People v. Drummond

2024 IL App (1st) 241540-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 4, 2024
• Docket: 1-24-1540
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 241540-U No. 1-24-1540B First Division November 4, 2024

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Circuit Court of ILLINOIS, ) Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 21 CR 14899 v. ) ) ROBERT DRUMMOND, ) Honorable ) Sophia Atcherson Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order denying defendant-appellant’s pretrial release, where the court found that the State had met its burden on all three elements of its detention petition. No. 1-24-1540B

¶2 In 2021, 1 prior to the passage of major criminal law reform in Illinois, defendant-appellant,

Robert Drummond, was arrested and subsequently charged for violating various sections of the

Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012. Specifically, defendant was charged with crimes related to

the murder of his pregnant girlfriend, Yarianna Wheeler, and her unborn child. Such charges

included: (1) three counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)), (720 ILCS

5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2020)), (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2020)); (2) three counts of intentional

homicide of an unborn child (720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(a)(1) (West 2020)), (720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(a)(1) (West

2020)), (720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(a)(2) (West 2020)); and (3) one count of armed robbery without a

firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2020)). 2 At some point after defendant’s arrest, a bond

hearing was held and he was ordered detained without bail pending trial. 3

¶3 A few years later, the Illinois Legislature passed Public Act 101-652, commonly referred

to as “the Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act” or the “Pretrial

Fairness Act” (Act). See Pub. Acts 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan.

1, 2023); Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting

stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023). Subsequently, on April 16, 2024, defendant

filed a motion seeking his release from continued pretrial detention under the new statutory

scheme.

1 The record confusingly reflects that defendant was arrested on September 9, 2021, but also that a new warrant was re-issued, and he was again arrested on November 3, 2021. The record does not contain any explanation as to this timeline of events. 2 The charging documents do not appear in the record. We have derived these facts from other documents therein. 3 The record also does not contain any indication of when this hearing was held, what the order for detainment stated, or when defendant was first ordered detained. The report of proceedings solely indicates that the current judge presiding over defendant’s most recent detainment hearing became involved in the case at some point in 2022.

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¶4 On July 9, 2024, the State filed a verified petition for a pretrial detention hearing pursuant

to articles 110-2 and 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Procedure Code) (725

ILCS 5/110-2, 110-6.1 (West 2022)). That same day, following a hearing on the petition and

defendant’s motion to vacate, the circuit court granted the State’s request. On July 11, 2024,

defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. April 15, 2024).

The motion was heard on July 16, 2024, and was subsequently denied. Now, in this interlocutory

appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in ordering pretrial detention on all three bases

of the State’s petition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s detention order.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 A. Original Detainment Proceedings

¶7 As noted, defendant was ordered detained before the Act’s passage. Although we have

limited documentary evidence of the details of defendant’s arrest and earlier court proceedings,

the record includes a supplemental “Public Safety Assessment” (PSA) conducted by “pretrial

services” on November 6, 2021. 4 Therein, the PSA rated defendant’s “new criminal activity score”

as a “4” out of “6,” and a “failure to appear” score as a “2” out of “6.” It also rated his “new violent

criminal activity flag” as a “yes.” Finally, the PSA stated that, if defendant were to be released,

“maximum conditions” should be imposed.

¶8 B. State’s New Detention Petition

¶9 Although defendant’s motion to vacate his detention order was filed prior to the State’s

petition, we first discuss the State’s petition in order to provide context to the case, as defendant’s

motion challenges the State’s timeline of events and procured evidence.

The record does not reflect that an additional PSA was conducted in light of the Code’s 4

amendments or defendant’s motion to vacate his detention order.

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¶ 10 On July 9, 2024, the State filed its verified petition, which is the subject of this appeal.

Therein, the State argued that defendant was eligible for pretrial detention because the charged

offenses of first degree murder, intentional homicide of an unborn child, and armed robbery were

non-probationable felonies and/or forcible felonies pursuant to sections 110-6.1(a)(1) and (a)(1.5)

of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)), (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022));

(2) defendant posed a “real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community;” and (3) there were “[n]o condition or combination of conditions set forth in [725

ILCS 5/110-10(b) (West 2022)] *** to mitigate that risk.” With regard to the second element, the

State asserted that:

“On August 10, defendant asked his girlfriend, [Yarianna Wheeler], to meet him at

the Lake Michigan beach near his home. When defendant arrived, he located victim, and

walked to the lake shore with her. Victim never returned and was never seen or heard from

again. She was found dead, floating in Lake Michigan near Waukegan approximately 5

days later. She suffered multiple stab wounds and died as a result. Defendant left the lake

shore with victim’s purse and belongings. Defendant was seen on security video using

victim’s Link card two times shortly after the victim’s body was recovered. When

defendant was arrested, he was still in possession of victim’s Link card. Victim was 7

months pregnant with defendant’s baby when he killed her.”

¶ 11 C. Defendant’s Original Motion to Vacate

¶ 12 On April 16, 2024, defendant filed a motion to vacate his existing detention order. 5 With

regard to the first element of the petition, defendant argued that the State was unable to meet its

5 Again, we do not know the date of this order.

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burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the proof was evident and the

presumption great that he had committed the charged offense of first degree murder, as the State’s

case was based on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence. In turn, defendant addressed the

evidence against him. First, defendant attacked various surveillance videos on the day of the

murder that depicted the victim at the beach with an unidentified male. Defendant asserted that the

videos were unclear, and that nothing therein showed the individual attacking the victim or using

any weapons against her. Second, defendant challenged the State’s obtaining of cell phone location

data, which showed that his cell phone had “pinged” near a location where the victim had last been

seen. Defendant noted again that this evidence was circumstantial, as his residence was less than

a mile away from the beach where the victim had travelled to, at 4333 S. Berkeley Avenue in

Chicago.

