. No one disputes that three-year-old M.M., who was shot in the spine and paralyzed for life
during the commission of this offense, was an unintended victim in this case. Under the doctrine
of transferred intent, “[w]here someone in the commission of a wrongful act commits another
wrong not intended, or where in the execution of an intent to do wrong, an unintended act resulting
in a wrong ensued as a natural and probable consequence, the one acting with a wrongful intent is
responsible for the unintended wrong.” People v. Psichalinos, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1067 (1992).
The doctrine of transferred intent applies “when a third person is injured as a result of a defendant’s
assault upon another person.” People v. Burrage, 269 Ill. App. 3d 67, 76 (1994). When the
defendant and codefendants were fired upon by a third party as a result of their firing at Chairs and
Holman, Beard returned protective cover fire for his codefendants when they were trying to kill
Chairs. Beard aided and abetted the defendant and Bruce in trying to kill Chairs, which resulted in
the injuries to innocent victims. With the State having established accountability, the defendant
was criminally responsible for the acts of Beard when he returned fire injuring innocent bystanders.
¶ 84 In the context of the circumstances in this case, the trial court did not err in its responses to
the jury regarding transferred intent. The responses given by the trial court accurately described
the doctrine of transferred intent as it applied in this case and did not permit the jury to convict the
32 defendant based on fewer than seven acts. This is especially true where the instructions also
included principles of accountability, making clear that the defendant could be held responsible
for the actions of his codefendants if they were done in furtherance of a common criminal purpose.
Moreover, the trial court issued, and the jury was required to sign, separate and distinct verdict
forms as to each individualized victim and the jury was instructed to consider and apply the
propositions of attempted murder to each victim.
¶ 85 Lastly, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to properly respond to the
final jury question during deliberations. “The general rule when a trial court is faced with a
question from the jury is that the court has a duty to provide instruction to the jury when the jury
has posed an explicit question or requested clarification on a point of law arising from facts about
which there is doubt or confusion.” People v. Millsap, 189 Ill. 2d 155, 160 (2000). “Nevertheless,
a trial court may exercise its discretion to refrain from answering a jury question under appropriate
circumstances.” Id. “Appropriate circumstances include when the instructions are readily
understandable and sufficiently explain the relevant law, where further instructions would serve
no useful purpose or would potentially mislead the jury, when the jury’s inquiry involves a
question of fact, or where the giving of an answer would cause the court to express an opinion that
would likely direct a verdict one way or another.” Id. The trial court’s decision whether to answer
and how to answer questions asked by jurors during deliberations will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. People v. Landwer, 279 Ill. App. 3d 306, 314 (1996).
¶ 86 Here, the jury inquired as follows:
“If we find the defendant guilty on several of the same charges, do we also have to find the defendant guilty on the rest of the same charges? If we believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty on some of the same charges, but we have reasonable doubts about the remaining same charges with other victims, can we have a different verdict on those charges?
33 Also, your answer to a previous question states that ‘intent applies to all other individuals unintentionally harms.’ [sic] This seems to suggest that if we find the defendant guilty of one charge (like attempt first degree murder toward one individual), we must find the defendant guilty of all the like charges against other victims (for example, attempt first degree murder) even though we may have reasonable doubt. Please clarify. Thank you.”
As detailed in the background section above, when the trial court reviewed the question with the
defendant and State present, the State requested that the response be that “they have received the
instructions and to continue their deliberations.” The defendant did not expressly object to the
State’s suggested response or offer an alternative response but instead simply recognized that the
answer to the jury’s question was already in the instructions they had received. The trial court did
not directly answer the jury’s question but responded by stating, “You’ve received the jury
instructions you are to follow the instructions and continue to deliberate.” The defendant argues
that by responding in this way the trial court effectively directed the jurors to convict him on
multiple counts of attempted murder despite their “reasonable doubts,” and did nothing to correct
the jury’s misapprehension. The State argues that there was no error in the trial court referring the
jurors to their previous instructions because answering the questions as phrased risked misleading
the jurors or directing their verdicts, and the answer to the jury’s question was contained in the
initial instructions.
