People v. Godines

2025 IL App (1st) 231646-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 1-23-1646
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 231646-U No. 1-23-1646 Order filed June 18, 2025 Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 22 CR 6094 ) ANTONIO GODINES, ) Honorable ) Timothy J. Joyce, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lampkin and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol over his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Antonio Godines was convicted of aggravated driving

under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(A) (West 2022)) and

sentenced to two years’ probation. He appeals, arguing the State failed to prove he was impaired

by alcohol. We affirm. No. 1-23-1646

¶3 Defendant was charged by indictment with aggravated DUI following an incident on

February 12, 2022. The indictment also alleged that defendant had committed two prior DUI

violations.

¶4 At trial, Oyin Owei testified that on February 12, 2022, around 2 a.m., he was in his vehicle,

stopped at a red light in Chicago for a “minute or two,” when something hit his vehicle from

behind. Owei exited his vehicle, concerned it “was going to blow up from all the smoke.” Owei

saw the rear of his vehicle was “smacked inside” and called the police. In the vehicle that collided

with his own, Owei saw a man in the driver’s seat and a woman in the passenger seat. They

remained inside the vehicle for three to four minutes despite smoke emitting from it. The man

eventually exited, “looking confused.” Owei did not speak to him.

¶5 A surveillance camera recorded the incident. The video—which was published and has

been reviewed by this court—showed a red light at an empty intersection. While the light remained

red, a white vehicle collided with the rear of a silver vehicle and pushed it into the intersection. A

man exited the silver vehicle within seconds, and smoke arose from the white vehicle. A minute

later, a man exited the white vehicle and looked at the damage.

¶6 Chicago police officer Michael Phillips testified that he responded to the collision. Phillips

had been a police officer for five years and had conducted approximately 400 DUI arrests. He was

trained in conducting standard field sobriety tests and had taken a DUI refresher course and two

classes on “advanced roadside impaired driver enforcement.” At the scene, he observed that

defendant “displayed glassy and watery eyes,” “had slurred, low and slow, speech and a strong

odor of alcohol[ic] beverage emitting from his breath,” and was “slow to respond” to questions.

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¶7 Phillips testified that his body-worn camera recorded his interactions with defendant. The

footage was published and has been reviewed by this court. It showed Phillips approach defendant,

who was speaking to other police officers and searching through his wallet. After approximately

one minute, defendant said he did not have identification with him. Phillips testified that

defendant’s identification was later recovered at the police station from within the same wallet.

¶8 In the recording, defendant initially told the officers that “everybody was speeding,”

“somebody hit the brakes,” and he was “not so sure it’s [his] fault.” About a minute later, he said

he “ran into a stopped car” at a green light. He said he hit his head but was not injured and did not

need an ambulance, and he did not have any medical problems that would impair his ability to

drive.

¶9 Defendant said he was coming from “downtown,” then specified Fulton Market. When

Phillips asked, “What’s over there,” defendant paused before answering, “Restaurants.” He later

said he was “just hanging out downtown.” When Phillips asked what he was doing, defendant

paused, then answered that he was at his cousin’s birthday party for part of the night. Defendant

could not remember any specific place he had been.

¶ 10 Phillips asked defendant where he was going, and defendant said he was going home to

Berwyn. Then a few seconds later, he said he was “heading downtown.” Phillips asked, “You are

heading downtown?” Defendant answered, “Yeah.” Phillips said, “I thought you said you were

going to Berwyn.” Defendant replied, “Yeah we are going to Berwyn.”

¶ 11 Phillips asked defendant how much he had to drink, and defendant said, “Nothing really.”

Phillips asked what he meant and “how many beers.” Defendant paused for 10 seconds before

giving an inaudible answer, then repeated, “Nothing really to be honest.” Phillips stated he could

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smell alcohol on defendant, and defendant said he “wasn’t really drinking like that.” He then said

he had his last drink approximately an hour ago. When asked what kind of drink, defendant paused

for 14 seconds until Phillips prompted him, “Was it a beer? A shot?” Defendant then answered,

“Yeah, it was like a beer.” Phillips asked what kind of beer, defendant paused for 12 seconds, then

stated he could not remember. He could not remember how much he drank over the course of the

night or whether it was a lot.