¶ 13 With regard to the second element of the petition, defendant argued that the State could not

show that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community.

Defendant asserted that he was 23 years old and had been 21 at the time of the incident, had

attended Butler College Preparatory High School in Chicago, where he had maintained an A and

B average at school, and had “strong familial ties” as his family was often present at his court

appearances. Next, defendant stated that he had no prior criminal convictions or criminal history. 6

Although defendant acknowledged that the current charged offenses were of a violent nature, he

reiterated that there was no evidence linking him directly to the victim’s murder.

¶ 14 With regard to the third element, defendant argued that the State could not prove that he

was at risk for failing to appear at future court dates, or that no combination of conditions could

6 As the record later demonstrates, this assertion proved to be incorrect.

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mitigate his willful flight. 7 Defendant contended that the State could not solely meet its burden by

relying on the charges and facts of the case, citing People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, in

support. Additionally, defendant asserted that the State had not “acknowledged any of the potential

mitigating factors” contained in section 110-10(b) of the Act, which allowed for home supervision

or electronic monitoring as potentially appropriate conditions. Finally, defendant asserted that he

had been present at every court date and would continue to appear at future ones in order to care

for his family and his livelihood.

¶ 15 D. New Pretrial Detention Hearing

¶ 16 On July 9, 2024, the State and defendant appeared before the circuit court on the State’s

petition and defendant’s earlier filed motion to vacate.

¶ 17 1. The State’s Proffer

¶ 18 Prior to proceeding with its proffer, the State informed the court that defendant had been

detained since November 2021, and the court had already denied two motions to reduce his bond.

The State had also tendered discovery to defense counsel, which included, inter alia, arrest reports,

which contained defendant’s statements to police; records associated with the victim’s Link card;

records from Lyft and Uber; defendant’s employment records from Home Run Inn; defendant’s

medical records from the University of Chicago; video surveillance and video exhibits from

various locations across the city; and the victim and defendant’s phone records.

¶ 19 Proceeding with its proffer, the State argued that the proof was evident and the presumption

great that defendant had committed the non-probationable felonies of first-degree murder,

intentional homicide of an unborn child, and armed robbery. According to the State, on August 10,

7 We observe that, during the hearing, the court expressly noted that the State was not seeking detention on the basis that defendant was a flight risk, but rather, a threat to the community.

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2021, the 19-year-old victim was seven months pregnant and had been living in a shelter.

Defendant was 21 years old. Both the victim and defendant believed he was the father of the

victim’s unborn child. That day, defendant and the victim were captured on various surveillance

videos across the city. Notably, all surveillance video showed the victim wearing a “distinctive”

pink dress and flip flops, with her hair tied back and carrying a large pink purse.

¶ 20 Prior to leaving the shelter, the victim spoke to several friends and employees. She told

them she was going to the Shedd Aquarium, and was excited as she had never been there prior and

had purchased the tickets for herself and defendant as a birthday treat. After she left the shelter,

she was not heard from again.

¶ 21 Next, through surveillance video, defendant and the victim were seen at the Shedd

Aquarium entering and exiting the facility together. The two were then seen on surveillance video

going to a Portillo’s location for lunch. While eating lunch, the two had an argument and went

their separate ways. Cell phone location data confirmed that defendant waited for a CTA train to

go home. The victim travelled to a movie theater alone via Uber, which was confirmed by

surveillance records and her cell phone location data. After defendant and the victim separated,

the victim called defendant’s cell phone over 25 times.

¶ 22 During the course of the night, the victim was also in contact with her friend, Malik Miller,

through text and Facebook messaging. Miller had been at home that evening in Bellwood, Illinois.

Miller knew about defendant but had never met him. Around 9:30 p.m., the victim called Miller

and left him a voicemail, which apparently had been meant for defendant. The voicemail indicated

that the victim was going to the beach and wanted to know where to meet. Miller did not hear from

her after that phone call.

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¶ 23 Once at the movie theater, the victim decided not to see a movie and instead called another

Uber at 9:50 p.m. While in the car, the victim called defendant again. The two spoke while the

Uber travelled to 39th Street Beach in Chicago. The Uber driver overheard the victim speaking to

a person on the phone. He assumed she was talking to her boyfriend based on the content of their

conversation. The two discussed a meeting point on the beach.

¶ 24 At 10:01 p.m., the Uber arrived in the beach parking lot. The driver did not see who the

victim was meeting. The location of the victim’s drop-off was a few blocks away from defendant’s

home at 43rd Street and Berkeley Avenue. After exiting the car, the victim walked down the path

to the beach alone and remained on the phone with defendant. Video surveillance showed the

victim wearing the same pink dress and carrying the same pink purse. The beach was mostly

deserted. However, cell phone records showed that defendant was also in the area at the time.

¶ 25 Fifteen minutes later, video surveillance showed the victim walking side-by-side with a

man believed to be defendant. However, his identity could not be confirmed as the video was

grainy. The two headed towards the water at Oakwood Beach on 41st Street and disappeared from

camera view. Approximately 30 minutes later, the same unknown man was seen on video walking

away from the water alone but carrying the victim’s purse. Minutes later, the man was captured on

“POD” video at 43rd Street and Berkeley Avenue, again walking and holding the same purse.

