People v. Fultz

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 2-26-0031
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (2d) 260031-U No. 2-26-0031 Order filed May 7, 2026

NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DARVIONTE D. FULTZ, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County. Honorable Marcy L. Buick, Judge, Presiding. No. 25-CF-294

PRESIDING JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment. Justice Jorgensen dissented.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying defendant pretrial release where there was clear and convincing evidence that (1) defendant posed a real and present threat to the minor victim, the victim’s family, and the community where defendant and his wife approached the victim and his family in a confrontational manner while armed with a firearm, got into a physical altercation, and defendant shot the victim; and (2) conditions could not mitigate the threat posed by defendant where there was ongoing conflict between the victim’s family and defendant’s wife.

¶2 Defendant, Darvionte D. Fultz, appeals from the denial of his pretrial release under section

110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024)). For

the following reasons we affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 29, 2025, defendant was initially charged via complaint with aggravated battery

with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2024)) and aggravated unlawful possession of a

weapon (no concealed carry license) (id. § 24-1.6(a)(3)(a-5). The charges arise out of an incident

which occurred on May 28, 2025, in which defendant and his wife, Akiah D. Washington, got into

a physical altercation with J.M.J, the minor victim; Sharneshia Hunt, who was J.M.J.’s mother;

Lano Miller; and another woman, ultimately leading to defendant shooting J.M.J. in the abdomen.

¶5 On May 29, 2025, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release pursuant to

section 110-6.1 of the Code. A hearing was held on the State’s petition the same day, following

which the trial court granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial release.

¶6 At the pretrial detention hearing, the State asked the court to take judicial notice of the

police synopsis. According to the police synopsis, officers responded to a report of a shooting in

the 800 block of Russell Road in De Kalb. Officers located a 17-year-old victim, J.M.J., with a

gunshot wound to his abdomen. J.M.J. was transported to the hospital for surgery. Police spoke

with a witness who observed defendant and his wife Washington arguing with individuals in the

street outside of an apartment building located at 822 Russell Road. The witness saw defendant

with a firearm, heard a single gunshot, and then observed defendant and Washington go back into

the apartment building. The witness knew defendant and Washington to stay in apartment nine.

¶7 Officers reviewed surveillance footage from a TransDev bus which captured the incident.

According to the synopsis, the footage showed defendant and Washington engaged in a fight with

J.M.J. and other individuals. During the fight, defendant was engaged with J.M.J. when he fired a

single shot striking J.M.J. and causing him to fall. Defendant and Washington then walked towards

the apartment building.

-2- ¶8 Officers went to apartment 9 and made contact with defendant and Washington, who were

taken to the De Kalb Police Department for questioning. Defendant stated that he and Washington

were “jumped” by several individuals and a fight ensued. He continued that, during the fight,

defendant and J.M.J. struggled over defendant’s firearm and he discharged the firearm during the

struggle.

¶9 A search of the apartment was conducted and a Taurus G2C 933 firearm was recovered. A

LEADS search revealed that defendant possessed a valid FOID card but did not possess a valid

concealed carry license.

¶ 10 The State acknowledged that defendant did not have a criminal history, history of substance

abuse, or any known mental health issues. The State maintained that despite defendant’s clean

history, defendant’s actions constituted extremely violent and dangerous behavior directed towards

a minor. Further, defendant discharged his firearm in an area with several people around,

endangering the public in general. The State further argued that no set of conditions could mitigate

the threat posed by defendant.

¶ 11 Defendant argued that pretrial release was appropriate, maintaining that there was a

reasonable inference of self-defense or an inadvertent discharge. Defendant also argued that he

had no criminal history and scored a one on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment. Additionally,

conditions of pretrial release were available to mitigate the threat posed by defendant such as

electronic home monitoring, a no-contact order, and relinquishing any firearms to the police.

¶ 12 The trial court denied defendant’s pretrial release, noting that the shooting and altercation

occurred in broad daylight near a public park, and that defendant apparently made no attempt to

render aid to the victim or call an ambulance.

-3- ¶ 13 On August 12, 2025, defendant filed a motion to reconsider pretrial detention, which

argued that defendant should be granted pretrial release because Washington had suffered a

miscarriage, was on bed-rest, and defendant was needed to care for her and their ten-year-old child.

