NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after
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are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court.
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports
advance sheets following final action by the Court.
Docket Nos. 80158, 80159 cons.--Agenda 9--May 1996.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. BILLIE J.
EVANS, Appellee.--THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant,
v. MICHAEL MEEKS, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 19, 1996.
CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
These two, consolidated appeals concern how Supreme Court Rule
604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) applies to negotiated guilty pleas.
FACTS
In People v. Meeks, the State originally charged defendant
Michael Meeks with reckless homicide, robbery, and first degree
murder. Meeks' defense counsel and an assistant State's Attorney
negotiated a plea agreement. Under its terms, Meeks would plead
guilty to the reckless homicide charge; in exchange, the State
would (1) move to dismiss the other two charges, (2) dismiss
several additional charges pending against Meeks in other cases,
and (3) recommend a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.
On March 11, 1994, the circuit court of Marion County
conducted a proceeding attended by Meeks, his defense counsel, and
an assistant State's Attorney. Defense counsel orally presented the
terms of the negotiated plea agreement to the circuit court. The
circuit court then carefully complied with Supreme Court Rule 402
(134 Ill. 2d R. 402) by, inter alia, admonishing and examining
Meeks, determining that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily
made, and determining that a factual basis existed for the plea.
Meeks executed a written guilty plea and waiver form, which was
presented to the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
circuit court concurred in the negotiated plea agreement and
sentenced Meeks to the recommended sentence of 10 years in prison.
On April 11, 1994, Meeks filed a written pro se motion to
reduce his sentence. Subsequently, his defense counsel filed an
amended motion requesting that the court reduce Meeks' sentence or,
in the alternative, place him in a rehabilitation facility. The
circuit court conducted a hearing on the amended motion. Defense
counsel explained that the motion did not seek to disturb Meeks'
guilty plea; rather, it sought only to reduce the length of Meeks'
sentence so that he could begin substance abuse treatment. Because
the sentence was the product of a negotiated plea agreement, the
circuit court declined to reduce it.
Meeks appealed. The appellate court held that, under Rule
604(d), the circuit court was required to exercise discretion when
considering Meeks' motion to reduce his sentence. Consequently, the
appellate court reversed and remanded the cause to the circuit
court. No. 5--94--0583 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill.
2d R. 315; 134 Ill. 2d R. 612(b)) and consolidated this case with
People v. Evans.
In People v. Evans, the State initially charged defendant
Billie J. Evans with residential burglary, armed violence, and
aggravated unlawful restraint. Evans' defense counsel and an
assistant State's Attorney negotiated a plea agreement. Under its
terms, Evans would plead guilty to the armed violence and
aggravated unlawful restraint charges; in exchange, the State would
(1) move to dismiss the residential burglary charge, and (2)
recommend concurrent sentences of 11 and 5 years' imprisonment for
the armed violence and aggravated unlawful restraint charges, to be
served concurrently with sentences previously imposed in another
county.
On February 3, 1992, the circuit court of Williamson County
conducted a hearing attended by Evans, his defense counsel, and an
assistant State's Attorney. The assistant State's Attorney orally
presented the terms of the negotiated plea agreement to the circuit
court. The circuit court then carefully complied with Rule 402 by,
inter alia, admonishing and examining Evans, determining that the
plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, and determining that a
factual basis existed for the plea. Evans presented his signed
written guilty plea and waiver form to the court. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the circuit court concurred in the negotiated plea
agreement and sentenced Evans to the recommended prison terms.
A short time later, Evans' defense counsel filed a motion to
withdraw Evans' guilty pleas, asserting that Evans did not
understand the plea negotiation process. The circuit court denied
the motion after a full hearing. Evans appealed. On grounds not
relevant here, the appellate court affirmed the convictions,
vacated the sentences, and remanded the cause for a new sentencing
hearing. Following remand, the circuit court conducted a new
sentencing hearing in compliance with the appellate court's order.
The circuit court again sentenced Evans according to the terms of
the negotiated plea agreement.
Evans' defense counsel next filed a written motion for
reconsideration of Evans' sentences. The motion asserted that
Evans' sentences are excessive and should be reduced, mainly
because he is a young man with mental disabilities. Following a
full hearing, the circuit court denied the motion and declined to
reduce Evans' sentences. The circuit court determined, for the
third time, that Evans should serve the prison sentences to which
he had agreed in his plea agreement with the State.