Video from the opposite end of the block showed the man carrying the purse but never exiting the

block.

¶ 26 The next day, on August 11, 2021, defendant sent a text message to an individual named

Dejana Young, who the State believed to be defendant’s new girlfriend. He indicated that he was

going to get his hand checked out as he might have injured a nerve. On August 12, 2021, defendant

took a photograph of a cut on his hand, for which he later sought treatment at the University of

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Chicago. Defendant stated to hospital personnel that he had received the wound while cooking.

Defendant later told Young that he had cut his finger while working at the Home Run Inn.

However, employment records from Home Run Inn indicated that he had not been at work between

August 7 and 18, 2021.

¶ 27 On August 15, 2021, the victim’s body was recovered from Lake Michigan in Lake County,

Illinois, near Waukegan. A Jane Doe investigation was opened. The Lake County Medical

Examiner’s Office received the body, confirmed it to be Yarianna Wheeler, and determined that

her death had been the result of an assault. She had also sustained multiple injuries to her body,

including significant sharp-force injuries to her left lung and left hemidiaphragm, bilateral rib

fractures, and stab wounds to her back, chest, neck, and arms. There was also evidence of

drowning, and a deceased male fetus was detected in her uterus.

¶ 28 After the victim was identified, the Lake County Sheriff’s Office and CPD conducted a

search of Oakwood Beach. Detectives recovered one of the victim’s flip flops, which matched

another shoe found on her body in the water at Oakwood Beach. Detectives also recovered the

victim’s COVID mask, jewelry, and a headwrap that she had been seen wearing on earlier

surveillance video.

¶ 29 On September 9, 2021, defendant travelled to Albion, Michigan, to visit Young. Along the

way, defendant used the victim’s Link card to purchase $300 worth of Red Bull. 8 On the date of

his arrest in September 9, defendant attempted to give the victim’s Link card to an unknown woman

at the scene. The card was recovered and confirmed as belonging to the victim.

8 There is some confusion in the record as to whether defendant used the victim’s Link card once or twice. 9 The record reflects both a September 9, 2021, arrest date and a November 3, 2021, arrest date.

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¶ 30 On November 3, 2021, defendant was arrested again. He admitted to dating the victim and

that she had been pregnant with his child. He told police that he had introduced her to his family

as his girlfriend, and that his family had helped her take pregnancy tests. Defendant admitted to

being with the victim on the date of her murder and that, while at Portillo’s, they had a

disagreement about seeing a movie that night.

¶ 31 Next, as to whether defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person,

persons, or the community, the State asserted that defendant had been “willing to stab a 19-year-

old woman who was carrying his child in order to avoid responsibility of parenthood.” Regarding

defendant’s criminal history, the State informed the court that on February 6, 2019, defendant had

been sentenced to two years’ probation for an aggravated robbery conviction involving two

victims. Specifically, defendant and two of his friends approached the victims. While one of the

offenders served as the lookout, the second offender held what appeared to be a firearm and

demanded one of the victim’s property. Defendant approached the other victim and took her purse,

cell phone, keys, debit card, and student ID. The three then fled from the scene.

¶ 32 The State additionally noted that defendant and a co-offender had also been arrested in the

same area the next day on July 11, 2018, for an unrelated burglary to automobile charge.

Defendant admitted that he had committed the first robbery and that one of his co-offenders had

used a BB gun. After naming his other co-offenders, the burglary to automobile charge was

dismissed via nolle prosequi as part of a plea deal on the aggravated robbery charge.

¶ 33 Finally, with regard to the third element of its petition, the State argued that, based on

defendant’s previous criminal background and the nature of the current charges, there was no

condition or combination of conditions that could mitigate the risk to the community.

¶ 34 2. Defendant’s Arguments Against Detainment and In Mitigation

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¶ 35 Defense counsel challenged the first element of the petition, arguing that the State did not

have clear and convincing evidence that defendant had committed first degree murder. Counsel

characterized the State’s theory of the case as “reaching,” as it had only been able to establish that

defendant and the victim had been in a dating relationship and had been together the day of her

murder. Defense counsel noted that the two had been in a relationship for some time and that

defendant’s family had assisted in taking care of them prior to the victim living in a shelter.

Defense counsel further asserted that the victim had also been dating other people, as shown

through texts messages from the victim to her friends, and that it was possible that another could

have been involved in her murder.

¶ 36 Defense counsel conceded that defendant had been with the victim at the Shedd Aquarium

and Portillo’s. However, counsel maintained that once defendant got onto the train to go home, he

arrived and remained home, which was corroborated by defendant’s mother. With regard to the

Uber driver’s observations, defense counsel contended that there was no evidence to show that the

victim had been on the phone with defendant, as the conversation had not been on speakerphone

and the witness could not provide a name as to the other individual. Defense counsel also pointed

out that the victim had left a voicemail on Malik Miller’s phone, which had indicated that the two

had planned to meet at the beach. Defense counsel further challenged the State’s suggestion that

this voicemail had been intended for defendant, not Miller, and posited that Miller could be an

alternative suspect, given that he did not have an alibi at the time of the victim’s death. Moreover,

defense counsel reasoned, even if cell phone data showed that Miller’s phone was located at his

home at the time of the call, that did not mean that he was also at the house at the same time.