¶ 12 Phillips attempted to administer the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. He first asked

if defendant had anything wrong with his eyes; defendant said yes but refused to explain. Upon

further prompting, he held up his middle fingers on both hands, asked if Phillips could see them,

and said he could not see them. Phillips asked if defendant meant he had a problem with his

peripheral vision, and defendant said yes.

¶ 13 Phillips twice asked defendant to step forward, and each time defendant stepped to the side.

On the third try, defendant stepped forward. Phillips asked defendant to hold his head still, but

defendant stepped away, saying he was “not physically able” to perform the test. Defendant refused

to explain, and demanded the officers demonstrate walking in a straight line. Phillips agreed, then

defendant retrieved his phone, saying he wanted to record the demonstration. Phillips and his

partner asked defendant to put his phone away, saying they just needed to check him. Defendant

pointed at them and said, “No, f*** you and f*** you.” Phillips’ partner demonstrated walking in

a straight line down the sidewalk. Phillips repeatedly asked defendant to cooperate with testing,

and defendant refused. Defendant said he was “sick and tired of being harassed by people like

you.” Defendant then went to speak to his girlfriend in his vehicle.

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¶ 14 When defendant returned, he submitted to the HGN test. Phillips testified that he observed

“six out of six clues,” where four out of six clues indicated “consumption.”

¶ 15 Next, the recording showed Phillips instruct defendant to walk in a straight line and to put

one foot in front of the other. Defendant stumbled and said, “I can’t do that.” Phillips asked him

to try his best. Defendant said, “I can’t hold that position. Even if I was sober or f***ing drunk or

f***ing intoxicated or like, f***ing retarded, I can’t do that s***.” Phillips asked why; defendant

did not explain but again demanded the officers perform the test. Phillips demonstrated and asked

if defendant wanted to try now; defendant said no. For approximately five minutes, defendant

continually refused Phillips’ requests to perform the test. At one point, defendant walked toward

the street, lost his balance at the curb, and stumbled.

¶ 16 Phillips testified that he then arrested defendant under suspicion of driving under the

influence of alcohol and took him to the police station, where he refused a breathalyzer test.

Phillips believed defendant to have been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident.

¶ 17 The trial court asked whether defendant said “f*** you” on two occasions, and Phillips

confirmed defendant did. The court asked, “That ever happen to you often [during] your work as

a police officer, where people say ‘f*** you’?” Phillips answered, “It’s unusual.” The court stated,

“That’s what I would have thought too.”

¶ 18 In closing, defendant’s counsel argued that the State had not proved defendant was under

the influence of alcohol beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel emphasized that defendant only

admitted drinking one beer at least one hour prior and posited defendant “hit his head in the crash

which could have been affecting him.” Counsel further argued that even if defendant had been

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impaired, if he were under the influence of another substance such as medical cannabis,

prescription medication, heroin, or MDMA, “that would make him not guilty” of DUI as charged.

¶ 19 After a recess, the court issued its ruling, stating:

“I believe Mr. [Owei] without qualification. And I believe Officer Phillips without

qualification. Much of what they testified to is confirmed by the [surveillance] video and

by the Officer Phillips’[s] body worn camera.

Mr. Godines was winning until he said f*** you. F*** you to the officer. Because

I cannot understand why anybody would say that to a Chicago Police Officer who is

comporting him[self] in an eminently proper manner. Unless, your judgment is fried by

[virtue] of the fact that you’re under the influence of alcohol.”

¶ 20 The court found defendant guilty of DUI and denied his motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and his motion in arrest of

judgment. Following a sentencing hearing where the court received evidence of defendant’s prior

DUI convictions, the court sentenced him to two years’ probation, plus alcohol counseling and 10

days in jail.

¶ 21 Defendant appeals, arguing the State failed to prove he was impaired by alcohol.

¶ 22 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the State to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037,

¶ 66. We will not retry the defendant or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Id. ¶

67. We allow all reasonable inferences in favor of the State and will not reverse unless the evidence

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is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s

guilt. Id.

¶ 23 To sustain a conviction for DUI under section 11-501(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code, the State

must prove the defendant was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the

influence of alcohol. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2022). “A defendant is under the

influence when his mental or physical faculties are so impaired as to reduce his ability to think and

act with ordinary care.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Olvera, 2023 IL App (1st)

210875, ¶ 25. That is, “a defendant must be under the influence to a degree that renders [him]

incapable of driving safely.” People v. Groebe, 2019 IL App (1st) 180503, ¶ 57.

