2026 IL App (4th) 250511-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under May 27, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0511 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County KENDALL D. DRUMMOND, ) No. 24CF762 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Mark E. Gilles, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding defendant had not established any reversible error with respect to the actions of the trial court or his trial counsel.
¶2 Following a November 2024 trial, a jury found defendant, Kendall D. Drummond,
guilty of aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a) (West 2024)). He was later sentenced
to seven years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). Defendant appeals his conviction,
challenging (1) the absence of an instruction to the jury conveying that his decision not to testify
could not be held against him and (2) the adequacy of the inquiry into his pro se claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 During voir dire, the trial court admonished four-person panels regarding the four Zehr principles (see People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 477 (1984)), including that defendant was not
required to present any evidence and that defendant’s failure to testify could not be held against
him. The venirepersons in each panel indicated they understood and accepted these principles.
¶5 The State called three witnesses: Justice Brown, Mary Brown, and Officer Hunter
Willoughby.
¶6 Justice testified she was previously in a relationship with defendant and they shared
a one-year-old child. On August 3, 2024, Justice, defendant, and their child lived together in a two
bedroom apartment. Around 6 a.m. that morning, Justice woke and noticed the front door of the
apartment was, unusually, wide open. At the time, the child was staying with Justice’s mother,
Mary, who lived nearby. Justice called defendant, who had gone out the night before to celebrate
a friend’s birthday and had not returned home.
¶7 Justice described defendant as being “dry with [her]” and “annoyed” while they
spoke on the phone. Justice wanted defendant to return home to check out the apartment with her.
After calling defendant, Justice called her mother to tell her what had happened.
¶8 While Justice was on the phone with her mother, defendant arrived home. Justice
testified defendant was standing in the apartment, staring at her, seemingly irritated and asking
why the door was wide open. Justice could tell defendant “had been drinking.” Mary testified she
overheard a man’s voice in the background of the phone conversation and recognized it to be
defendant’s voice.
¶9 Justice ended the phone call with her mother. She then explained to defendant how
the door was wide open, and she thought their dog’s cage had been moved slightly from its place
next to the door. Justice testified defendant asked “with attitude” if anything was taken, to which
Justice responded by saying she did not really look, but nothing seemed out of the ordinary. In
-2- response, defendant told Justice she told this story to get him to return home.
¶ 10 Justice testified she and defendant argued. She acknowledged her recollection of
the events after the argument commenced was limited. Justice testified she called her mother after
defendant “was done beating [her].” She also testified she woke up in a hospital. She
acknowledged she told police officers she couldn’t remember what happened to her.
¶ 11 Mary testified Justice made a second call to her about 30 minutes after the initial
call. During this call, Mary could hear only Justice’s voice, which she described as scared, frantic,
panicked, and upset. Mary testified Justice told her that her face was bloody and two of her teeth
were broken. Mary, wondering if Justice was involved in a fight, immediately looked out her
window and saw a man, whom she identified as defendant, walking away from the direction of
Justice’s apartment. Mary did not remember details about defendant’s clothing but maintained she
knew it was defendant. Mary went to Justice’s apartment.
¶ 12 Upon arriving at Justice’s apartment, Mary saw Justice, whose face was bloody and
who appeared out of it. Mary did not see anyone else outside or inside the apartment. She then
took Justice to the hospital.
¶ 13 While at the hospital, Justice was given five stitches above her brow and under her
right eye. Justice testified she had a broken nose, broken orbital bone, and cheek. She also testified
she lost two front teeth, which required two root canals. Both sides stipulated Justice was
diagnosed with an orbital fracture. Justice testified the vision from her right eye was still blurry at
the time of trial. Justice also testified she did not have any injuries to her face prior to defendant
returning to the apartment on the morning of August 3, 2024.
¶ 14 Justice went to her apartment after leaving the hospital. She described her living
room as a mess, with blood trailing from the living room to the bedroom and handprints on the
-3- living room floor. She found her two front teeth in the kitchen.
