People v. Hepburn

180 Misc. 2d 265, 688 N.Y.S.2d 428, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 129
CourtUtica City Court
DecidedMarch 23, 1999
StatusPublished

This text of 180 Misc. 2d 265 (People v. Hepburn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utica City Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Hepburn, 180 Misc. 2d 265, 688 N.Y.S.2d 428, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 129 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Albert A. Alteri, J.

Defendant is charged with possession of a wolf hybrid in violation of section 180.1 of the miscellaneous regulations of the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) of the State of New York (6 NYCRR), a violation. The regulation reads in part:

“§ 180.1 Wildlife dangerous to health or welfare * * *

“(b) Prohibitions. No person may possess, release, transport, import or export, or cause to be released, transported, imported or exported, except under permit from the department, any of the following live wildlife: all subspecies of the lion (Panthera leo), the raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonides), and any animal, the overall appearance of which makes it difficult or impossible to distinguish it from a wolf (Canis lupus) or a coyote (Canis latrans).”

The first issue to be resolved is whether the defendant can be prosecuted under that regulation.

Section 180.1 (b) of the miscellaneous regulations prohibits possession of any of the following live wildlife: “any animal, the overall appearance of which makes it difficult or impossible to distinguish it from a wolf (Canis lupus)” (emphasis supplied). Thus, in order for this defendant to be found guilty of a violation of that section the People must have proved that she: (1) possessed; (2) species of a live wildlife; (3) specifically, an animal the over-all appearance of which makes it difficult or impossible to distinguish it from a wolf.

Wildlife is described as “wild game” and all other animal life “existing in a wild state”. (ECL 11-0103 [6] [a] [emphasis supplied].) Wild game is all game (game birds, big game, small game) except domestic game birds or domestic game animals. (ECL 11-0103 [3].)

The words “existing in a wild state” need no explanation other than their ordinary meaning of game “living under unrestrained conditions”.

Therefore, although certain wolf hybrids may be prohibited from possession certain others cannot. For instance, a wolf [267]*267hybrid kept as a pet that was born in captivity and domesticated from birth, as was the animal here, cannot be said to be “existing in a wild state” and, consequently, cannot be considered wildlife, whereas a possessed animal that had been taken from the wild can be said to be still “existing in a wild state” and considered wildlife.

Although the intent of 6 NYCRR 180.1 was to protect humans and animals alike it has fallen short of its goal and neither ECL 71-0919, 71-0921 nor 71-0923 establishing such offenses as either misdemeanors or violations, and setting their punishment, can remedy the problem. Section 180.1 was primarily enacted to supplement and enforce ECL articles 11 and 13; still, that was not accomplished until ECL 11-0511 was amended to include “wolfdog” as one of the protected wildlife. However, the defendant was not charged with a violation of ECL 11-0511 and cannot be prosecuted under that section. A criminal complaint must state the exact section under which a defendant is charged and neither the court nor the defendant is required to grope for sections not charged. (See, CPL 100.10, 100.15.)

Therefore, defendant cannot be found guilty of violating section 180.1 of the miscellaneous regulations of the Department of Environmental Conservation of the State of New York and the complaint against her must be dismissed.

The next issue to be resolved is whether the wolf hybrid was legally taken from the defendant and whether the animal should be returned to her in view of the complaint against her being dismissed.

This is a case of first impression; hence, a review of the legislative history of the regulation is appropriate. In interpreting a statute, the intent of the Legislature is the controlling or most important factor. (See, 97 NY Jur 2d, Statutes, § 101; Matter of Abrams v Ford Motor Co., 74 NY2d 495 [1989]; Matter of Jessup, 85 Misc 2d 575 [1975]; People v Lane-Marvey Corp., 203 Misc 413 [1952].) Court interpretations of legislation are subordinate to legislative intent and not subject to speculation. (Matter of Roballo v Smith, 99 AD2d 5 [4th Dept 1984].) Nonetheless, the statutory language must be clear and unambiguous. (Doctors Council v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys., 71 NY2d 669.)

Wolves (Canis lupus) were sought as companion animals by persons desiring an unusual or exotic pet. However, wolves were, and are, unavailable in New York State having been listed as an endangered species, and illegal to possess except for scientific or educational purposes or for display in zoos.

[268]*268To circumvent the prohibition against keeping wolves as pets enterprising people commenced selling and keeping wolf/ dog hybrids. Because a dog is defined under the Agriculture and Markets Law as a member of the species “Canis Familiaris” the DEC law did not cover hybrids of dogs with wolves and there was no requirement that they be licensed. Consequently, an increased number of hybrids were being possessed and without the minimum safeguards required of the public for the common domestic dog.

In an attempt to eliminate that problem the Legislature authorized the DEC to promulgate new regulations designating the specific species to be regulated, resulting in the enactment of the miscellaneous regulations of the Department of Environmental Conservation, also known as 6 NYCRR 180.1.

The new 6 NYCRR 180.1 dealt with prohibiting the importation of certain game and actually lists the wildlife that DEC considers dangerous to the health or welfare of the people of the State of New York and protection to the animals themselves. It restricts their possession to legitimate scientific, educational or exhibitory purposes with the intent of helping to prevent personal injuries from wolves and other large canids to those who keep these dangerous animals and to third parties accidentally exposed to them, by requiring a permit issued by DEC. Concurrently, it required humane treatment of the captive animals.

There were no other rules under the Environmental Conservation Law that governed wolf hybrids. The intended purpose of the new regulation was to address that issue. Sections 120 and 370 of the Agriculture and Markets Law dealt with dogs and dangerous wild animals in general and were not in conflict with this new regulation.

As stated in the regulation, the purpose of the rule was to list species of wildlife, not otherwise identified in the Environmental Conservation Law, or in 6 NYCRR, that presented a danger to the health or welfare of the people of the State, individual residents or indigenous wildlife populations.

Lacking enactment, owners of these animals, as well as third parties, would have continued to be harmed as the pets grew larger and increasingly dangerous. As a rule, wolf hybrids made poor pets once they were fully grown.

Section 180.1 of the miscellaneous regulations was repealed in 1966. The new section 180.1 was filed June 14, 1972. Two subsequent amendments to that regulation did not alter the [269]*269fact that the language contained therein was unclear, vague and ambiguous.

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Related

Tipton v. Town of Tabor
1997 SD 96 (South Dakota Supreme Court, 1997)
MTR. STATE v. Ford Motor Co.
548 N.E.2d 906 (New York Court of Appeals, 1989)
Doctors Council v. New York City Employees' Retirement System
525 N.E.2d 454 (New York Court of Appeals, 1988)
Roballo v. Smith
99 A.D.2d 5 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1984)
People v. Lane-Marvey Corp.
203 Misc. 413 (New York City Magistrates' Court, 1952)
In re Jessup
85 Misc. 2d 575 (New York Family Court, 1975)
State v. DeFrancesco
668 A.2d 348 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
180 Misc. 2d 265, 688 N.Y.S.2d 428, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-hepburn-nyuticacityct-1999.