Evans took a second appeal. The appellate court found that
Evans' defense counsel failed to file a Rule 604(d) certificate. As
a result, the appellate court reversed in part and remanded the
cause to the circuit court for a new hearing. No. 5--94--0100
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the
State's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315; 134 Ill.
2d R. 612(b)) and consolidated this case with Meeks' case.
ANALYSIS
The common issue in these consolidated appeals is how Supreme
Court Rule 604(d) applies to negotiated guilty pleas, as opposed to
open guilty pleas.
In each of these cases, the defendant and the State entered
into a negotiated plea agreement in which the defendant pleaded
guilty to certain charges in exchange for the State's agreement to
dismiss other charges and recommend a specific sentence. The trial
courts accepted the negotiated plea agreements and sentenced the
defendants to the recommended prison terms. Following the trial
courts' entry of judgment, each defendant then sought to reduce his
sentence by filing a motion for sentence reconsideration under Rule
604(d).
The State challenges the defendants' efforts to reduce their
sentences. The State contends that it is fundamentally unfair for
the defendants to agree to a negotiated plea agreement, obtain the
benefits of that bargain (especially the dismissed charges), and
then separately seek reconsideration of their negotiated sentences.
According to the State, problems concerning plea bargaining
arrangements should be addressed using contract law principles. The
State claims that, where a defendant pleads guilty in accordance
with a negotiated plea agreement, the guilty plea and the sentence
"go hand in hand" as material elements of the plea agreement.
Consequently, the State maintains, for a defendant to challenge
only a sentence imposed as part of a negotiated plea agreement, the
defendant should be required to withdraw his guilty plea, thereby
returning the parties to the status quo. In this regard, the State
asks us to hold that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions
of Rule 604(d) do not apply to negotiated guilty pleas.
We agree with the State's argument for several reasons. A
review of plea bargaining, guilty pleas, and Rule 604(d) is
conducted while we explain the basis for our agreement.
A. Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas
Plea bargaining was once a questionable practice, often not
acknowledged in open court. See 3 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice §14--65 (2d ed. 1980) (and authorities cited therein).
Since the 1970s, however, the plea bargaining process and the
negotiated plea agreements that result have been recognized not
only as constitutional, but also as vital to and highly desirable
for our criminal justice system. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 363-64, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 611, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668
(1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 30 L. Ed. 2d
427, 432, 92 S. Ct. 495, 498 (1971). Accordingly, this court has
stated that "plea bargaining, when properly administered, is to be
encouraged." People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 416 (1985).
The typical plea bargain contains an agreement by the
defendant to plead guilty to a certain charge or charges. In
contrast to some past practices, trial courts now accept guilty
pleas "only with care and discernment" (Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 756, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (1970)).
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct.
1709 (1969) (holding that due process is violated where a state
court accepts a guilty plea in criminal proceedings without an
affirmative showing, placed on the record, that the defendant
voluntarily and understandingly entered the guilty plea); 134 Ill.
2d R. 402 (requiring, among other things, that plea agreements be
placed on the record, that certain admonitions be given to the
defendant, and that the court determine whether the plea is
voluntarily and knowingly made and whether a factual basis exists
for the plea). Entering a guilty plea is therefore accurately
described as "a grave and solemn act." Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 25
L. Ed. 2d at 756, 90 S. Ct. at 1468. It is not a "temporary and
meaningless formality reversible at the defendant's whim." United
States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see People v.
Hale, 82 Ill. 2d 172 (1980). Consequently, leave to withdraw a plea
of guilty is not granted as a matter of right, but as required to
correct a manifest injustice. People v. Hillenbrand, 121 Ill. 2d
537, 545 (1988); see generally 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal
Procedure §20.5(a), at 661 (1984) (providing examples).
Although plea agreements exist in the criminal justice
structure, they are governed to some extent by contract law
principles. People v. Langston, 125 Ill. App. 3d 479, 482 (1984).