¶ 15 Officer Willoughby testified he spoke with Justice at the hospital. He described her
as dazed and confused during their interaction. He took photographs of Justice, which were shown
to the jury. Officer Willoughby then went to Justice’s apartment. He took photographs of the
apartment, which were also shown to the jury. While inside the apartment, he did not see a dog.
¶ 16 On August 12, 2024, Officer Willoughby spoke with Justice again. Officer
Willoughby testified Justice seemed to recall more at that time and had a red mark around her eye.
¶ 17 After eliciting this information, the State rested its case. Defendant’s trial counsel
then stated he did not believe the defense was going to present any evidence. As the trial court
began to confirm this decision, defendant told the court, “We aren’t seeing eye to eye.” The court
asked defendant if he understood that not presenting evidence meant he would not testify, and
defendant responded, “No, we’re not—no, I don’t understand anything. I don’t—we’re not seeing
eye to eye. You—no, no, no, no.” When the court clarified it was not asking whether defendant
agreed with the decision and only asked if he understood, defendant told the court, “I’m being
improperly—improper defended. I’m not—I’m not being defended properly at all.” The court
asked, “How is that?” Defendant responded, “I never—we never talk. We never—we’re not
communicating. It’s all bad.” When asked by the court, “What’s the problem?” defendant stated,
“I feel like I’m not getting presented the right way.” When then asked, “Why?” defendant stated,
“Because he’s telling me something and I’m hearing something different.”
¶ 18 Based upon defendant’s statements, the trial court asked defendant if his trial
counsel told him his prior conviction would be introduced if he testified, to which defendant
indicated counsel “said all that.” The court told defendant the advice was correct. The court then
asked the State if it intended to admit the conviction, to which the State indicated it did. The court
-4- confirmed the advice was correct.
¶ 19 After the trial court asked if there was another reason defendant felt he was
improperly represented, defendant replied, “He—I’ve tried to tell—we’re not communicating on
the right page.” The court asked, “Whose fault would that be in your view? His or yours?”
Defendant replied, “His.” When asked what was not communicated to him, defendant told the
court, “I never had a chance to, ever, to talk to this man about my—anything in my case. Anything.
This whole case, I—the schedule conference hearing, nothing. Didn’t talk to me about anything,”
and, “He didn’t break nothing down to me.” Defendant further said, on the seventh day of an
unspecified month, his counsel came to him with an offer, which he rejected. Defendant said they
did not talk about anything else regarding the case, such as whether he had any evidence to present
in his defense. At that point, defendant’s trial counsel interjected and stated he had asked if
defendant had any witnesses and was told no. The court told counsel it was “going to hear
[defendant] out,” and then it would hear from counsel.
¶ 20 The trial court asked if defendant had any other complaints. Defendant went on to
explain that while his trial counsel said he spoke to him on the first court appearance, this was not
true and they never talked. Defendant further asserted he did not have a detention hearing on
August 28, 2024, to which the court indicated that was factually incorrect, as it presided over the
hearing on August 28. Defendant maintained he and his counsel did not talk “[a]t all.” The court
asked, “Did you tell him that you wish to plead not guilty and have a trial?” Defendant replied,
“Yes. No, I did not. I just got indicted.” When asked if he conveyed to counsel that he did not want
to plead guilty, defendant again asserted, “We never talked.” When the court attempted to follow
up with another question, defendant interrupted, stating, “We never talked or anything. I just said
I want to get a jury trial.” At that point, the court admonished defendant to not interrupt it and that
-5- he was about to be found in contempt for not letting the court ask him a question. The court further
stated:
“I’m not asking whether you had lengthy conversations with [counsel], but
I’m in this courtroom daily. [Counsel] is [in the courtroom] almost every day and
he has enough of a conversation with his clients on a regular basis to know whether
or not his client wishes to accept an offer from the State or whether the client wishes
to go to trial.”