Defendant also would no longer be living near J.M.J. and his family. Finally, a statement from the

bus driver and the surveillance footage showed that J.M.J. and the other individuals initiated the

confrontation. A hearing was held on August 13, 2025. At the hearing defense counsel proffered

that Washington had previously sought a protective order against Hunt, who was one of the

individuals who engaged in the altercation with Washington. However, her petition was dismissed

due to a procedural defect. Hunt was now seeking a protective order against Washington, and

Washington claimed that Hunt told her she would “get her ass kicked” if she showed up to contest

the protective order. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 14 On December 17, 2025, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment. A hearing was

held on January 7, 2026. At the hearing defense counsel proffered that Washington had obtained

an order of protection against Hunt. Additionally, there were pending criminal charges against

Hunt and Miller for violating that order of protection. Defense counsel further proffered that the

bus driver had seen J.M.J., Hunt, Miller, and the other woman waiting in the same location about

half an hour earlier on her previous round. Defense counsel also argued that the surveillance video

showed Hunt with a taser. Additionally, video existed from a prior incident where Hunt was outside

of the apartment building waiving a hatchet around screaming, “get my fucking gun.” The bus

surveillance footage was also tendered as evidence.

¶ 15 The bus surveillance footage from the instant case showed the bus turning South onto

Russell Road. The bus came to a stop in front of 822 Russell Road. As the bus approached J.M.J.

and Miller were standing in the middle of the street facing south. To their right, on the west side

-4- of the street, Hunt, another woman, and a child were getting out of a black sedan. Hunt appeared

to have a small item in her right hand, but there is nothing to indicate that it was a taser, and she

did not brandish the item as if it were a weapon. Defendant and Washington approached the group

from the south. Defendant had his right hand near his waistband. Defendant stepped up to J.M.J.

and Miller, while Hunt and the other woman stepped up to Washington.

¶ 16 They all appeared to be arguing. Miller made a bluff charge towards defendant, and

defendant then charged him. As he did, J.M.J. either punched or pushed defendant. Defendant then

reached into his waistband. As this was happening the unidentified woman began to step towards

the group of men. As she did, Washington began striking Hunt. The two melees then merged.

Defendant lunged towards Miller attempting to punch him, as Miller backpedaled away from the

group. J.M.J. then interposed himself between Washington and the two women, causing

Washington to back away. J.M.J. then left the group of women to engage with defendant, as Miller

stepped forward to push Washington. Seeing this, defendant charged Miller who backpedaled away

from the melee. J.M.J. pursued defendant throwing punches as defendant’s back was turned.

Defendant then turned and fired his gun at J.M.J., who fell to the ground. Miller then fled the field

as the women were engaged in grappling.

¶ 17 Defendant briefly pursued Miller, pointing his gun, before turning back towards the group

of women. He appeared to place the gun back in his waistband. At this point Washington was on

the ground holding Hunt down. As this happened, J.M.J. struggled to get back to his feet and

proceeded to hop away eastward. Defendant managed to break up the fight between the women.

Washington then headed east towards the apartment building’s southern parking lot, while

defendant retrieved what appeared to be a backpack and a jacket. Defendant then headed towards

the building’s southern parking lot. Hunt and the other woman went back to the car and then east

-5- towards where J.M.J. and Miller had gone. Approximately two minutes later police arrived at the

scene.

¶ 18 The trial court took the matter under advisement and denied defendant’s motion on January

15, 2026. Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues that the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence

that (1) defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community based on the specific articulable facts of the case, arguing that the trial court relied

exclusively on the nature of the charges; (2) the State did not prove by clear and convincing

evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the threat posed by

defendant as his pretrial risk assessment indicated a low likelihood that he would be charged with

a new offense if released, and defendant’s actions were taken in self-defense under circumstances

which were unlikely to reoccur; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to

reconsider based on the admission of new evidence “establishing that J.M.J. and others were the

aggressors, and that defendant needed to be released in order to care for his Washington and their

child.”

¶ 21 All defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial release, and the State shall bear the

burden of proving otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West

2024). To deny a defendant pretrial release, the State must show that (1) the proof is evident or the

presumption great that the defendant has committed an eligible offense, and (2) the defendant poses

a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, which (3) no

condition or combination of conditions can mitigate. Id. The trial court’s finding that no

-6- combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by a defendant must be based on the

specific articulable facts of the case. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3).