¶ 37 With regard to the video surveillance at the beach, defense counsel conceded that defendant

lived about half a mile away, but that there was no way to identify who the individual was given

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the video quality. Further, although defendant admitted that defendant’s phone records placed him

nearby, the records had never directly “pinged” him at the beach. Defense counsel acknowledged

that the videos also showed an individual walking with the victim’s belongings on defendant’s

block but pointed out that the video never showed the individual go into or out of defendant’s

home, which was located at the end of the block. Finally, defense counsel noted that defendant

called the victim’s phone several times that night and the next morning to look for her, and also

left a voicemail with the shelter indicating his concern that he had not spoken with her.

¶ 38 As for the evidence collected during defendant’s arrest, defense counsel pointed out that

the police never found the victim’s bag, any of her other belongings, or a murder weapon. Police

also did not find fingerprints or DNA, and instead solely found a towel with blood on it, but

analysis later revealed that it was not human blood. With regard to the victim’s Link card, defense

counsel challenged the State’s interpretation of defendant attempting to pass off the victim’s card

to another. Defense counsel asserted that the card had been located in defendant’s wallet, and that

he had tried to give his personal items to the individual who was at his home at the time of arrest.

Defense counsel further noted that the State was unable to tell how he obtained the card or whether

it had been located in the victim’s bag and reasoned that his use of the card did not indicate that

he knew she was dead.

¶ 39 Finally, regarding the real and present danger element of the State’s proffer, defense

counsel argued that the State could not meet its burden solely on the nature of the current

allegations, citing People v. Stock. Defense counsel acknowledged defendant’s aggravated battery

conviction, but indicated that he had been 18 years old at the time and had successfully completed

probation after pleading guilty. In this case, defense counsel pointed out, defendant also went to

the police “without incident.” Finally, defense counsel directed the court’s attention to various

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letters of recommendation, defendant’s high school grades, and certificates earned while in prison

to indicate his good character.

¶ 40 Finally, defense counsel argued, even if defendant was a real and present danger, there

were “mitigating factors” that could preclude pretrial detention, suggesting as alternatives,

electronic home monitoring or pretrial supervision.

¶ 41 3. State’s Rebuttal

¶ 42 The State noted that its theory or motive of the case “did not matter” at this juncture, as it

did not have to prove its case at a pretrial detention hearing. Returning to its factual proffer, the

State suggested that defendant had thrown the victim into the lake and then had sent her text

messages to set up an alibi defense for himself. The State further pointed out the significance of

the victim’s Link card, given that she had been homeless at the time of her death, and reasoned

that, based on the victim’s current financial position, it did not make sense that she would have

given someone her only source of purchasing food. The State further observed that when defendant

had used the Link card, he had not used it to buy necessities, but rather, energy drinks on his way

to visit his new romantic partner. These actions, the State concluded, showed an “unbridled

disregard” for the victim’s circumstances, her whereabouts, her health, or the unborn child.

¶ 43 4. Circuit Court’s Ruling

¶ 44 Prior to ruling, the court noted, inter alia, that the current proceeding was “not a trial” and

that the State’s burden on a detention petition was “very different.” The court stated that it had

first become involved in the case in 2022 and had not found “any significant change in the evidence

or information” during the hearing. However, the court had nonetheless allowed the parties to

“engage in a full hearing to fully consider” the requests.

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¶ 45 In granting the State’s petition, the court found that the State had met its burden in

establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant had committed the detainable

offenses. Although the court acknowledged that there was some conflicting evidence regarding the

status of the parties’ relationship, both parties agreed that defendant and the victim were in each

other’s company the day of the murder and that she was pregnant with defendant’s child. Further,

the court continued, despite the two parting ways earlier in the day, the victim continued to reach

out to defendant, with the victim’s last known location within range of defendant’s home. The

court further acknowledged that the Uber driver had not definitively identified defendant as the

individual on the phone, but the court did not find that to be dispositive. The court also noted that

the video surveillance at the beach was unclear and could not be used to identify the individual

there. However, the court continued, that same video showed that the individual had gone with the

victim to the beach and had returned alone with what appeared to be the victim’s purse. That same

individual, the court stated, was later seen on the block where defendant lived, and although he

was not seen going into the home, both parties agreed that he had gone there after being in the

victim’s company. The court also acknowledged that there was evidence of the victim leaving

voicemail messages on another individual’s phone around the same time period, but rejected that

evidence as dispositive given that the other individual’s phone records placed him at home at the

time the call was made. Moreover, the court reasoned, that same argument could be made as to

defendant’s own cell phone history and whereabouts that night.

¶ 46 Next, the court observed that defendant had suffered an injury to his hand, which he had

discussed with others the day after the victim was last seen on the beach, and who was later

discovered with “sharp-force injuries.” The court noted that defendant had sought medical

treatment a few days after the victim was last seen, and although he claimed the injury to be work-

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related, the State had procured evidence that he had not been at work at the time he had sustained

the injury. Finally, the court stated that defendant had been discovered using the victim’s Link card

after her body was found, although both parties had their own interpretation as to how the card

ended up in defendant’s possession.

¶ 47 Second, the court found that defendant posed a real and present danger to the community

based on the nature of the current charges and defendant’s past criminal history. The court noted

that the charged offenses were violent and committed against a person with whom he had been in

a dating relationship, and thus “call[ed] into question whether he would then be willing to use

violence against persons he was not thus connected to[.]” The court also pointed to defendant’s

prior violent conviction in 2019.