¶ 24 Scientific proof such as a breath or blood alcohol test is not required to establish

intoxication. Id. ¶ 58. The trier of fact may rely solely on circumstantial evidence, including the

arresting officer’s observations of the defendant’s conduct, speech, appearance, odor of alcohol,

and ability to perform field sobriety tests. Id. A defendant’s inability to comprehend and follow

instructions may also support a finding of impairment. People v. Tatera, 2018 IL App (2d) 160207,

¶ 28. The testimony of a single credible police officer may sustain a DUI conviction. People v.

Phillips, 2015 IL App (1st) 131147, ¶ 18.

¶ 25 Defendant does not dispute that he had actual physical control of his vehicle at the time of

the collision. He contends only that the State failed to prove he was impaired by alcohol, arguing

the trial evidence “demonstrated only [defendant’s] consumption of alcohol, but not his

impairment.” We disagree.

¶ 26 First, defendant stated on video that he had “a beer,” though he refused to elaborate.

Second, Phillips’s testimony and body-worn camera footage provided strong circumstantial

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evidence that defendant was impaired by alcohol. Phillips testified he smelled alcohol on

defendant’s breath, and defendant’s eyes were “glassy and watery.” Video confirmed other signs

of impairment, including delayed speech, confusion, agitation, stumbling, and inability to follow

directions. Defendant’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer was further evidence of consciousness

of guilt. See Groebe, 2019 IL App (1st) 180503, ¶ 59; 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c)(1) (West 2022)

(refusal to submit to testing is admissible evidence in DUI prosecution).

¶ 27 Defendant contends the trial court “defie[d] common sense” when it stated he was

“winning” until he said “f*** you.” To the extent defendant argues the trial court relied solely on

defendant’s use of profanity toward the officer, we note that immediately prior to this comment,

the trial court stated it “believe[d]” Owei “without qualification” and “believe[d] Officer Phillips

without qualification.” The trial court thus clearly considered the two witnesses’ testimony in

reaching its conclusion. In any event, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record,

regardless of the trial court’s stated basis. See Beacham v. Walker, 231 Ill. 2d 51, 61 (2008).

¶ 28 Defendant also contends that what Phillips testified was “slurred, low and slow, speech”

was in fact “the normal cadence of [his] voice coupled with a slight accent.” Defendant offered no

evidence at trial to contradict Phillips’ testimony, and we draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the finding of guilt on appeal. See Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 67. We thus infer, based on

Phillips’ testimony and our review of the video evidence, that defendant’s speech was slurred and

slow, and was not his normal speech cadence.

¶ 29 Moreover, as our supreme court has instructed, “the trier of fact is not required to disregard

inferences which flow normally from the evidence and to search out all possible explanations

consistent with innocence.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 332 (2000); see also People v. Galarza,

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2023 IL 127678, ¶ 25. Here, the inference logically flowing from the trial evidence is that

defendant’s consumption of alcohol on February 12, 2022, impaired his faculties to such a degree

that he severely rear-ended another vehicle, struggled to answer questions and follow directions,

and behaved aggressively toward police officers. In finding defendant guilty of DUI, the trial court

inferred that this level of impairment had rendered defendant “incapable of driving safely.” See

Groebe, 2019 IL App (1st) 180503, ¶ 57. We allow all reasonable inferences in favor of the finding

of guilt (see Aljohani, 2022 IL 127037, ¶ 67). This evidence was not so unreasonable, improbable,

or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. See id.

¶ 30 Finally, defendant argues that Phillips improperly administered the HGN test and “walk

and turn” tests. Defendant forfeited these arguments by failing to raise them at trial or in a posttrial

motion. See People v. Briseno, 343 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961-62 (2003). To the extent that these

arguments are connected to his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence—and thus not subject

to waiver—we note that they in no way discredit the testimony and video evidence of defendant’s

slow and slurred speech, glassy eyes, confusion, agitation, stumbling, and refusal to submit to a

breathalyzer. See id. at 962 (finding sufficient evidence supported DUI conviction even without

considering the results of field sobriety tests). We also decline defendant’s request to take judicial

notice of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s “DWI Detection and Standardized

Field Sobriety Test (SFST) Participant Manual,” which was not introduced at trial.

¶ 31 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 32 Affirmed.

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