¶ 22 Regarding dangerousness, despite the results of defendant’s pretrial risk assessment and

clean criminal history, there was clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and

present threat to the safety of J.M.J., J.M.J.’s family, and the community. Regarding the nature and

circumstances of the charged offense, this case involved a crime of violence and the use of a

firearm. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(1), (7). Additionally, while defendant seeks to characterize his actions as

self-defense and paint J.M.J. and the others as the initial aggressors, the evidence presented does

not bear this out.

¶ 23 Even accepting defendant’s proffer that the bus driver saw J.M.J. and the others waiting at

the same location an hour earlier, at this time, there is no other evidence suggesting that they were

specifically waiting for defendant or Washington. The evidence we do have shows that defendant

and Washington approached J.M.J.’s group in a confrontational manner while defendant was

armed with a concealed firearm without a concealed carry permit. Defendant and Washington’s

access to their apartment was not blocked. Additionally, defendant and Washington had set down

the things they had been carrying in order to go and confront J.M.J.’s group, indicating that they

were initiating (or at least anticipating) the physical confrontation. Defendant’s failure to call for

emergency assistance does not bolster his accusations.

¶ 24 Moreover, defendant discharged his firearm in a roadway surrounded by an occupied

apartment building on one side and a park on the other. A bus with passengers was in the street and

a young child was with J.M.J.’s group. Even if we accept that J.M.J.’s group was waiting to

confront defendant and Washington, instead of going back to his apartment and calling the police,

-7- defendant chose to confront the group while armed illegally, thereby placing everyone in the

vicinity in danger.

¶ 25 While defendant argues that his actions were taken in self-defense, “the question of whether

a defendant’s use of force was ultimately justified is a matter resolved at trial[.] (Emphasis in

original.)” People v. Smith, 2024 IL App (2d) 240168, ¶ 21. Despite the surveillance footage and

defendant’s proffer, questions of fact still exist such as whether defendant was an initial aggressor,

and whether the force used was justified. At a hearing on pretrial detention, the court is not required

to accept a defendant’s claim of self-defense where the record permits other conclusions

concerning the defendant’s culpability and, by extension, potential dangerousness. People v.

Romine, 2024 IL App (4th) 240321, ¶ 21.

¶ 26 Further, defendant’s proffer regarding the ongoing conflict between Hunt and Washington

indicates a heightened risk of additional conflict between defendant and J.M.J.’s family if

defendant were released.

¶ 27 Accordingly, there was clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and

present threat to the safety of J.M.J., his family, and the community.

¶ 28 Turning to conditions of pretrial release, defendant argues that the trial court failed to

consider the plethora of available pretrial release conditions, and that because defendant was acting

in self-defense when he shot J.M.J., a similar incident was not likely to occur. We reject this

contention. From the record, the conflict between J.M.J.’s family and defendant’s family was

ongoing with both sides seeking orders of protection and Hunt being charged with violating an

order of protection obtained by Washington. While this may tend to support defendant’s self-

defense argument, it also indicates a heightened likelihood of future conflict between defendant

and the victim’s family.

-8- ¶ 29 Further, despite defendant’s lack of criminal history, defendant’s choice to carry a gun in

public without a concealed carry permit indicates a willingness to disregard pretrial release

conditions. See People v. Rose-Watkins, 2026 IL App (1st) 252509-U, ¶ 43 (“[I]llegally possessing

a firearm *** supports a finding that [the defendant] is willing to disregard conditions of pretrial

release and accordingly supports his pretrial detention.”)

¶ 30 Finally, we address defendant’s contention that his release is required in order to help care

for Washington and their children. Washington was pregnant at the time of the shooting and

defendant presumably was already helping to care for her and their child. This did not prevent him

from getting into a physical altercation with J.M.J. and shooting him in Washington’s immediate

presence.