¶ 87 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its response. The trial court’s
initial instructions accurately conveyed the elements of each attempted murder charge and
emphasized the jury’s duty to consider each count individually. Further, the trial court provided
separate verdict forms, consisting of not guilty and guilty, for each of the named victims. The jury
was required to treat each victim separately when determining the defendant’s guilt for attempted
murder. Additionally, as the defendant recognized during deliberations, the initial instructions
clearly directed the jurors to find the defendant not guilty if they determined the State had not
34 proven each proposition as to each count beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the jury’s note,
which was a full page and contained multiple questions, was directly inviting a response from the
trial court that would likely direct a verdict one way or another. Although the jury expressed
confusion, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s determination to avoid directly
responding to the jury’s questions was not an abuse of its discretion.
¶ 88 C. Review of Video Exhibits
¶ 89 Next, the defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it restricted
access to the entirety of the videos contained in People’s Exhibits 3 and 4 and limited the manner
in which the jury could review those videos.
¶ 90 Initially, we note that defendant acknowledges that he did not preserve this issue in a
posttrial motion. Thus, the issue was forfeited and may not be considered on appeal, unless there
was plain error. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). The defendant invokes the first prong of
the plain-error doctrine.
¶ 91 The defendant must first establish that a clear or obvious error occurred. People v.
McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 497-98 (2009). “ ‘[T]he plain error exception will be invoked only
where the record clearly shows that an alleged error affecting substantial rights was committed.’ ”
(Emphasis in original.) People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 549 (2010) (quoting People v. Hampton,
149 Ill. 2d 71, 102 (1992)). It is well established that whether evidentiary items should be taken to
the jury room rests within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be disturbed
unless there was an abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. People v. Hollahan, 2020
IL 125091, ¶ 11.
35 ¶ 92 In this case, jury deliberations took place in the courtroom where the trial took place rather
than a separate, smaller jury room. 2 The defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by limiting the jury’s access to surveillance video exhibits during deliberations. Specifically,
defendant claims error in the trial court’s refusal to allow the jury to view the entirety of People’s
Exhibits 3 and 4, its denial of the jury’s request to pause, zoom, or slow the videos, and its decision
to have the exhibits replayed under controlled conditions by the court clerk.
¶ 93 As an initial matter, it is well settled that the decision whether to allow the jury to review
exhibits during deliberations is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. Contrary to
the defendant’s argument, the record establishes that the trial court acted reasonably in crafting
procedures to accommodate the jury’s request while safeguarding the integrity of the proceedings.
As the State notes, and the record confirms, the surveillance videos in question were voluminous
and contained lengthy segments of irrelevant or inadmissible content, including footage unrelated
to the charged offenses. Only select excerpts were presented to the jury at trial, and the defendant
and the State worked together to compile an agreed upon list of the relevant timeframes from those
exhibits that the jury would review. Further, the laptop used to play the videos belonged to the
state’s attorney’s office and contained confidential materials unrelated to the defendant’s case. The
trial court, working with both parties, arranged for the jury to view all portions of the videos that
had been previously published at trial, with the playback handled by the court clerk under
instructions to avoid any communication with jurors. Under these circumstances, the trial court
reasonably exercised its discretion in allowing the jury to review only those published segments
While the record indicates that pretrial delays occurred in this case as a result of the COVID-19 2
pandemic, it is not clear whether this was the basis for jury deliberations taking place in the courtroom. 36 and the procedure employed did not prejudice the defendant where he actively participated in
compiling the list.