Courts must keep in mind that the defendant's "underlying
`contract' right is constitutionally based and therefore reflects
concerns that differ fundamentally from and run wider than those of
commercial contract law." United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294,
300 (4th Cir. 1986), citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 81
L. Ed. 2d 437, 443-44, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547 (1984) (due process
clause implicated where broken government promise that induced
guilty plea impaired the voluntariness and intelligence of plea).
As a result, the application of contract law principles to plea
agreements may require tempering in some instances. Harvey, 791
F.2d at 300; see, e.g., People v. Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d 516, 523
(1988) (holding that due process principles may govern the
enforceability of plea agreements).
The two cases at bar are appropriate for the application of
contract law principles. As earlier noted, in each of these cases,
the defendant and the State entered into a negotiated plea
agreement in which the defendant pleaded guilty to certain charges
in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss other charges and
recommend a specific sentence. The trial courts accepted the plea
agreements and entered judgment thereon. Each defendant then
unilaterally sought to reduce his sentence by filing a motion for
sentence reconsideration. In effect, the defendants are seeking to
hold the State to its part of the bargain while unilaterally
modifying the sentences to which they had earlier agreed. Such a
practice flies in the face of contract law principles. See Harvey,
791 F.2d at 300 ("Neither side should be able, any more than would
be private contracting parties, unilaterally to renege or seek
modification simply because of uninduced mistake or change of
mind"). It is also inconsistent with constitutional concerns of
fundamental fairness. See Harvey, 791 F.2d at 300, citing
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261-62, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 432-33, 92 S. Ct.
at 498. Consequently, the defendants' efforts unilaterally to
reduce their sentences while holding the State to its part of the
bargain cannot be condoned.
Were we to hold otherwise would be to "encourage gamesmanship
of a most offensive nature" (United States ex rel. Williams v.
McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1970)). The accused could
negotiate with the State to obtain the best deal possible in
modifying or dismissing the most serious charges and obtain a
lighter sentence than he would have received had he gone to trial
or entered an open guilty plea, and then attempt to get that
sentence reduced even further by reneging on the agreement. This
would be "nothing more than a `heads-I-win-tails-you-lose' gamble"
(McMann, 436 F.2d at 107). See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal
Procedure §20.5(e), at 669-74 (1984). Prosecutors would be
discouraged from entering into negotiated plea agreements were such
an unfair strategy be allowed to succeed. That result certainly
would not advance our policy of encouraging properly administered
plea bargains.
B. Supreme Court Rule 604(d)
The defendants do not challenge the application of contract
law principles to their negotiated plea agreements. Nonetheless,
they assert that Rule 604(d)'s plain language authorizes them to
file a motion for sentence reconsideration. The State disagrees and
asks us to hold that the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions
of Rule 604(d) apply only to open guilty pleas, as opposed to
negotiated guilty pleas.
Rule 604(d) requires certain post-judgment proceedings in the
trial court before a defendant who has pled guilty can appeal from
the judgment entered upon the guilty plea. It provides in pertinent
part:
"No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of
guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30
days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in
the trial court A MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE SENTENCE, IF
ONLY THE SENTENCE IS BEING CHALLENGED, OR, IF THE PLEA IS
BEING CHALLENGED, a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty
and vacate the judgment. The motion shall be in writing
and shall state the grounds therefor. *** The motion
shall be heard promptly, and if allowed, the trial court
shall MODIFY THE SENTENCE OR vacate the judgment and
permit the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and
plead anew." (Emphasis added.) 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)
(emphasized language added April 1, 1992, eff. August 1,
1992).
The rule further states that, if the motion is denied, the
defendant may appeal. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). Any issue not raised
in the motion to reconsider or to withdraw the plea shall be deemed
waived. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
The main purpose behind the promulgation of Rule 604(d) was to
reduce the large number of appeals being taken from guilty pleas.
People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103-04, 106 (1988). The rule must
be invoked before an appeal can be taken from a guilty plea. Rule
604(d) was designed to give the trial judge who accepted the guilty
plea and imposed sentence the opportunity to consider the factual
basis upon which the defendant relies to withdraw his guilty plea.
A hearing under Rule 604(d) allows a trial court to correct
immediately any improper conduct or any errors that may have
produced a guilty plea. The rule ensures that fact finding takes
place and a record is made at a time when witnesses are still
available and memories are fresh. If the motion to withdraw the
plea is denied, that decision can be considered on review. If the
motion is granted, the need for an appeal has been eliminated.
Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104. Rule 604(d) therefore accomplishes the
goal of reducing the number of appeals taken from guilty pleas by
requiring post-judgment proceedings in the trial court before an
appeal can be taken.
As noted, the State contends that the motion-to-reconsider-
sentence provisions of Rule 604(d) (emphasized above) were not
intended to apply to negotiated guilty pleas. We agree.
This court previously addressed the application of Rule 604(d)
to negotiated guilty pleas in People v. Stacey, 68 Ill. 2d 261
(1977). At the time Stacey was decided, Rule 604(d) provided in
relevant part:
" `No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of
the trial court a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty
and vacate the judgment.' " Stacey, 68 Ill. 2d at 264,
quoting 58 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).
This version of Rule 604(d) thus differs from the current version
in that a defendant could never appeal from a guilty plea unless
the defendant first moved in the trial court to withdraw the guilty
plea and vacate the judgment. The defendants in Stacey claimed that
they should not be required to move to withdraw their guilty pleas
because they wished to appeal only their sentences. This court
disagreed and held that Rule 604(d) applies to all guilty pleas,
thereby including both negotiated guilty pleas and open guilty
pleas. Stacey, 68 Ill. 2d at 266. The Stacey court explained:
"In entering into the plea agreement, the defendants
recognized that in consideration of the State's dismissal
or modification of charges, they would plead guilty to a
certain specific charge or charges and accept what
punishment the court might impose. The State also agreed
to the dismissal or modification of charges. It was a
bargain into which the People and the defendants freely
entered. The defendants and the State are equally bound
to adhere to this agreement. TO PERMIT A DEFENDANT TO
APPEAL ONLY THE SENTENCE WITHOUT REMOVING THE PLEA WOULD
VITIATE THE AGREEMENT HE ENTERED INTO WITH THE STATE."
(Emphasis added.) Stacey, 68 Ill. 2d at 265.
The Stacey court therefore ruled that a defendant could not appeal
from a guilty plea unless he first moved in the trial court to
withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment, even if he sought
to challenge only his sentence.
In People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93 (1988), this court overruled
Stacey's interpretation of Rule 604(d) where open guilty pleas are
involved. The same version of Rule 604(d) involved in Stacey was in
effect for Wilk. Wilk addressed the consolidated appeals of four
defendants. The portion of Wilk which concerns us here is
illustrated by defendant Danny Brown's case. See Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d
at 101-02. Brown pleaded guilty to aggravated battery of a child
and was sentenced to seven years in prison. He timely filed a
motion to reconsider his sentence, asserting that the sentence was
excessive. Brown did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and vacate the judgment in the trial court pursuant to Rule 604(d).
The trial court denied the motion to reconsider. The appellate
court followed Stacey and dismissed Brown's appeal because he had
not filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the
judgment. This court reversed and remanded Brown's case to the
appellate court for a review of his sentence. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at
110. This court held that Brown was not required to file a motion
to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment, because he was
not challenging his guilty plea. See Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 109-10.
In other words, the Wilk court allowed Brown to challenge only his
sentence by filing a motion to reconsider the sentence.
This aspect of Wilk was reaffirmed in People v. Wallace, 143
Ill. 2d 59 (1991). Following Wilk and Wallace, Rule 604(d) was
amended to reflect Wilk's holdings. The present version of Rule
604(d), quoted in relevant part above, now contains the language
allowing the filing of a motion to reconsider the sentence where
only the sentence is being challenged.
As previously discussed, in each of the cases involved here,
the defendants filed only motions to reconsider their sentences,
which were negotiated as part of a plea agreement. The defendants
assert that Wilk, Wallace, and the present version of Rule 604(d)
clearly permit all defendants who enter guilty pleas to file only
a motion for sentence reconsideration. In contrast, the State
maintains that Rule 604(d)'s motion-for-sentence-reconsideration
provisions were intended to apply only to open guilty pleas. Since
Wallace and the amendment to Rule 604(d), our appellate court has
expressed conflicting views on this issue. Compare People v.