¶ 48 Last, the court found that there were no conditions that could mitigate defendant’s threat.

Specifically, the court did not find compelling that defendant had complied with his previous

probation requirements in a “much less serious case,” and reasoned that by pleading guilty,

defendant had “[known] what he was getting” in order to remain out of jail. The court noted that

the current charges were not “probationable matter[s],” and although it could impose conditions

such as electronic home monitoring, that did not mean that defendant would not be inclined to cut

off bands, move without permission, or commit crimes while such conditions were in place.

¶ 49 The court’s written ruling, memorialized that same day, substantively parroted its oral

ruling.

¶ 50 E. Defendant’s Motion for Relief

¶ 51 On July 11, 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

604(h)(2) (eff. April 15, 2024). Although the motion expounded upon some of the evidence

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presented during the hearing, it contained substantially similar arguments as in the original motion

to vacate defendant’s detention order as discussed prior.

¶ 52 On July 16, 2024, following hearing, the court denied the motion and this appeal followed.

¶ 53 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 54 A. The Procedure Code

¶ 55 The Procedure Code now presumes that all persons charged with a qualifying offense shall

be eligible for pretrial release prior to conviction. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a); § 5/110-6.1(e) (West

2022). Therefore, pretrial release may be denied only if a person is charged with a qualifying

offense as delineated within section 110-6.1 of the Procedure Code and following the conducting

of a corresponding hearing. Id. §§ 5/110-2; 5/110-6.1(e)-(f).

¶ 56 The Act also provides for reconsideration of pretrial detention for those detained prior to

January 1, 2023, i.e. the initial effective date of the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5 (West 2022). In

particular, an individual who remains in pretrial detention and is eligible for continued detention

under the Procedure Code is entitled to a hearing determined by the type of charged offense. 725

ILCS 5/110-7.5(b)(1)-(3) (West 2022). In particular, for those charged with first degree murder

and armed robbery, the new hearing shall be held within 90 days of the defendant’s motion for

reconsideration of pretrial release conditions. Id. § 5/110-7.5(b)(1) (West 2022); Id. § 5/110-

6.1(a)(1)-(7).

¶ 57 The State will also trigger the requirement for a pretrial detention hearing upon its timely

filing of a verified petition for detainment. Id. § 5/110-6.1(a). The State must prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, three elements in its petition: (1) that the “proof is evident or the presumption

great” that the defendant has committed an eligible detainable offense (Id. § 5/110-6.1(e), (e)(1)),

(2) that a defendant “poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

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community, based on the specific articulable facts [of their case],” (Id. § 5/110-6.1(a)(6), (e)(2))

and (3) that there is “no condition or combination of conditions set forth” within the Procedure

Code that could mitigate that real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the

community, based on the facts of the case (Id. § 5/110-6.1(e)(3)).

¶ 58 Following the filing of either a petition for detainment or motion for reconsideration of

detention, the circuit court must hold a hearing. See id. §§ 5/110-6.1(a), (c), (f); Id. § 5/110-

7.5(b)(1). Each decision regarding pretrial release is individualized, and no single factor or

standard is determinative. Id. § 5/110-6.1(f)(7). If the court determines that the State has met its

burden on its petition, the court must make a written finding summarizing its reasons for pretrial

detention. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h).

¶ 59 Following the grant or denial of pretrial release, an appealing party must first file a motion

for relief before the circuit court that requests the same relief that will eventually be sought on

appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. April 15, 2024). Following the circuit court’s review and denial

of the motion, the party may appeal to the appellate court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1) (eff. April 15,

2024). 10

¶ 60 With this framework in mind, we now turn to the merits of defendant’s appeal.

¶ 61 B. Standard of Review

¶ 62 Defendant asserts that the correct standard of review is de novo as the circuit court’s

detention order was based on “proffered facts,” citing People v. Yost, 2021 IL 126187, and People

v. Whittaker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232009 (Ellis, J., concurring). However, defendant maintains that

10 The motion for relief shall serve as the appellant’s argument on appeal, but appellant may also file a supplemental memorandum in further support of the claims on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. April 15, 2024).

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he would still be successful even under a more deferential standard of review, citing People v.

Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 240154, and People v. Pitts, 2024 IL App (1st) 232336. The State

responds that the correct standard of review is “in flux.” However, the State posits that, under any

standard, the circuit court’s decision should be affirmed.

¶ 63 We stand in agreement with the State but again acknowledge, however, the ongoing and

unresolved debate among the appellate districts, and even among the divisions in the First District,

concerning the appropriate standard of review. See People v. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164,

¶¶ 46-50 (discussing and collecting cases on court split). Absent direction from our supreme court

on this significant issue, we continue to find People v. Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020,

persuasive. As such, with regard to the first two elements of the petition, we apply the manifest

weight of the evidence standard, where reversal is only warranted when the “opposite conclusion

is clearly evident or if the finding itself was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence

presented.” Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020, ¶¶ 31-32, 35; Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164,

¶¶ 48-50; People v. Reed, 2023 IL App (1st) 231834, ¶ 24. With regard to the third element of the

petition, we apply the abuse of discretion standard. Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232030, ¶ 36.

Thus, when considering whether the circuit court’s determination on the conditions of release

factor was proper, we are mindful of the level of discretion afforded to such findings, where an

abuse of discretion only occurs where the court’s findings are “arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable,

or where no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the [circuit court.]” Id.