¶ 94 Additionally, the denial of the jury’s request to pause, zoom, or slow the videos did not
constitute error. The trial court acted within its discretion to limit juror interaction with sensitive
equipment to avoid inadvertent access to unpublished material or risk of improper contact with the
clerk. Moreover, the jury had previously viewed multiple angles of the incident from the relevant
video clips during trial with extensive commentary by the witnesses including the defendant. The
trial court reasonably ensured that the jurors were exposed to the same evidentiary conditions
during deliberations. The trial court’s decision to have the clerk play the admitted clips—without
the presence of any party or the judge and under strict non-communication instructions—was
consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Hollahan. See People v. Hollahan, 2020
IL 125091 (where the court rejected a claim of plain error after a jury was shown video evidence
in a controlled courtroom setting with appropriate safeguards in place). Lastly, we find the
defendant’s reliance on People v. Cavitt, 2021 IL App (2d) 170149-B, unpersuasive where it is
readily distinguishable. Unlike Cavitt, the trial court here did not offer any commentary on the
evidentiary value of the videos nor later reverse several convictions based on the court’s own
multiple viewings of the videos posttrial. Where plain error was established in Cavitt based on the
combination of the trial court’s restrictions on the videos and the trial court’s improper comments
to the jury, which is absent in the present case, we decline to find plain error.
¶ 95 D. Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing
¶ 96 Next, the defendant argues that his sentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the trial court’s imposition of the 20-year “personal discharge” firearm enhancements to each
of the seven counts of attempted murder. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in
37 imposing seven firearm enhancements because the State submitted only a single enhancement
finding form to the jury, and thus, only one enhancement was properly authorized. As a result, the
defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve this issue at sentencing.
¶ 97 In support, defendant relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and claims
that each enhancement must be supported by a separate jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.
He argues that “because the State sought to enhance each sentence, it had to obtain a finding that
the defendant fired a gun during each offense, not just during the offense.” He asserts that, because
the jury signed only one verdict form finding he personally discharged a firearm, the court was
without authority to impose more than one enhancement. He further argues that counsel’s failure
to raise this specific challenge constituted ineffective assistance and that had the issue been
properly raised, a different outcome—i.e., the imposition of fewer enhancements—was reasonably
probable.
¶ 98 The State responds that the defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to the verdict
forms at trial and cannot now raise it under the guise of ineffective assistance of counsel. Further,
the State maintains that counsel at sentencing did argue that only a single enhancement should
apply, just under a separate theory, thereby defeating any claim of deficient performance.
Additionally, the State contends that the trial court properly imposed an enhancement for each
attempted murder conviction given that each involved a separate victim and the jury found the
defendant had personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense. The State
also notes that the defendant himself admitted to firing two shots during the incident, and the
evidence supporting his discharge of a firearm was overwhelming and uncontested. The State
recognizes that Apprendi requires submission of “a separate finding form for each enhancement
at issue” and argues that the State satisfied that requirement where the two enhancement factors at
38 issue were submitted to the jury and were restricted to the attempted murder charges. (Emphasis
in original.) The State argues the defendant’s assertion that “a separate finding form had to be
incorporated into each of the separate verdict forms for the seven victims is not supported by case
law.”
¶ 99 In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s
deficient performance resulted in prejudice. People v. Campos, 2024 IL App (2d) 230056, ¶ 64.
Prejudice, in this context, means a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Id. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed de novo. People v. Lewis, 2022 IL
126705, ¶ 48.
¶ 100 Here, we find that counsel at sentencing was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial
court’s imposition of the firearm enhancement to each count of attempted murder on this basis for
several reasons. First, sentencing counsel did object to the imposition of multiple firearm
enhancements and specifically argued that only one enhancement should be imposed, or that none
be applied. Next, counsel sought mitigation based on provocation and presented arguments to
support a minimum sentence. Additionally, counsel had no basis to raise this issue where the
defendant, while pro se at trial, did not object to the enhancement verdict/finding forms.
Accordingly, though the basis for counsel’s objection does not exactly mirror the defendant’s
argument on appeal, we cannot say that counsel’s failure to raise this specific argument fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.
¶ 101 Further, assuming arguendo that counsel’s performance was deficient, we would find that
the defendant was not prejudiced. If the underlying claim has no merit, no prejudice resulted and
39 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial must fail. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d
444, 465 (2002). Here, even if counsel had raised the specific Apprendi violation now claimed on
appeal, there is not a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. The State gave pretrial notice to the defendant that it was seeking 15- and 20-year firearm
enhancements “on each count” of attempted murder; the State provided and the jury returned
enhancement findings on each enhancement sought; the defendant did not object to the
enhancement forms at trial; and the State requested the firearm enhancements be applied to each
count at sentencing; and the trial court imposed them accordingly. We find the State satisfied the
requirement set forth in Apprendi and the trial court did not err in imposing the enhancements.
