IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2
3 THE PEOPLE OF GUAM, )
) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CM0715:ii 4 vs. )
5 ) DECISION AND ORDER STANLEY JOE HALLERS, )
6 )
Defendant. )
7
8 INTRODUCTION
9 This matter came before the Honorable James L. Canto II on the Defendant's second 10 motion to reconsider, filed October 15, 2012. Oral arguments were heard on December 10, II 2012. Assistant Attorney General Gabrielle L. Rossi, Esq. appeared on behalf of the 12 Government and Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath, Esq. represented the Defendant.
13 Having considered the parties' briefs, oral arguments, and the applicable law, the Court now 14 issues the following Decision and Order.
15 BACKGROUND
16 The Defendant is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol based upon the 17 following events: On June 22, 2011 at approximately 6:50 a.m., Guam Police Officer R.G.
18 Shimizu approached a truck parked in a left tum lane and found Defendant sleeping with the 19 engine on. (Testimony ofR.G. Shimizu, Record Log at 5:03, Dec. 10, 2012.) Officer Shimizu 20 saw an open beer can on the driver's seat in between Defendant's legs and could smell the odor 21 of alcohol emanating from the vehicle. !d. Officer Shimizu turned off the engine and woke the 22 Defendant at approximately 6:53 a.m., whereupon he observed Defendant had bloodshot eyes.
23 !d. At 7:05 a.m., Officer Shimizu placed Defendant in handcuffs and transported him to the 24 police station, though he did not inform Defendant that he was under arrest. !d.
25 On December 1, 2011, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the 26 investigative detention because it lasted longer than fifteen (15) minutes in violation of 8 GCA 27 § 30.30. Defendant asserted his initial detention was an unreasonable seizure and that all 28 evidence obtained during or as a result of the seizure must be suppressed. The Government opposed suppre ion on the asis that. efendant was arrested before fifte n (1 5) minutes f 2 detention elapsed. 3 The ourt d ni d uppre i n on th grounds that probabl cau to arre t appeared before fift n minut f d t nti n elapsed. (Deci ion and Ord r Jun. 6 2012. On July 2 5 2012 D fendant filed a motion reconsider becau e disputed facts wer considered as 6 undisputed. On r consid rati n the ourt denied uppres i n because th disputed fa did 7 not change its pr ba l cause analy is. ( cision and Order Oct. 2 2012.) The matter wa 8 thereafter reassigne to Judge Jam L. Cant II. 9 On 0 tober 15 2 12 De:fi ndant filed a second motion to reconsider on the grounds that 10 ma. erial facts r main in di put . Th ovemment agr d an videntiary bearing is ne sary II pursuant to People . anto , 1999 uarn I 16-25 and further argued the ourt pnor 12 pr babl cau e analy is must be applied pursuant to the law of the c d trin . 13 Dl 10
14 1. con id ration nd the aw of the a e 15 Th Jaw of the a doctrine gen rall precludes a court from recon idering an issue it 16 has already decided unless: 1) the first decision is dearly erroneous- 2 th law evidence or 17 other circumstances ha e changed· or 3 manift t inju tice would re uJt. People v. Hua/de 18 9 Guam 3 r a trial court alway has the power to reexamine m dify acate 19 c rr ct and re rs 1 pn r rulings and rd rs ' and the [l]a of the cas do n t ... precJude 20 the court fr m r onsidering an earlier ruling if the court feels that the ru1ing was probably 21 erroneous and more harm would be d ne by adhering to the earlier rule than from the d lay 22 incident to a r con iderati nand th po jbJ change in the rul ofla to b applied. People v. 23 1/ierrez 2 05 uarn 4 n. 7 quotin hun . Board ofTru.stee of Employees ' Retirement 24 ~~ tem of tate of Hawaii 92 P.2d 127 136 Hawaii 2000)). Furthermore [a] judge may 25 r xarnine hi earlier ruling (or th ruling of a judge previously as ign d to th 26 tr ng and r nabl that th earlier ruling was wrong, and if 27 r cinding it ould n t cau undue hann t th party that had ben fi.U from it /d. (quotin 28 A ilia v. Metro. lub if hica o, Inc. 49 F.3d 1219 1227 7th ir. 1995 ).