The court then asked, “Did you convey to him that you wished to go to trial?” Defendant
responded, “Yes, I did.” The court then asked if defendant had any additional complaints about
counsel’s representation, to which defendant indicated he did not.
¶ 21 The trial court allowed defendant’s trial counsel the opportunity to respond to
defendant’s complaints. Counsel stated he asked defendant what he wanted to do and conveyed
the State’s offer of 10 years at 85%, which defendant rejected and stated he wanted a jury trial.
Counsel asked defendant whether anyone else was present during the altercation, to which
defendant indicated there was not. Counsel asked if there was video, to which defendant indicated
there was not. Counsel asked if this was a “he said, she said” situation, to which defendant
indicated it was. Counsel stated he had a later conversation with defendant about the admissibility
of his prior conviction should he testify and advised him it would be bad if the conviction was
introduced.
¶ 22 After hearing from both sides, the trial court confirmed defendant’s trial counsel
was still willing to represent defendant for the remainder of the case and then announced counsel
would remain.
¶ 23 The trial court returned to admonishing defendant regarding his right to testify. The
-6- court stated:
“And, now, [defendant], I’m going to go back to where we started, and that
is, do you understand that if no evidence is presented on your behalf, first of all,
there’ll be an instruction given that that’s not to be held against you. Do you
understand that?
If you don’t testify, it’s not to be held against you. Do you understand that?”
Defendant replied, “Yes.” The court confirmed defendant understood the State would be able to
cross-examine him and introduce his prior conviction if he testified. The court also confirmed
defendant understood it was his decision whether to testify. Defendant stated he did not want to
testify, and the court confirmed that decision was voluntary. After defendant made his decision,
the court told him it believed the decision was “prudent and understandable.” The court also stated,
“There will be specific instructions given to the jury regarding the fact that you’re not testifying.
You have already heard some of that instruction today.”
¶ 24 The trial court proceeded with a jury instruction conference. Neither side tendered
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 2.04 (approved Dec. 8, 2011) (hereinafter IPI
Criminal No. 2.04), which conveys that a defendant’s decision not to testify cannot be held against
him. The jury was not given this instruction.
¶ 25 The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated domestic battery. Thereafter, the trial
court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, sentenced defendant to seven years in DOC, and
denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence.
¶ 26 This appeal followed.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 On appeal, defendant challenges (1) the absence of an instruction to the jury
-7- conveying that his decision not to testify could not be held against him and (2) the adequacy of the
inquiry into his pro se claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The State, in response, seeks
an affirmance of the judgment.
¶ 29 We begin with defendant’s challenge to the absence of an instruction to the jury
conveying his decision not to testify could not be held against him. Defendant initially argues the
trial court erred by not instructing the jury pursuant to IPI Criminal No. 2.04 where he indicated
his desire for the jury to be so instructed and the court assured him the jury would be so instructed.
Defendant acknowledges he did not raise this issue below but asserts this court should relax the
rule of forfeiture and review the issue on the merits because the purported error arose from the trial
court’s own conduct or, alternatively, review the issue as a matter of second-prong plain error and
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant alternatively argues his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not tendering IPI Criminal No. 2.04.
¶ 30 Our supreme court has repeatedly recognized a “defendant forfeits review of any
putative jury instruction error if the defendant does not object to the instruction or offer an
alternative instruction at trial and does not raise the instruction issue in a posttrial motion.” People
v. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 39; see People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934, ¶ 13; People v. Patrick,
233 Ill. 2d 62, 76 (2009); People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 175 (2005). This rule encourages a
defendant to raise instruction issues before the trial court, allowing the court to correct errors before
the instructions are given, and thus disallowing the defendant to obtain a reversal through inaction.
Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 175.