¶ 102 Furthermore, even assuming the State did not meet this requirement or the trial court erred
in imposing multiple enhancements, we would not find prejudice to the defendant where harmless-
error review applies to Apprendi violations. People v. Walker, 2015 IL App (1st) 130500, ¶ 27. An
Apprendi error is harmless when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would
have found the defendant guilty absent the error. Id. More specifically, the failure to instruct the
jury on an element is harmless when the evidence in support of the omitted element is uncontested
and overwhelming. Id. Accordingly, we find the defendant’s reliance on People v. Edgecombe,
2011 IL App (1st) 092690, misplaced. The defendant relies on Edgecombe for the proposition that
where the State fails to submit separate instructions and verdict forms for each enhancement it
seeks, any enhancement imposed without a separate jury finding must be vacated. Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 25-
27. However, the Walker court recognized that that the court in Edgecombe did not address the
application of harmless-error analysis to violations under Apprendi. Walker, 2015 IL App (1st)
130500, ¶ 29. Here, the jury did find that the defendant personally discharged a firearm during the
commission of attempted first degree murder. Although a single enhancement verdict form was
40 used, the record reflects that the defendant repeatedly admitted to personally discharging his
firearm during the offense. The evidence was uncontested and overwhelming in this respect and
where accountability was established, the acts committed in furtherance of the crime are
attributable to the defendant and the codefendants and applicable to the firearm enhancement. See
People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 (finding that the personal discharge enhancement
under attempted murder unambiguously requires an accountable defendant to have personally
discharged his firearm but does not require that he personally discharged his firearm at the victim
or injured the victim). Given the overwhelming and undisputed evidence that the defendant
discharged a firearm, there is no reasonable probability the jury would have declined to find the
enhancement applicable to each count had individual forms been used. Accordingly, based on the
foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing
counsel fails.
¶ 103 E. Defendant’s Sentence
¶ 104 We next turn to the defendant’s argument that his sentence should be reduced pursuant to
section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Code, controlling the aggregate maximum of consecutive sentences. This
issue involves the proper application of different subsections of section 5-8-4 of the Code, the first
of which requires the imposition of consecutive sentences for specified offenses. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-
4(d) (West 2020). The defendant acknowledges that all seven Class X felony convictions for
attempted murder were mandatory consecutive due to the infliction of severe bodily injury to the
victims. The defendant agrees that under this section of the Code, his mandatory minimum
sentence was 182 years with the firearm enhancements applied.
¶ 105 However, under the second relevant subsection, section 5-8-4(f)(2), which provides for a
“cap” on the aggregate length of consecutive sentences under certain circumstances, he argues the
41 maximum sentence available to the trial court was 120 years, or 160 years if the firearm
enhancements were also applied.
¶ 106 The relevant portion of subsection (f)(2) is as follows:
“For sentences imposed under the law in effect on or after February 1, 1978, the aggregate
of consecutive sentences for offenses that were committed as part of a single course of
conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal
objective shall not exceed the sum of the maximum terms authorized under Article 4.5 of
Chapter v for the 2 most serious felonies involved, but no such limitation shall apply for
offenses that were not committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there
was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective. ***” (Emphasis added.)
Id. § 5-8-4(f)(2).
¶ 107 Article 4.5 of chapter V of the Code pertains to general sentencing provisions for offenses.
Sections 5-4.5-25 of the Code defines the sentencing term for a Class X felony as follows: “The
sentence of imprisonment shall be a determinate sentence of not less than 6 years and not more
than 30 years. The sentence of imprisonment for an extended term Class X felony *** shall be not
less than 30 years not more than 60 years.” Id. § 5-4.5-25. This section of the Code does not refer
to firearm enhancements, and the defendant argues the enhancements should not be used in
calculating the aggregate maximum consecutive sentence. Therefore, the defendant argues that the
sum of the maximum terms authorized for the two most serious felonies involved in this case, two
Class X offenses, is 120 years, and the 182-year aggregate sentence exceeds this limit.