¶ 64 C. Arguments

¶ 65 1. Detainable Offense

¶ 66 There is no dispute between the parties that the charged felony offenses of first-degree

murder and armed robbery are detainable under the Procedure Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-

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6.1(a)(1), (a)(1.5) (West 2022), 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5). Relying on arguments first raised in

his motion for relief, defendant argues, however, that because the State relied on “circumstantial

evidence” to prove that he committed the detainable offenses it failed to meet its burden and the

court’s grant of the petition was in error.

¶ 67 The State maintains that defendant’s assertion that it solely relied on circumstantial

evidence is incorrect, and even if so, the use of circumstantial evidence was enough to sustain its

burden at this juncture. The State further asserts the evidence overwhelmingly established that it

was defendant who murdered the victim and her unborn child, as well as robbing her of her purse

and Link card.

¶ 68 We need not resolve any dispute as to whether the State’s proffer consisted of direct or

circumstantial evidence. As the circuit court noted in its ruling, the current proceeding was not a

trial and the State’s burden on a detention petition was “very different” therefrom. Even accepting

that the State’s proffer consisted purely of circumstantial evidence, we note that even a defendant’s

criminal conviction, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may be based solely on

circumstantial evidence. See People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 49; see also People v. Williams,

2024 IL App (1st) 241013, ¶ 35. Thus, we find defendant’s argument to be without merit.

¶ 69 Further, defendant makes no argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support

the State’s petition on this element, only the form of that evidence. Thus, we need not repeat the

evidence presented here. Suffice it to say, after reviewing the record, we do not find that the circuit

court erred in determining that the State had met its burden to show that the proof was evident and

the presumption great that defendant had committed the charged offenses. Accordingly, we do not

find the court’s findings to be unreasonable or arbitrary.

¶ 70 2. Real and Present Threat

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¶ 71 Similarly to the first prong, defendant again relies on his arguments made in his motion for

relief, namely that the circuit court also erred in finding that he was a real and present threat.

Defendant further adds that any showing of dangerousness regarding the charged offenses were

“entirely circumstantial,” and that defendant’s prior conviction was not dispositive as he had not

physically harmed anyone.

¶ 72 The State responds that the court properly determined that defendant was a real and present

danger based on the violent and domestic nature of the charged offenses, the safety threat to the

community, and defendant’s prior criminal history. The State further rejects defendant’s

suggestion that the court relied too heavily on the nature of the offenses when determining

dangerousness, and replies that the court properly took into account defendant’s capacity for

violence based on the specific articulable facts of the case. With regard to defendant’s prior

criminal history, the State contends that the court properly considered the violent nature of

defendant’s previous conviction, which also involved another dangerous weapon.

¶ 73 After reviewing the record, we do not find the court’s conclusion that the State had met its

burden on this element to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record reflects that

the circuit court carefully considered all aspects of the proffer based on a variety of statutory

factors, even after noting that it did not find the evidence or circumstances of the case to have

changed from defendant’s prior hearings.

¶ 74 First, the court properly considered defendant’s history and characteristics with regard to

his overall criminal background, of which, as we have noted above, we do not have any

documentary evidence beyond the parties’ assertions during the hearing. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2)

(West 2022) (assessing defendant’s history and characteristics, including prior criminal history).

The hearing transcript reflects that, despite defendant’s initial assertion to the contrary, defendant

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was convicted of aggravated robbery in 2019 and served a probation sentence after pleading guilty.

He had also been arrested for robbery of an automobile, a crime committed the very next day after

the first offense, and which had only been dismissed in exchange for defendant’s plea in the first

case. On that point, the court further considered that defendant’s very recent completion of

probation clearly had not deterred him from allegedly engaging in more serious crimes. See id. §

5/110-6.1(g)(2)(A) (evidence concerning prior criminal history indicative of violent or assaultive

behavior may also be considered in dangerousness assessment); Id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(9) (court may

assess any other factors that it believes has a reasonable bearing on the defendant’s propensity or

reputation for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior). Further, we reject defendant’s contention

that the aggravated robbery conviction was somehow less serious because no physical harm was

done to those victims, given that a BB gun was purportedly utilized during the incident, and it

otherwise appeared to be a completely random occurrence.

¶ 75 Next, the circuit court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the charged

offenses, including the notion that the current charges were crimes of violence, as the victim’s

body was found to be assaulted and stabbed, and that defendant had been discovered using her

Link card almost a month after her disappearance. Id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(1). More significantly, in

both its rulings, the court expressly noted that the victim and defendant were both relatively young

in age, were in a dating relationship, and that the victim was pregnant with defendant’s child. See

id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(5) (assessing dangerousness by way of defendant’s age); Id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(6)

(assessing dangerousness by way of the victim’s age and physical condition); Id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(9)

(court may also utilize factors under conditions analysis to determine dangerousness); 725 ILCS

5/110-5(a)(6) (West 2022) (court may assess whether the charged offense was an attempt to

commit first degree murder against a current partner in a dating relationship); Id. § 5/110-

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5(a)(6)(H) (court may assess the severity of the alleged incident, including abuse rendered during

victim’s pregnancy). Further, in so noting the relationship, the court orally reasoned that the

domestic nature of the crime also called into question defendant’s willingness to commit violence

against unknown persons in the community, which was not unreasonable given the nature of

defendant’s prior conviction.