¶ 31 Accordingly, we find that there is clear and convincing evidence that no condition or

combination of conditions can mitigate the threat posed by defendant.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

¶ 35 JUSTICE JORGENSEN, dissenting:

¶ 36 The majority today upholds a pretrial detention order where the State failed to proffer any

specific articulable facts, apart from the elements of the crime itself, that prove by clear and

convincing evidence that there are no conditions of release that could mitigate defendant’s safety

risk. I depart from the majority’s dangerousness finding; however, even assuming, arguendo, the

State established dangerousness, I would find there were conditions of release that would mitigate

any potential safety threat posed by defendant. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

-9- ¶ 37 Under the Code, as amended, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that: the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a

detainable offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)), the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or the community (id. §§ 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2)), and less

restrictive conditions would not mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or

the community (id. § 110-6.1(e)). “Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable

doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v.

Department of Human Services, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74.

¶ 38 Section 110-10(a), (b) of the Code, as amended, authorizes the circuit court to impose a

nonexhaustive list of pretrial release conditions that may mitigate an individual or communitywide

safety concern and mitigate the risk of future violations. Importantly, those conditions include that

a defendant (1) “surrender all firearms in his or her possession to a law enforcement officer

designated by the court to take custody of and impound the firearms and physically surrender his

or her Firearm Owner’s Identification Card to the clerk of the circuit court ***”; (2) “[r]efrain

from possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon”; (3) “[r]efrain from approaching or

communicating with particular persons or classes of persons”; (4) “[r]efrain from going to certain

described geographic areas or premises”; (5) “[b]e placed under direct supervision of the Pretrial

Services Agency, Probation Department or Court Services Department in a pretrial home

supervision capacity with or without the use of an approved electronic monitoring device”; and (6)

any other reasonable conditions, so long as these conditions are the least restrictive means to

“ensure the defendant does not commit any criminal offense, ensure the defendant complies with

all conditions of pretrial release, prevent the defendant’s unlawful interference with the orderly

administration of justice, or ensure compliance with the rules and procedures of problem solving

- 10 - courts,” are individualized, and follow national best practices detailed in the Pretrial Supervision

Standards of the supreme court. 725 ILCS 5/110-10(a)(5), (b)(3)-(5) (West 2024).

¶ 39 Although I disagree with the majority’s dangerousness analysis, for the sake of argument,

I assume the State proved that defendant was dangerous. Nonetheless, it is essential to consider

defendant’s degree of dangerousness, to properly consider whether appropriate conditions exist

that would mitigate any safety concern. See People v. Romine, 2024 IL App (4th) 240321, ¶ 16

(finding “dangerousness and conditions of release are two sides of the same coin; the nature and

severity of the threat necessarily determine the nature and severity of the conditions that could—

or could not—mitigate the threat.”). During the detention proceedings, the evidence, including a

video recording from a bus, showed that defendant and his pregnant girlfriend, Washington,

walked towards a group of individuals already congregating on the street. There were four

individuals outside a car also moving toward defendant and Washington. Defense counsel

recounted (and it was not disputed by the State) a bus driver’s statement, indicating that the

individuals exiting the car, Hunt, Miller, and J.M.J. among them, had been standing, blocking the

street, at the same location 30 minutes prior to the shooting. While the video showed defendant

walking towards Hunt’s car, defense counsel also proffered that the bus driver believed defendant

approached and said, “What’s going on?” It is after that, the fight broke out; defendant and

Washington were outnumbered. The bus surveillance video depicts that J.M.J and Miller were

marginally taller than defendant and Washington, but with a slimmer build. Based on defendant’s

proffers and pretrial arguments, he has raised a viable claim for self-defense or the defense of his

pregnant girlfriend, which is relevant, although not conclusive, during pretrial proceedings. People

v. Smith, 2024 IL App (2d) 240168, ¶ 21.

¶ 40 The majority further supports dangerousness and faults defendant for not retreating to his

- 11 - abode, for discarding items as he approached Hunt and the others, and for not calling emergency

assistance after the shooting. I do not view this evidence in the same light. Regarding defendant’s

opportunity to retreat, the parties’ proffers evince that defendant did not appear to approach in a

confrontational manner, as he approached and asked what was going on, according to the account

from the bus driver. As such, there was no apparent reason for defendant to retreat, as he was not

the confronter. Next, while the video shows Washington discarding her shoes as she approached