¶ 108 The determination of whether a defendant’s actions constituted a single course of conduct
or were part of an unrelated course of conduct for the purposes of section 5-8-4(f)(2) is a question
of fact for the trial court to determine. People v. Robinson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130837, ¶ 102. In
42 the instant case, the trial court did not make an express finding as to whether defendant’s actions
constituted a single course of conduct for purposes of section 5-8-4(f)(2). Although the issue was
raised by the State and the trial court considered it at sentencing, there is no express finding in the
record. Instead, the trial court only found that “720 ILCS 5/8-4 with the enhancement applies to
this case.” However, on appeal, neither party disputes that section 5-8-4(f)(2) applies. The parties
only dispute the correct calculation of the defendant’s aggregate maximum sentence. Because
neither party disputes the application of section 5-8-4(f)(2) and we conclude that a finding that
defendant’s actions were not part of single course of conduct would be against the manifest weight
of the evidence, we address the issue. See People v. Thompson, 2022 IL App (2d) 190950-U, ¶ 41. 3
¶ 109 Illinois courts have calculated the maximum aggregate sentence using the maximum
extended-term sentence for the class of felony committed. See People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 46
(2000); People v. Woods, 131 Ill. App. 3d 51, 55 (1985); People v. Beck, 190 Ill. App. 3d 748, 763
(1989); People v. Myrieckes, 315 Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (2000). The maximum permissible sentence
was 120 years—the sum of the maximum permissible extended-term sentences for two Class X
offenses. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42. When a trial court imposes consecutive sentences for multiple
Class X felonies based on a single course of conduct, pursuant to section 5-8-4(f)(2), the maximum
total sentence is 60 years plus 60 years: 120 years. Myrieckes, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 482.
¶ 110 Here, it is apparent from the law in Illinois that the defendant’s aggregate maximum
sentence for the two most serious Class X felonies is 120 years. However, our research did not
reveal any Illinois cases that addressed the question of whether mandatory firearm enhancements
should be applied in calculating a defendant’s aggregate maximum sentence or whether the
3 Nonprecedential Rule 23 orders issued on or after January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes. Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023). 43 enhancements should strictly apply to the defendant’s actual sentence. Based on our interpretation
of section 5-8-4(f)(2), the case law, and the distinct silence as to firearm enhancements in article
4.5, chapter 5 of the Code, we decline to apply the enhancements for the purposes of calculating
the defendant’s aggregate maximum sentence and find 120 years to be the defendant’s aggregate
maximum sentence. Consequently, we honor the statutory cap on consecutive sentences. Pursuant
to Rule 615(b)(4), a reviewing court may “reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court.” Ill.
S. Ct. R. 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). Depending on the circumstances of the case, we can impose
a new sentence or remand the matter for resentencing. People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 378 (1995).
Here, we find it more appropriate to impose a new sentence rather than exhaust additional judicial
resources that would be expended by ordering a new sentencing hearing. People v. Saldivar, 113
Ill. 2d 256, 268 (1986); People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 300 (1988). As previously stated, the
trial court imposed the minimum sentence of 182 years after applying the mandatory consecutive
sentences and mandatory firearm enhancements to the defendant’s sentence. When a defendant
receives consecutive sentences for multiple felonies, these sentences are treated as a single term,
and the defendant serves the mandatory supervised release (MSR) term corresponding to the most
serious offense. People v. Jackson, 231 Ill. 2d 223, 227 (2008). Therefore, pursuant to our authority
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), we reduce the defendant’s
aggregate sentence on the seven attempted murder charges and any convictions running concurrent
to 120 years’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years of MSR, to comply with the statutory cap on
consecutive sentences.
¶ 111 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 112 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and reduce his sentence
to 120 years’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ MSR to comply with the statutory cap on
44 aggregate maximum consecutive sentences pursuant to section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Code (730 ILCS
5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2020)).
¶ 113 Affirmed; sentence modified.
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