Pag 2 of8
In this case, the Government asserts the Court cannot reexamme the suppression 2 analysis of the previously assigned judge. The Court does not agree. The law of the case 3 doctrine should not be applied here where new testimony is considered for the first time. Based 4 upon the discussion infra, the Court holds a strong and reasonable conviction that the earlier 5 analysis was incorrect. Furthermore, a reexamination of the suppression decision and a 6 rescinded order shall not cause undue harm before trial. Cf, Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1227-1228 7 (prejudice may result without notice of jury instruction). For these reasons, the Court shall 8 grant reconsideration and reexamine the issues presented by Defendant's motion to suppress 9 under 8 GCA § 30.30. 10 2. The Stop and Frisk Statutes 11 The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative detentions that are based upon a 12 reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct. People v. Johnson, 1997 Guam 9 ~ 4 (citing Terry v. 13 Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)). This principle is codified in the "Stop and Frisk" 14 statutes at 8 GCA Chapter 30. See People v. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 ~ 40. 15
16 Title 8 GCA § 30.10 states: 17 Whenever a peace officer encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing or is about to 18 commit a criminal offense, the peace officer may detain such person.
19 Title 8 GCA § 30.20 states:
20 Detention pursuant to § 30.10 shall be for the purpose of ascertaining the 21 identity of the person detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which lead the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, 22 or was about to commit a criminal offense, but such person shall not be 23 compelled to answer any inquiry of the peace officer.
24 Title 8 GCA § 30.30 states: 25 No person shall be detained under the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that section, and in no event 26 longer than fifteen (15) minutes. Such detention shall not extend beyond the 27 place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.
Title 8 GCA § 30.40 states:
2 If at any time after the onset of the detention authorized by § 30.1 0, probable cause for arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If after 3 an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the detention, no probable 4 cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, he shall be released.
5 Thus under Guam law, a police officer having a reasonable suspicion regarding criminal 6 activity by a particular individual may detain that person to investigate said suspected criminal 7 activity. 8 GCA §§ 30.10 & 30.20. When this investigative detention reveals probable cause 8 for arrest, "the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. However, "in no event [shall a 9 person be detained] longer than fifteen (15) minutes," and the person "shall be released," if no 10 probable cause for arrest appears. 8 GCA §§ 30.30 and 30.40.
II In this case, the parties dispute the application and effect of the 15-minute time limit for 12 investigative detentions. The Government argues that any appearance of probable cause to 13 arrest within 15 minutes removes the need to apply the time limitation. Alternatively, the 14 Government contends that any suppression applies only to evidence obtained after 15 minutes 15 and before arrest. Defendant asserts that if he is not arrested or released within 15 minutes 16 pursuant to the Stop and Frisk statutes, then all evidence from the investigative detention must 17 be suppressed unless it comes from an independent source.
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19 3. Violation of the 15-Minute Time Limit 20 a. Meaning ofthe "Stop and Frisk" Act.
21 Title 8 GCA Chapter 30 and the 15-minute time limit are derived from former Penal 22 Code Sections 735 through 736.4. See 8 GCA § 30.1 0, COMMENT; Guam Pub. L. 10-99 (June 23 19, 1969). Former Sections 735 through 736.4 were enacted as original statutes and without 24 any statement of legislative findings or intent. P .L. 10-99. There is an absence of controlling 25 authority to interpret the 15 minute time limit. 1 Without clear legislative intent or authority to 26
27 1 For example, Guam law does not explicitly discredit any detention beyond the time limit nor does it converse!
28 hold that the time limit is merely a guide for law enforcement. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460, U.S. 491, 500, 103 the contrary, the Court shall interpret the Stop and Frisk statutes according to their plain 2 meaning. See Guam Resorts, Inc. v. G. C. Corporation, 2012 Guam 13 ~ 7 ("When the plain 3 reading of a statute is 'clear on its face' and yields to an unambiguous definition, we will not 4 look past that plain reading."); Castino v. G. C. Corp., 2010 Guam 3 ~ 29 ("A plain reading 5 construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly 6 what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms."); People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ~~ 7 11-14. 8 An examination of the plain language of the 15-minute time limit within the context of 8 9 GCA Chapter 30 does not reveal ambiguity or absurd and unworkable consequences. See 10 Sumitomo Canst., Co., Ltd. v. Government of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ~ 17; People v. Flores, II 2004 Guam 18 ~ 18. The Stop and Frisk statutes state that a person shall be detained, "in no 12 event longer than fifteen (15) minutes." 8 GCA § 30.30. If probable cause to arrest appears, "at 13 any time after the onset of the detention ... the person shall be arrested." 8 GCA § 30.40. If 14 probable cause does not appear, "he shall be released." !d. This language clearly contemplates 15 that any investigative detention must end by arrest or release within 15 minutes. Even where 16 probable cause to arrest appears within 15 minutes of detention, the plain language of 8 GCA § 17 30.30 does not allow the detention to continue beyond 15 minutes. When a person is detained 18 without arrest for more than 15 minutes, although probable cause to arrest may appear, the Stop 19 and Frisk statutes are violated. 20 To posit that probable cause ansmg before the expiration of 15 minutes somehow 21 negates the statute's time limit is to say that an officer may detain an individual indefinitely 22 without an arrest just because probable cause arose within the first 15 minutes. This would be 23
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25 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) ("[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary t effectuate the purpose of the stop."), and US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985) ("I 26 assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider i appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm o 27 dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant."), with US. v. Place, 46 U.S. 696, 709 n.IO, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2646 (1983) ("We understand the desirability of providing law enforcemen 28 authorities with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Neve11heless, we question the wisdom of a rigid time limitation.