¶ 31 Defendant initially, with respect to the purported error of the trial court in not
instructing the jury pursuant to IPI Criminal No. 2.04, invites this court to relax the rule of
forfeiture and review the issue on the merits because the purported error arose from the trial court’s
-8- own conduct. We decline defendant’s invitation. While our supreme court has recognized an
exception to the forfeiture rule where the basis for the objection is the trial court’s own conduct
(People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963)), it has also made clear the application of this
exception is appropriate only in “extraordinary circumstances, such as when a trial judge makes
inappropriate remarks to a jury [citation] or relies on social commentary, rather than evidence, in
sentencing a defendant to death” (People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 488 (2009)). Defendant
does not explain, nor do we find, the circumstances of this case warrant the application of this
exception. Defendant had ample opportunity to raise the purported error during trial and in his
posttrial motion, which he failed to do.
¶ 32 Defendant also invites this court to review the purported error of the trial court as a
matter of second-prong plain error. The plain-error doctrine provides a “narrow and limited
exception” to the rule of forfeiture. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 81; see People v.
Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶¶ 49-50 (stating unpreserved jury instruction errors may be reviewed
as a matter of plain error). Under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court
considers whether there has been “a clear or obvious error” and, if so, whether that “error is so
serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the
judicial process.” People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 27. The defendant bears the burden of
persuasion in establishing plain error. People v. Wilmington, 2013 IL 112938, ¶ 43.
¶ 33 Our first step under the plain-error doctrine is to determine whether there has been
a clear or obvious error. People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256, ¶ 21. Defendant has not made such a
showing. To begin, a trial court is generally “under no obligation *** to give jury instructions not
requested by counsel.” People v. Underwood, 72 Ill. 2d 124, 129 (1978). Further, with respect to
the specific jury instruction at issue, IPI Criminal No. 2.04, the committee notes to that instruction
-9- state it “should be given only at the defendant’s request.” (Emphasis in original.). See Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge
must give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so.”);
People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 450 (1983) (“[A] state trial judge has the constitutional
obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will give evidentiary weight
to a defendant’s failure to testify.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Defendant’s responses
when being admonished about his right to testify did not constitute a request that IPI Criminal No.
2.04 be given. The exchange between the court and defendant shows an assumption was made by
the court defendant, through his counsel, would tender IPI Criminal No. 2.04 during the jury
instruction conference, an assumption which was ultimately proven incorrect. That assumption
and the responses thereto do not amount to a request that IPI Criminal No. 2.04 be given. We
conclude defendant has not shown the court erred by not instructing the jury with IPI Criminal No.
2.04. We need not proceed further in our analysis under the plain-error doctrine.
¶ 34 And last, defendant invites this court to review the purported error of the trial court
as a matter of ineffective assistance based upon trial counsel’s failure to object to the court not
giving the instruction. Additionally, as an alternative to his argument that the court erred, defendant
argues counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not tendering IPI Criminal No. 2.04.
¶ 35 “The United States and Illinois Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.” People v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 44. To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both (1) counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the deficient performance of counsel
prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); see People v.
Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526-27 (1984) (adopting the Strickland standard). “More specifically, a
- 10 - defendant must show counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing
professional norms and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.).
People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36. A court “may dispose of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim by proceeding directly to the prejudice prong without addressing counsel’s
performance.” People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 17.
¶ 36 We find there is no reasonable probability, but for trial counsel not objecting to the
trial court’s not giving IPI Criminal No. 2.04, or but for counsel himself not tendering the
instruction, the result of the proceeding would have been different. First, we find the trial court
was under no obligation to give the instruction absent a request by defendant to do so. Second, the
venirepersons who eventually became members of the jury indicated they understood and accepted
the principle defendant’s decision not to testify could not be held against him, thereby mitigating
the risk the jury would hold defendant’s decision not to testify against him. We do not suggest the
earlier admonition to the venire is somehow determinative but note the venire accepted the
principle. And third, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Justice testified defendant
was the person who “beat[ ]” her, and that testimony was corroborated by the timeline of events
provided by Justice and her mother and by defendant’s flight from the scene. After considering the
record, we find there is no reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been
different had trial counsel either (1) objected to the court not giving IPI Criminal No. 2.04 or
(2) tendered IPI Criminal No. 2.04. Accordingly, we conclude defendant’s trial counsel did not
render ineffective assistance.