Hunt, the video does not show when or if defendant discarded a backpack he later retrieved. Any

hypothesis as to when or why the items were discarded is rank speculation. Finally, defendant’s

failure to call emergency services, in my view, supports his claim for self-defense, not diminishes

it. I believe it is far more reasonable to conclude that someone in imminent danger, or protecting

a loved one from imminent danger, is more likely to flee danger and assist a loved one in fleeing,

before calling 911. This is especially true here where defendant likely did not realize the extent of

J.M.J.’s injuries, as defendant turned his back on J.M.J. after firing, to briefly follow Miller. During

these few seconds, J.M.J. rolled to the curb and jumped away. Defendant’s failure to incapacitate

J.M.J. was all the more reason to flee rather than stop to call emergency services. Thus, in my

view, failing to call emergency services here is not indicative of dangerousness.

¶ 41 Finally, I do not agree with the majority’s supposition that there is a heightened risk of

additional conflict between defendant and J.M.J.’s family. The evidence shows that defendant and

Washington no longer live in proximity to J.M.J. and his family. Further, Washington sought and

obtained an order of protection against Hunt and Miller, and both Hunt and Miller have since been

charged with violating this order. Overall, there is no indication that defendant is at risk of initiating

or participating in future conflict with J.M.J.’s family. On the contrary, the presented evidence

indicates that it is defendant and Washington who have taken steps to diminish any potential for

- 12 - future communication with J.M.J. or his family by moving out of the area.

¶ 42 However, assuming defendant is dangerous, I find the State failed to present clear and

convincing evidence that there were no less restrictive conditions than detention that would

mitigate the real and present threat defendant posed to the safety of J.M.J. or the community. The

State’s only argument was that “based on the specific and articulable facts of the case—namely,

bringing a gun in public and discharging it in public—that there is no set of circumstances that

could allow this defendant to be safely released from the custody of DeKalb County jail ***.” I

disagree and submit any number of conditions would mitigate defendant’s safety risk.

¶ 43 Defendant’s possession and discharge of a gun in public alone is not clear and convincing

evidence that no conditions exist, less than detention, that would mitigate his safety risk to J.M.J.

and the community. While the nature of the charge is one factor to consider in determining whether

conditions can mitigate dangerousness, here, possession of a weapon and discharge a weapon in

public are essential elements of the detainable offenses. This evidence alone is not sufficient to

justify defendant’s detention, as section 110-5 requires that courts base their findings of detention

on more than the general nature of the charge itself. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2024); People v.

Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶ 18 (finding that “[i]f the base allegations that make up the sine

qua non of a violent offense were sufficient on their own to establish this element [(conditions of

release)], then the legislature would have simply deemed those accused of violent offenses

ineligible for release.”); see also People v. Bartosik, 2026 IL App (4th) 251398-U (affirming the

basis of Stock under de novo review).

¶ 44 Considering the remainder of the majority’s analysis on conditions of release, I believe de

novo review supports the imposition of conditions. Here, defendant has no prior criminal history,

no history of substance abuse, and no history of mental illness. Defendant scored only one point

- 13 - on his Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment, suggesting that there was a 96% probability he would

attend all future hearings and not reoffend. He was also recommended for release without

supervision. These recommendations should carry significant weight in favor of release with

conditions. Defendant also possessed a valid FOID card and had, thus, passed the rigors of scrutiny

to legally own a firearm in Illinois. Although he did not possess a CCL, he had taken significant

steps to comply with Illinois gun laws. There is no indication here that defendant armed himself

to engage in a conflict. Rather, the evidence and defendant’s proffer show that it was Hunt and her

family who had been “waving in the street” 30 minutes prior to the altercation. The evidence also

supports defendant’s claim that he did not approach J.M.J. or his family in a confrontational

manner. Instead, the evidence supports a viable claim of self-defense or defense of Washington.

Overall, defendant’s lack of criminal history, grant of a FOID license, and viable defense show he

has the ability and willingness to comply with any and all conditions the court may set. The

majority’s analysis and suppositions leave more than a reasonable doubt in my mind that the

State’s evidence was sufficient to foreclose conditions of release. With this in mind, and the

presumption being defendant’s release (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024)), I would reverse the

circuit court’s detention order and remand this cause to the circuit court for the imposition of

conditions consistent with the Code, as amended. 725 ILCS 5/110-5, 110-10 (West 2024).

- 14 -