Goodbrake, 255 Ill. App. 3d 833, 837 (1994), with People v. Soles,
226 Ill. App. 3d 944 (1992).
We agree with the State's position. Our review of Wilk and
Wallace reveals that the pleas involved in those cases were open
guilty pleas. In other words, the defendants pled guilty without
receiving any promises from the State in return. Following a
defendant's open guilty plea, the trial court exercises its
discretion and determines the sentence to be imposed. Both good
public policy and common sense dictate that defendants who enter
open guilty pleas be allowed to challenge only their sentences
without being required to withdraw their guilty pleas. See Wilk,
124 Ill. 2d 93; Wallace, 143 Ill. 2d 59. Wilk thus overruled Stacey
where open guilty pleas are concerned.
The reasoning utilized by this court in Wilk, however, does
not apply to negotiated guilty plea agreements. We agree with the
State that, under these circumstances, the guilty plea and the
sentence "go hand in hand" as material elements of the plea
bargain. To permit a defendant to challenge his sentence without
moving to withdraw the guilty plea in these instances would vitiate
the negotiated plea agreement he entered into with the State. We
therefore hold that, following the entry of judgment on a
negotiated guilty plea, even if a defendant wants to challenge only
his sentence, he must move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate
the judgment so that, in the event the motion is granted, the
parties are returned to the status quo. Stacey, 68 Ill. 2d at 265;
People v. Goodbrake, 255 Ill. App. 3d 833, 837 (1994).
Consequently, the motion-to-reconsider-sentence provisions of Rule
604(d) apply only to open guilty pleas.
In summary, for a defendant to prevail in a challenge to a
sentence entered pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the
defendant must (1) move to withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the
judgment, and (2) show that the granting of the motion is necessary
to correct a manifest injustice.
C
The cases at bar remain to be resolved. In the case of
defendant Michael Meeks, Meeks and the State entered into a
negotiated plea agreement. Under its terms, Meeks pleaded guilty to
the charge of reckless homicide and, in exchange, the State
dismissed five other charges pending against him and recommended a
specific sentence. The circuit court accepted the plea agreement
and entered judgment in accordance with its terms. Subsequently,
Meeks filed a written pro se motion to reduce his sentence. His
defense counsel then filed an amended motion requesting that the
court reduce Meeks' sentence. Because the sentence was the product
of a negotiated plea agreement, the circuit court declined to
reduce it. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded,
directing the circuit court to exercise its discretion to determine
whether Meeks' sentence should be reduced.
The appellate court was incorrect. There was no error in the
circuit court proceeding. The circuit court correctly ruled that
Meeks was not entitled to a reduction of his negotiated sentence
because it had been bargained for in his plea agreement. As
explained above, Meeks could obtain relief only by moving to
withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the judgment. He would also
have to show that the granting of the motion is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. He did neither. As a result, Meeks is
not entitled to a reduction of his negotiated sentence. The circuit
court's judgment is affirmed. The appellate court's judgment is
reversed.
In the case of defendant Billie J. Evans, Evans and the State
entered into a negotiated plea agreement. Pursuant to its terms,
Evans pleaded guilty to two charges and, in exchange, the State
dropped a third charge and recommended specific sentences. The
circuit court accepted the plea agreement and entered judgment in
accordance with its terms. Subsequently, Evans' defense counsel
filed a motion for sentence reconsideration asserting that Evans'
sentences are excessive. The circuit court declined to reduce
Evans' sentences. The circuit court held that Evans should serve
the sentences to which he agreed under the terms of the negotiated
plea agreement. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing because counsel failed to
file a Rule 604(d) certificate.
The appellate court was mistaken. The circuit court's ruling
was correct. As the circuit court explained, Evans was not entitled
to a reduction of his negotiated sentences because they had been
bargained for in his plea agreement. Evans could obtain relief only
by moving to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate the judgment. He
would also have to show that the granting of the motion is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice. He did neither.
Consequently, Evans is not entitled to a reduction of his
negotiated sentences. The circuit court's judgment is therefore
affirmed. The appellate court's judgment is reversed.
CONCLUSION
In the case of Michael Meeks, the appellate court's judgment
is reversed, and the circuit court's judgment is affirmed. In the
case of Billie J. Evans, the appellate court's judgment is
reversed, and the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.
No. 80158--Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
No. 80159--Appellate court judgment reversed;