People v. Bartosik

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 3, 2026
• Docket: 4-25-1398
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 251398-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is April 3, 2026 NO. 4-25-1398 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th limited circumstances allowed 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County ANTHONY E. BARTOSIK, ) No. 25CF322 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court reversed and remanded for a hearing on the appropriate conditions of defendant’s pretrial release, finding the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and (2) there were no conditions of release that could mitigate the threat defendant posed.

¶2 Defendant, Anthony E. Bartosik, appeals the trial court’s order denying him pretrial

release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art.

110 (West 2024)), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. He argues the State failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he posed a real and present threat to the safety of

any person, persons, or the community and (2) no condition or combination of conditions of

pretrial release could mitigate the threat he posed.

¶3 We reverse and remand with directions.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 On December 3, 2025, defendant was charged by information with 12 counts of

child pornography (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(6) (West 2024)). Two of the counts were Class 3

felonies and related to depictions of children under the age of 18. The other 10 counts were Class

2 felonies and related to depictions of children under the age of 13. The offenses were alleged to

have occurred between April 2024 and August 2024.

¶6 The State filed a verified petition to detain defendant pretrial, and a hearing was

held. The State proffered the following information: on July 21, 2025, a detective received a

cybertip from the Internet service provider Google that 13 files containing apparent child

pornography had been uploaded to a Google drive belonging to defendant. The detective obtained

a search warrant for defendant’s Google account, which yielded six photographs and seven videos.

The photos showed various individuals under the age of 18, some of whom were “clearly under

the age of 13,” in different stages of undress, exposing their breasts or vaginas. The videos showed

individuals who were all under the age of 13 engaged in various acts of masturbation, sexual

penetration, or sexual conduct. In one of the videos, the child being filmed stated that she was 11

years old.

¶7 The State further proffered that a search warrant was executed on defendant’s

home, and he was brought to the Pontiac Police Department to be interviewed. Defendant waived

his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and admitted to police that he

had downloaded the images and videos from a messaging service called “Telegram” and saved

them to his Google account.

¶8 A pretrial services report was admitted at the hearing. The report indicated that

defendant was 28 years old, was employed full-time, and lived with his girlfriend and two children.

Defendant also had another eight-year-old child, who stayed with him every weekend. The report

-2- indicated that defendant had no history of mental health issues or substance abuse issues and had

no prior criminal history. He scored a 0 out of 14 possible points on the Virginia Pretrial Risk

Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI-R), placing him in the category at the lowest risk of

violating conditions of pretrial release.

¶9 The State also offered a document detailing the capabilities of the Office of

Statewide Pretrial Services (OSPS) in monitoring defendants who have been granted pretrial

release. This document discussed OSPS’s use of GPS monitoring and home visits, as well as its

officers’ duties and the organization’s reporting requirements. The document provided that “OSPS

is committed to doing all it can to comply with the court’s order and to hold defendants ordered to

OSPS supervision accountable with the conditions of pretrial release.”

¶ 10 Defense counsel proffered that defendant would agree to abide by any and all

conditions of release imposed by the trial court, including a prohibition on contact with minors.

Defendant also indicated that he was able to make alternative living arrangements with his mother

so that he would no longer reside in a home with children.

¶ 11 The State argued that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or the community, noting that he was an individual “who ha[d] essentially gone out of his

way to obtain these videos and images of children who are under the age of 13, to save those for

his own purposes.” The State argued that the evidence showed defendant was attracted to minors,

a vulnerable group in need of protection, and that as long as defendant continued to seek out this

pornographic material, children would be in danger. The State further argued that OSPS could do

nothing to meaningfully monitor defendant on pretrial release, as most of the monitoring would

rely on defendant’s own self-reporting. It therefore requested that the trial court grant its petition

to deny defendant pretrial release.

-3- ¶ 12 Defendant argued that the State had failed to prove that no conditions of release

would mitigate any threat he posed. He emphasized that he cooperated with police during the

investigation, had no criminal record, scored a 0 on the VPRAI-R, and was willing to abide by any

conditions of release the court imposed.