¶ 76 Finally, although not referenced by the court in its ruling, we observe that the record

contains defendant’s initial safety assessment conducted by Pretrial Services on November 6,

2021, around the time defendant was arrested. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (allowing court to

consider risk assessment tools in determining propriety of pretrial detention, although not solely

dispositive); 725 ILCS 5/110-5(b) (same). Therein, defendant had scored a “yes” on the “new

violent criminal activity flag,” “4 out of 6” on the “new criminal activity scale,” and “2 out of 6”

on the “failure to appear scale.” The assessment further indicated that, if defendant were to be

released, “maximum conditions” were recommended.

¶ 77 As such, based on the record before us, we find that the circuit court fully considered all

aspects of the proffer under the statutory requirements, which included a variety of factors ranging

from the nature of the crime—and in particular the domestic relationship between defendant and

victim—to defendant’s individualized history and characteristics. Thus, we do not find that an

opposite conclusion concerning defendant’s real and present threat was clearly evident, or that the

court’s findings were unreasonable based on the evidence presented.

¶ 78 3. Conditions

¶ 79 Finally, defendant argues that the State did not present any evidence to demonstrate that

there were no appropriate release conditions to mitigate any threat defendant presented to the

community. According to defendant, the State failed to mention or discuss any specific potential

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conditions, such as supervision, a ban on possessing dangerous weapons, a no-contact order, home

confinement, curfew, GPS, or electronic monitoring, citing sections 110-5(g) and 110-10(b) of the

Act. Additionally, defendant urges us to consider, as he did before the circuit court, People v.

Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, for the proposition that a detention order is improper if the State

solely presents evidence on dangerousness, but not whether conditions of release could mitigate

that danger. Additionally, defendant contends that the court failed to fully consider the

circumstances of his case in violation of the Act’s mandate to consider the least restrictive

conditions possible, citing People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, in support.

Specifically, defendant points out that the court did not explore other potential release conditions

and instead only named one to be inadequate. Further, defendant argues, the court erred by finding

that defendant’s successful completion of probation for his prior conviction was not “compelling.”

¶ 80 The State responds that courts are given broad discretion in fashioning conditions

decisions, citing People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, in support. Additionally, the State

continues, in making a conditions determination, the court was required to assess similar factors

to the dangerousness analysis. Here, the State argues, the court properly considered the required

statutory factors in accordance with the specific facts of defendant’s case, which included

defendant’s capacity for violence and prior criminal history. Further, the State points out, in both

its written and oral rulings, the court noted specific reasons for why no conditions were

appropriate. With regard to its own burden, the State rejects defendant’s suggestion that the State

was required to “utter specific words” at the detention hearing, citing People v. Carpenter, 2024

IL App (1st) 240037, in support. The State further maintains that it presented evidence that no

conditions were adequate to mitigate defendant’s threat, particularly where he had shown a

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complete disregard for humanity in the commission of the crime and thereafter. Last, the State

argues that People v. Stock is distinguishable.

¶ 81 We turn to the record. Preliminarily, we address defendant’s contention that the State failed

to present any evidence regarding the lack of appropriate conditions. The plain language of the

Code indicates that the “dangerousness” assessment overlaps with the analysis of whether any

conditions are appropriate in lieu of pretrial detention. Compare 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(9)

(dangerousness analysis may include factors listed in section 110-5 of the Code, which provides

similar statutory factors for conditions analysis); 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a); Carpenter, 2024 IL App

(1st) 240037, ¶ 17 (“The proof as to the danger presented by a defendant’s pretrial release will

frequently overlap with the evidence supporting a conclusion that less restrictive conditions cannot

mitigate the threat.”) Thus, it is reasonable that the evidence presented for both the second and

third prongs of a detention petition would overlap, especially when both sections of the statute

consider the specific and articulable facts of the case. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1) (assessing nature

and circumstances of the charged offenses); Id. § 5/110-5(a)(2) (assessing weight of the evidence

against defendant); Id. § 5/110-5(a)(4) (assessing nature and seriousness of the real and present

threat posed by defendant based on the specific and articulable facts of the case); Id. § 5/110-

5(a)(6)(A) (assessing whether the incident involves harassment or abuse as defined by Illinois

Domestic Violence Act of 1986); Id. § 5/110-5(a)(6)(H) (assessing the severity of the incident that

is the basis of the alleged offense, including whether the incident involved physical injury or

assault during victim’s pregnancy); 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1) (assessing the nature and

circumstances of the charged offense); Id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(4) (assessing defendant’s statements in

relation to the charged offense); Id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(5) (assessing defendant’s age and physical

condition); Id. § 5/110-6.1(g)(6) (assessing victim’s age and physical condition). Further, the

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“nature and circumstances of the crime charged may well be the most compelling evidence”

available at a detention hearing. Carpenter, 2024 IL App (1st) 240037, ¶ 17.

¶ 82 Additionally, as noted by the State, the statute does not require that the State “utter specific

words at a detention hearing.” Id. ¶ 21. The record reflects that the State argued at the hearing that

no conditions could mitigate defendant’s threat already posed to two victims and to the rest of the

community at large. Although it is true that the State did not explicitly respond to defense counsel’s

contention that certain types of conditions could be imposed, the circuit court’s oral and written

rulings addressed why such conditions were not adequate. In particular, the court noted that it did

not believe electric home monitoring would be appropriate in light of the serious allegations

against defendant, which involved two deceased victims, as well as the court’s belief that

defendant would not comply. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(g) (West 2022) (electronic home monitoring

may only be appropriate if it would reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance or protect an

identifiable person from imminent threat of serious physical harm).