¶ 37 We turn next to defendant’s challenge to the adequacy of the inquiry into his pro se
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant argues the trial court erred by not
- 11 - conducting a neutral and nonadversarial inquiry pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181
(1984), and its progeny. Defendant asserts the court improperly “dismissed the allegations,
defended counsel’s trial strategy and his representation, in part, on matters outside the record, and
solicited confirmation from the State that counsel’s advice was correct.”
¶ 38 Krankel and its progeny establish the procedures a trial court must follow when a
defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Krankel, 102 Ill.
2d at 189; People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 126 (1994); People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78
(2003). These procedures serve “ ‘the narrow purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether
to appoint independent counsel to argue a defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance
claims,’ ‘to promote consideration of pro se ineffective assistance claims in the trial court,’ and
‘to limit issues on appeal.’ ” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 95 (quoting People v. Patrick, 2011 IL
111666, ¶¶ 39, 41).
¶ 39 Under Krankel, a trial court must first conduct an inquiry into the factual bases of
the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance. In conducting its inquiry, the court may (1) briefly
discuss the claim with the defendant, (2) ask trial counsel to “answer questions and explain the
facts and circumstances” relating to the claim, and (3) evaluate the claim based on “its knowledge
of *** counsel’s performance at trial,” as well as “the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations
on their face.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78-79. The inquiry should generally not involve the
participation of the State, nor should the court rely upon matters outside the record. People v. Jolly,
2014 IL 117142, ¶¶ 31, 46. “The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial
court conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78.
¶ 40 We find the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into defendant’s pro se claim
- 12 - of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As an initial matter, neither defendant nor the State
addresses when defendant made his claim—during trial. Our supreme court has stated, “Krankel
is limited to posttrial motions.” People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 22. In any event, our review
shows the court, when presented with defendant’s claim, conducted a thorough inquiry of
defendant to understand the factual bases for his claim. The court repeatedly asked defendant
open-ended question to allow him to elaborate on his claim. In doing so, the court cautioned
defendant against interrupting it or risking contempt, which we find did not transform the
proceeding into an adversarial one but rather was an appropriate exercise of the court controlling
its courtroom. See, e.g., People v. Cummings, 2023 IL App (1st) 220520, ¶ 54. The court also, in
conducting its inquiry, attempted to alleviate defendant’s concerns by explaining counsel’s actions.
In particular, the court explained why counsel may have advised defendant not to testify—to avoid
the introduction of defendant’s prior conviction. While the court confirmed with the State it
intended to introduce the conviction if defendant testified, this confirmation was unnecessary, and
any participation by the State was de minimis. See Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 38. The court further,
as part of its inquiry, considered whether counsel spoke with defendant about the plea offer. While
the court commented on the general practice of counsel on this issue, the court’s comment was
ultimately harmless, as defendant, himself, confirmed counsel had discussed the offer with him.
In sum, we find the court conducted an adequate inquiry into defendant’s claim.
¶ 41 Before concluding, we would be remiss not to comment on the quality of the
briefing provided by defendant’s appellate counsel. In particular, we commend counsel for the
statement of facts set forth in the opening brief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). It is
concise, neutral, and accurate. As a result, the background section of this decision is largely a
recitation of the statement of facts. We thank counsel for the efforts which, in turn, have allowed
- 13 - us to spend additional time on the legal issues presented in this appeal.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we conclude defendant has not established any reversible
error with respect to the actions of the trial court or his trial counsel and, therefore, affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.
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