¶ 13 Following arguments, the trial court announced its decision. It emphasized that the

crimes with which defendant was charged were “particularly abhorrent,” noting that they spanned

multiple months and involved children under the age of 13. The court acknowledged that defendant

scored a 0 on the VPRAI-R and had no criminal record but found that that the fact that the crimes

occurred “behind closed doors” made it difficult to impose any restrictions to reduce the risk of

harm defendant posed to minors. It therefore found the State had met its burden of proof and

granted its petition to detain.

¶ 14 On December 8, 2025, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In the motion, he argued that less restrictive

conditions than detention would have avoided any threat he posed based on his VPRAI-R score

and his lack of criminal history. He further argued that the State’s argument for detention centered

around the charged conduct itself, with nothing presented as to his specific background or

characteristics. Finally, he asserted that the “inadequacies of OSPS [were] not a factor to consider”

under section 110-6.1(g) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2024)) when deciding if

pretrial release should be granted.

¶ 15 The trial court denied defendant’s motion for relief.

¶ 16 This appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

-4- ¶ 18 Under the Code, all defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. People v.

Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 13. To overcome this presumption, the State must prove

(1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense,

(2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the threat the

defendant poses. Id. ¶ 14. Where the parties at a detention hearing proceed solely by proffer and

documentary evidence, our review is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 51.

¶ 19 Here, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he posed a real and present

threat to the safety of the community and that no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the

threat he posed. We will address each issue in turn.

¶ 20 A. Real and Present Threat

¶ 21 When determining whether a defendant poses a real and present threat to any person

or the community, a court must consider factors such as (1) the nature and circumstances of the

offense charged, including whether it is a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the

defendant, including his prior criminal history; (3) the identity of any person to whose safety the

defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of that threat; (4) the age and physical

condition of the defendant; (5) the age and physical condition of the victim or complaining witness;

(6) whether the defendant was on probation at the time of the offense; and (7) any other factors

deemed to have a reasonable bearing on the defendant’s propensity for violent behavior. 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(g)(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), (9) (West 2024). A finding of dangerousness must be based

on the specific, articulable facts of the case. Id. § 110-6.1(g). “[A] general recitation of the charges

a criminal defendant faces” is insufficient to establish a defendant’s dangerousness. People v.

Nicholson, 2024 IL App (2d) 240257-U, ¶ 17.

-5- ¶ 22 Defendant argues that possession of child pornography is not a physically violent

crime such that his release would pose a “real and present threat” to a person or the community.

He also argues that, in arguing his dangerousness, the State only presented evidence regarding the

nature of his offenses. However, he argues that the specific facts of his case, such as his lack of

criminal history and his low score on the VPRAI-R, show that he is not dangerous.

¶ 23 We agree with defendant that the State here did not prove his dangerousness by

clear and convincing evidence. To begin, we briefly address defendant’s argument that the mere

possession of child pornography is not a violent crime. Although defendant does not acknowledge

it, we have previously held otherwise. See People v. Popovich, 2025 IL App (4th) 250196, ¶ 21

(finding possession of child pornography is inextricable from the abuse inherent in its creation).

¶ 24 Regardless, even considering possession of child pornography as a violent offense

would not be enough, by itself, to establish that defendant posed a real and present threat to any

person or the community. “There is no offense so serious or so dangerous to ipso facto require

detention.” People v. Shaffer, 2024 IL App (4th) 240085-U, ¶ 26. Rather, section 110-2 of the

Code (725 ILCS 5/110-2 (West 2024)) provides that all persons charged with an offense, even a

violent one, are eligible for pretrial release. Here, the State argued that defendant posed a real and

present threat to the safety of the community based on the fact that he had “gone out of his way to

obtain these videos and images of children who are under the age of 13.” In other words, the State

argued that defendant was dangerous by reciting the facts of his charges: that he allegedly

possessed child pornography. This is not sufficient to support a finding of dangerousness. See

Shaffer, 2024 IL App (4th) 240085-U, ¶ 25 (finding that a dangerousness analysis that focuses

exclusively on the nature of the charged offense “fails to comport with section 110-6.1 of the Code,

which sets forth a multifactorial approach and is heavily weighted against detention”).

