People v. Dukes

151 Misc. 2d 295, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 27
CourtCriminal Court of the City of New York
DecidedJanuary 31, 1992
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 151 Misc. 2d 295 (People v. Dukes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Criminal Court of the City of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Dukes, 151 Misc. 2d 295, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 27 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1992).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Bruce Allen, J.

In recent years we have witnessed an increased use of magnetometers and scanning devices at our public buildings. This case involves the legal propriety of a metal detector search conducted at a New York City high school pursuant to [296]*296guidelines established by the Board of Education in 1989. To my knowledge, this is the first time this issue has been litigated. As will be shown, I find no legal barrier to the search.

The facts adduced at the suppression hearing on September 23, 1991, and supplemented by various submissions, are as follows. During the early morning hours of May 17, 1991, a team of special police officers from the Central Task Force for School Safety set up several metal detector scanning posts in the main lobby of Washington Irving High School. Signs announcing a search for weapons were posted outside the building.

Washington Irving, which is in Manhattan, was one of several schools selected for periodic scanning. The students at these schools had been told at the beginning of the year that searches would take place but they were not given any specific dates in advance. The entire procedure was governed by written guidelines adopted a few years earlier by former Chancellor Richard E. Green. The stated purpose of the search is to prevent students from bringing weapons into the schools.

With regard to general procedures, the guidelines require that the officers use hand-held scanning devices rather than magnetometers. All students entering the school are subject to the search although the officers may choose to limit the search by any random formula. For example, if the lines become too long, the officers may decide to search every second or third student. The officers are prohibited, however, from selecting a particular student to search unless there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the student is in possession of a weapon.

As to each individual search, the guidelines provide that the officer who conducts the search is to approach the student and explain the scanning process. Then the officer asks the student to place any bags and parcels on a table and remove all metal objects from pockets. If a student refuses to cooperate, the officer notifies the principal or administrator who is stationed nearby to monitor the search. If the student cooperates, then the scanning takes place, beginning at the toes and continuing up to the head without actually touching the body. The bags and parcels are scanned, too. Students are searched by officers of the same sex.

The guidelines provide further that when a student’s bag or parcel activates the scanning device, the officer is to request [297]*297the student to open the container in question so that the officer can look for weapons. If a student’s body activates the device, the officer first repeats the request to remove metal objects. A second scan is then conducted and if the device is activated again, the officer escorts the student to a private area where a more thorough search is conducted.

Prior to the private search, the officer must ask the student for the third time to remove any metal objects. Then the search begins near the place where the device was activated. This is a pat-down search, geared to locate the item which triggered the scanning device. If the officer feels an object during the pat-down, the student is given a chance to remove it before the officer does. If such an object, once removed, appears to be the one which activated the device, the search ceases. The search can be continued only if a subsequent scan activates the device.

Against this backdrop, the defendant Tawana Dukes, a student, entered the front lobby of Washington Irving at approximately 7:15 a.m. on the morning of May 17 and took her place in line. When Ms. Dukes’ turn came, Special Police Officer Jessica Wallace, the sole witness at the hearing, introduced herself and asked Ms. Dukes to place her bag on the table. After Ms. Dukes did so, Officer Wallace scanned the bag with a hand-held metal detector. The device signalled the presence of metal inside the bag.

Officer Wallace next asked Ms. Dukes to open the bag. When the defendant complied with this request, the officer reached into the bag and removed a manilla folder. Once again, Ms. Dukes agreed to open this folder at the request of the officer. Upon looking inside the folder, the officer saw a black switchblade knife which had a blade of 4 to 5 inches. While they were looking at the knife Ms. Dukes stated, ”1 had it for my protection.”

Ms. Dukes was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, a class A misdemeanor. She now moves to suppress the knife, claiming that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

Every legal discussion of the Fourth Amendment begins with the broad statement that unreasonable searches are prohibited. There are, of course, many different kinds of searches; as a result, the standard of reasonableness is somewhat flexible and may appear to vary from category to category. Reasonableness is typically associated with probable [298]*298cause but there are certain searches which are not based on probable cause.

The type of search which took place here is usually called an administrative search and it is never linked with probable cause or the issuance of a warrant. Designed to prevent the occurrence of a dangerous event, an administrative search is aimed at a group or class of people rather than a particular person. The theory is that any member of the group or class may be the agent who could cause the dangerous event to take place. Two common examples of administrative searches are the use of a magnetometer or scanning device at a public building and the highway checkpoint for drunk drivers.

An administrative search is upheld as reasonable when the intrusion involved in the search is no greater than necessary to satisfy the governmental interest underlying the need for the search. In other words, in determining whether the search is reasonable, the courts balance the degree of the intrusion, including the discretion given to the person conducting the search, against the severity of the danger posed. (See, People v Kuhn, 33 NY2d 203, 209 [1973]; see also, People v Scott, 63 NY2d 518, 525 [1984]; cf., Michigan State Police Dept. v Sitz, 496, US 444, 449-452 [1990].)

Airports typically use screening devices such as magnetometers to search all passengers just before they board an airplane. In Kuhn (supra) the Court of Appeals, faced with a passenger’s claim that a magnetometer search had violated his rights, applied the balancing test and held that the search was a reasonable one. After citing the "overwhelming” governmental interest in deterring air privacy and aircraft hijackings, the court went on to note that a magnetometer search, by definition, was minimally intrusive. (33 NY2d, supra, at 210.) Virtually every other court which has considered the propriety of magnetometer searches at airports has reached the same result. (See, e.g., United States v Davis, 482 F2d 893 [9th Cir 1973]; cf., People v Waring, 174 AD2d 16.)

A second public building where administrative searches have become increasingly popular is the courthouse. Not surprisingly, the courts have concluded that preentry searches for weapons of all visitors to these highly sensitive places do not violate the Fourth Amendment.

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Bluebook (online)
151 Misc. 2d 295, 580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 1992 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 27, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-dukes-nycrimct-1992.