an illogical reading of the statute that subverts its entire purpose, and one which this Court 2 cannot reasonably adopt. The Guam Legislature has apparently narrowed the ability of any 3 officer to graduate an investigative detention according to the demands of a particular situation, 4 as the U.S. Supreme Court might otherwise afford in the absence of an explicit time limit. See, 5 e.g., US. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-87, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985). Based upon the plain 6 meaning of the Stop and Frisk statutes, the Court holds that an investigative detention must
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7 cease by arrest or release within 15 minutes of its initiation. 8 The Government argues that a defendant's voluntary consent to undergo a Standardized
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9 Field Sobriety Test vitiates the effect of8 GCA § 30.30, tolling the 15-minute clock. However, IO the plain language of the statute is inescapable. It states in pertinent part: "No person shall be II detained ... longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of [Section 30.1 0], and in I2 no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes. 8 GCA § 30.30 (emphasis added). This 13 unconditional language unequivocally imparts that no circumstance may serve as an exception I4 to the time limit, be it exigency or even an express waiver by the detainee. 15 b. Application to the Facts ofthis Case. I6 In order to apply this rule to the present case, the Court must further examine the I7 difference between an investigative detention and an arrest. Under Guam law, "a person has I8 been seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding 19 the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Cundiff, 20 2006 Guam 12 at~ 21 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 2I 1877 (1980)). An investigative detention under 8 GCA Chapter 30 is consistent with a Fourth 22 Amendment seizure. See e.g. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~ 40; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 ("It must be 23
24 Such a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to th demands of any particular situation.").
25 2 The Court recognizes this Jaw's possibly impairing effect upon meaningful law enforcement investigatio
technique; however, this Court is duty-bound to administer the law as the Legislature intended and may do no more.
26 The only alternative is for the Legislature to re-examine whether the statute indeed withstands an effectiv application to real-world circumstances within the reasonable balance between individual liberty interests and th 27
28 Government's law enforcement interests. 3 See generally, People v. Santos, 1999 Guam I,, 33-37; People v. Chargualaf, 200! Guam 1 ,, 14-15 recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 2 walk away, he has 'seized' that person."). For this reason, an investigative detention occurs 3 when a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave under the circumstances. 4 Guam law defines an arrest as, "an actual restraint of the person, or. .. submission to the 5 custody of the person making the arrest." 8 GCA § 20.10. An officer must announce the arrest 6 pursuant to 8 GCA § 20.25, but the declaration is not an absolute requirement for a lawful arrest 7 based upon probable cause. Cundiff, 2006 Guam 12 at~~ 35-36 and 25-26 (quoting People v. 8 A1addox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1956); and Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225 9 (1964)). Any physical restraint that curtails movement constitutes an arrest. !d. at ~~ 19-20
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IO (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (1968)). Even without physical II restraint, a severely intrusive detention may constitute an arrest. !d. at ~~ 21-22 (quoting 12 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248 (1979) (custodial interrogation is an
13 arrest and requires probable cause)). 14 In this case, Officer Shimizu turned off Defendant's truck and woke him from his sleep 15 in the driver's seat at approximately 6:53a.m. A traffic stop is "unquestionably a seizure within 16 the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ~ 26 (citing 17 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-439 (1984)). See also People v. Chargualaf, 2001 18 Guam 1 ~ 17. Under the circumstances of a traffic stop, Defendant was detained pursuant to 8 19 GCA Chapter 30 because he could not reasonably believe that he was free to disregard Officer 20 Shimizu and drive away. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (no detention if person can disregard 21 and walk away). Defendant was placed in handcuffs and transported to the police station at 22 7:05 a.m., or twelve (12) minutes after the traffic stop commenced. The physical restraint of 23 Defendant's movement constitutes an arrest and the investigatory detention ceased before 24 fifteen (15) minutes elapsed. For this reason, the detention did not violate 8 GCA § 30.30 and
25 Defendant's motion to suppress shall be denied. 26
27 4 Cf People v. Farata, 2007 Guam 8 ~~ 44-45; People v. Santos, 2003 Guam I ~ 51 (police custody ultimate!
28 determined by use of physical restraint comparable to formal arrest).
Ill 2 CONCLUSION 3 Based upon the foregoing, Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED. 4
5 SO ORDERED this ;2/-sr day of February, 2013. 6
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9 HON. JAMES L. CANTO II Judge, Superior Court of Guam 10
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