IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 STANLEY JOE HALLERS, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on January 30, 2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by 11 Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs 12 herein, the Court DENIES the motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On June 22, 2011, at approximately 6:50 a.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 15 (hereinafter "Officers") responded to a vehicle of the Defendant (hereinafter "Hallers") parked 16 along Route #1 by the Micronesian MalL Hallers vehicle had been observed parked in the left 17 tum lane with two individuals sleeping inside. The Officers approached Hallers's vehicle and 18 woke up Hallers up. Hallers was transported to the Dededo Precint for further investigation. At 19 approximately 7:00 a.m. Hallers agreed to a breath test of his blood alcohol content ("BAC") 20 was administered with a reading of 0.205% by the Intox. EC/IR-II. Hallers was arrested at 7:30 21 a.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On June 22, 2011, Hallers was charged with 1) 22 Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 2) Driving While 23 Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Possession of an Open Container, a 24 petty misdemeanor. 25 DISCUSSION 26 Hallers moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of 27 an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, 28 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under
Page 1 of 4 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 2 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. HaIlers argues 3 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 4 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Hallers cites the Court to an 5 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 6 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 7 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 8 its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 9 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 10 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 11 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 12 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 13 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 14 individual. See §30.40 The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 15 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 16 At 6:50 a.m. June 22, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 'investigatory 17 stop' because his vehicle was parked in the left tum lane on Route #1. At 7:20 a.m. the Officers 18 requested Hallers to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable suspicion Defendant was 19 Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. HaIlers was formally arrested at 7:30 a.m. During this 20 investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest Hallers shortly before 7:30 a.m. 21 based on him being asleep in his vehicle on the road. Once probable cause is formed during the 22 "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no longer 23 governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional 24 muster against umeasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 25 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 26 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 27 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 28 investigative detention is umeasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must
Page 2 of 4 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 2 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 3 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 4 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 5 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 6 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 7 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 8 not address the suppression issue, this Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 9 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 10 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 11 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 12 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 13 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 14 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 15 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 16 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 17 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 18 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 19 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 20 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 21 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 22 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 23 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 24 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior 25 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos 1 wherein it concluded 26
27 I More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on p. 5 'Ii 2. "The
28 existence of probable cause does not alter the time and place limitations of 8 G.c.A. §30.20" Instead, the Court finds the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. Ifprobable cause is foun during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration of the fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
Page 3 of 4 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 2 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 3 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 4 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 3 ) 4 vs. ) ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 STANLEY JOE HALLERS, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on January 30, 2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by 11 Assistant Attorney General James C. Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs 12 herein, the Court DENIES the motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On June 22, 2011, at approximately 6:50 a.m., Officers of the Guam Police Department 15 (hereinafter "Officers") responded to a vehicle of the Defendant (hereinafter "Hallers") parked 16 along Route #1 by the Micronesian MalL Hallers vehicle had been observed parked in the left 17 tum lane with two individuals sleeping inside. The Officers approached Hallers's vehicle and 18 woke up Hallers up. Hallers was transported to the Dededo Precint for further investigation. At 19 approximately 7:00 a.m. Hallers agreed to a breath test of his blood alcohol content ("BAC") 20 was administered with a reading of 0.205% by the Intox. EC/IR-II. Hallers was arrested at 7:30 21 a.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On June 22, 2011, Hallers was charged with 1) 22 Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 2) Driving While 23 Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Possession of an Open Container, a 24 petty misdemeanor. 25 DISCUSSION 26 Hallers moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of 27 an unlawful detention of his person in violation of 8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, 28 Guam's "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under
Page 1 of 4 the provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that 2 section, and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. HaIlers argues 3 that he was detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for 4 violation should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Hallers cites the Court to an 5 earlier decision of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), 6 wherein this Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than 7 lawfully permitted under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning 8 its ruling in Santos based on the following analysis. 9 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 10 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 11 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 12 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. Ifprobable 13 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 14 individual. See §30.40 The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 15 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 16 At 6:50 a.m. June 22, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 'investigatory 17 stop' because his vehicle was parked in the left tum lane on Route #1. At 7:20 a.m. the Officers 18 requested Hallers to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable suspicion Defendant was 19 Driving under the Influence of Alcohol. HaIlers was formally arrested at 7:30 a.m. During this 20 investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest Hallers shortly before 7:30 a.m. 21 based on him being asleep in his vehicle on the road. Once probable cause is formed during the 22 "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section 30.10 no longer 23 governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only pass constitutional 24 muster against umeasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 25 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 26 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 27 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 28 investigative detention is umeasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must
Page 2 of 4 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[s]uch a 2 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 3 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 4 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 5 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 6 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 7 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 8 not address the suppression issue, this Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 9 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 10 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 11 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 12 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.C.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 13 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 14 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 15 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 16 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 17 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 18 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 19 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 20 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 21 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing 22 a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions" People v. 23 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 24 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior 25 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos 1 wherein it concluded 26
27 I More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on p. 5 'Ii 2. "The
28 existence of probable cause does not alter the time and place limitations of 8 G.c.A. §30.20" Instead, the Court finds the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. Ifprobable cause is foun during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration of the fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
Page 3 of 4 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 2 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 3 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11,2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 4 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 5 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppressIOn IS not an 6 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 7 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 8 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b( c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 9 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 10 afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section 30.50 only applies to weapons search 11 and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search occurred. Section 30.60 provides 12 the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by § 30.50 to be limited to 13 weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the suppression of 14 evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's Motion to 15 Suppress is DENIED. 16 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting on JULY 2,2012 at 9:30 a.m. 17 SO ORDERED 18
20 Judge, Superior Court of Guam 21
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