People v. Elder

Michigan Court of Appeals

People v. Elder

305 N.W.2d 563, 104 Mich. App. 651, 1981 Mich. App. LEXIS 2829

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 17, 1981

DocketDocket 46836

StatusPublished

Cited by12 cases

This text of 305 N.W.2d 563 (People v. Elder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Elder, 305 N.W.2d 563, 104 Mich. App. 651, 1981 Mich. App. LEXIS 2829 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).

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Opinions

Per Curiam.

On April 16, 1979, defendant pled guilty to armed robbery in violation of MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. Defendant was sentenced to a term of from 25 to 50 years imprisonment. Defendant appealed of right on August 20, 1979. On March 31, 1980, before this matter was .heard on appeal, defendant filed with this Court a motion to remand to the trial court for the purpose of completing the lower court record concerning the alleged involuntary nature of his plea of guilty. The motion was granted on May 23, 1980, and a hearing was held on July 12, 1980, to complete the lower court record. The appeal is now before our panel.

First, defendant claims that the trial court’s failure to advise defendant as to the consequences of MCL 791.233b; MSA 28.2303(3), otherwise known as 1978 Initiated Proposal B, rendered his plea of guilty involuntary. This claim is without merit. Court rules do "not require the judge to inform the defendant of all sentence consequences —only the maximum sentence, any mandatory minimum and, * * * if he is on probation or parole, the possible effect on his status as a probationer or parolee”. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 118; 235 NW2d 132 (1975). A review of the completed lower court record establishes that the trial court fulfilled all of the requirements of the court rules at the plea-taking hearing. No error occurred.

The completed lower court record indicates that defendant may not have been totally aware of all of the sentence consequences of Proposal B at the [654]*654time of offering his guilty plea. Defendant urges this Court to impose upon the trial courts the additional requirement of insuring that defendants are totally aware of all sentence consequences flowing from Proposal B. While this Court might agree that the sentence consequences of Proposal B could have some effect on a defendant’s decision to enter into a plea agreement, this Court is bound by Guilty Plea Cases, supra. Any additional requirements to be imposed on trial courts must come from the Legislature or the Supreme Court. See also People v Solomon, 104 Mich App 695; 305 NW2d 295 (1981).

Defendant’s other claim of error is likewise without merit. Defendant claims that the sentencing judge’s knowledge that defendant took a polygraph examination concerning the crime charged should disqualify that judge from sentencing defendant. However, it was defendant who testified at sentencing that he took a polygraph examination that implicated others, as well as himself, in the crime charged in hopes of gaining leniency from the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge, in fact, did specifically indicate that he was discounting defendant’s sentence because of the defendant’s cooperation with the authorities. This situation is distinguishable from the cases cited by defendant in which the sentencing court improperly relied upon knowledge of a polygraph examination which implicated the defendant in criminal activity other than that to which the defendant had pled guilty or for which he was on trial. In the instant case, the mention of the polygraph examination was only in regard to the current charge to which the defendant had already pled guilty. No error occurred.

Affirmed.

Allen and C. L. Hoehn, JJ., concurred.

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Per Curiam.

On April 16, 1979, defendant pled guilty to armed robbery in violation of MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. Defendant was sentenced to a term of from 25 to 50 years imprisonment. Defendant appealed of right on August 20, 1979. On March 31, 1980, before this matter was .heard on appeal, defendant filed with this Court a motion to remand to the trial court for the purpose of completing the lower court record concerning the alleged involuntary nature of his plea of guilty. The motion was granted on May 23, 1980, and a hearing was held on July 12, 1980, to complete the lower court record. The appeal is now before our panel.

First, defendant claims that the trial court’s failure to advise defendant as to the consequences of MCL 791.233b; MSA 28.2303(3), otherwise known as 1978 Initiated Proposal B, rendered his plea of guilty involuntary. This claim is without merit. Court rules do "not require the judge to inform the defendant of all sentence consequences —only the maximum sentence, any mandatory minimum and, * * * if he is on probation or parole, the possible effect on his status as a probationer or parolee”. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 118; 235 NW2d 132 (1975). A review of the completed lower court record establishes that the trial court fulfilled all of the requirements of the court rules at the plea-taking hearing. No error occurred.

The completed lower court record indicates that defendant may not have been totally aware of all of the sentence consequences of Proposal B at the [654]*654time of offering his guilty plea. Defendant urges this Court to impose upon the trial courts the additional requirement of insuring that defendants are totally aware of all sentence consequences flowing from Proposal B. While this Court might agree that the sentence consequences of Proposal B could have some effect on a defendant’s decision to enter into a plea agreement, this Court is bound by Guilty Plea Cases, supra. Any additional requirements to be imposed on trial courts must come from the Legislature or the Supreme Court. See also People v Solomon, 104 Mich App 695; 305 NW2d 295 (1981).

Defendant’s other claim of error is likewise without merit. Defendant claims that the sentencing judge’s knowledge that defendant took a polygraph examination concerning the crime charged should disqualify that judge from sentencing defendant. However, it was defendant who testified at sentencing that he took a polygraph examination that implicated others, as well as himself, in the crime charged in hopes of gaining leniency from the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge, in fact, did specifically indicate that he was discounting defendant’s sentence because of the defendant’s cooperation with the authorities. This situation is distinguishable from the cases cited by defendant in which the sentencing court improperly relied upon knowledge of a polygraph examination which implicated the defendant in criminal activity other than that to which the defendant had pled guilty or for which he was on trial. In the instant case, the mention of the polygraph examination was only in regard to the current charge to which the defendant had already pled guilty. No error occurred.

Affirmed.

Allen and C. L. Hoehn, JJ., concurred.

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305 N.W.2d 563, 104 Mich. App. 651, 1981 Mich. App. LEXIS 2829, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-elder-michctapp-1981.

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