-6- ¶ 25 Instead, there was significant evidence presented at defendant’s detention hearing

to suggest that he did not pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

community. Defendant had no criminal history, scored a 0 out of 14 points on the VPRAI-R, was

not known to possess any weapons or firearms, was not on probation at the time of his offenses,

was employed full-time, was compliant with police officers in his arrest, was able to make

alternative living arrangements so as not to reside with any children, and had proffered that he

would abide by any and all conditions imposed by the court. All these factors weighed against a

finding of dangerousness.

¶ 26 Because the State failed to present evidence of defendant’s dangerousness beyond

the nature of the charged conduct itself, we find that it failed to prove this element by clear and

convincing evidence.

¶ 27 B. Conditions of Release

¶ 28 Defendant also argues that the State failed to provide evidence that he would not

abide by any conditions that were imposed. He further asserts that the capabilities of OSPS are not

a factor to be considered in denying a defendant pretrial release.

¶ 29 When determining what, if any, conditions of pretrial release will reasonably ensure

the safety of a person or the community, the court must consider factors such as (1) the nature and

circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the

history and characteristics of the defendant, including his criminal history, employment, and

whether he was on probation at the time of the offense; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the

specific articulable facts of the case. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)-(4) (West 2024). Again, bare

allegations that a defendant committed a violent offense are not sufficient to establish that no

-7- conditions of release could mitigate the threat he poses. People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753,

¶ 18.

¶ 30 We find there were conditions of release that could have mitigated the threat that

defendant posed to the safety of the community. For example, because defendant’s charged

conduct occurred entirely online, a prohibition on Internet and social media use would have

effectively mitigated any potential threat. See People v. Reamy, 2024 IL App (2d) 240084-U, ¶ 17

(“Given the fact that all of [the defendant’s] conduct was carried out over the Internet, it is

axiomatic that prohibiting [him] from using or accessing the Internet would mitigate any harm

stemming from these types of conduct.”). While banning Internet or social media use might not be

sufficient to mitigate the threat a defendant poses in every case, there was ample reason to believe

it would be sufficient in the instant case. As stated, defendant had no criminal history, was

employed, and scored a 0 out of 14 possible points on the VPRAI-R, placing him at the lowest risk

of violating conditions of release. He had also previously been compliant with law enforcement

and proffered at his detention hearing that he would continue to be compliant in abiding by all

release conditions imposed by the court. Although the State argues that OSPS’s available

monitoring tools were limited, there is no reason to believe they would be insufficient in this case,

with this particular defendant. See Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 18 (“[A] court should

not rule out pretrial release for a defendant based on a general perception that conditions of release

are loosely monitored.”).

¶ 31 The State also argues that the nature of defendant’s charges supported a finding that

no conditions of release could mitigate the threat he posed. As with our analysis of defendant’s

dangerousness, we note that this factor is relevant but insufficient on its own. “If the legislature

were convinced that all criminal defendants charged with child pornography presented an

-8- unmitigable threat to the community, it would have simply deemed those accused of child

pornography ineligible for release.” Reamy, 2024 IL App (2d) 240084-U, ¶ 23. Yet, it did not do

so. There is nothing to suggest that this particular defendant, although charged with a violent

offense, could not be granted pretrial release with appropriate conditions.

¶ 32 Because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence two of the

necessary elements to deny defendant pretrial release, either one of which would be sufficient to

reverse, we are compelled to do so. We remand to the trial court with directions to hold a hearing

on the appropriate conditions of defendant’s pretrial release. See People v. Farah, 2025 IL App

(4th) 250322-U, ¶ 45.

¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a

hearing on the appropriate conditions of defendant’s pretrial release.

¶ 35 Reversed and remanded.

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