¶ 83 Additionally, we also do not find error in the court’s comment that it did not find

defendant’s compliance with his prior probation requirements to be compelling, given that the

conviction was less serious in nature and that defendant had chosen to plead guilty knowing exactly

what conditions he would be submitting to. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(5) (assessing the nature and

seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process).

Further, even if the victims in defendant’s prior conviction had not been physically harmed, we

derive from the court’s comments on this point that defendant had not been deterred from allegedly

engaging in further assaultive behavior following his conviction only two years prior. Id. § 5/110-

5(a)(3)(A) (assessing prior criminal history and other court proceedings); Id. § 5/110-5(a)(3)(B)

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(assessing whether, at the time of the current offense, defendant had completed a sentence for

another crime).

¶ 84 Finally, we agree with the State that People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, is not

persuasive. In Stock, the defendant was charged with one count of the detainable offense of

aggravated battery/discharge of a firearm. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant was alleged to have discharged a

firearm at the time that the complaining witness, his estranged wife, was packing up their residence

to leave him and pursue a divorce. Id. ¶ 5. At the defendant’s detention hearing, Pretrial Services

rated the defendant a “1 out of 6” on the “new criminal activity scale,” and a “1 out of 6” on the

“failure to appear scale.” Id. ¶ 7. The record further reflected that the defendant had no other

criminal history prior to the alleged offense. Id. ¶ 6. In granting the State’s detention petition, the

circuit court found that no conditions could mitigate the defendant’s real and present threat

because, per the written order, he had “shot a firearm at the complaining witness.” Id. ¶ 8.

¶ 85 On appeal, the Stock court reversed and remanded the detention order. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.

Although the court found that the State had met its burden on the first two elements of its petition,

it failed on the conditions prong. Id. ¶¶ 13-15. The court noted that the State had presented “no

evidence” on that element and had merely proffered the facts of the incident. Id. ¶ 17. Additionally,

the court pointed out that, according to the record before the circuit court, the defendant had no

prior criminal history and thus otherwise appeared to be an “upstanding and law-abiding member

of the community.” Id. ¶ 19. Finally, the court critiqued the circuit court’s ruling, noting that

neither the written order nor the oral ruling complied with the express requirement that the court

provide a written summary as to why less restrictive conditions could not mitigate the threat posed

by the defendant. Id. ¶ 20. Ultimately, the court reasoned that, “[i]f the base allegations that make

up the sine qua non of a violent offense were sufficient on their own to establish this element, then

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the legislature would have simply deemed those accused of violent offenses ineligible for release.”

Id. ¶ 18. However, the court cautioned, although “more [was] required” as to both the State’s

proffer and the court’s analysis on this element, its holding was not to be interpreted to mean that

“alleged facts stating the basic elements of an offense are not relevant or part of the proof that no

conditions could mitigate the threat posed by a defendant.” Id.

¶ 86 Stock is distinguishable in numerous ways. First, in Stock, the record failed to demonstrate

that the State argued, let alone even mentioned, the applicable statutory provision governing the

conditions analysis. See 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶¶ 5, 17. In contrast here, the State argued at

hearing that no conditions could mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant, based on

the egregious nature of the charged offenses as well as the defendant’s prior criminal history.

Second, whereas the Stock defendant had no prior criminal history to consider against appropriate

release conditions, here defendant had at least two prior interactions with law enforcement, one

that was violent in nature and resulted in defendant pleading guilty to aggravated robbery. Third,

the circumstances of the alleged crimes here were much more deliberate in nature in comparison

to the Stock defendant’s apparent momentary lapse in judgment, given the State’s proffer

suggesting that defendant had taken numerous steps to create an alibi for himself by calling the

victim’s phone multiple times, lying about the cause of an injury to his hand, and attempting to get

rid of the victim’s Link card after using it to buy $300 worth of Red Bull.

¶ 87 Further, the court’s consideration of the proffer was more substantive in nature than the

one criticized in Stock. In our case, the circuit court assessed in a lengthy oral ruling whether any

conditions were appropriate in lieu of pretrial detention, even if it only mentioned one condition

in particular, which was subsequently reiterated in its written order. See Carpenter, 2024 IL App

(1st) 240037, ¶ 21 (noting that “[t]he circuit court knows the law including conditions of release

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and less restrictive alternatives to detention.”) Moreover, the court provided an explanation as to

why it did not believe electronic monitoring or other conditions to be appropriate, as it did not

believe that defendant would comply with such restrictions based on his actions after the murder.

See Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 19 (noting the importance of courts articulating the

reason as to why a particular defendant would not comply with any conditions of release, versus a

general threat posed by anyone). Therefore, we find that the record reflects a careful weighing of

multiple factors as to the conditions analysis, which implicate safety, fairness, and judicial

administrative concerns, all of which were not unreasonable given the circumstances. Carpenter,

2024 IL App (1st) 240037, ¶ 21 (under an abuse of discretion standard, appellate courts are not to

substitute their judgment in lieu of the circuit court’s decision merely because we would have

balanced the appropriate factors differently).

¶ 88 In sum, we do not find that the circuit court erred in concluding that the State’s petition

had satisfied its burden on all three elements of its petition. We ultimately conclude that the circuit

court properly granted the State’s request for defendant’s continued detention following the

amendments to the Procedure Code and affirm the order in its entirety.

¶ 89 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 90 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 91 Affirmed.

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